three years regiments was called for, and by the middle of July the number was increased to twenty-two. No cavalry or artillery were embraced in the original call.

On the 23d of April there were in the State of Ohio one thousand eight hundred and eighty small arms, mostly altered flint locks; thirty-one field guns, many of which were unfit for service, and few provided with the indispensable equipments; one hundred and twenty tents; not a regiment yet mustered into the United States service. Such were the preparations of a State which has since sent vast armies into the field. Indiana and Illinois were not in a more favorable condition.

All mail communications with Washington were at that time interrupted in consequence of the occurrences at Baltimore, and were for a long period difficult and uncertain. The attention of the authorities was fully occupied in arranging for the immediate defense of the capital, and—the supplies being limited in amount-but little could be done for the Western States, which were for some weeks compelled to rely on their own resources. Neither the people nor the governors failed in the emergency, but both manfully met the crisis. It was then that the strength and value of the State governments were made fully manifest, for to them was the safety of the West due in that hour of trial.

I have good reason to know that all the loyal governors of the Western States did their full duty in the emergency, but being in more direct personal communication with Governor Dennison of Ohio during the most critical portion of this period, I desire to bear testimony to the high qualities he then displayed. He manifested a degree of energy, ability, untiring devotion, and disinterested patriotism which was creditable in the extreme.

As has already been said, the Western States were totally unprepared for the impending struggle. It may be asserted with almost literal truth that neither arms, ammunition, nor equipments existed there; we had nothing but the men,-all else was to be created. Another great difficulty arose from absence of government funds; the subsistence department soon supplied its agents with money, but none was received

from the quarter-master's department until after the 20th of May, and then for some time in insufficient amounts.

The governors of the States now exerted themselves to the utmost; they were energetically supported by the Legislatures, who authorized them to use the funds and pledge the oredit of their States, for the purchase of arms, ammunition, clothing, etc. Without this action on their part, the greater portion of the summer would have passed without the organization of troops in the West.

On the 3d of May the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were formed into the Department of the Ohio, which the general-in-chief placed under my command. Immediately upon receiving the order I placed myself in communication with the governors of these three States, and nothing in our power was left undone to push forward military preparations. The governor of Ohio, fully alive to the magnitude of the occasion and the insufficiency of the number of troops called for, had, by the close of April, obtained the authority of the Legislature to form nine regiments of three months troops for the service of the State, in addition to those called for by the United States. He placed these additional regiments under my command. It was only after repeated efforts and refusals that a very small number of regular officers were obtained to take charge of the administrative branches of the service, and the task of organization slowly proceeded.

Supplies did not come in rapidly, and great difficulty was experienced in arming and equipping the troops.

On the 21st of May the total number of small arms in the State of Ohio was twenty-five thousand one hundred and seventy-nine, of which twenty-two thousand and seventy-five were smooth bores, mostly very inferior specimens of the altered flint locks. Infantry equipments were still more difficult to obtain.

During the month of May the political aspect of affairs in Kentucky and Western Virginia was uncertain and threatening. In the latter a convention had been called to assemble at Wheeling, on the 13th of May, to decide upon the question of separation from the eastern portion of the State, while the election upon the question of ratifying the Richmond ordinance

of secession from the United States, was fixed for the 23d of the same month. Excitement ran high, and honest men differed widely as to the policy that should be pursued by the military authorities of the general government.

I received a multitude of letters from a large number of sincere Union men who entertained widely divergent views as to the measures adequate to the emergency. Many urged, as early as the beginning of May, that troops should immediately be sent into Virginia, to encourage the Union men and prevent the secessionists from gaining a foothold. At least an equal number insisted with equal force that the arrival of troops from other States would merely arouse State pride, throw many wavering men into the rebel ranks, and at once kindle the flames of civil war.

In Kentucky the struggle was much more bitter than in Western Virginia. The State government, the arms, and the military organization, were to a great extent in the hands of men who favored the secession of the State; but so able and determined was the course of the Union leaders, and so marked did the majority of the people soon become in their support, that the secessionist leaders were compelled to content themselves with the avowal of the position of neutrality, while awaiting the results of the elections to be held on the 26th June for Congressmen, and on the 4th August for members of the Legislature.

The policy of the leaders of the Union party was, To remain in the Union without a revolution, under all the forms of law, and by their own action." The words of Garret Davis were, "We will remain in the Union by voting if we can, by fighting if we must, and if we cannot hold our own, we will call on the general government to aid us."

It was the desire of these true and able men that no extraneous elements of excitement should be introduced in the State until the elections were over; they felt sure of carrying these elections if left to themselves. I fully coincided with them in their expectations and opinions, and, so far as was in my power, lent them every assistance in carrying out their views, among which were the organization of Home Guards and the distribution of arms to Union men. In Missouri, hos

tilities had already broken out, and it was evident that that State was destined to become the seat of serious fighting; nor was it then supposed that our tenure of St. Louis was entirely secure.

Collections of Southern troops at Memphis and Union City threatened Columbus, Ky., and Cairo, and made it necessary to keep a vigilant watch in that direction. It should also be remembered that in the early part of May the national capital was by no means secure, and it was not at that time an improbable contingency that Western regiments might yet be needed to protect or regain Washington. As bearing upon this point, it may be stated that in a letter addressed to the General-in-chief on the 21st May, I informed him that from the information in my possession the indications were that the disposable troops in the regular Confederate service, from Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas and Louisiana had gone to the East via Lynchburg; leaving in Tennessee the State militia, who were badly armed and under no discipline. On the 26th April, when my command was confined to the limits of the State of Ohio, I submitted to the general-in-chief certain suggestions, the substance of which was:-That, for the purposes of defense, Cairo should be occupied by two battalions, strongly intrenched, and provided with heavy guns and a gunboat to control the river; that some eight battalions should be stationed at Sandoval in Illinois to observe St. Louis, sustain the garrison of Cairo, and if necessary, reinforce Cincinnati; that a few companies should observe the lower Wabash; that some four thousand men should be posted at Seymour in Indiana to observe Louisville, and be ready to support either Cincinnati or Cairo; that there should be five thousand men at or near Cincinnati, and two battalions at Chillicothe, Ohio. With the troops disposable for active operations, it was proposed to move up the valley of the Great Kanawha upon Richmond; this movement to be made with the greatest promptness, that it might not fail to relieve Washington, or to insure the destruction of the enemy in Eastern Virginia, if aided by a prompt advance on the eastern line of operations. Should Kentucky assume a hostile attitude, it was recommended to cross the Ohio with eighty thousand men, and move straight

on Nashville, acting thence in concert with a vigorous offensive on the Eastern line. It was strongly urged that everything possible should be done to hasten the equipment and armament of the Western troops, as the nation would be entirely deprived of their powerful aid until this should be accomplished.

It was not until the 13th May that the order, forming the Department of the Ohio and assigning me to the command, was received. In the meantime, as much excitement existed at Cincinnati, which city was regarded as a tempting object to the enemy in the uncertain condition of Kentucky, I took steps to concentrate the greater part of the Ohio troops at Camp Dennison, on the Little Miami Railroad, seventeen miles from Cincinnati; a favorable position for instruction, and presenting peculiar facilities for movement in any direction. As soon as the new department was placed under my command, I' took steps for the immediate erection of heavy batteries at Cairo. In the letter of May 21st, already referred to, after giving the information obtained in regard to the position of the enemy on the Mississippi River, it was stated that I was convinced of the necessity of having, without a day's delay, a few efficient gunboats to operate from Cairo as a base; that if they were rendered shot-proof, they would enable us at least to annoy seriously the rebel camps on the Mississippi, and interfere with their river communications-their main dependence; that I requested authority to make the necessary expenditures to procure gunboats, and that I regarded them as an indispensable element in any system of operations, whether offensive or defensive. In the same letter the necessity for light batteries was strongly set forth.

I now urged to the utmost the organization and equipment of the troops in the three States, and received the most energetic and cordial support from Governors Morton, Yates and Dennison. While awaiting the development of the policy of the general government, and in accordance with the sound advice of the general-in-chief as to the instruction of the troops, I determined to hold the troops in readiness to move wherever they might be needed, and to push the work of instruction and equipment. I also determined to afford