nistration, the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Dundas) moved, in May 1782, "that Mr. Hastings should be recalled from the government of Bengal." He stated, that he moved the recall of Mr. Hastings, because, in his opinion, he had forfeited the confidence of the native princes in India, and could not conclude a peace. It hap pened, however, that, in that very month, and almost on the day the right hon. gentleman made the motion, Mr. Hastings did conclude a peace with the Mahrattas. I have since heard the same right hon. getleman avow in this House, that he was happy the proprietors had resisted that vote, because he was convinced by so doing they had rendered a very essential service to the Company and to this country. The right hon. gentleman declared also, that he had been pressed to remove Mr. Hastings for delinquency, but that he had declined to do so, not thinking him a delinquent. At another time the right hon. gentleman avowed, that, by great exertions, by procuring money, (God knew how or where), Mr. Hastings had been enabled to pay the army, which otherwise must have mutinied, or been disbanded. In March, 1783, the gentlemen who conduct this prosecution again came into office, with the additional strength of a noble lord, formerly the minister, and his numerous friends. The committee will recollect, that the events upon which this charge is founded happened in January, 1782: that complete information of them arrived in England in the autumn of 1782, and that in 1783, a report upon the subject was made by the select committee. Par. liament continued to sit till July; and admitting that there was not time in that session to bring in a general bill of regulation for India, I ask, what could be the reason for not removing Mr. Hastings? If the ministers of that day thought so ill of him as they now pretend to do, they were criminal for continuing him in charge of the first office under the British empire, and for destroying at the time the authority of his office. They had the power of removing him by a short bill in any ten days from April to July. In September 1783, a letter arrived from Mr. Hastings, in which he expressly desired the court of directors to remove him, and to appoint a successor. Of this letter no notice was taken; and in November, it was very plainly discovered for what purposes Mr. Hastings had been continued so many months in office. When the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Fox) introduced his celebrated bill on the 18th of November, 1783, he grounded the necessity of that Bill upon the mismanagement of Mr. Hastings, and upon his interest being so great in the court of proprietors, that there were no hopes of future reformation, without a total overthrow of the privileges of the Company. The Bill passed through this House; but, thank God, was defeated in the other. The nation reprobated the measure: and I call upon gentlemen to declare, whether the mover of that Bill was founded in his predictions as to the ruin or the loss of India, provided his Bill, or one similar to it, was not carried? Upon that occasion if I had been under any apprehension for Mr. Hastings, I might at least have attempted to insure his safety, and might have succeeded; for though it appears by an explanation between two gentlemen in 1786, that I was mistaken as to the extent of the offer that I conceived to have been made on the day that Bill was brought in, (though it is remarkable that my public avowal of the transaction, with my name signed to that avowal, was made a very few days after it happened and was never contradicted by any man openly, or anonymously;) yet it will be allowed, that if I had been under apprehensions for Mr. Hastings, and had met the hon. gentleman who opened the charge yesterday, he might have lost that opportunity of displaying his astonishing eloquence. I have now, Sir, stated the grounds upon which the present prosecution stands. The hon. gentleman (Mr. Francis) has stated to the committee the share he had in the original demand made upon the Begum; and he has said, that he gave his opinion on the impropriety of a woman, immured in a seraglio, presuming to talk of appointing ministers and governing kingdoms; but that, in so doing, he rather meant to glance at Mr. Hastings than the subject then in debate. It would have been fair and candid if he had added what follows in his minute. "With respect to receiving her into the provinces, I shall have no objection, provided she can obtain the Nabob's consent; without that, she can have no right to remove the immense wealth she possesses, or even her own person out of his dominions." I appeal to any gentleman to determine whether the hon. gentleman who wrote this minute in January, 1776, did not conceive, that, notwithstanding the Com pany's guarantee, some power remained in the Nabob. Why say she had no right to remove the immense wealth she possessed without his permission, if all future claims were given up? Her eunuch Behar Ally Cawn had told Mr. Bristow it was amassed, to provide against an emergency. It will be impossible to follow the hon. gentleman who opened this charge. All I shall presume to attempt will be, to detail very shortly what was our situation in Oude in 1781, what reduced us to that situation, and then to consider whether Mr. Hastings was justifiable in consenting, first to the resumption of the jaghires, and afterwards to the seizure of the treasures. In one point we are all agreed, that the province of Oude, from having been in a state of prosperity, was reduced to very great distress. I assert, that this distress was brought upon the country by measures in which Mr. Hastings not only had no concern, but, as the gentlemen who carried them into effect observed to the court of directors, which he opposed in every stage. The treaty of Benares of 1773, was merely a modification of the treaty concluded at Allahabad in 1765. By the treaty of Benares, Sujah Dowlah was to pay two lacks and 10,000 rupees a month for a brigade of British troops, when doing duty in his dominions; and when Sujah Dowlah died in February, 1775, Mr. Hastings was of opinion that no new treaty should be made. The majority, Mess. Clavering, Monson, and Francis, determined otherwise; and they obtained from the young Nabob the districts of Benares and Ghazepore, and an addition of six lacks of rupees a year to the former subsidy. Mr. Hastings then predicted, as may be seen in the fifth report of the secret committee, that these conditions could never be fulfilled, and that they were inconsistent with former treaties. When Sujah Dowlah died in 1775, he left his army from eight to twelve months in arrear; and there was a very considerable sum due to the Company. I refer gentlemen to the correspondence of Mr. Bristow in those days, to prove the wretched and miserable state of the Nabob's government. In October, 1775, he applied for British officers to command his troops. These were granted, and were undoubtedly the source of additional distress to his finances. With regard to the oppressions said to have been committed in Oude, and the plunder of that country by British officers, i am totally ignorant of the subject; for [VOL. XXVI. ] myself, I should have no objection to proclaim the amount of the fortune I acquired in India to-morrow morning at Charingcross. And I can safely answer, that in marching in the command of a small detachment through a part of Oude in 1773, the utmost that I received was a few bullocks and a few sheep, which were sent to me by Sujah Dowlah: but that the avowed and fair advantages of officers serving in Oude on the Vizier's establishment, were infinitely superior to any that were enjoyed by officers in our own provinces, is a fact of public notoriety, and cannot be mentioned as a reflection upon any one. The pay of the monthly subsidy for the regular brigade, of the corps under British officers, of the Naboh's separate military establishment, added to the enormous amount of his other expenses, had so greatly deranged his affairs, that the country was precisely in the state which Mr. Bristow represents on the 22nd Jan. 1777, and from that day I date Mr. Hastings's responsibility to commence. I entreat gentlemen to read that letter, and they will see how truly Mr. Hastings's prophetic apprehensions were fulfilled. His first measure was to propose to the Nabob either to withdraw the British officers from his service, or to consent to their being put upon the same establishment with our own army, and tr be relieved at stated periods by other battalions. To this arrangement the Nabob consented; nor was it attended with any additional expense to him. The Nabob's dominions continued in 1777 and 1778 in the same state as in the two preceding years. The debt, when Mr. Middleton took charge, was 70 lacks of rupees, and was never diminished until finally liquidated by Mr. Hastings in 1785. In April 1779, the Nabob wrote a very strong complaint to Calcutta of the injuries he sustained by the weight of our demands upon him; but what is pretty singular, he added, that the difficulties he then laboured under he experienced for three years, that is, from the first adoption of a system in which Mr. Hastings had no concern, and the mischievous consequence of which system he had predicted. In 1780, the Nabob renewed his complaint; but it is perfectly clear, that, at either of these periods, Mr. Hastings could not have withdrawn the British troops from his dominions. In 1781, Mr. Hastings met the Nabob at Chunar: to this time, he had protected the Begum in the possession of all her rights, under the Company's [Y] guarantee. The propriety of resuming the jaghires under the then existing circumstances seems to be allowed. The principal point is the seizure of the treasures; and the circumstance to be proved, in order to justify that measure, is, that the Begums, by themselves and their agents, did openly encourage the levy of troops for the service of Cheit Sing, and were in a state of open hostility to the Nabob and the English at that period. The letter of Mr. Middleton to Mr. Hastings, dated the 17th of October, 1781, contains information, sufficient to fix this point beyond dispute, that the Begums and their eunuchs Jeuar and Behar Ally Cawn, did publicly raise troops for the service of Cheit Sing, in Sept. 1781, and that they were as active and as hostile to the British interest at that interesting period, as their situations would enable them to be. The important facts mentioned in Mr. Middleton's letter were afterwards confirmed by col. Hannay, capt. Williams, capt. Gordon, and major Macdonald, as well as by several native officers under their command. To these are opposed, the letters of col. Hannay and captain Gordon, acknowledging their obligations to the Begum for relieving captain Gordon when in great distress at Tanda. Col. Hannay is no more, but capt. Gordon was in England last year, and is so still I believe. It is extraordinary, that he was never called before the committee. That col. Hannay acted with proper policy, in temporizing with the Begum at that critical moment is allowed: but why her release of capt. Gordon should be brought as a proof that she was not disaffected to the British government, I cannot conceive; for I do not find that the hon. gentleman has at all attempted to invalidate the depositions of col. Hannay. These stated, that his troops were seduced from him the 8th Sept. 1781, at Fyzabad-that his sepoys were not permitted to enter the town that troops were publicly raised there for Cheit Sing; and in his letter to Mr. Middleton, the 5th Sept. 1781, col. Hannay writes that the Begums themselves had almost recruited for Cheit Sing. Col. Hannay also swears that he 'represented these improprieties to the Begum, but could obtain no answer. One circumstance in col. Hannay's deposition is most singular, that a few days previous to his arrival at Fyzabad, a commander named Sher Cawn, had marched with 1,000 horse and foot to reinforce Cheit Sing. These troops are called Nujubs. It is deposed by Cheit Sing's second officer, that there were 1,000 Nujubs from Lucknow in Cheit Sing's army, and the commanding officer of our troops took some wounded Nujubs prisoners. This is a most material confirmation of col. Hannay's account, for they are unquestionably the same men; since it is evident Cheit Sing's officer mistook Lucknow for Fyzabad, a mistake that might very naturally have happened. To the various depositions that were taken in order to prove the reality of the Begums' share in the rebellion of Cheit Sing, may be added the general opinion of every officer who was in that part of India, in Sept. 1781. I have never yet conversed with an officer who did not confirm the truth of the depositions. I have been assured, that by the daily reports of the hircarrahs, who brought intelligence during the rebellion of Cheit Sing, the road from Fyzabad to Benares, was filled with troops raised by the Begums' eunuchs. If it should be observed, why was not evidence called to these points by Mr. Hastings; I put it to the honour and candour of gentlemen, to consider how the prosecution has been carried on, or if there is any thing similar to it in history. I could not last year obtain half an hour for the examination of a single officer, capt. Williams excepted, whose evidence delivered at the bar is most important. The hon. gentleman who spoke yesterday, talked much of suffering millions, and that the British character in India had materially suffered by this transaction. I deny both his assertions; and I appeal to facts, which are of more consequence than mere declamation. Will the hon. gentleman point out a period when the British character in India stood higher, than im◄ mediately after that he alludes to, or than it does at the present moment? It is a singular circumstance that so far from the Begum having ever complained of an injury done to her, except what is stated in her letter to Mr. Bristow, in Oct. 1782, she voluntarily consented, as well as her brother Salar Jung, in 1784, to contribute a sum of money from the income of her jaghire, in order to enable the Nabob Vizier to liquidate his debt to the Company. It is now two years since Mr. Hastings resigned the government of Bengal. Has any complaint been transmitted against him from the Begum, or from any person in India? Where are the suffering millions which the hon. gentleman alludes to? I appeal to facts, to prove that in no period of the history of India was Bengal in a more flourishing state, or the revenues better collected, or with so little severity, as during the height of the late war. The hon. gentleman has been very profuse of his censures; but I would ask him, in what part of the world has the British character been better sustained than in India during the late war? A British officer will ever be a respectable character, serve where he will; but where have our officers served with equal success, as in India during the late war, or with so much substantial service to the country? The hon. gentleman has dwelt upon points that are totally foreign to the charge against Mr. Hastings. It is in evidence, that not only Mr. Hastings could have no concern in the distresses of the women of the Khord Mahal, but that no English gentleman had at any time the slightest concern with that zenana. Major Gilpin, who happened to be at Fyzabad when the unfortunate women immured in it were in so much distress, did what I am sure every British officer would have done on the same occasion. He applied for relief, and he obtained it: but it is remarkable that these distresses were not notified to Mr. Hastings or the council, until after the relief had been given. With regard to the eunuchs Jeuar and Behar Ally Cawn, it is also a fact, that the severities practised to compel them to pay the money they had stipulated to pay, were never communicated to Mr. Hastings, or the council, until after their release in Oct. 1782, and then the particulars having been sent as inclosures in a letter, were entered upon the consultations; but that they were never read by any one member of the board is evident, since, on the 3d of March 1783, the whole board wrote to Mr. Bristow to know what had been done relative to the recovery of the balance, and they ordered that the most effectual means should be taken for the immediate recovery of it. heard, he had a reply to make to every charge in five days, it will scarcely be expected that he had not some assistance; indeed, he has said so in the beginning of his reply to this charge: after saying this, I do now declare upon my honour, that Mr. Hastings neither wrote nor read the reply to this charge: it was cursorily read to him by me, and the inaccuracy in it escaped his attention and my own. He added a very few lines, in which no inaccuracy appears, and in this state it was read to the House. After having said this, it will be no difficult matter most ef fectually to explain this error. Mr. Hastings's defence states as one reason for seizing the Begum's treasures, that she had resisted the resumption of her jaghires with actual force. No such argu. ment was ever urged by Mr. Hastingswhether the committee shall determine for or against him, the fact is clear, that he has at all times avowed, that he strenuously supported the Nabob in seizing the Begum, in consequence of the active part she took in the insurrection of Benares. Mr. Hastings consented to the seizure of the Begum's treasures on the 1st Dec. 1781, and wished it to be done immediately. He repeatedly wrote with the greatest earnestness to Mr. Middleton upon it, and threatened to go to Lucknow himself, unless he would accomplish this point. It was not until the 8th of January, that the Nabob and Mr. Middleton had arrived at Fyzabad. In the interval between the 2d Dec. and the 8th of Jan., orders had been issued for the resumption of the jaghire, and resisted, which the Nabob assigned as a reason for seizing his mother's treasuresbut Mr. Hastings's encouragement and support of that measure, was originally taken up upon one ground only, namely, the share the Begums had in the insurrection of Cheit Sing; of this his correspondence with Mr. Middleton in Dec., gives most ample proof. In Mr. Hastings's letter to the board of the 23d Jan. 1782, he says, "This resolution" (to seize the treasures) "I have strenuously encouI now come to take notice of the argu-raged and supported, not so much for the ments of the hon. gentleman on the contradictions that appear in the face of Mr. Hastings's defence, which in one instance is very material: but in effectually clearing Mr. Hastings from this charge, I am afraid I shall incur the risk of bringing another upon him; I mean the charge of disrespect to the House. If it is considered, however, that when he petitioned to be reasons assigned by the Nabob, as because I think it equally unjust, and impolitic, that they should be allowed to retain the means, of which they have already made so pernicious a use, by exciting disturbances in the country, and a revolt against the Nabob their sovereign." In short, there are a thousand incontrovertible proofs, that Mr. Hastings had never the most distant idea of grounding his consent to the seizure of the treasures, on the resistance made by the Begums to the resumption of the jaghires; nor was it ever so understood by the directors at home, or by the Begum in India, since she herself in her letter to Mr. Bristow, says, "The conspiration now framed an accusation against me, of a conduct which I never had conceived even in idea, of rendering assistance to Rajah Cheit Sing." and very unexpectedly, and very unac- He I now desire to call the attention of gentlemen to the arduous situation of India at the time these events occurred; and I am the more desirous of doing this, because I find a very fallacious gloss is thrown upon the single circumstance of Mr. Hastings having, in the midst of his difficulties at Chunar, effected a separate peace with Madagee Scindia, which in its consequences restored peace to India at a more distant period. I can affirm most safely, that there never was a period of history in which any empire upon earth was in a more precarious state than the British empire in India, from Oct. 1780, to the beginning of 1783; and that the most critical time, even of that momentous period, was precisely at the instant when Mr. Hastings strenuously encouraged and supported the Nabob in seizing the treasures in his mother's possession for the liquidation of the Company's debt. Whatever gentlemen may think in these days of tranquillity, warmed and animated as they have been, and still are, by the eloquence of the hon. gentlemen, the time of cool reflection will come, and then they will be convinced that India was saved by the recovery, in January 1782, of the debt due to the Company by the Nabob. I do not desire the truth of this fact to rest upon my assertion, but shall proceed to prove it. In Sept. 1780, the intelligence was received in Calcutta, that Hyder Ally Cawn had defeated colonel Baillie's detachment, and that sir Hector Munro had found it necessary first to retreat to the Mount, and from thence to Madras. In that situation, men, money, and provisions, were required from Bengal, in order to save the Carnatic. But this was not all-at the same time accounts were re-loans; and in Nov. 1781, when it was ceived, that a very strong armament was expected from the island of Mauritius and from France to co-operate with Hyder Ally. This armament arrived the following month of January, consisting, of seven sail of the line, with frigates, and a number of French troops. Very fortunately, I beg leave to mention a very singular circumstance, in order to prove the distress to which we were reduced. Our army in Bengal was considerably in arrears. Our investment was kept up by absolutely necessary to send a considerable supply of money to sir Eyre Coote, the council in Calcutta, Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Macpherson, could not complete the sum from the public treasury; but, upon the credit of a principal native in Ĉal. cutta, borrowed five lacks of rupees, |