From this we passed to a historical survey of the more notable of the many experiments which have been made in various countries and times to improve the condition of States and nations by making money cheap and plentiful. We purpose now to recapitulate briefly the chief points in this survey in order that the full moral force of its teaching may not be missed.

We should say, perhaps, at the outset that no formal reply has been made to numerous letters that have come to us questioning in one way or another statements which had been advanced in some of the earlier articles of the series, for the reason that all the objections raised by these letters have been most effectively answered by subsequent articles. For example, when objection was made that we took too emphatic ground in favor of the best money and too extreme ground against "cheap money," it seemed to us better to show by human experience that our position was the only safe or tenable one than to argue that it must be so. So with other objections that the first historical cases which we cited covered only a part of the problems of our own country to-day. We preferred to answer these by giving further citations which did cover the points of the problem not reached by the first.

The first historical experiment recalled by us was that of the English Land Bank of 1696. This was the most formidable project ever broached for the establishment upon private capital of a bank which should lend money on land as security. The Government granted a charter on condition of the requisite amount of capital being subscribed, and the King subscribed £5000 as an example to the nation; but beyond that the Government was in no way identified with the bank. The subscription-books were opened with entire confidence that the necessary £1,300,000 would be obtained within a few days. At the end of the period allowed for raising it only £2100 had been subscribed by the entire nation. It was thus shown that private capital was not eager to enter into the business of lending money on land. The country gentlemen, who had been eager for the establishment of the bank, were not in position to subscribe to its capital, since their sole purpose in wishing for it was to be able to borrow money from it on their land, and, wishing to borrow, they of course were not able to lend. The capitalists would not put their money into it because its avowed object was to injure them by lowering the rate of interest and lessening the demand for existing money. The result was complete failure to establish the bank.

Passing from this failure of 1696, we took up a notable attempt which was made in Rhode Island about a century later to establish a Land Bank as a State institution, which should lend money on land as security, and pledge the faith of the State for its redemption. We showed that from the outset this experiment was a failure; that the money which the State declared to be a legal tender for public and private debts never circulated at par, but was depreciated from its first is sue; that it paralyzed the industries and commerce of the State; that the whole power of the State Government was not sufficient to make it circulate at par; that it led to the repudiation of the greater part of the State debt, giving to Rhode Island the name of "Rogues' Island" throughout the land; that it dropped steadily during the three years of the bank's existence till one

dollar in coin was worth fifteen of the Land Bank issue, and that the end was a collapse of credit and business so complete that years were required for the State to recover from it.

Criticism was made upon our citation of the Rhode Island experiment that it was attempted in a small and struggling State, at the close of the exhausting Revolutionary War, and that it could not be taken as a criterion of what would be the outcome were the United States Government to go into the business of loaning money on land. It was argued that the wealth of this mighty and prosperous nation was so great, as compared with the resources of Rhode Island, that any attempt to make the experience of one apply to the other was absurd. As an answer to this objection we cited the famous John Law experiment in France in 1718. This was the Rhode Island principle applied to a great nation, and, as a basis for its operation, the entire property of the nation was brought into the bank and used as security for its loans. Law's idea was to have all France as a mortgage, and he carried out the idea to its fullest extent. Our readers have not forgotten the details of his experiment as we set them forth in THE CENTURY for July. Only two years were necessary for him to lead the nation at a headlong gallop to overwhelming disaster, in which all credit was destroyed, all industrial values ruined, and everything except landed property left worthless.

Finally, lest some critics might say that all these unsuccessful attempts had been made in times long past, and under different economic and industrial and commercial conditions from those which obtain in our own time, we took up the case of the Argentine Republic, giving in much detail the efforts of that country to obtain prosperity under the same system of finance that had failed in Rhode Island and in France. That it was the same system was recognized in Buenos Ayres by sound financial thinkers, who opposed its adoption. After our article on Law's experiment was in press, and the article upon the Argentine experience had been completed, we found in the "Buenos Ayres Standard" an editorial article upon John Law from which we quote the following passages:

The calamity brought on France by John Law was the most tremendous that can be imagined; it has no parallel in history except the present crisis in Buenos Ayres. But in many respects Law's crisis was less disastrous than of which nobody can venture to predict. that which has now commenced in our city, the outcome

If Argentine statesmen really believe that they can issue notes at will, they will find that they are sadly mistaken. We must come, some day, to a grand wind-up, and the convulsion that must ensue will eclipse anything before seen in the world. Men and women will go mad in the streets, and no government will be able to face the hurricane of popular indignation.

We cannot resist the wish to send all our shinplaster advocates to Venice, to end their days in obscurity, like Law. It is only fair to Law's memory to say that he admitted the error of his theories before his death, and regarded shinplasters as a calamity of the greatest magnitude.

In the September number of THE CENTURY we showed that the sub-treasury scheme of the Farmers' Alliance was more dangerous than Law's, because the money which it called for would be issued upon a far less certain and stable foundation of values than his plan provided. In future numbers of THE CENTURY

we may recall the experience of other States and governments for the purpose of showing still more plainly that human experience has been uniform in this matter. Michigan's experience with "wildcat banks" between 1837 and 1843 is very instructive, and we shall make it the subject of our next article. Like every other cheap money experiment which has been made, it ended in disaster. In every case the final result has been ruin, and the wider the field of trial, the more desolating has been the calamity. The Argentine Republic believed itself an exceptional nation, rich and powerful enough to change this unbroken current of human experience, but its people know now how terribly mistaken they were. We do not believe it possible that the American people will ever be capable of such folly.

Presidential Voting Methods.

No student of our system for the election of President and Vice-President can fail to be impressed with its lax and antiquated character. In fact, from the earliest period of our Government we have gone about this most important of all our elections in a happy-go-lucky style which has more than once brought us to the verge of serious complications. The electoral college system was the outcome of a prolonged and earnest discussion in the convention of 1787 which adopted the Constitution. Upon no other subject was there greater diversity of opinion. Hamilton favored the selection of President by secondary electors, chosen by primary electors, chosen by the people. Gouverneur Morris wished to have the President chosen by popular vote of the whole people en masse. Another delegate favored giving the power of selection to the governors of the several States. Another favored popular election by districts. Another wished the power to reside in Congress. Popular election and choice by electors were both voted down on one day, and choice by Congress adopted. These votes were reconsidered subsequently, and choice by electors chosen by the State legislatures was adopted. This in turn was reconsidered, and choice by Congress again adopted. Finally the convention reconsidered this vote, rejected all former plans, and adopted the present system, introducing for the first time the office of VicePresident.

The language of the provision of the Constitution in which the final verdict of the convention was set forth precludes all doubt as to the meaning of the system's framers: "Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress," etc. That leaves no possibility of doubt that the convention gave the absolute control of the appointment of electors to the State legislatures, for, as Alexander Johnston says in his history of the system, "the words in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct' are as plenary as the English language could well make them."

When, therefore, the last legislature of Michigan passed a law providing for the choice of presidential electors by districts,- twelve of them by the congressional districts, and two by districts dividing the State on a line running through the center, north and south,— it was exercising an' indoubted right given it by the Constitution. In fact, the first quarter of the pres

ent century many States chose electors by popular vote in the districts precisely after the Michigan plan. In other States, including New York, the legislature chose all the electors. New York followed this practice as late as 1824, when she changed to the plan of election by popular vote in the districts, observing it only in the election of 1828. South Carolina maintained election by the legislature as late as 1860, and Maryland maintained election by popular vote in the districts as late as 1832. But after the election of 1832 all the States except South Carolina adopted the present plan of choosing all the electors on one ticket by the vote of the whole State.

There is nothing in the Constitution, therefore, to prevent all other States in the Union from following the Michigan example. Neither is there anything in it to prevent the legislature of any State, New York for example, in case there be a legislative majority and a gov. ernor of the same political faith, from reverting next winter to another old method and appointing outright by legislative act all the State's electors for the Presidential election of 1892. If any State were to do that, it would be impossible to contest successfully the legality of its action. The only restraining influence is the knowledge that such arbitrary and partizan action would arouse an amount of popular disapproval which might prove fatal in the national election to the prospects of any party which should be guilty of it. In this, as in many other respects, the conduct of our electoral system is regulated by usage and restrained by public opinion and not by law. There is no penalty to be inflicted upon electors for improper performance of duties, or for refusal to perform them at all. If there should be a general refusal of all the electors, or of a majority of them, to perform their duties, the election of President and Vice-President would devolve upon the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively, but the defaulting electors could not be punished save by popular disapproval. If an elector who had been chosen to vote for Republican candidates were to betray his trust and vote for Democratic candidates, or vice versa, there would be no legal penalty and no method by which his vote could be changed. It would have to be counted as cast, and in casting it he would be exercising his constitutional rights in precisely the way in which the first electors chosen under the system exercised them. Usage has changed the method of carrying out the system, but the system itself is unchanged. It is a signal evidence of the faith of the American people in their own honesty and fair dealing that they are willing to continue to conduct their Presidential elections under a system so lax as this.

The return to an old method of choosing electors in Michigan attracts great attention because of the effect which it has in unsettling calculations about the next Presidency. It makes certain a division in the electoral vote of the State, preventing the candidates of either party from getting the entire fourteen. Under the new apportionment the electoral college of 1892 will have 444 members, making 223 necessary for a choice. If all the States which voted for Mr. Cleveland in 1884 were to be carried by the Democrats in 1892, the total Democratic electoral vote under the new apportionment would be 225, just two more than a majority. With the vote of Michigan cast by districts the Democrats are certain of getting at least two electors from

that State, hitherto solidly Republican, a gain which might be of great importance to them in a close contest. In short, it is easy to see how it would be possible for a Presidential election to be decided by the divided vote of Michigan.

At the first glance it might appear that the election by popular vote in districts was a step towards election by popular vote in the whole country. This would be the case were the congressional districts not so often laid out on gerrymandering principles. There are many States so completely "gerrymandered" that they have a majority vote in favor of one political party, and a congressional delegation with a majority in favor of another political party. It is unnecessary to point out that in States of this kind an election by congressional districts would be less of an election by popular vote than one under the system of a State electoral ticket. Suppose, furthermore, that in 1892 all the States were to follow the Michigan plan. One effect would be to give the Farmers' Alliance or some other third party an opportunity to secur ecure several members of the electoral college, for while such a party might have much difficulty in carrying any entire State, it might succeed in carrying a considerable number of congressional districts. Let us, for example, suppose that one party, say the Republican, secured 222 electors, one less than a majority, that the Democratic party had 210, and the Farmers' Alliance had 12. The result would be that neither of the great parties would have a majority; the election would devolve upon Congress as elected last fall; the House would choose a Democratic President, and the Senate a Republican Vice-President. Results of this kind would be possible in every election, for the district system would always work in the interest of third parties.

There has been perceptible, in the discussion aroused by the Michigan law, a growing tendency to advocate the election of President by popular vote. This would be a complete abandonment of the fundamental idea of the present system, which is that the States vote as individuals and have absolute power as to the manner in which they shall vote. A change to popular vote by the whole country could of course be made only by constitutional amendment ratified by two-thirds of all the States. It is to be said of this change that if the whole country were to vote en masse, the States serving merely as great election districts for the counting of the votes, there would probably be an end at once of all efforts to influence the result by corrupt or unworthy means. When the vote of no particular State could be said to have a deciding weight in the result, there would be no effort made to carry any State by dishonest means. The whole country would have to be appealed to by open arguments and methods, and the manifest impossibility of close calculations as to the division of a poll of such gigantic proportions would preclude all idea of either side seeking to purchase a majority. On the other hand, it is to be said that until all parts of the country can be heard from within about the same period after election, decision by popular vote might introduce a new and serious element of uncertainty. Three or four weeks are usually required, for example, to obtain full official returns from Texas, and the vote of that State is sufficiently large to have been the deciding factor in every Presidential election that we have had in recent years if the election had been decided by popular vote. VOL. XLII.-122.

The Key to Municipal Reform.

It was made evident by the legislation of the year now drawing to a close that an unusual amount of attention was given to the subject of reform in municipal government. Many of the State legislatures passed new charters for their larger cities, and many others spent much time in the discussion of such measures. In Ohio home rule was granted to all the large cities of the State, and new charters, embodying that and other important principles, were granted to four of them, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Springfield, and Youngstown. In Indiana a new charter was granted to the city of Indianapolis. In all these cities confident hopes are entertained that the new forms of government will sweep away some abuses, modify others, and give the people better government than they have hitherto enjoyed.

It is not our purpose to enter upon a discussion of the provisions of these new charters, or to consider the relative merits of their leading features. Some of them aim at divided responsibility, others at concentrated power and direct responsibility. In these and other respects they are like charters which have been tried in other cities, and the results attained under them will not differ much from those attained hitherto elsewhere. In the last analysis the character of the results will be determined by the character of the men who adminis ter the system. No charter has been drawn, or can be devised, which will give a city good government when its offices are in the hands of incompetent and dishonest men.

As the readers of THE CENTURY are aware, we have for a long time held the opinion that the only way by which reform in municipal government can be secured is by getting it into the hands of intelligent, honest, and experienced men. The system which will put men of this character into office and keep them there is the only one that will meet the emergency. Is there such a system, and what are its leading features? What is wanted is, in the first place, fitness combined with character, and, after that, permanent tenure. This is civil service reform in its essence, and it follows that we can never have genuine and lasting municipal reform until we put the entire municipal system of government upon a civil service reform basis.

The unwillingness of the better classes of the community to enter into active political life is notorious. Not only do they decline to take any part in the primaries and nominating conventions, but they refuse to accept nominations for office. It frequently happens that a promising reform movement is delayed and its enthusiasm hopelessly chilled by the failure of its promoters to find an eminent and suitable person who is willing to make the sacrifice of becoming its chief nominee for office. This indifference and unwillingness cannot be overcome by appeals to civic pride and sense of public duty, except in very rare instances, for reasons which are not difficult to find. Public life offers only temporary and uncertain occupation, and the man who enters it must do so at the peril of being left without means of support at the end of his first term of office. We cannot expect that young men of talent and character will enter into the public service until they are offered inducements to do so whare, to some extent at least, as attractive as those offe by professional and

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business life. What every man who is of any account in the world seeks at the opening of his career is a profession or calling which promises to give him sure employment with a prospect of wealth, or at least a competence, as the years go by. If he could find such promises in the public service as are held out in the model cities of Berlin, Paris, Glasgow, Birmingham, Manchester, and Liverpool, he would enter into it eagerly enough. As Mr. Shaw pointed out in his Paris and Glasgow articles, and as we have repeatedly pointed out in this department of THE CENTURY, in these cities the highest expert talent is sought for the heads of departments, is paid handsomely, and is kept in office for life or during good behavior. It is this policy which gives the city good government and at the same time secures the interest of the intelligent and moral portions of the community in public affairs.

In American cities the opposite policy prevails. Not only is no inducement offered for expert intelligence to seek place in the public service, but every obstacle is raised to prevent its finding an entry there. If by chance any man possessing it gets office, he is certain to be turned out at the end of a very brief period. The result is that every young man of first-rate intelligence shuns political life and public service and seeks for his occupation in other directions; while the men of inferior intelligence, unstable character, and flabby morality turn to politics as offering them a better chance of success than they could hope for in the severer competition of private occupations. It is not surprising that under such conditions we have bad municipal rule in all our large cities; that municipal indebtedness rolls every year into larger and more portentous dimensions, and that all efforts to bring about a better state of af fairs, by amending existing charters or enacting new ones, result in failure or only partial and temporary improvement. Reform of a thorough and lasting kind will be attained only when we get a system which will give us in all the departments of our municipal service the kind of officials which Mr. Shaw in his article on Paris, in THE CENTURY for July, described as controlling the police department of that city. "Every one of the numerous bureaus," he said, “is manned with permanent officials who have entered the service upon examination and who are promoted for merit." This system prevails throughout the service, making every bureau of the executive municipal government, according to Mr. Shaw, "a model of efficiency." The same system would produce similar results in American cities, making them as well governed as any in the world, instead of standing, as at present, among the worst governed in the world. It will be a slow and arduous task to educate public sentiment to a realization of this truth, but it must be accomplished before we can hope for genuine municipal reform.

James Russell Lowell, Poet and Citizen.

No name among those familiar to the late generations of Americans has done more to make our country respected and believed in abroad and to uphold the faith and courage of patriotic Americans than that of James Russell Lowell. It behooves us not so much to grieve for his untimely death,- for he was the youngest of the distinguished New England group of men-of-letters, and yet not the last to go,- but rather

to rejoice at the noble, salutary, and inspiring career of the great poet, humorist, essayist, scholar, diplomatist, politician, statesman, and citizen.

As a poet, whatever comparisons may be made with his predecessors or contemporaries, at home or abroad, whatever just criticisms may be recorded, we believe it will be found at the end that a large part of his verse has passed into literature, there to remain. The originality, vitality, intensity, and beauty of the best of it are self-evident. Although a true, spontaneous poet, his life had other strong interests and engrossing occupations, and the volume of his verse does not equal that of others whose careers have extended beside his own; his impression as a poet upon his time has not equaled that of others. It may, indeed, be said that if as strongly poetic in nature as they, he would have been dominated as exclusively as were they by the poetic mood. However this may be, the quality of his genius, as shown in his best work, was. we believe, quite as fine as that of any poet writing English in his day. No one can read his last volume of verse without being impressed anew by the vigor, variety, and spontaneous character of Lowell's poetic gift. Even his literary faults are of such a nature as to testify to the keenness of his thought and the abundance of his intellectual equipment.

But, after all, perhaps the most striking thing in Lowell's career was not the brilliancy of his mind, his many-sided and extraordinary ability,— but the fact that in every department of his intellectual activity was distinguished the note of the patriot. He loved letters for art's sake; he used letters for art's sake-but also for the sake of the country. His poetic fervor, his unique humor, the vehicle of his pithy and strenuous prose, his elegant and telling oratory-all these served fearlessly the cause of American democracy, of which he was the most commanding exponent in the intellectual world of our day. His keen sense of the responsibilities of citizenship, added to his native genius, made him from early life—in the true and undegraded sense of the word-a politician, and an effective one, as well as a statesman whose writings are an arsenal of human freedom.

A few years ago, as our readers will remember, it was the good fortune of THE CENTURY to bring out the record of Lowell's relation to Lincoln. It will be remembered that he was one of the first, in fact he himself believed that he was the very first, of the so-called "Brahman class" of New England to discover and widely proclaim the peculiar virtues and political abilities of Lincoln, at a time when many, even among the good, were suspicious or scornful of "the railsplitter." Cordial recognition of good intent, as well as of natural gifts, was, indeed, one of Lowell's most admirable traits. American literature and American politics owe much to him, not only for inspiration and example, but for most cordial encouragement, both private and public.

Lowell passes from us in the very year of the establishment in America by statute of the principle of International Copyright, a cause of which he was the official leader as the president of the American Copyright League. He brought to the agitation all the stored-up wealth of his great reputation, the total result of a spotless and noble life, all the forces of his literary skill, his biting wit, his oratory, his moral en