Question. How much force do you think would be required to hold it, if you did not contemplate offensive movements against the enemy? Answer. I would move up close towards Centreville, and down towards Occoquan, to be ready the moment the enemy reduced their force here to turn them, or, if they commenced a precipitate retreat, to break them up. For that purpose it would require a considerable force. But simply to hold our works, a much smaller force than 160,000 men would be amply sufficient. There is now a strong force of the enemy between Occoquan and Quantico creek, at Dumfries; and I suppose there is a considerable force at Aquia creek. The enemy should never have been allowed to occupy those positions on the river. I proposed early in July, before we advanced to Bull Run, to put 10,000 men afloat on the river, and threaten the whole river and the little rivers that empty into the Chesapeake. Question. I know that very well. I know that we should have occupied Manassas as well as other places. Answer. I crossed the bridge with the first troops last May. The day before General Mansfield took me over to the engineer's office to learn what they proposed to do. I was very much surprised to learn that they did not propose to occupy Alexandria. I thought that was the principal object of the movement. I thought that by occupying Alexandria we could throw a considerable force out on the railroad outside of town and capture all the locomotives and cars there, and then we could advance and occupy Manassas. At that time they did not have more than 1,000 or 1,500 troops there. There were 700 of their troops escaped out of Alexandria the day we occupied it. Question. Then, as I understand you, you think the army is doing the best it can do; that is, to lay by and hold our positious? Answer. Yes, sir. I think a considerable force could be spared for some other positions. Centreville is strongly fortified, and could not be taken without a great deal of loss and some risk. Question. What is your opinion about cavalry? What amount of cavalry can you use over the river to advantage against the enemy? Answer. Not a very large force. The country is not adapted to cavalry, at least as far out as I have been. Question. The cavalry is a very expensive arm of the service, and we are disposed to have no more than military men suppose can be made useful? Answer. I think we have more cavalry than we want. Question. How many regiments of cavalry do you suppose you want over there to co-operate with your infantry and artillery? Answer. I should suppose that one-half the cavalry that is across the river would be sufficient. Question. There are about 12,000, I believe? Answer. On the other side of the Potomac? Question. Perhaps that many on the other side. Answer. No, sir; not 12,000. But I do not know how many. I know very little about the troops and the position of the enemy; and, of course, I can give no very definite opinion about what ought and what ought not to be done. By Mr. Chandler: Question. What is your own estimate of the force of the enemy? Answer. I think their force is very much overestimated, very much indeed. I believe their force is more overestimated than ours is. I have no very definite idea of the force they have. I have no other means of knowing than you have, seeing the papers from day to day. Occasionally we get a man from their lines, but I have very little confidence in what they tell us. There are very few people who, in going through a camp, can judge of the number of the force there. If you see troops under arms you can tell; but then you have got to count the companies and the regiments. If you do not, you can form no correct estimate. Question. We will suppose a case: Suppose they have ninety regiments in their army here, and no more. I believe it is pretty well settled that their regiments average not to exceed 600? Answer. I should doubt whether they go over 600. Question. That would give them 54,000 men. I should suppose that a much larger proportion of their force are sick and in hospitals than of ours; perhaps one-third of their force. Answer. Not one-third, I should think. Question. Say one-fourth, then. Answer. I should put it at less than that. I have not a very definite idea about the matter. I have no communication with headquarters on that subject at all, and no information except from the contrabands or the whites who come in. Question. Suppose that should be their force, would you consider that an obstacle to the advance of our army in almost any direction? Answer. I have no doubt that we can take Centreville. Question. What is to prevent our flanking Manassas to-morrow, or throwing out a column anywhere south of Manassas-say 50,000 or 60,000 men-and cutting off their railroad communication? Answer. The difficulty would be transportation. I presume, too, the condition of the roads would be a difficulty. and By the chairman: Question. Do you think that 50,000 men could not land near Lynnhaven bay pass over to Norfolk and hold that place? Answer. I proposed some time ago to collect a force, say at Fortress Monroe. You might give out that they were going south. When everything was ready, then you could go up the York and James rivers, silence their batteries there, and land your troops between General Magruder's force and Richmond. Question. What prevents that from being done? Answer. I do not know anything that prevents it. I think if we should do that we should get 15,000 or 20,000 of their men; for there would be no possibility of re-enforcing them. Question. And then they must quit Richmond? Answer. They cannot retreat. If you go above them, they are obliged to surrender, for they cannot have more than two or three days' supplies in their hands. Question. Why, then, do you say the best policy is to remain as we are? Answer. I did not mean that we were not to do anything. I did not want to attack Centreville. Mr. Julian: The general said before that some troops could be spared from here, but that he did not think it advisable to attack Centreville. The chairman: I am military man enough to see that. The witness: I did not mean that we should sit still and do nothing. The chairman: I am glad to hear that. The witness: I meant not to attack Centreville; I should not do that. I did not mean that we should sit here and do nothing; I believe in moving forward. I believe we should occupy Fairfax Court-House. Go forward on the left, for instance. Let my division advance. By the chairman: Question. You believe such an expedition as you have spoken of would be practicable? Answer. Yes, sir. I went several weeks ago to see General McClellan to propose it to him. I could not see him, but I saw General Marcy, and I pro posed it to him. But I have never heard anything on the subject from them. If we were to do that, Magruder's force would be certain to fall into our hands. I do not doubt that those batteries could be silenced by our navy; and then we are in a position to threaten Richmond. There is water communication, I think, within nine miles of Richmond by that route; and then, by means of our navy and other facilities, we can increase that army, if necessary, and advance on that line; or, should they reduce their force at Centreville, we can take that, or we can go by our left flank to Brentsville, and cut the railroad there, and cut off their whole army. What prevents any such movement I do not know, as I am not familiar with the position, and I do not know what force Magruder has, except from rumor; and I do not know what force General McClellan has here. Question. Would it not, in your opinion, be useful to hold a council of war, that those general officers high in command might give their opinions as to matters? At all events let them be overruled if the commanding general thought them wrong. Would it not be useful for you to compare notes on the subject? Answer. I suppose he has his friends whom he consults, military men; but I think it would be advisable to have a council. I think myself there would be no harm in holding a council of war. Of course the general in command is always responsible for what he does. The responsibility finally comes upon him, even when he holds a council of war; still he gets the ideas of men of some experience. Question. How many men do you suppose would be necessary to go on that expedition towards Richmond? Answer. I would send 30,000 men, as I suppose Magruder has about 20,000. You might have a force, say at Fortress Monroe, to come up afterwards, if necessary. Question. It would not be so costly a mode of transportation? Answer. It would give transportation by water instead of by land. The only difficulty is I do not know the extent of their batteries. But I have no doubt in my own mind that we can silence their batteries. I think the plan is feasible. I was so well satisfied of it that I went to a great deal of pains to see the general, and did not succeed in seeing him after all; but I saw General Marcy, and told him what I proposed. Question. Did you ever talk it over with any other generals? Answer. No, sir. I talked it over a little with officers of my staff; but I did not say much about it because I did not care about its getting out. I thought I would lay it before the general, but if it was talked about much it might get out. Question. You think that a council of war among the chief officers might be beneficial? Answer. I think so. Certainly it would be very satisfactory to some of them, I know. We have been very anxious to know what is proposed to be done. I should act with more confidence if I knew. Question. Is there any feeling among officers that they are not consultedthat they are slighted? Answer. Yes, sir; I suppose there is some. Of course, if a man is slighted he naturally would feel it. I thought it very singular that I never had a question asked me about the position of affairs here. I thought I had been long enough in the service-25 years. Question. To make your experience worth something? Answer. To make my experience worth a little. Question. It is not your opinion that the army should remain in their encampments until spring? Answer. No, sir. I have had more than a hundred people ask me if we were going into winter quarters; and I have told them that I knew nothing about it, but I should imagine not. I do not think it possible that we should go into winter quarters. I suppose we are ready here, if anything turns up, to move at a moment's notice. I am looking for a movement in Kentucky, or in some of the other places of operation south, to break up this army. And the moment it begins to melt away we are ready to follow them, to make a demonstration upon them, and cut off a portion of them. WASHINGTON, D. C., December 26, 1861. General WM. B. FRANKLIN sworn and examined. By the chairman: Question. What is your command? Answer. I command a division in the army of the Potomac, consisting of three brigades. Question. How far from the headquarters of General McClellan are you located? Answer. About five miles-near Alexandria, at the Theological Seminary. Question. How often has General McClellan held councils of war with the generals of his army? Answer. He has never held a council of war, to my knowledge. Question. How often has he consulted the principal officers of his army upon the subject of the prosecution of the war? Answer. I can only answer in regard to myself. often; I cannot tell the precise number of times. conversations, perhaps more. Question. Conversations? He has consulted me quite We must have had a dozen Answer. Yes, sir; they were private, confidential communications. Answer. No, sir; never any formal council. Question. Do you know anything in regard to the plans of the general-inchief with relation to the operations of this army? Answer. I do know something in regard to it. Question. Are you willing to disclose what you know to the committee? We are all sworn to secrecy. We want to know what the plans of the commanding general are. Answer. Before doing so, I would prefer, if the committee will permit me, to see General McClellan on the subject, because I do not think he has made known his plans to anybody, unless he has done so to one or two of his general officers. And he gave us these plans with the understanding that we were to keep them to ourselves. If the committee will permit me, I would much prefer to see him before saying anything to anybody about it. Question. How long since you have had such conversations with General McClellan? Answer. The last particular conversation I had with him was a week ago today. Question. I will waive that matter for the present then. About what number of troops are in your division now? Answer. About 12,000. Question. What is their condition in regard to discipline, clothing, health, &c. Answer. The health is very good; the equipments are moderately good; the discipline of two-thirds of them is very good. As regards the discipline of the other third I think there is great room for improvement, and they are improving every day. Question. What is the condition of the roads on the other side of the Potomac for moving the army? Answer. The condition of the roads is goods. I am speaking of them as they are after three weeks' good weather. Question. Do you know of any insurmountable obstacle to a proper movement of the army now as well as at any other time? Answer. That opens the question as to what you refer to; whether you refer to the enemy in front of us, or to some other consideration. Question. I am not now inquiring where you should go. I am not supposing that it is necessary for you to storm Manassas, or any such thing as that. I want to know if any advantageous movement could be made to rid this capital of this siege now as well as at any other time. Answer. I know nothing at all about the means of transportation for the army, except such as are connected with my own division. I have not been consulted at all about the transportation, or any other branch of the army. I only know what is the case with my own division. Question. Well, speak of that. Answer. I know we have not the means of transportation with my division to move one day in the field; and we have not the provisions in my division to move one day in the field. We get all our provisions in Alexandria, and they are taken out in small trains of wagons, such as would be necessary to haul them four or five miles. Question. Are the means of transportation being increased now? Answer. Not in reference to my division particularly, but they are in reference to the whole army. But for what purpose I do not know; perhaps to move to some other points. Question. You have not provisions enough to move, you say? Answer. I imagine there are provisions in Alexandria and Washington to move the whole army anywhere. But there is no assignment of provisions for the purpose of any movement. Question. Therefore you are not in a condition to move now. Answer. No, sir; I mean by that to have a wagon train to move provisions and forage for four or five days in Virginia. Question. How long have you been in that condition of impracticability of movement on account of want of transportation? Has it been so all the time? Answer. Yes, sir. I have never supposed for a moment that I was to be held responsible for the means of transportation, in case the order should be given to move. I took it for ganted that some one else was looking out for that. Question. I do not know as it is your duty to see to that. I only inquire as to the fact. Do you know any reason why the means of transportation has not been increased so as to enable your division of the army to move? Answer. I do not; but I want to state, in connexion with that, that I believe the means of transportation are here in Washington at this moment; and in case the order was given to move my division, the quartermaster of the army of the Potomac would assign to me at once, without delay, whatever was necessary to make the movement. Question. It comes to this, then: that there is really no insuperable difficulty in the way of transportation? Answer. And the same in regard to provisions also. Question. Then, really, the non-movement of the army is not occasioned by any want of transportation or provisions? Answer. I think not, sir. By Mr. Chandler: Question. I suppose that sufficient transportation is assigned to each division for its daily wants, and no more? |