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Adjourned advance Alexandria Answer army arrived artillery asked attack batteries battle believe bridge brigade Burnside called carry cavalry chairman Colonel command committee communication condition corps cross delay direction division duty enemy enemy's engaged entirely examined field fight fire force forward four Franklin Fredericksburg front General-in-Chief give guns HALLECK HEADQUARTERS hold horses immediately instructions James land leave Major Manassas matter McClellan means miles military morning move movement necessary never night o'clock occupied officers once operations opinion portion position possible Potomac present President probably Question railroad re-enforcements reached reason rebels received regard regiments remain returned Richmond river road Secretary sent side soon sufficient supplies suppose taken thing thought thousand tion told took train transportation troops Washington whole Yorktown
Stran 76 - State from the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House of Representatives in whichsoever house it shall last have been so approved, and he shall carefully preserve the originals.
Stran 525 - In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.
Stran 340 - I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you.
Stran 310 - Ordered: That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as in the opinion of the general-in-chief and the commanders of all the army corps shall leave said city entirely secure.
Stran 24 - I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted and shall omit no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can- A.
Stran 46 - You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania; but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he docs so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.
Stran 9 - MY DEAR SIR: — You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac — yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.
Stran 45 - As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named.
Stran 44 - The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south.
Stran 11 - That any movement, as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March, instant, and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day.