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peerage of Scotland in parliament till the last election; when two noble dukes, who both possessed British baronies, voted for the two peers, vacancies for whose seats had been made, in consequence of a late determination of that House. He imputed no blame whatever to the two noble dukes in question, but as he conceived their lordships meant that their resolutions should be effectual, and not remain waste paper, he should move, "That a copy of the said resolution be transmitted to the Lord Registrar of Scotland, as a rule for his future proceeding in cases of election."

Lord Douglas (Duke of Queensberry) remarked, that as the motion went materially to affect his rights, he hoped that the House would not precipitately decide a question of such a nature, but would suffer him to be heard by his counsel.

that made some re-delivery necessary. As a proof how little the resolutions of the House were to be considered as equal to law, he stated that, on the 20th December, 1711, that House passed a resolution declaring two noble Scotch dukes, who had been created British peers, incapable of sitting in that House as British peers. He reasoned upon the injustice of these two resolutions in proportion to their different effects and operations. The first took away the votes of the noble dukes as Scotch peers, and the other deprived them of their seats as British peers. The resolution of 1711 was, undoubtedly, a very great hardship, and it had lately been done away; but how? Not by resolution, but by an act of parliament. In like manner, if, upon mature consideration and deliberate discussion, it should be thought right to make the resolution of 1708-9 effectual, let it be done by due course of parliamentary proceeding: let a bill be brought in, and pass through its regular stages, but by no means let the House, acting judicially, decide a matter that involved in it the private rights of individuals. Whenever the question, whe ther the right of a Scotch peer, who had been created a British peer by patent, to vote at the election of Scotch peers to serve in Parliament came to be finally decided, there were other important considerations to be decided at the same time. For instance, suppose a Scotch peer was made a bishop; did he, in that case, lose his right to vote at an election of any of the sixteen peers? When a Scotch peer was created a British peer hy patent, why ought his sons to be deemed ineligible to sit in the other House? Another consideration was, what was the nature of the office of Lord Registrar? Was it purely judicial, or purely ministerial; or was it of a mixed nature? as he took it, the Lord Registrar was to record the decisions of the remnants of the Scotch parliament, the Lords of Council, and the Lords of Session; to authenticate certificates of their proceedings, and at an election to take by his clerks the lists of the lords who voted. He had some time before seen the outlines of a bill for the better regu lating the election of the peers of Scotland; and he could wish to see some such bill brought forward. He could not help approving very much of their electing a Præces of their own number to preside at their meetings instead of the Lord Clerk Registrar. In short, he was decidedly of opinion that there was a variety of matter

Lord Osborne said, that the noble duke appeared to mistake the nature of the motion altogether. It was not a question involving in it considerations of private right, but a plain and simple question, whether that House meant to abide by its resolutions or not. The resolution of 1708-9, was, in his opinion, a clear wellfounded maxim, since as the sixteen peers represented the peerage of Scotland, who were in fact no otherwise represented, Scotch peers created British peers could have no claim to vote, as they sat in parliament in their own right, and had no claim whatever to any part of the compensation made by the acts of union to those, who, having given up their personal right to sit, could only sit virtually and by representation.

The Lord Chancellor earnestly exhorted their lordships to be cautious how they proceeded precipitately to decide a question of much greater importance, than it might, upon the first blush of it, appear to be. He stated, that a resolution of either House of Parliament, however unanimously carried, did not constitute law. Nothing amounted to, or made law, but what had passed both Houses legislatively, and had received the assent of the Crown in the form of an act of parliament. The House were now called upon in their judicial capacity to re-deliver a judgment that they had formerly delivered. There was no new case before the House, and it was diametrically contrary to the practice of every, even the lowest court of justice in the kingdom, to re-deliver a judgment, unless in consequence of some new case,

which stood much in need of regulation by an act of parliament.

The Earl of Hopetoun said, that the object of the motion was to enforce the resolution of the House, which their lordships certainly meant should be the rule of conduct at every future election. It had been obeyed till the late election, when the votes of two noble dukes, who had been created British barons, had beer tendered and taken in the face of the resolution. He denied that it at all intruded upon the private rights of those noble dukes; it left their rights as entire as they were before, and pointed out to them, that if they thought themselves injured, they must apply to that House for a remedy.

Earl Stanhope said, that the learned lord's arguments had been extremely plausible and fallacious. The learned ford had declared the right of voting for representatives in Parliament to be private right. The reverse was the fact. It was a public right, vested in an individual as a trust, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the community. In support of this doctrine he quoted the authority of sir George Savile, a man of sound judgment, great knowledge, profound sagacity, and unimpeachable virtue and integrity. Sir George used to reason thus: if the right of voting at an election were a private right, any individual possessing it might publicly sell it, as he might legally dispose of any other part of his private property. But the fact is otherwise, it is a public right, vested in him as a trustee, and he is liable to heavy penalties if he sells it. That was the clear and undoubted definition of the right of voting. With regard to the present motion and the resolution of 1708-9, neither of them altered the right of the noble dukes in question; they only pointed where they should come for a remedy, if they thought themselves aggrieved. To illustrate his meaning, he stated the case of the last Bedfordshire election, where Mr. St. John was returned, and lord Ongley was a petitioner against a false return. On that occasion, there were two petitions, one against the return, and another upon the merits of the election. In the arguments urged, on considering the case, a distinction had been drawn between the possession and the seat, and it had been agreed, that lord Ongley was entitled to the return. Upon inquiring into the mexits of the election afterwards, the com

mittee re-seated Mr. St. John. In like manner the present motion concluded upon the possession, but did not decide the seat. The learned lord dared, not meet him on the question of law, for there he knew the argument was so strong, that no reasoning could shake it. The noble earl declared himself a strenuous advocate for the motion.

Lord Sydney repeated several points that the Lord Chancellor had touched upon, and urged additional arguments to enforce them; after which, he took notice, that as their lordships Journals furnished no precedent for such a measure, recourse had been had to the other House, in order to find one. He had, he said, spent a great part of his life in that assembly, consequently he was no stranger to its proceedings; but he defied any noble lord to prove that the House of Commons in any one of their election decisions ever came to so strange a resolution as to send down to the returning officer, that they had resolved that such a specific principle ought to govern the election of any borough or town in future. He denied that the doctrine stated by the noble earl who spoke last, had been the opinion of sir George Savile, with whom he had always lived on terms of the strictest intimacy.

Lord Kinnaird said, that he should not have presumed to offer his sentiments so recently after having had a seat in that House, but that he trusted the peculiarity of the question, which so materially affected the rights of those whom he had the honour to represent as well as of himself individually, would plead his apology, and would also secure to him that indulgence for which he should have so much occasion. The motion which their lordships were called upon to agree to, seemed to him confined within very narrow limits, as its obvious purport and intent was, to give full effect, in the first instance, to a solemn determination and resolution of that House, as a construction of law, and which construction had been put upon that law within a few months after the different acts relative thereto had passed that House. In objection to this motion it had been stated, that it would not become the solemnity of proceedings usual to that House, suddenly to decide upon the rights of individuals without having all the parties before them, which agreeing to this motion would certainly by an indirect mode do. That no precedent

of its ever having adopted such a resolution, nor did there now appear any evidence whatsoever of the necessity of creating such a precedent.

To the first objection he should answer, that by adopting this motion the House would only do that which it became their dignity to do, by giving that effect and consequence to a solemn construction of the existing statutes by the highest court of judicature, and which the peculiar construction of the office of Lord Clerk Registrar rendered dubious and uncertain. He perfectly agreed with the learned lord, that a resolution of that House would not constitute or make a law; but he could not help believing that a solemn construction of the existing statutes by the only court of judicature before which the subject could be agitated, and such construction adopted by the very persons, many of whom had been themselves framers of the statutes, entitled him to assert that to be law, which otherwise it might have been possible to have entertained doubts of.

whatever could be shown to this House | to effect the object it had in view. A string of abstract questions were stated to the House, arising out of the circumstances which had happened at the election, and counsel having been heard thereon, it came to solemn resolutions on each, and after having so done, ordered a committee to report as to the number of votes for each candidate, according to the applications of those resolutions: that which their lordships had heard read that day was one of them, and was the only one which had been attempted to be infringed, although it had been held and considered completely as law for near fourscore years; their lordships therefore could not be offended with him for affirming that such was the law, when he was sanctioned by the weight of their own authority and the acquiescence of all those who were interested for 79 years. He could not therefore admit, that the interests of the two noble persons to whom it was reserved to discover that these solemn resolutions of their lordships were founded on a misconstruction of law, were now before them. He must affirm, that he thought that matter was already settled, and the only object of this motion was, to prevent these noble persons from adopting a mode of making their claim, which was injurious to those who thought their rights protected by this resolution. He hoped their lordships would not hesi tate to adopt the motion, and thereby give that effect to their own resolution.

The history of mankind had not furnished their ancestors with any example of the union of two countries circumstanced as England and Scotland were in the year 1706, by which the respective rights and franchises of the individuals of Scotland were to be finally settled and arranged, though exceedingly dissimilar to those of the subjects of the country with which Scotland was to become united; and therefore it was not surprising that some of the terms of the Treaty might be liable to misinterpretation, and particularly those which related to the Peerage. An elective peerage was a thing perfectly novel in its nature, and though much praise is due to the accuracy with which this statute of the 6th of queen Anne is drawn up, yet it is not very extraordinary that the first election in 1708 should have given birth to a great variety of questions relative to the mode of constructing the acts regulating the manner of elections. Accordingly, on that occasion a petition was presented to that House, complaining of a great variety of irregularities; the House, anxious to preclude the possibility of future cavil and doubt respecting the true intent and meaning of the Treaty, and of the different acts on that subject, adopted a mode the most suited to its own dignity and the solemnity of the proceeding, and the best calculated

The Earl of Denbigh said, that the whole of the question appeared to him to be much misunderstood; that the case did not stand upon a resolution, but was still stronger; for instead of a single resolution, it was now the law of parliament, the House having done an act subsequent to the resolution of 1708-9, and ordered the clerk of the parliament at the bar of the House to erase the name of the marquis of Lothian from the return of the Scotch peers, and to insert the name of the marquis of Annandale. The earl expatiated upon that fact, contending that it materially altered the nature of the case. He also gave the history of the resolutions of the Scotch Parliament that had been alluded to, and mentioned that the Lords and Commons both sat in one House, and that of course the question that had been there carried, that no British peer, either then or hereafter, should vote, was a double and a compound question, Had it been divided he did not conceive it would have been

election of Scotch peers, unless his pretensions to the peerage shall have been previously made out to the satisfaction of this House;" and after several more of a similar tendency respecting different claimants of Scotch peerages, there followed a resolution, that copies of all the preceding resolutions be transmitted to the Lord Registrar of Scotland.

carried. With regard to the rights of the noble dukes, they were already decided upon; but it ought to be remembered, that the noble duke who had talked of being heard by his counsel was no longer a duke in that House; he was only baron Douglas. At a dance, a ball, a dinner, or fête, either in his own house, or elsewhere, he was duke of Queensberry, but within those walls he was only lord Douglas. He had given up his pretensions to any higher title, and he had done wisely-he had gotten a better thing for it.

Lord Douglas (Duke of Queensberry) admitted, if the resolution of 1708-9 was good for any thing, he well knew that he had no ground to stand upon; but he Viscount Stormont combated the argu- should still contend that a resolution of ments of the Lord Chancellor and lord that House was not final and conclusive; Sydney, and said, that the learned lord and therefore, if the present motion were had thought proper to oppose a resolution carried, his rights would be injured mateof the House, that had been originally rially, because, if, after the present motion carried without deliberation, and had were to be passed, he were to offer to vote been since condemned and done away at any future election, his vote would be by act of parliament, to a resolution refused, and consequently he should not that had been preceded by ample deli- stand in the situation he then did, as several beration and very copious discussion, noble lords had contended. With regard and which, till lately, had never been to the invalidity of mere resolutions, let called in question. [The Lord Chan- the House look to their Journals, and see cellor said from the woolsack," both reso-how various and contradictory their resolutions were carried by the same men."]lutions were. In the resolution of 1708-9 Viscount Stormont denied that such had and that of 1711, how was his noble anbeen the fact. He recapitulated the his- cestor (the duke of Dover) dealt by? One torical facts of those times, and relied upon resolution took away his vote as a Scotch them, as incontrovertible evidence of the peer, the other took away his seat as a truth of his argument. With regard to the British peer, and surely he was either a resolution of 1708-9, it had been acqui- Scotch or a British peer. He persisted esced in for near eighty years, nor had therefore in his claim to be heard by any clerk, till in a late instance, dared to counsel in defence of his rights before a take any votes declared by that resolution motion was carried which so far changed to be improper. It became therefore highly the nature of those rights, that it would necessary that the House should enforce put him in a worse situation than before, the resolution by sending a copy of it to and prevent him from voting in the first the Lord Registrar of Scotland. He instance. Besides, how fallacious was it owned that he was a little astonished to to tell him, that he should stand were he have heard it said that there was no pre- did, after the motion was carried, when cedent for that House sending any one of the House in that case would be fortified its resolutions to a returning officer. Such by their own resolution against any appeal a declaration must have been owing to an he might bring to their bar, and would accidental lapse of memory; for surely it have nothing to do but to order their resocould not have been forgotten, that solution to be read to him, as binding upon lately as 1762, several persons laid claim themselves, and as a full and complete to Scotch peerages, and attempted to vote answer to all that he could have to urge. at the election of sixteen peers; insomuch that their lordships took notice of it, and entered into a string of resolutions upon the subject. He had one of them in his pocket, which he would read to the House. He then read the words of a resolution stating," That whereas William Alexander claims to vote for the election of Scotch peers under the title of earl of Stirling, resolved, that no person, calling himself a Scotch peer, shall be allowed to vote at an $

The Earl of Morton saw no reason to prefer one resolution of the House to another. As that of 1711 had been considered as unjust, why might not the other resolution of 1708-9 be deemed liable to the same imputation? At least till he heard some good reason to the contrary, he should hold himself entitled so to consider it. The Act of Union directed that sixteen Scotch peers should be chosen by all the Scotch peerage, to be their representatives in par

liament; why, therefore, were they to set up distinctions contradictory to an express act of parliament ?

of our ancestors had found necessary to prevent, forestalling and regrating cattle, and other articles of provision; and the The Duke of Richmond observed, that petitioners apprehend the said evils may it appeared to him to be so unjust to pass in some degree be removed, by reviving to the present motion in the absence of one a proper extent the laws against forestallnoble duke, whose rights would be mate- ing and regrating, and by ascertaining, rially affected by it; and when another licensing, and regulating, the persons emnoble duke standing in the same situation, ployed as salesmen or factors in cattle and desired to be heard by his counsel in other provisions; and that the petitioners defence of his rights, that he could not have entered into a very serious investithink the House ought on any account to gation of the cause of the said evils, which, adopt so monstrous a measure, especially from the importance of the subject, has when it was considered that the matter occupied their attention for a great length had been brought on by surprise. He of time, and has thereby prevented them had no scruple to acknowledge that his from presenting a petition within the time private opinion was, that the resolution of limited by the House for receiving peti1708-9 was right; but under the circum- tions for private bills: and therefore praystances of the case, he thought it most ing, that they may now be at liberty to unjust to attempt to enforce it in such a present a petition for leave to bring in a way as that proposed, without any petition bill, or bills, to prevent forestalling and being presented, any complaint made, or regrating, and for licensing salesmen, facany new occasion formally stated, to war-tors, and others, employed in the sale of rant the House in its judicial capacity to re-pronounce its opinion. He contended, that no judicial court ever took upon themselves, upon their own mere motion, and without a new case before them, to promulgate a judgment long since delivered. He recommended a procedure by bill, in preference to the proposed motion, because it would remove all ground of complaint of injury, and afford the parties who conceived their rights infringed upon, abundant opportunity of making out their claims in the progress of the Bill through its various stages.

The question being put, the House divided: Contents, 51; Not-contents, 35.

Debate in the Commons on the London Petition against Forestallers and Regrators.] May 4. A Petition was presented to the House from the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled, setting forth,

"That the great advance in the price of meat, and other provisions, of late years, by distressing the middling and lower classes of people, has a tendency, in the apprehension of the petitioners, immediately to injure, and at length to destroy the manufactures and commerce of the kingdom; and that the petitioners are advised, and believe, that such advance has been partly occasioned, and is likely to increase, by the repeal, in the 12th year of his present Majesty, of most of the laws, which the wisdom and experience

cattle, or other provisions, or to have such other relief in the premises as to the House shall seem meet.”

May 16. It was moved by alderman Le Mesurier, and seconded by alderman Newnham, that the said Petition be referred to a committee.

Alderman Townshend declared the motion to be founded neither in necessity nor wisdom, nor fit for the House to countenance. There had been, he said, plenty of cattle at Smithfield all the winter, and as the season advanced, the price of butcher's meat would undoubtedly be cheaper. He reminded the House that the laws against forestallers and regrators had long since been repealed on the recommendation of the present Chief-justice of the court of King's-bench, and asked, if the House would, upon the suggestion of a committee of common-councilmen go back and revive what the deliberative wisdom of the legislature had upon experience determined should no longer exist? There were some vexatious suits, he understood, now going on upon some obsolete statutes, and if the present motion were listened to, vexatious prosecutions would be multiplied, and the only object obtained would be, that a few commoncouncilmen would be fed more cheaply than at present. He hoped, therefore, that the House would not suffer the petition to be referred to any committee, and moved, That the motion be negatived.

Mr. Vyner said, that the worthy magis

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