pendent of all other States, in like manner as indivi- sation of Westpha § 10. A State is admitted into the fellowship of NationaliNations either overtly by the recognition of its Inde- States. pendence in some Public Act on the part of the Established Powers, or tacitly by being allowed to be a contracting party to a Public Convention entered into with the Established Powers. Thus the States of the Roman Empire of the Germans, upon the signature of the Treaty of Westphalia, became de jure Treaty of members of the European family of Nations. Their capacity to make conventions among themselves and with non-Germanic Powers, without the political sanction of the Emperor and the Empire, had been under the VIIIth Article of that Treaty explicitly recognised by the established Powers, and so became part of the Public Law of Europe. On the other hand the Federal Union of North American States was de facto recognised as a Nation by France, when Louis XVIth concluded the Treaties of Paris, (Feb. 6th, 1778,) with the Envoys of the Thirteen Provinces ; and by the Low Countries, when the States General concluded the Treaty of the Hague with them, (Octr. 8th, 1782); and the claim of the Union to be generally regarded as a Nation, became indisputable from Denationalisation the day when the Mother Country acknowledged de facto her former dependencies to be sui juris by entering into international engagements with the Federal Union. (Treaty of Versailles, Sept. 3, 1783.) 13 On the other hand, the Denationalisation of a State of States. ensues, upon its ceasing to have the capacity to enter into engagements freely with other Nations, whether it has voluntarily renounced its capacity, or has been deprived of it by a superior Power. Thus the Republics of the Valais and of Geneva, and the Principality of Neuchatel, voluntarily renounced their capacity to enter into treaty-engagements with foreign powers upon their admission into the Union of Helvetic States 13, and the separate Nationality of each State was thenceforth merged in the common Nationality of the Federal Union. On the other hand, the princes of the Germanic Empire who were mediatised upon Confedera- the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, the Rhine, (July 12, 1806,) were interdicted by the independent members of that Confederation, to whose sovereignty they had been made respectively subject, from entering into treaty-engagements with Foreign Powers. They accordingly ceased to occupy the place in the family of Nations, into which they had been admitted by the Treaty of Westphalia. tion of July 12, 1806. Hobbes' view of political society. § II. Hobbes' has adopted a view of the origin of Political Society, according to which no community would be entitled to be regarded as a Nation, unless it were adequate to maintain its independence against all external assault by its own intrinsic strength 15. 13 Martens, Nouveau Recueil 14 Ibid. VIII. p. 488. qui in mutuam opem conspirant, tantus sit, ut paucorum hominum ad hostes accessio non sit ipsis conspicui momenti ad victoriam. De Cive, c. 5. § 3. Such an idea of independence as applicable to Political Societies, however tenable it may be in abstract theory, will be found in practice to be too absolute, as there are weaker and stronger members of the family of Nations, and the weaker members owe the maintenance of their independence to the mutual fears and jealousies of the more powerful Nations, whilst on the other hand the stronger members could not maintain themselves single-handed against the combined assault of the weaker Nations. A State is entitled to be regarded as independent, if it be not de jure dependent upon any other State for its freedom of political action. Nations. § 12. The independence of a Nation is absolute, Equality of and not subject to qualification, so that Nations in respect of their intercourse under the Common Law are Peers or Equals 16; and their rights and obligations are under that law reciprocal. Power and weakness do not in this respect give rise to any distinction, and a Free City of Germany is as much an independent State as the Empire of the Ottomans. It results from this equality, that whatever is lawful for one Nation is equally lawful for another, and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally unjustifiable in the other. As independence is an essential condition of Nationality, a Nation will be justified in doing or practising whatever is necessary for the maintenance of its independence. The right of self-defence is accord- Right of ingly a primary right of Nations, and it may be exer- fence. cised either by way of resistance to immediate assault, or by way of precaution against threatened aggression. The indefeasible right of every Nation 16 Vattel, Préliminaires, § 18. Heffter, § 27. Klüber, § 89. Wolff, § 16. Self-de Perfect and Rights of to provide for its own defence, is classed by Vattel amongst its perfect rights. 13. The distinction which Vattel has drawn Imperfect between the perfect and the imperfect rights of Nations may be conveniently noticed here. The perfect right," says Vattel", "is that which is accompanied by the right of compelling those who refuse to fulfil the corresponding obligation; the imperfect right is unaccompanied by that right of compulsion. The perfect obligation is that which gives to the opposite party the right of compulsion; the imperfect only gives him the right to ask. The right is always imperfect, when the corresponding obligation depends on the judgment of the party in whose breast it exists, for if in such a case we had a right to compel him, he would no longer enjoy the liberty of determining as to the conduct which he should pursue, in order to obey the dictates of his own conscience. Our obligation is always imperfect with respect to other people, as long as we possess the liberty of judging how we are to act, and we retain that liberty on all occasions on which we ought to be free." A perfect right alone would thus seem to be the subject of Law. An imperfect right is a subject of Comity. Rights incidental to vation. §14. Accordingly, a reasonable fear of danger to the right of its own independence, is held to justify a Nation in self-preser having recourse to war in order to prevent attack. This right of a Nation to preserve itself from injury by anticipating attack, is a perfect right. It is the Right of right of security, and is incidental to the right of self-preservation. When an injury has been inflicted, the same right of self-preservation authorizes the injured Nation to obtain complete reparation, and to 17 Droit des Gens. Préliminaires, § 17. Security. employ force for that purpose. This may be termed the right of indemnity. The right of self-preservation necessarily involves all other incidental rights which are essential as means to give effect to the principal ends. Thus a Nation, after it has been attacked and has worsted its enemy, will be justified by taking precautions against a second attack, by depriving its enemy of the means of renewing his aggression. The justice of all war depends upon the principles involved in the right of security and the right of indemnity. Whatever strikes at those rights strikes at the Perfect Rights of a Nation, and is a just cause of war. Right of Indemnity. tions cor §15. Every right which a Nation possesses under obligathe Common Law has its corresponding obligation. responding The right of security accordingly involves the obliga- to Rights. tion of self-restraint, so as to avoid encroaching on the independence of other States, and the right of · indemnity involves the obligation of granting redress. A Nation is mistress of her own actions as long as they do not affect the perfect rights of other Nations. It owes as a duty to itself, in the first instance, and in preference to all other Nations, to do every thing that can promote its own happiness and perfection, but it must not overstep the limit beyond which it cannot pass without impairing the happiness and perfection of another Nation. On the other hand, when a Nation cannot contribute to the welfare of another Nation without doing an essential injury to itself, it has reached the limit of its natural obligations towards that Nation, and it is considered to be under a disability to perform any further good offices towards it. offices of § 16. Every Nation is entitled to form its own The good 18 Wheaton's Elements, pt. II. c. 1. § 1. |