must not deal in the hats made by the plaintiffs under threats of such boycotting; to falsely represent to said wholesale dealers and their customers, that the plaintiffs had discriminated against the union men in their employ, had thrown them out of employment because they refused to give up their union cards and teach boys, who were intended to take their places after seven months' instruction, and had driven their employees to extreme measures "by their persistent, unfair, and un-American policy of antagonizing union labor, forcing wages to a starvation scale, and given boys and cheap unskilled foreign labor preference over experienced and capable union workmen," in order to intimidate said dealers from purchasing said hats by reason of the prejudice thereby created against the plaintiffs and the hats made by them, among those who might otherwise purchase them; to use the said union label of said The United Hatters of North America, as an instrument to aid them in carrying out said conspiracy and combination against the plaintiff's and their customers' interstate trade aforesaid, and in connection with the boycotting above mentioned, for the purpose of describing and identifying the hats of the plaintiffs, and singling them out to be so boycotted; to employ a large number of agents to visit said wholesale dealers and their customers, at their several places of business, and threaten them with loss of business if they should buy or handle the hats of the plaintiffs, and thereby prevent them from buying said hats, and in connection therewith to cause said dealers to be waited upon by committees representing large combinations of persons in their several localities to make similar threats to them; to use the daily press in the localities where such wholesale dealers reside and do business, to announce and advertise the said boycotts against the hats of the plaintiffs and said wholesale dealers, and thereby make the same more effective and oppressive, and to use the columns of their said paper, the Journal of the United Hatters of North America, for that purpose, and to describe the acts of their said agents in prosecuting the same.

21. Afterwards, to wit, on July 25th, 1902, and on divers days since hitherto, the defendants, in pursuance of said combination and conspiracy, and to carry the same into effect, did cause the concerted and simultaneous withdrawal, by means of threats and coercion made by them, and without previous warning or information thereof to the plaintiffs, of all but ten of the nonunion makers and finishers of hats then working for them, as well as all of their union makers and finishers, leaving large numbers of hats in an unfinished and perishable condition, with intent to cripple and did thereby cripple the operation of the plaintiffs' factory until the latter part of October, 1902, and thereby prevented the plaintiffs from filling a large number of orders then on hand from such wholesale dealers in States other than Connecticut, which they had engaged to fill and were then in the act of filling, as was well known to the defendants, and thereby caused the loss to the plaintiffs of many orders from said wholesale dealers in other States, and greatly hindered and delayed them in filling such orders, and falsely representing to said wholesale dealers, their customers, and the public generally, in States other than Connecticut, that the plaintiffs had discriminated against the union men in their employ, and had discharged or thrown out of employment their union men in August, 1902; that they had driven their employees to extreme measures by their persistent, unfair, and un-American policy of antagonizing union labor, forcing wages down to a starvation scale and giving boys and cheap, unskilled foreign labor preference over experienced and capable workmen; that skilled hatters had been discharged from said factory for no other cause than their devotion and adherence to the principles of organized labor in refusing to give up their union cards, and to teach the trade to boys who were intended to take the place of union workmen after seven months' instruction, and that unable to submit longer to a system of petty tyrannies that might be tolerated in Siberia but could not be borne by independent Americans, the workmen in the factory inaugurated the strike to compel the firm to recognize their rights, in order to prejudice, and did thereby prejudice the public, against the plaintiffs and their product, and in order to intimidate, and did thereby intimidate said wholesale dealers and their customers, in States other than Connecticut, from purchasing hats from the plaintiffs by reason of the fear of the prejudice created against said hats; and in connection therewith declared a boycott against all hats made for and so sold and delivered, and to be so sold and delivered to said wholesale dealers, in States other than Connecticut, and actively boycotted the same and the business of those who dealt in them in such other States, and thereby restrained and prevented the purchase of the same from the plaintiffs, and the sale of the same by those in whose hands they were, or might thereafter be, in the course of such interstate trade, and caused and produced others of said combinations united with them in the said American Federation of Labor to declare a boycott against the plaintiffs, their product and against the business of such wholesale dealers in States other than Connecticut, as should buy or sell them, and of those who should purchase from such wholesale dealers any goods whatever, and further intimidated said wholesale dealers from purchasing or dealing

in the hats made by the plaintiffs, as aforesaid, by informing them that the American Federation of Labor had declared a boycott against the hats of the plaintiffs and against any dealer who should handle them, and that said boycott was to be actively pressed against them, and by sending agents and committees from various of said labor organizations, to threaten said wholesale dealers and their customers with a boycott from them if they purchased or handled the goods of the plaintiffs, and by distributing in San Francisco, California, and other places, circulars containing notices that such dealers and their customers were to be boycotted, and threatened with a boycott, and did actively boycott the customers who did or should buy any goods whatever, even though union made, of such wholesale dealers so boycotted, and used the daily press to advertise and announce said boycott, and the measures taken in pursuance thereof by said labor organizations, particularly the San Francisco Bulletin, in its issues of July 2d and July 4th, 1903, and a daily paper published in Richmond, Virginia, on December 10th, 1902, and notified such wholesale dealers in States other than Connecticut that they were at liberty to deal in the hats of any other nonunion hat manufacturers of similar quality to those of the plaintiffs, but that they must not deal in the hats made by the plaintiffs, under threats of being boycotted for so doing, and used the said union label of the United Hatters of North America as an instrument to aid them in carrying out said combination and conspiracy against the plaintiffs' and their customers' interstate trade as aforesaid, and in connection with such boycotting by using the same and its absence from the hats of the plaintiffs as an insignia or device to indicate to the purchaser that the hats of the plaintiffs were to be boycotted, and to point them out for that purpose, and employed a large number of agents to visit said wholesale dealers and their customers at their several places of business in each of said States, particularly in Philadelphia and other places in the State of Pennsylvania, in Baltimore in the State of Maryland, in Richmond and other places in the State of Virginia, and in San Francisco and other places in the State of California, to intimidate and threaten them, if they should continue to deal in or handle the hats of the plaintiffs, and among many other instances of like kind, the said William C. Hennelly and Daniel P. Kelly, in behalf of all of said defendants, and acting for them, demanded of the firm of Triest & Co., wholesale dealers in hats, doing business in said San Francisco, that they should agree not to buy or deal in the hats made by the plaintiffs, under threats made by them to said firm of boycotting their business and that of their customers, and upon their refusing to comply with such demand and yield to such threats, the defendants by their said agents caused announcement to be made in the newspapers of said city that said Triest & Co. were to be boycotted therefor, and that the labor council of San Francisco would be addressed by them for that purpose, and that they had procured a boycott to be declared by said labor council, and thereupon the defendants, through their said agents, Hennelly and Kelly, printed, published, issued, and distributed to the retail dealers in hats, in the several States upon the Pacific coast, the following circular, to wit:

[San Francisco Labor Council, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, Secretary's office, 927 Market street. Rooms 405, 406,407 Emma Spreckel's Building. Meets every Friday, at 1159 Mission St. Telephone, South 447. Address all communications to 927 Market street.]

To whom it may concern:

SAN FRANCISCO, July 3, 1903.

At a special meeting of the San Francisco Labor Council held on the above date the hat jobbing concern known as Triest & Co., 116 Sansome St., San Francisco, was declared unfair for persistently patronizing the unfair hat manufacturing concern of D. E. Loewe & Co., Danbury, Connecticut, where the union hatters have been on strike, for union conditions, since August 20th, 1902. Triest & Co. will be retained on the unfair list as long as they handle the product of this unfair hat manufacturing concern. Union men do not usually patronize retail stores who buy from unfair jobbing houses or manufacturers. Under these circumstances, all friends of organized labor, and those desiring the patronage of organized workers, will not buy goods from Triest & Co., 116 Sansome St., San Francisco.

Yours, respectfully,

Also the following, to wit:

[San Francisco Labor Council, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, Secretary's office, 927 Market street. Rooms 405, 406, 407 Emma Spreckel's Building. Meets every Friday, at 1159 Mission St. Telephone, South 447. Address all communications to 927 Market street.] SAN FRANCISCO, July 14, 1903.

Messrs.

GENTLEMEN: We beg leave to call your attention to the following products which are on the unfair list of the American Federation of Labor:

We do this in order that you refrain from handling these goods, as the patronage of the firms named below is taken by the organized workers as an evidence of a desire to patronize those who are opposed to the interests of organized labor. The declaration of unfairness regarding the firms mentioned is fully sanctioned and will be supported to the fullest degree by the San Francisco Labor Council. Trusting that you will be able to avoid the handling of these goods in the future,

we are,

Yours, respectfully,

G. B. BENHAM, President. [L. s.]
T. E. ZANT, Secretary.

Unfair list.--Lowe & Co., Danbury, Conn., and Triest & Co., 116 Sansome st., San Francisco, Cal., hat manufacturers; Cluett, Peabody & Co., shirts and collars, Troy, New York, and 562 Mission st., San Francisco, Cal.; United Shirt and Collar Co., Troy, New York, and 25 Sansome st., San Francisco, Cal.; Van Zandt, Jacobs & Co., Troy, New York, Greenbaum, Weil & Michaels, selling agents, 27 Sansome st., San Francisco, Cal.

And caused said circulars to be mailed to and personally delivered to the retail dealers in hats, and the other customers of said Triest & Co., upon the Pacific coast, and to many others, thereby causing the loss of many orders and customers to said Triest & Co., and to the plaintiffs, for the purpose of intimidating and coercing the said Triest & Co., not to deal with the plaintiffs, and thereby caused the loss of many orders and customers to said Triest & Co., and to the plaintiffs.

22. By means of each and all of said acts done by the defendants in pursuance of said combination and conspiracy, they have greatly restrained, diminished, and, in many places, destroyed the trade and commerce of the plaintiffs with said wholesale dealers, in said States other than Connecticut, by the loss of many orders and customers directly resulting therefrom, and the plaintiffs have been injured in their business and property by reason of said combination and conspiracy, and the acts of the defendants done in pursuance thereof, and to carry the same into effect, which are declared to be unlawful by said act of Congress, to the amount of eighty thousand ($80,000) dollars, to recover threefold which damages, under section 7 of said act this suit is brought.

By force of the statute aforesaid, the plaintiffs claim two hundred and forty thousand ($240,000) dollars damages.

And you are hereby further commanded to leave a true and attested copy of this writ, and of the accompanying complaint, at least twelve days before the session of the court, to which it is made returnable, with the Danbury National Bank, the City National Bank, the Savings Bank of Danbury, and the Union Savings Bank of Danbury, corporations duly organized and located and having their principal places of business in said Danbury, and the Fairfield County Savings Bank, Norwalk Savings Society, South Norwalk Savings Bank, National Bank of Norwalk, Fairfield County National Bank, Central National Bank, and City National Bank of South Norwalk, corporations duly organized and located and having their principal place of business in said town of Norwalk, and with each of them, as they are the agents, trustees and debtors of each of said defendants, and are indebted to them.

Elmore S. Banks, of Fairfield, within said State and district of Connecticut, is recognized in the sum of $150 to prosecute, etc.

Witness the honorable Melville W. Fuller, Chief Justice of the United States, and the seal of said circuit court, at Hartford, in said district, this 31st day of August, 1903.

DAVENPORT & BANKS,

R. F. CARROLL, Deputy Clerk.

BRIDGEPORT, September, -, 1903.

The within and foregoing is a true and attested copy of the original writ and

complaint.

Attest:

Marshal for the District of Connecticut.

STATEMENT OF HON. REESE BLIZZARD, PARKERSBURG, W. VA.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, it has been thought proper by those opposing the passage of this bill that I should try to Occupy

Mr. GILLETTE, of California. Whom do you represent, Mr. Blizzard?

Mr. BLIZZARD. I represent the Fairmount Coal Company, the Clarksburg Fuel Company, and practically all of the mining companies in the upper Monongahela Valley of West Virginia. I also represent the combined Wabash railroad interests in West Virginia, together with other clients.

Mr. GILLETTE, of California. Does that take in the Flat-top district of West Virginia, too?

Mr. BLIZZARD. No, sir; it does not include the Flat-top district; the Flat-top district is farther south.

I may add, gentlemen of the committee, that I represent myself, also. If you will see, gentlemen, I am suffering intensely from physical pain, and I should not, I am certain, considering my own personal welfare, attempt any discussion of the question before this committee. Mr. HENRY. Would you like to wait until to-morrow to go ahead? Mr. BLIZZARD. No, sir; I am bound to leave this evening. But, gentlemen of the committee, I can not forego the performance of the duty that I owe as a citizen to my State, to say nothing of the obligation which I owe to my clients, to appear before you and add one word at least of protest to what we believe will in the outcome and in the final ending, if this bill is passed, be in a degree at least a destruction of the property interests of my State. There is no pain, gentlemen of this committee, that is so painful to me as the realization of the fact that the property interests of my State are to be diminished and decreased, are to be withered and paralyzed by an act of the law, and that the law that we look to for protection might, and would if this act should become a law, become the object of oppression rather than that of protection.

West Virginia, gentlemen of the committee, you will doubtless remember is forging to the front, although small in area, as one of the greatest of manufacturing centers. The production of coal, of oil, of timber, and of the resources that it contains are forging to the front, so that there are but few of the States which are now its superior, and very many who are not its equal.

I say to you if this act which is before you should be reported favorably by you and become a law that it would reduce the value of the interests which I am here representing at least 25 per cent, and we do not know but what it would totally destroy them. I appear here, suffering as I am this morning, for the purpose of addressing you gentlemen simply because I have some personal relation to the subject which has been introduced here to you by possibly the only person who has addressed you yet who favors this bill, Mr. Gompers. In my section of the State the courts, I may say, have been made the subject of attack, and I can not sit here and let that go without a refutation of those charges and a declaration that those charges are untrue. Now, gentlemen of the committee, I shall do that later. Let us get down to the question that is before you for consideration and determination this morning. In my limited practice as a lawyer I have

always thought that it was best to brush aside the generalities and get down before the jury the real heart of the question that shall be determined by the jury and on which they are to render their verdict. Let us get down to the heart of this question here and see what is really before you for consideration and determination. Let us limit the boundaries of that controversy upon the one side by saying and by showing to you that certain things are not involved in this controversy. First we say to you, gentlemen of the jury, that there is not and can not be involved in this controversy the question of whether any one has the right to strike or whether any one has not the right to strike, because no court except one, and that one was very promptly reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States, has ever held or declared that any person should not, whether he belonged to an organization or whether he did not belong to an organization, no court has said a person has not the right to quit work when he wants to quit work; has not the right to strike when he wants to strike.

I ask your particular attention to that essential part of this controversy to show whether the powers that have been conferred upon the Federal courts of this country have been abused, because the law is so well settled and well defined that no one, I am sure, can show that there has been more than one instance where a Federal court of this country has ever gone to the extent of saying that the laborer, whether he belonged to a union or not, has not the right to quit work and has not the right to strike. Therefore, gentlemen, that question is not and can not be involved in the controversy here before you for determination and consideration. The question, gentlemen, of peaceable and lawful persuasion upon the part of those who have gone on a strike to induce others to join them is not involved. It has never been involved. It is not one of the matters before you for consideration. Therefore, gentlemen of the jury-pardon me for that reference, but I do not know that it is very inapt.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. We will assume we are the jury.

Mr. BLIZZARD. Yes, the American people have appointed you as the jury and you have taken a solemn oath under the Constitution of the United States, and you are sitting here to render a verdict, and therefore my unintentional misnaming you has not been so bad.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. I hope it will not prove to be a reflection on the jury.

Mr. BLIZZARD. No, sir, I do not believe it will be. I am willing to say in advance it will not be.

But the questions, gentlemen, are limited on the one side by showing that no personal right that anyone has ever claimed or that any court has ever said belonged to any individual has been abridged, or that they have been limited, or that anyone has prevented the full exercise of such right. Now, that is the limit of the question before you on the one side. What is the limit of it on the other?

On the other side, gentlemen of the committee, it is contended here that you shall enact a new law; a law that does not exist now must be made to exist; rights that people do not have now or never have had in the history of the world must be created by an act of Congress. What are these rights that these gentlemen ask to be created because they have never existed? The courts of the land, the law writers, and the authors of the law must be considered in determining what has been the right of the citizen heretofore. To go to that source of