Missouri Compromise in 1854, covers thirty years. In two respects, namely, the rise of the new radical democracy under Andrew Jackson, and the growth of sectionalism over the slavery issue, this period was highly critical. In view of these events the most difficult task of the Whigs, clearly discerned and heartily accepted by them, under the patriotic and conservative leadership of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, was to moderate and enlighten, rather than antagonize, the new democracy; and what proved to be beyond their powersto overcome the disrupting influence of the slavery issue.

The inaugural address and the messages to Congress of President J. Q. Adams set forth clearly the nationalizing, broad-construction programme of the new party. But his supporters in Congress, imperfectly organized and facing a powerful opposition, accomplished very little in the way of legislation. The election of 1828 gave to Andrew Jackson the Presidency, and to the people, in a higher degree than ever before, the control of the government. The president's attack upon the Bank, the introduction of the modern "spoils system" into the federal civil service, the unprecedented use of the veto power, Jackson's assumption of powers which his opponents deemed unconstitutional, and his personal hostility towards Clay, who had succeeded Adams in the leadership of the party, brought about, under Whig leadership, a coalition of opposition parties which influenced deeply and permanently the character, policy and fortunes of the Whig party. It became the champion of the Bank, of the rights of Congress, and of the older and purer form of the civil service. Moreover, as a means of strengthening the bond with their new allies the Whigs learned to practise a tolerance towards the opinions and even the principles of their associates which is exceptional in the history of American political parties. In strict accord with their own principles, however, the Whigs supported the president during the nullification controversy. The renown of Webster as the foremost expositor of the national theory of the Union rests largely on his speeches during this controversy, in particular on his celebrated reply to Senator R. Y. Hayne

of South Carolina. Nevertheless, after vindicating the rights of the Union, most of the Whigs supported Clay in arranging the compromise tariff of 1832 which enabled the nullifiers to retreat without acknowledging discomfiture. The majority of the Northern Whigs, with the entire Southern membership of the party, disapproved the propaganda of the Abolitionists on the ground of its tendency to endanger the Union, and many from a like motive voted for the "gag rules" of 1835-1844, which in spirit if not in letter, violated the constitutional right of petition. In the election of 1832 Clay was the nominee of the party for the Presidency, but in 1836 and 1840, purely on grounds of expediency, the Whig conventions nominated General W. H. Harrison. During the administration of Martin Van Buren the Whigs tried with success to make party capital out of the panic of 1837, which they ascribed to Jackson, and out of the long depression that followed, for which they held Van Buren responsible. The election of General Harrison in the "log cabin and hard cider" campaign of 1840 proved a fruitless victory; the early death of the President and the antiWhig politics of his successor, John Tyler, whom the Whigs had imprudently chosen as Vice-President, shattered their legislative programme.

In 1844 Clay was again the Whig candidate, and the annexation of Texas, involving the risk of a war with Mexico, was the leading issue. The Whigs opposed annexation, and the prospect of success seemed bright, until Clay, in the effort to remove Southern misapprehensions, wrote that he "would be glad" at some future time to see Texas annexed if it could be done "without dishonor, without war, with the common consent of the Union, and upon just and fair terms." It is widely held that this letter turned against Clay the anti-slavery element and lost him the Presidency. The triumph of Polk in 1844 was followed by the annexation of Texas and by war with Mexico. The Whigs opposed the war, but on patriotic grounds voted supplies for its prosecution. The acquisition of Texas, and the assured prospect of a great territorial enlargement, at the cost of Mexico, brought to the front the ques

tion of slavery in the new domain. The agitation that followed continued through the presidential election of 1848, in which the Whigs elected General Zachary Taylor, and did not subside until the passage of the compromise measures of 1850. To its authors this compromise seemed essential to the preservation of the Union; but it led directly to the destruction of the Whig party. In the North, where the inhumane Fugitive Slave Law grew daily more odious, the adherence to the compromise, on which Clay and Webster insisted, weakened the party fatally. The alternative, namely, a committal of the party to the repeal of the obnoxious law, would have driven the Southern Whigs into the camp of the Democrats, leaving the Northern Whigs a sectional party powerless to resist the disruption of the Union. The only weapons that the Whigs knew how to use in defence of the Fugitive Slave Law were appeals to patriotism and sectional bargaining, and these could be employed only so long as the party remained intact.

The National Whig Convention of 1852, the last that represented the party in its entirety, gave to the Northern Whigs the naming of the candidate - General Winfield Scott - who was defeated in the ensuing election, and to the Southern the framing of the platform with its "finality" plank, which, as revised by Webster, read as follows:

"That the series of acts of the Thirty-second Congress, the act known as the Fugitive Slave Law included, are received and acquiesced in by the Whig party of the United States as a settlement in principle and substance of the dangerous and exciting questions which they embrace . . . and we will maintain this system as essential to the nationality of the Whig party and the integrity of the Union."

Two years later the repeal of the Missouri Compromise by the Kansas-Nebraska Act demonstrated that "this system" could not be maintained, and that in committing the Whig party to the policy of its maintenance the Convention of 1852 had signed the death-warrant of the party.

Among the services of the Whigs the first in importance are these: During the thirty critical years in which under the lead

ership of Clay and Webster they maintained the national view of the nature of the Union, the Whigs contributed more than all their rivals to impress this view upon the hearts and minds of the people. During this same extended period as peacemakers between the sections they kept North and South together until the North had become strong enough to uphold by force the integrity of the Union. And lastly they bequeathed to the Republican party the principles on which, and the leader, Abraham Lincoln, through whom the endangered Union was finally saved.

WR

E HAVE been trying ever since the close of the Civil War to obliterate the old sectional lines. Our success although considerable, is far from perfect; the lines are still traceable; the terms North and South retain too much of their earlier meaning. This vitality of the sectional spirit, so long after the main cause which produced it has disappeared, testifies to the completeness of the sectionalization and to the conservatism of the American character; but these facts do not constitute a sufficient explanation. The public spirit and the practical instincts of the American people favor the fullest and speediest reconciliation. Why is it so slow in coming? I believe that an important but generally overlooked reason is the erroneous character of prevalent theories respecting the origin and nature of the secession movement. In the North those who seceded are assigned an unjust degree of responsibility for secession and its consequences. In the South, on the contrary, the defenders of the Union are regarded as aggressors, and therefore as responsible for all that was suffered by the South.

What exactly is the Northern theory? Previous to the passage of the ordinance by which South Carolina undertook to make herself independent of the United States, the North had never really believed that a serious attempt to destroy the Union would be made. Threats of disunion had been heard often, and at times these had borne the marks of settled purpose, as for example in 1849. But hitherto they had yielded 1 The Political Science Quarterly, Vol. II, September, 1887.