This does not, however, mean that the American people are unalterably opposed to movements looking to the abrogation of laws designed to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few; hence, the Democratic party is not bound to renounce all hope of drawing votes from Populist, Labor, and Socialist sources. It will be only consistent with itself if, unmindful of its former escapades, it again vigorously attacks the tariff as unnecessary and prolific of corruption. It will not lose votes if it wages war upon trusts and combinations; and, if it will only condescend to discriminate among them, by the aid of expert advice, it will actually gain votes. Tariff and trust reform, then, may be safely chosen as planks in the next platform; and, if it seems necessary to emphasize the party's sympathy with the masses, a progressive income tax, beginning far below the $4,000 level, and thus escaping the odium of being an unjust class measure, may be advocated. For it is well to insist that the alliance between Populism and the Democracy, however disastrous it may have been thus far, was not altogether the fortuitous and fatuous thing it has been supposed to be in many quarters. Over and above the local causes that produced Populism, there was a general necessity that the "unprotected" masses in this country of concentrating wealth should draw together in political organizations; and there were many reasons why the less wealthy and powerful of the two great parties should espouse their cause. That cause need not be given up, if only it be advocated with discretion and with due regard to the teachings of history. But there is another cause that offers more hope as a basis for the rehabilitation of the Democratic party. This is the cause of the inhabitants of our new dependencies. Exactly how this cause should be fought out at the polls will depend greatly upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the important cases now being heard before it. If it be decided that Congress has control over the destinies of the people of Porto Rico and the Philippines, it will be both right and expedient for the Democratic party to agitate upon moral grounds for the immediate and unconditional granting to the Filipinos of terms similar to those granted the Cubans, and for the extension of the Constitution, by amendment or otherwise, to the Porto Ricans. Should the court decide that the Constitution reaches the Philippines, the best intelligence of the party should be directed toward determining the most effective way of agitating for an amendment or for some other legal means, should such exist, by which the territory could be alienated to its rightful owners and the sublime ideal of human liberty in its fullest sense be preserved among us. The admittedly embarrassing question what should be done with the Philippines, should we let them go, is, as one of expediency, secondary to the moral question, "Will we do by the Filipinos in arms against us what we would have them do by us?" The question of imperialism was not settled at the polls in November, 1900, both because it was not presented separately to the American people, and because its moral aspects were not, for many reasons, brought fully home to them. The important speech of exPresident Harrison and the favorable comments upon it in Republican circles sufficiently prove the truth of this statement. It would, of course, be far better for humanity and the nation were some honorable escape from our present predicament discovered and acted upon by President McKinley and his advisers; for the whole situation is fraught with danger, and is one which no honest patriot could wish to see used as a basis of partisan agitation, save in case of the direst necessity. But it is not often that a party that creates a situation can extricate the nation from it; and it would at least furnish the ironically inclined historian with a pungent parable should the party of Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan free the Filipino from the party of Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant. Absit omen. It must be admitted, however, that there are serious obstacles to an effective campaign upon the issue of imperialism. There are many avowed imperialists in the Democratic party-especially in the South. Still, as we have seen, the South can be held in line on any platform, even on one that is partly antagonistic to Southern notions with regard to Anglo-Saxon supremacy over inferior races. And, after all, the Filipino is not the negro, and there is a marked difference between denying full rights to the principal inhabitants of a country and denying such rights to a subordinate caste. The Democrats need not, then, abandon the Philippine plank because of their past and present record in the South. A more serious obstacle is to be found in the fact that a zealous missionary spirit, which has marked out the Filipino for its prey, is abroad in the land. But this is not the first time that the spirits of justice and liberty have clashed with the missionary spirit in its mad proselyting mood - the inquisitors were very fervid missionaries of a kind and it will not be the last time. Other obstacles are found in greed of commercial gain, in popular, and especially Anglo-Saxon, unwillingness to part with territory once acquired, and in overweening patriotism. But these obstacles, while serious, are not invincible; and there is no better way to build up a party than to set it a moral task of stupendous proportions. The Republicans of 1856 confronted such a task, and all the world knows the result. Perhaps, like the Republicans, the Democrats of 1904 will have to take up the rallying cry of "A Higher Law"; but even from this there should be no shrinking, for an appeal to the conscience of the nation may be the only way of arousing the people from the lethargy that tolerates political corruption and fatuity. We may conclude, finally, that a rehabilitation of the Democratic party may be, and probably will be, undertaken by its accredited leaders along lines that ought to satisfy the disaffected elements, and which, with one exception, need not differ materially from those voluntarily laid down already by Mr. Bryan. All discussion of the currency basis which is, after all, a matter of expediency, not of principle — must be abandoned, and can easily be, if Mr. Bryan will only convince himself that he saw, in all sincerity be it granted, a principle where none existed, and advocated an expedient which the country rejected. A conservative, but not necessarily hostile, attitude must be taken toward the Populists. Lastly, a moral stand of the most radical character should be assumed with regard to the treatment of the Philippine Islands by the United States. Upon the Philippine question should rest the burden of every Democratic utterance and action until victory is won. With silver out of the way, and with tariff and trust agitation used in a purely ancillary manner, it will be impossible to obscure the issue of imperialism as was done in 1900. Like every other moral question, it will not down. It is for the Democrats to make certain that they rise with it.1 AN EX-DEMOCRAT. 1 Mr. Bryan's Chicago speech of January 8 was not, so far as reported, so instructive as that at Lincoln. He claimed, as the present writer does, that reorganization must come from within the party, but he based his contention on illiberal and inconclusive reasoning, and showed a lack of magnanimity toward the disaffected Democrats that augurs ill for the future of the party should he be retained as leader. His remarks about plutocracy and Democratic principles were vague, and his assertions as to the fighting trim of the party were little short of amusing. The Democrats seem to need leaders more than they do issues. NATIONALIZATION OF THE STATE GUARDS. NAPIER said of the English that they were warlike but not military. Are we, as a nation, either military or warlike? We have shown ourselves at times belligerent and capable of heroic endeavor. Nevertheless, we are a peaceably disposed people, and only take up the sword when no other alternative is left us. The reason we find it so hard to decide how large an army we require comes from the fact that a large proportion of our people do not recognize the need of any army at all. They try to persuade themselves that they shall never have another war or another rebellion. They are too patriotic to wish the country to be without any resource in such a contingency; yet, knowing little or nothing of modern military methods, they cling to the belief that a volunteer force, called out when required, is all that is needed to meet any emergency. If this is not a correct diagnosis, then the only other alternative supposition is that they are willing to trust to luck for all time to come. We hear on all sides that we do not need a large standing army. The question naturally occurs: What is a sufficient force under present conditions? Yet, it seems almost hopeless to discuss the subject in the face of popular indifference. Anyone who has ever tried to get any measure through Congress must have noted the apathy of our representatives to any project which has not a public sentiment back of it. An army reorganization bill will probably pass the present Congress; but if a public sentiment is not crystallized in its favor, the chances are that the measure will be repealed at some future time. It would, therefore, seem expedient to ascertain what kind of a military system our people want. Popular opinion seems to be so strongly against an army of the strength and organization favored by most military men that I have thought it judicious to suggest a system similar to that adopted by the Swiss, Swedes, and Canadians; that is, a permanent staff, controlling a well organized, instructed, and equipped militia. This is very far from being an ideal method; yet an unscientific system carried out heartily and in good faith would be better for us than a system better in the abstract, but unpopular, and not in accord with what is figuratively called the genius of our institutions. The indifference of our people to military literature is surprising. European periodicals publish many articles on military subjects. In our magazines they are conspicuous by their absence. There is no doubt that ours would be filled with military articles if the readers demanded military information. This apathy can only be accounted for by the fact that Mars has acted but a subordinate part in our national drama. Comparatively few read much more of history than is contained in school compendiums. As ours are written from a pietistic, patriotic standpoint, the impression is left that all our wars have been triumphantly successful. Yet even in our Indian wars we have had a number of positive defeats. Our Revolutionary War gave ample proof that an untrained militia was no match for a disciplined army. We remember our successful battles, but are apt to forget the speedy flight of our militia at Long Island and at Camden. cers. In the War of 1812 we had on land a succession of humiliations. Our untrained and ill-disciplined levies proved utterly unreliable. In the Mexican War we had only a small proportion of volunteers actively engaged. Scott's campaign was made with the old regular army, with ten provisional regiments commanded by regular offiPatterson's division of volunteers did not reach Mexico until the fighting was over. The War of the Rebellion is instan conclusive proof of the efficiency of volunteer organizations. nionly a proof of their efficiency when pitted against similar orga zations; and it should not be forgotten that nearly all our successfu generals in that war were regular officers, and that all the supply departments were under the direction of the regular staff of the army. ced as a It is But our late war with Spain and its continuing supplement in the Philippines afford the best test of the strength and weakness of the volunteer system. Nearly all of the volunteer organizations mustered into the national service were State Guard regiments or batteries. While something less than half of their full complement of men volunteered, these organizations started in with a marked advantage over the volunteers of previous wars. Most of them went into service with a fair proficiency in drill and some training in target practice. Some of them had also learned something of guard and outpost duty in State camps of instruction. Another advantage was |