eyewitnessing the four great-nation river-development programs, is qualified unchallengeably to have an opinion as to "the relative size, scope, and velocity of these programs in actual results."

While for obvious reasons this distinguished engineer is not available to this United States Senate committee as a witness, his opinion has been solicited, and in personal conversation he endorses the broad generalizations set down herein, and further courteously provided the voluminous texts of his reports to his Government on his Russian and Chinese travels. These frequently directly, if incidentally, answer the committee's inquiries, and will be incorporated in the committee files for the convenience of Senators as are interested.

There is in the committee's instruction, an implicit desire (expressed by reference to "logical projections of the trends registered") as to information regarding where these relative river and other water programs may lead. While the larger and more populous Communist nations are currently all out and accelerating their river and water programs, similar work in the United States has been and is being cut back. However, answer to this future question invades the area of prophecy and violates the request to "report factually on what and how much is being done in this field; where and just how it is done," and not what will or may happen.

RUSSIAN LEADER'S PREDICTION

Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chief of the Soviet Communist Party, gave a direct answer to this question very recently when he publicly pro

claimed:

The Soviet Union can in the next 15 years not only catch up with the United States in the production of basic items but also outstrip it.

The context of Mr. Khrushchev's forecast establishes that he certainly considers hydroelectric energy, irrigated food, water, transport, and flood control as "basic items" of Soviet production. And obviously his prophecy, to be factual, presupposes a prerequisite knowledge of not only what the Soviets will do in the next 15 years, but also what river development will be undertaken in the United States in the same period, which in the final analysis appears more within the jurisdiction of the Congress than within the authority of the Soviet spokesman.

In any event, this reporter is not forecasting in the absence of positive knowledge as to what either the Soviets or the U. S. A. will do in the next 15 years. Khrushchev is positive.

We declare war on the United States in peaceful production

he recently told William Randolph Hearst, Jr., an American reporter at the Kremlin.

We declare that war. We will win over the United States. The threat to the United States is not the intercontinental missile. We are relentless in this.

AMERICAN SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The foregoing summary report is supplemented by the following pertinent specifics and details, as well as citation of sources that the chairman directed this reporter

to collect and assemble from any sources easily available to this committee or yourself, and then set down in the form of a report to the committee.

Executive Department sources included the Federal Power Commission; the Central Inteligence Agency; the Department of Agricul ture; the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce; the Bureau of Reclamation, Interior Department; and others. The United Nations records, and those of Great Britain, and the Government of India provided acceptable statistics, as did wide technical and daily press reports, plus a quarter of a century of accumulated study. Because rivers run downhill in anybody's country and everybody's language, measurements of scope and velocity of water programs are reduced to universal units of energy, area volume, and weight, as far as possible. There is herein a deliberate avoidance of monetary symbols which become confusing or meaningless comparisons in the closed economy of Russia and China. Likewise, the obvious direct comparison of governmental fostered electrical energy production in the United States and Soviet Russia is avoided. This, too, would be meaningless since the United States in the past 6 years has partially stopped, as a matter of executive policy, adding Government-produced power to its energy totals, while all Soviet power is government-produced. Further, for simplicity, few differentiations are made between hydro or thermal sources of generation, while atomicenergy-produced power is disregarded. Russia leads in this coming latter field, but all atomic kilowatts produced anywhere are still inconsequential in overall totals here considered.

SOVIET RUSSIA'S POWER RECORD

Of all areas examined, the most precise and thorough figures and breakdowns for this relative study, both for Soviet Russia and the United States, are available in the electrical power field. This is natural on the Russian side, because ever since Lenin enunciated the historic formula "communism is the Soviet power plus electrification of the whole U. S. S. R." 27 years ago, Russia has been on an all-out drive of unprecedented proportions, continuity, and results to attain world leadership in national kilowatt-hour production. That end, not yet achieved, has been, and is being, adhered to as basic Soviet doctrine invariably accompanied and interwoven in all pronunciamentos qualifying power leadership as fundamental and essential Communist doctrine. Because of the recognized relationships between kilowatt availability and national strength-economic, industrial, or military-as well as because of the political controversy—the Russian versus American power comparisons found in this surveytogether with sources are set down in raw form to reveal mathematical variation despite general agreement and unanimity as to trend.

There is general agreement currently that United States overall power production capacity (all inclusive regardless of thermal, hydro, public, private, or other categories) has in recent years been doubling by the decade. The Federal Power Commission's last authoritative figures (1948 through 1956) show a United States increase of 96.8 percent while the same agency's calculation for the same span gave the Soviet Russian increase as 137.8 percent.

British sources give Soviet actual installed capacity (in megawatts) over a 38-year span as 1,000 for the year 1917, 11,000 for 1940, 10,700 for 1945 (reflecting World War II plant destruction), 36,900 for

1955, and add that at the end of 1960 (the end of the current 5-year plan) it is expected that the total U. S. S. R.1 will be 75,000 megawatts, which would indicate slightly more than doubling U. S. S. R. capacity in 5 years contrasted with current doubling of U. S. capacity in 10 years. The British source is the British Electricity Supply Delegation, an industry group that had the advantage of an extended eyewitness inspection and appraisal of the Russian endeavor last year before reporting. The chairman was Lord Citrine, personally known to this reporter as a competent appraiser and inspector in this field. The full British report is placed in the committee files.

INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S REPORT

An entirely independent Indian Government source reports the rise of Russian kilowatt production in words as follows:

In 1913 the U. S. S. R. power generated was 2 billion kilowatt-hours. In 1920, due to the ravages of World War I, the power generated was reduced to an estimated 0.4 billion kilowatt-hours, virtually all in thermal powerhouses * * * (here is omitted report of the origin of the Communist power concept and ideology). In 1938 the power production was 40 billion kilowatt-hours. Thus the target set by the plan in 1920 has been exceeded nearly threefold. Continued progress was maintained in the electrical supply industry with the result that power production was as follows:

Thus it will be seen that within 35 years-the equivalent of 6 to 7 5-year-plan periods, the electric supply (production) which was 0.4 billion kilowatt-hours has reached 149 billion kilowatt-hours-nearly 350 times the original figure * * * It is pointed out that the Indian report is in actual production kilowatt-hours, which differ from but are related to the British report which is in terms of installed nameplate capacity to produce. This quotation is from a report of Indian Government officials to New Delhi after the advantage of an extended U. S. S. R. power inspection. The 14 Indian officials making eyewitness appraisal of the Russian program were headed by Shri Konwar Sain.

RUSSIAN REPORT TO UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations pertinent information received direct from its member country, the U. S. S. R., consists generally of official verbatim unevaluated and accepted reports. Of interest is the text of N. A. Bulganin's presentation as chairman of the Council of Ministers at Moscow to the Congress of the Communist Party in February 1956 when outlining the sixth 5-year plan (1956 to 1960) on the topic of Electrification, he proclaimed:

The central committee of the party consistently adheres to Lenin's instructions concerning the electrification of the country.

In 1955 the total output of the power stations of the Soviet Union was 170,000 million kilowatt-hours or 31⁄2 times as much as in 1940. Nevertheless, the de

In the interest of brevity Soviet Russia is hereafter referred to as "U. S. S. R." and the United States as "U. S."

99182-57-2

mand for power was met only with difficulty. It will be necessary in the sixth 5-year plan to insure a rapid increase of power-producing capacity so as to satisfy fully the demand of the national economy and create a reserve power capacity. Whereas the total industrial output will increase by 65 percent the production of electric power is to be increased by 88 percent and the powergenerating capacity by 120 percent.

Our country has abundant hydropower resources. Hydroelectric stations are profitable since they require no fuel and produce power at the lowest cost.

Great attention will be paid in the sixth 5-year plan to the building of hydroelectric stations whose capacity will be increased by 170 percent.

United Nations economic files show that Chairman Bulganin identified and described the rivers and the hydrostations thereon that are to yield these kilowatt-hours by 1960 plus the "directive" of the Council of Ministers (unanimously adopted) commanding the identical program the chairman outlined. As the "directive" covered all sources of energy, it was interesting to note the Russians are committed to a far higher increase in hydropower than in oil, coal, or thermal power energies, all of which they also seek to increase substantially by 1960.

SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OUTLINED

Several other significant items on the Russian electrification program reflected in the British, United Nations, Indian, and most other reports are:

1. The U. S. S. R. power program seems to be planned to meet its industrial loads primarily with less consideration of agricultural, rural, or domestic loads which, however, are not omitted.

2. The Soviet program is always internally justified on the basis of eventual full potential, multiple-purpose, basinwide development.

3. The transmission program in span and pressure exceeds any anywhere. It calls for a single grid linking up of the vast U. S. S. R. operating at 400,000 volts. Relatively, there is no installation of this high voltage or span in the U. S. A. The initial lines of this grid in the European U. S. S. R. area are built and in operation. They link the principal Volga River stations and Moscow. The Siberian (eastern) section and the east-west tie are scheduled for operation by 1960.

4. There are now four hydroelectric stations either completed, in operation, or under construction in the U. S. S. R., any one of which will exceed the capacity of Grand Coulee on the Columbia River in Washington, which has long been the largest single hydropower producer anywhere. They are Kuibishev and Stalingrad, now generating on the Volga River, and Bratsk on the Angara River, and Kraznoyarsk on the Yenisei River, both in construction in Siberia. They were undertaken individually on an overlapping schedule during the years the United States considered its ability but did not undertake to erect Hells Canyon on the Snake River, the only comparable, if lesser, hydro station in America.

5. With the terracing of the Volga-Don interconnected river system in European U. S. S. R. well toward but not finally completed, the Soviets now are turning to the vast hydro potential of the Arctic-bound central Siberian, Angara, Ob, and Yenisei

Rivers for the vastly expanded hydropower production they promise themselves by 1960. The Bratsk and Krasnoyarsk stations, each designed to 3,200,000-kilowatt capacity (Grand Coulee has 2 million kilowatts), are listed as only the initial 2 of many Siberian producers in what appears to be planned as a stupendous electrometallurgical and electrochemical complex.

The entire Soviet power endeavor, the literature and propaganda reiterates, is undertaken on a self-contained basis with the philosophy that the essential generators, turbines, cement, steel, lines, hardware, etc., must be produced internally by the economy they are designed to augment. Also the essential skills, engineering and technical talent, are to be produced nationally. They are to come from a conglomeration of institutes, colleges, and research centers. Variations on United States of America scientific and technical procedure are reported, but no new basic discoveries of scientific facts with which this committee is not familiar. Nothing in the nature of a "scientific breakthrough" is reported. Heavy machinery, mechanization, and construction practices are employed in a fashion not identical but basically similar to the United States.

(The British, Indian, and United Nations versions are herein set forth in some detail because they have the virtue of eyewitness origin, not similarly enjoyed by any United States officials to this reporter's knowledge, and further to insulate data and conclusions from any of the emotions and repercussions of what is termed the "public versus private power" conflicts the committee is invariably confronted with in considering this subject on a domestic basis. British, Indian, and U. N. officials are deemed unaffected, disinterested in, and frequently simply mystified by that conflict which is primarily an all-American luxury not for export and, therefore, not pertinent to or discussed in this study.)

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE REPORT

The U. S. Department of Commerce (European Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce) data on the Soviet economy's last report is that from 1955 to 1956 total U. S. S. R. power went from 170.1 billion to 192 billion kilowatt-hours, a 13-percent rise. The hydroelectric (as differentiated from total power, including thermal), for the parallel year rose from 23.1 billion to 29 billion kilowatt-hours, which, in percentage, is 25 percent, or double the overall power increase.

The same analysts, on a longer time basis of 27 years as an item of Soviet industrial production, list U. S. S. R. electric production as skyrocketing from 5 billion kilowatt-hours in 1928 to 170.1 billion in 1955 for a 3,402.0-percent increase. The Russian power emphasis is further reflected in this study by the fact that the kilowatt increase is about triple the U. S. S. R. coal, pig iron, steel, or cement increases, used statistically in the identical study as key indexes of Soviet industrial production in identical periods.