the services of the Lieutenant-Governor should not be available, the Governor may appoint whomsoever he pleases as his deputy.

The Governor's functions, according to the Letters Patent, Commission, and Instructions, may be recapitulated as follow:

The Governor is the custodian of the Great Seal, under which all Crown grants, etc., must pass.

The Governor has the appointment of his own Council-the Executive. He is also to summon that Council, and is ordinarily its President; but in his absence some other member may be nominated to preside. It is usual, however, to appoint some member of the Ministry permanent Vice-President, who presides in the absence of the Governor.

The Governor is the fountain of honour within the state, since to him belongs the power to appoint, in the King's name, all Judges, Justices of the Peace, Commissioners, and other "necessary officers and Ministers"; and, by virtue of his powers as Viceroy, he may remove from the exercise of his office any official so appointed.

The Governor is also the depositary of the prerogative of mercy within the state, having it in his power to pardon, either absolutely or conditionally, any offender convicted in New South Wales. He can also remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures due to the Crown, but he cannot pardon or remit on the condition of the offender voluntarily leaving the state, unless the offence has been a political one only. In all capital cases until recently the final responsibility of deciding whether or not the death penalty should be carried out rested solely with the Governor, but, by a new arrangement which has been agreed to by all the Australasian colonies, such final power is now exercised by the Governor "with the advice of the Executive Council." This places the procedure of these colonies, in regard to capital cases, on similar lines to the system that has for some time past been in force in Canada. Its adoption was suggested and strongly urged by Lord Onslow, the former Governor of New Zealand; and Lord Knutsford, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the second Salisbury Administration, ascertained the views of the various Australasian colonies upon the subject. It being found that they all accepted the proposal as an improvement upon the practice then existing, a circular despatch was sent to each colony with instructions for its adoption. The new system was first brought into operation in New South Wales towards the end of October, 1892.

The Governor is also vested with the authority of the Crown, enabling him to nominate the members of the Upper House of the Legislature, and to summon, prorogue to a future day, or dissolve "any legislative body" existing in the state. His instructions, however, provide that in the exercise of the above powers he is to act by the advice of the Executive Council in all cases except those whose nature is such that in his opinion the public service "would sustain material prejudice were he to follow such advice," or in matters too trivial to submit to the Council, or "too urgent to admit of their advice being given"; but

in all such urgent cases he must communicate to the Council as soon as practicable the measures taken by him, and his reasons for acting. It is expressly provided, however, that the Governor may, if he think fit, disregard the advice of the Executive and act in direct opposition to the declared will of his advisers, but in such cases he is required to make a full report of the whole circumstances for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Governor acts as Viceroy as regards giving the Royal assent to or vetoing Bills passed by the Legislature, or reserving them for the special consideration of the Sovereign. The instructions deal at large with this matter, but it is usual in practice to be guided to a large extent by the advice of the law officers of the Crown. There are eight different classes of Bills, however, to which the Governor is bound to refuse the Royal assent. They are:

(1.) Divorce Bills (that is, private bills divorcing particular

persons).

(2.) Bills making any kind of grant, gratuity, or donation to the Governor.

(3.) Bills affecting the currency.

(4.) Bills imposing differential duties, which are not in accordance with the Australian Colonies Duties Act, 1873.

(5.) Bills apparently contrary to Imperial treaty obligations. (6.) Bills interfering with the discipline or control of His Majesty's land or sea forces employed in the state.

(7.) Bills of great importance, or extraordinary in their nature, whereby the Royal prerogative, or the rights and property of His Majesty's subjects residing beyond the state, or the trade and shipping of the United Kingdom and its dependencies, may be prejudiced.

(8.) Bills containing provisions to which the Royal assent has already been refused, or which have been once disallowed, unless they contain a clause suspending their operation until the King's pleasure has been signified, or unless the Governor is satisfied that there is urgent necessity for bringing any such Bill into immediate operation, in which case he is empowered to assent to the Bill on behalf of the King, if it is not repugnant to the law of England, or inconsistent with Imperial treaty obligations; and in every such case he is required to transmit the Bill to His Majesty, together with his reasons for assenting to it. The following Acts of Parliament regulate the action of the Governor in assenting to Bills on behalf of the King, or reserving them for the consideration of the Sovereign :-5 and 6 Vic., cap. 76, secs. 31-32; 7 and 8 Vic., cap. 74, sec. 7; and 13 and 14 Vic., cap. 59, secs. 13, 32, and 33. The effect of these enactments is to deprive any reserved Bill of all force and legality until the King's assent thereto has been formally communicated to the Governor; and power is given to His Majesty to

veto any Bill to which the Governor has assented on his behalf within two years after the receipt of such Bill by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in which case the Bill is to be declared null and void by message of the Governor, and proclamation. Reserved Bills are to be laid before His Majesty in Council, and the King may allow them or not within a period of two years from the day on which they were reserved by the Governor. The King's assent to reserved Bills may be transmitted by telegram.

By Act 7 Vic., No. 16, all Acts of Parliament which become law are required to be registered by the Registrar-General within ten days of their so becoming law.

The above is a summary of the powers and duties of the Governor, as defined by his instructions and the Letters Patent; but additional duties have been imposed upon him by the Constitution and Electoral Acts. In accordance with these enactments he must summon the Legislative Assembly; appoint the President of the Legislative Council; prorogue or dissolve Parliament; appoint his ministers proprio motu; also appoint, with the advice of the Executive, all public officers whose appointment is not vested in heads of departments; issue all warrants for the payment of money; issue the writs for general elections, and, in the absence of the Speaker, issue writs to fill vacancies occurring in the Assembly.

In summoning, proroguing, or dissolving Parliament, the Governor usually acts according to the advice tendered him by the Cabinet; but he is in no way bound to do so, and, as a matter of fact, he has sometimes declined to be guided by his Ministers. This, however, has never happened except in respect to granting a dissolution. As to summoning or proroguing, a difference of opinion is hardly likely to arise. The relations established between the Ministry and the representatives of the people are in accordance with the time-honoured precedents prevailing in Great Britain, which may be thus defined. The Cabinet must be chosen from-"(1) Members of the Legislature; (2) holding the same political views, and chosen from the party possessing a majority in the House of Commons; (3) carrying out a concerted policy; (4) under a common responsibility, to be signified by a collective resignation in the event of Parliamentary censure; and (5) acknowledging a common subordination to one Chief Minister."

The Imperial rule as to the circumstances under which a Government is bound to resign is as follows:-Censure, involving loss of office, rests entirely with the Lower House, or popular branch of the Legislature ; hence, directly a Ministry fails to command a majority of the House of Commons, it must give place to another. Want of confidence in a Cabinet may be shown in three ways: first, by a direct vote of censure, or a specific declaration of want of confidence; second, by a vote disapproving of some act of the Government; or, third, by the rejec tion of some important measure introduced by the Ministry. In any of these cases Ministers must either resign, or appeal to the country if they can get the Sovereign to sanction a new election.

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These rules have been virtually adopted in New South Wales, and the undoubted right of the Governor, as the depositary of the Royal prerogative, to refuse to grant a dissolution, if he think fit, has been more than once exercised. In March, 1877, Sir Hercules Robinson refused to grant a dissolution to Sir John Robertson, and in September of the same year he also declined to enable Sir Henry Parkes to go to the country. The reason alleged in each case was that the Assembly refused to make provision for the expenditure of the year. It will thus be seen that a grave responsibility is thrown upon the Governor in the exercise of the unquestioned right of granting or refusing a dissolution of Parliament, and in the cases mentioned it can hardly be doubted that Sir Hercules Robinson acted within his powers. The Viceroy is the conservator of the rights and interests of the whole population, and it must be evident that grave evils would ensue were a dissolution to take place before supplies had been granted.

The exercise of the prerogative of mercy is such an important function of the Governor, and he is so liable on some occasions to have strong pressure brought to bear upon him in connection with it, that it will be well to quote at length the instructions received a few years ago upon this point. The mode of procedure in capital cases has already been referred to, and in other cases the Governor is instructed not to pardon or reprieve any offender without receiving the advice of one, at least, of his Ministers; and in any case in which such pardon or reprieve might directly affect the interests of the Empire, or of any country or place beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of the state, the Governor must, before deciding as to either pardon or reprieve, take those interests specially into his own personal consideration in conjunction with such advice as aforesaid. In another

part of his instructions the Governor is permitted to act in opposition to the advice of the Executive Council "if he see sufficient cause," but he is to report any such matter to the Sovereign without delay.

The Executive.

The Executive Council is now composed of seven salaried Ministers, namely the Premier and Chief Secretary, the Colonial Treasurer, the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, the Secretary for Lands, the Secretary for Public Works, the Minister of Public Instruction and Minister for Labour and Industry, the Secretary for Mines and Agriculture, with a Vice-President, and two members without portfolio. These form the Cabinet, and, of course, are responsible to Parliament. The Ministry, as the advisers of the Governor, must also retain his confidence; but, practically, this is seldom likely to be withdrawn, so long as they command a working majority in the Assembly. The Governor may dissolve Parliament although the Ministry have not sustained a defeat, and in this case the continued existence of any Government would depend directly on the vote of the constituencies, but such a contingency can happen but seldom.

Apart from the Vice-President of the Executive Council, who holds no portfolio, it is rare for more than one Minister to be selected from the Upper House, and it will thus be seen that the principle of the responsibility of members of the Government to Parliament is fully carried out. For every act of the Governor as Viceroy some Minister is responsible to Parliament; and even in matters of Imperial interest, where the final onus rests upon the Governor, he himself is responsible to the Imperial Government, whose members are under the control of the House of Commons, so that no loophole is left for the exercise of any arbitrary act. The Crown, except in two instances (appeals to the Privy Council, and the bestowal of titles), acts towards the Executive through its representative, the Governor; and so long ago as the inception of Responsible Government, Earl Grey declared, in an official despatch, that he should make "a judicious use of the influence, rather than of the authority, of his office," which wise maxim has usually been followed. But in extreme cases, such as when his sanction is requested to any illegal proceeding, the Governor is bound, without question, to keep the law, though he may thereby be brought into hostile relations with the Cabinet. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in a communication to the Governor-General of Canada in 1879, clearly laid down the doctrine that the Governor of any British Colony "has an unquestionable constitutional right to dismiss his Ministers, if from any cause he feels it incumbent on him to do so." This does not militate against the doctrine of responsibility; for if the Ministry appointed by the Governor do not possess the confidence of Parliament, they cannot hold office, and the Governor will be forced to give way, or else persevere till he can select a Ministry whom the Assembly will accept. The final control will thus be, as in every other case, with the representatives of the people. In matters of routine the Governor will necessarily act on the advice of his Ministers, and in most cases relating to the internal economy of the departments, he will even adopt the individual recommendations of the Ministers by whom they are severally controlled.

As regards matters of purely Imperial interest, the Governor is responsible to the British authorities for their due conservation. If, in consequence of his action in any such matter, he is involved in a dispute with his Ministers, he is bound to refer them to the Sovereign, should his action have been endorsed by the Colonial Office. If his conduct were not approved of in England he would most likely be recalled. It follows from this, that in no case can the Governor be held to be responsible directly to Parliament for his conduct. His Ministers are responsible, but personally he has only to render an account to the Crown itself that is, to the Imperial Parliament.

The Executive Council cannot discharge any function unless duly summoned by the Governor, and unless at least two members, in addition to the Governor or presiding member, be present to form a quorum. Formal minutes are, of course, kept of all proceedings.