was at hand to demolish them. The town, once occupied, afforded shelter to our own forces. For General Lee would still be restrained from destroying it by his reluctance to injure his friends. Moreover, it was hoped that our columns, after crossing, would move through the town and charge the enemy's position. General Burnside did not expect to meet with much difficulty or opposition in crossing the river. That was thought to be a comparatively easy task. The chief labor was. to be performed after the passage of the river had been effected. There was one difficulty, however, which may not have been duly appreciated. It is possible that it had in it an element of great weakness for our troops. It consisted in the occupation of an abandoned town by a hostile army. The unoccupied houses and stores, many of which belonged to persons of considerable wealth, would offer opportunities for plunder too tempting to be missed. Here was an influence of demoralization which was not to be disregarded. The numerous camp followers that hung upon the skirts of the army, in several instances the soldiers themselves, would be exposed to a temptation which would make a proper measure of discipline exceedingly difficult. This may be thought a minor consideration. But upon matters of less moment have the most important movements sometimes hinged.

It

Beyond the town lay the slope up which the army was to march in order to reach the enemy's lines. Above the slope frowned the enemy's batteries. The main task was to carry those heights, bristling with bayonets and dark with cannon. was a perilous undertaking. For the first time in its history, the Army of the Potomac was to "move on the enemy's works" for a determined assault. It had shown itself unequalled for defensive warfare. Could it successfully take the aggressive? The answer to that momentous question was soon to be given in fire and blood!

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CHAPTER VIII.

WH

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

HAT assurance of success had General Burnside in carrying his plans into successful execution? By the consolidated morning reports of the Army of the Potomac, it appears that, on the 10th of December, there was in front of the enemy an effective force of one hundred and eleven thousand eight hundred and thirty-four officers and men of all arms. The artillery consisted of three hundred and twelve guns of different calibre, mostly field pieces. Of the three grand divisions,' the left, General Franklin's, was the largest, consisting of fortysix thousand eight hundred and ninety-two officers and men and one hundred and sixteen pieces of artillery, and was composed of the first corps, General J. J. Reynolds, and the sixth corps, General W. H. Smith. General Reynolds's division officers were Generals Meade, Gibbon and Doubleday; General Smith's were Generals Newton, Brooks and Howe. The centre grand division, General Hooker's, numbered thirtynine thousand, nine hundred and eighty-four officers and men and one hundred pieces of artillery, and was composed of the third corps, General Stoneman, and the fifth corps, General Butterfield. General Stoneman's division commanders were Generals Sickles, Birney and Whipple; General Butterfield's were Generals Sykes, Humphreys and Charles Griffin. The right grand division, General Sumner's, numbered twenty-two thousand seven hundred and thirty-six officers and men and

*For the sake of convenience of reference the organization of the army is stated in detail, notwithstanding some of the particulars have already been given.

sixty pieces of artillery, and consisted of the Ninth Corps, General Willcox, and the second corps, General Couch. General Willcox's division commanders were Generals Getty, Sturgis and Burns; General Couch's were Generals French, Hancock and Howard. The brigade of engineers, numbering fifteen hundred and five officers and men, was under the command of General D. P. Woodbury, to whom was assigned the duty of laying the bridges for the crossing. The signal corps, under the command of Captain Samuel T. Cushing, numbered one hundred and fifty officers and men. General Patrick's Provost Guard numbered about two hundred officers and men. General Ingalls' Quartermaster's Department numbered one hundred and fifty officers and men, and the headquarters escort about two hundred officers and men. A certain portion of the whole army was occupied in guarding the railroad and performing picket and outpost duty. The cavalry was held in reserve. There was, probably, in round numbers, an available force of one hundred thousand officers and men, who were either actively engaged or held in support, and thus, in a measure, exposed to the fire of the enemy at some time during the day of the battle of Fredericksburg.

The time for action came. On the 10th of December, the army was concentrated along the river front, within short marching distance from the bank, but concealed as much as possible from the enemy by the undulations of the land. During the night the artillery was posted along the edge of the plateau, from Falmouth to a point opposite the mouth of the Massaponax. Orders were issued to the engineers under General Woodbury to be ready for work at three o'clock on the morning of the 11th, and a sufficient force of infantry and artillery was detailed to cover the crossings and protect the working parties. Three points were selected for throwing the bridges—the first at a short distance above the place where the county bridge had stood; the second opposite the lower end of the town, and the third about a mile below Fredericksburg nearly opposite the mouth of Deep Run and not far from

the estate of a planter named Bernard. At the first of these points two, at the second one, and at the third three bridges. were to be laid. Upon these six bridges the army was to cross the Rappahannock, occupy the town and move rapidly to the assault. The left, by a vigorous and decisive attack, was to pierce the enemy's line near Captain Hamilton's crossing, seize the road in the rear and compel the evacuation of the works upon the crest. Then the right and centre, in support of the left attack, were to force the enemy from the heights in front and pursue along the telegraph or the plank road, according to the direction of the enemy's retreat. The success of the plan of attack was to depend upon the celerity and vigor with which the troops were pushed to its execution.

The morning of the 11th dawned raw, cold and foggy. The engineers among whom were volunteers from the 8th Connecticut regiment of the Ninth Corps-were promptly at work upon the bridges. But little opposition was made to the operations of General Franklin's working parties below the town, and after considerable labor, his three bridges were laid, secured and strengthened. At eleven o'clock in the forenoon he reported to General Burnside that he was ready to cross his grand division. But operations immediately opposite the town had not proceeded so satisfactorily as General Burnside had hoped, and General Franklin was ordered to hold his bridges, but not to cross the main body of his troops till the upper bridges were completed. The latter work was destined to meet with considerable opposition. As the day came on the design of crossing was revealed to the enemy's forces in the town. About two thirds of the work of laying the bridges had been accomplished, when the sharpshooters of General Barksdale's Mississippi brigade posted in the houses and streets directed a destructive fire upon the working parties. Then our artillery opened along the whole line opposite the town. Amid the deafening roar of cannon, the shrieking and bursting of shells, the crash of falling timbers, as solid shot pierced the walls, our men attempted to finish the bridges. Soon the exploding shells

set several houses on fire, and a portion of the city broke out into flames. But the persistent sharpshooters of the enemy obstinately held their position, and poured in a withering fire. Our engineers were brave, but they were unable to work, exposed as they were to the deliberate aim of riflemen that rarely missed their mark. General Woodbury reported to General Burnside that the bridges could not be built. They must be built," replied the chief. "Try again." Once again our men engaged in the useless endeavor. Once again they were obliged to desist. Once again General Woodbury reported his inability to complete his task. Our artillery could not dislodge those Mississippian riflemen from their position in the town.

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At noon the fog lifted, and the enemy's fire became, if possible, more deadly. General Burnside had been at the Lacy house through most of the morning, anxious and impatient to put his troops across the river. Upon receiving the last report of General Woodbury, he immediately went down to the riverside himself. He at once saw the difficulty. He also saw the remedy. Consulting with his chief of artillery, General Hunt and other officers, he decided to call for volunteers to cross the river in boats, drive out its defenders and hold the town till the bridges should be built. Soldiers from three regiments-the 7th Michigan, the 19th and 20th Massachusetts-sprang forward at the call. Men of the 50th New York were ready to take the place of oarsmen. With the flag of the Union floating in the van, the brave fellows turned the prows of their boats. towards the enemy and pushed off from the shore. A few minutes' strong pulling through the storm of death, and the opposite shore was reached. A party from the 89th New York, of General Getty's division, crossed at a point where the middle bridge was thrown, and our troops soon had the enemy in flank and rear. They rushed eagerly up the bank, along the streets, through the rifle pits, into the houses, and in half an hour's time the city of Fredericksburg was in our possession. The remnants of the Mississippi brigade, with the exception of a few that managed to escape, fell into our hands as prisoners