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important part; but his rôle is, after all, only a secondary one. scheme which elevates the middleman above the producer can be beneficial to mankind. Not all middlemen are useless; but Cobdenism does not distinguish between the useful and the useless ones. Its theory is that the unnecessary middleman performs as useful a function as the one really needed to forward the work of distributing. The Cobdenite takes no note of the waste incurred. He fails to consider that when competition is carried to extremes it makes impossible the achievement of its object. He ignores the fact that the creation of an unnecessary transportation army and the augmentation of the number of useless middlemen of other kinds militate against real cheapness. He notes that production is on a greater scale than formerly, and he attributes it wholly to the effects of competition. He refuses to take into account that the hauling of a bushel of wheat from the plains of Dakota or the fertile valleys of California does not add to its value, although the consumer in England is obliged to pay twice as much for it as it is worth at the place of production, or that if it were consumed in feeding men employed in gainful occupations near the fields in which it was raised it would be conferring a greater benefit than it does at present. In short, he refuses to see that there is no economic excuse for the gathering of great masses of people in contracted areas destitute of resources sufficient to maintain them, and that there would be a positive economic gain by their dispersion.

In my opinion, the demonstration is conclusive that the free-trade policy, which stands for absolutely unrestricted international competition, if it could win, would result in continuous waste and ultimate dearness; while, on the other hand, it is equally plain that protection, by bringing producer and consumer together, is an eliminator of waste. Therefore, the latter is the system which must finally prevail.

JOHN P. YOUNG.

CAN THERE EVER BE A CUBAN REPUBLIC?

THE answer to the question, Can there ever be a Cuban Republic? was given in 1859 by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of the Thirty-fifth Congress, second session, when reporting "A bill making appropriations to facilitate the acquisition of Cuba by negotiation." The eminent gentlemen who formed that committee recognized that, as Spain could not long maintain her grasp on that distant colony, there were but three possible alternatives in regard to its future: (1) Possession by one of the great European powers; (2) the independence of the island; or (3) annexation to the United States.

With regard to the first the committee said that any attempt to consummate it would be resisted "by all the means in our power. With regard to the second the committee said:

"This independence can only be nominal. It never can be maintained in fact. It will eventually fall under some protectorate, either open or disguised. If under ours, annexation will soon follow as certainly as the shadow follows the substance. An European protectorate could not be tolerated."

In respect to the third the committee said that if effected by war it would be too expensive, but if effected by negotiation its beneficial results, commercially, politically, and morally, would be immense.

This terse declaration of the American idea concerning Cuba introduced no novelty in the political programme mapped out in this respect by the American Government since 1809, when the thought of acquiring the island through the interposition of Napoleon was seriously entertained and considered.

On April 28, 1823, John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State, declared:

"There are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation. As an apple, when severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, so Cuba, when forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which by the same law of nature cannot cast her off from its bosom."

Mr. Adams' successor in the State department, who was a no

less prominent American than Henry Clay, said (April 13, 1826) that he had "prevailed upon the governments of Colombia and Mexico to suspend any expedition which both or either of them might be fitting against the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico," and declared that as far as the American Government and the American interests were concerned the said islands "would be safe in the possession of Spain."

His successor, Martin Van Buren, said (Oct. 13, 1830): “We are content that Cuba should remain as it now is." And again, "Motives of reasonable State policy render it more desirable to us that it should remain subject to Spain rather than to either of the South American States." Such a man as John Forsyth, one of the successors of Mr. Van Buren, went so far in this policy as to say to the United States Minister in Madrid (July 15, 1840):

"You are authorized to assure the Spanish Government that in case of any attempt, from whatever source, to wrest from her this portion of her territory (Cuba), she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it.”

And three years afterward (Jan. 14, 1843), upon information imparted strange to say by the Duke of Wellington himself— of a British plot "to cause the Cubans to rise in insurrection against the Spanish Government," establish a republic, and abolish slavery, Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, reiterated and reaffirmed verbatim the assurance which John Forsyth had given Spain, as above stated.

What was the reason of this attitude? Were, peradventure, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, Martin Van Buren, John Forsyth, Daniel Webster, and the eminent members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of the Thirty-fifth Congress, second session, champions of despotism and sworn enemies of Cuban freedom and self-government? Were they actuated by any other feeling than that of their paramount duty to protect the interests of their own country, by preventing Cuba from becoming a source of uneasiness and danger to the American Union?

To propound this question is to answer it. The interest of the United States in the political condition of Cuba, both during the period which preceded the declaration by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1859 and in all the years that have since elapsed, has not been due to "any spirit of meddlesomeness, or any desire to force its will upon another nation," as the Secretary of State, Mr. Olney, explained to the Spanish Minister here (April 4, 1896), but

upon considerations of all kinds, geographical, political, commercial, strategical, social, etc., which "compel it to be concerned in the solution of the Cuban problem, whether it will or no."

In his message to Congress of December 5, 1899, President McKinley said that Cuba is "bound to us by ties of singular intimacy and strength," and that "the destinies of Cuba are in some rightful form and manner irrevocably linked with our own." The year before (December 5, 1898), he had said also that "until there is complete tranquillity in the island, and a stable government inaugurated, military occupation will be continued."

Upon what ground can it be claimed that this sound traditional policy of the United States of America in regard to the island of Cuba, founded upon reasons of self-defence, shall now be changed into a new one, full of the same perplexities and dangers which American statesmen, ever since 1809, have been endeavoring to avoid? What solid reason can be alleged to demand from the United States, now, when, through the fortunes or misfortunes of war, they are in full possession of Cuba, that they should launch into the world a new sovereignty, exposed to foreign aggression, and one which, through alliance with any European nation, or compelled by it through belligerent action or diplomacy, might cause the whole work of American statesmanship for ninety-one long years to fall to the ground? What has happened since 1899 capable of persuading the United States Government that Cuban independence can now be maintained in fact, and that Cuba is no longer doomed to fall under a protectorate, ours or foreign, open or disguised?

The geographical position of Cuba, and the relations, whether commercial or strategical, which it forces imperatively between her and the United States, have not been changed. Havana is still the acknowledged key of the Gulf of Mexico, and the interests of our most important coast wise intercourse have not ceased to be compelled "to pass almost within hail of the Havana fortifications, and to run the gauntlet of their masters." What then could be sufficient to induce the United States to modify their traditional policy and to place themselves again, voluntarily, in the condition of danger and of anxiety with regard to Cuba in which they were placed for about a century?

The argument is made, however, that, under the joint resolution of Congress, approved by the President on April 20, 1898, we are bound to leave Cuba and to place the government thereof in the hands of her

people. Should the contention stop here nothing, perhaps, could be said against it. That joint resolution, no matter how ill-advised and productive of mischief it may be, is a law; and as long as it stands unrepealed on the statute books of the United States it is binding upon the people and the Government of the United States.

But the contention does not stop there; it goes farther, claiming that the people in whose hands the government of Cuba is to be left by us when withdrawing from that island are the Cuban insurgents of 1895, the authors or organizers of the "Republic of Cuba," created on Sept. 16, 1895, by the Constitution of Jimaguayú, and reorganized on Oct. 29, 1897, by the Constitution of La Yaya. It claims also that in going to war with Spain, we practically and implicitly recognized the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents, above named, and consequently their flag and their organization; that we became the allies of the said insurgents; and that, as the Republic of Cuba has been entirely ignored by us, we have wrongfully "cancelled" the law and have "robbed the Cuban people of their freedom."

Were it not for the fact that an argument of this kind might promote and encourage among certain classes of the Cuban people the feeling of unrest and aversion which unfortunately they entertain at present against the United States, there would not be any need of paying any attention to it. But as the mischief it does is serious, an effort should be made to disprove it. The fact must be made clear to all intelligent people that by remaining in Cuba until a government, republican in form and truly democratic, is established by her people, her whole people, and not the insurgents of 1895 alone, under a constitution which should free the United States from all anxieties on that side, we are not "cancelling" our laws or "robbing" anybody of what belongs to him, but, on the contrary, we are fulfilling to the letter what the law commands.

That the joint resolution itself absolutely ignored the "Republic of Cuba," and refused alliance, connection, or relation with the Cuban insurgents, their flag or their organization, is fully shown by its language. Not a word of recognition of any of those things can be found in it; and the most earnest advocates of the "Republic of Cuba" have to content themselves with the groundless statement that the said recognition was made "practically" and "implicitly."

True it is that when the joint resolution was read for the third time, put to a vote, and passed in the Senate (" Congressional Rec