Answer. That is all; and when I say we could not move, I mean that there has been no change made in that assignment.

By the chairman :

Question. What I want to ascertain is this: whether the army is in a condition to be moved.

Answer. That depends upon things I have no information about. I do not know how much of provisions, or wagons, or ordnance stores are available, because no assignment has yet been made to me of those things.

Question. You know of no difficulty in that respect?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. How much cavalry, in your judgment, could be used to advantage along with this great army over the river? It is a very expensive arm of the service, and we want to dispense with all that cannot be used to advantage. Answer. I have in my division now one regiment of cavalry.

I would be very glad to get rid of two-thirds of that regiment, which numbers about 1,000 men. I believe I could make better cavalry of the remainder, and do more good with the remainder, than I can with the whole regiment that I have.

By Mr. Johnson :

Question. The third you would retain would be for pickets and scouts ? Answer. Yes, sir; I would never think of making a cavalry fight or a cavalry charge.

By the chairman :

Question. Does that apply, so far as you are acquainted with the nature of the ground, &c., to the other divisions as well as your own?

Answer. Yes, sir; some of the other divisions have more cavalry than I have. Question. Suppose that you had 10,000 cavalry over the river, could you dispense with a portion of them to advantage?

Answer. There are not 10,000 there now.

Question. I do not know that there are; I put a hypothetical case. Answer. If there were 10,000 there I would dispense with 8,000 of them. Question. That is to say: you think 2,000 cavalry are as much as you want there?

Answer. Yes, sir, as things are situated now.

Question. Would the impolicy of using so large a portion of cavalry depend upon the condition of the country there?

Answer. Yes, sir, to a great extent; and then a cavalry soldier needs much more instruction than an infantry man does. You have got to teach him how to ride, and to teach the horse how to behave himself under fire. Then you have to feed the horses, which is an important thing.

Question. We want to be very particular about this thing, for there is an apprehension that we have too much cavalry, and it is very expensive.

Answer. It is a question I have not considered in its details, except the fact that we have a great deal more cavalry than any of us need. As to the actual amount this army could use to advantage I could not say; but I really think that two thousand cavalry is all that we want for the whole army. I would not give a snap for more than one-third of what I have now.

Question. Then if we had five regiments of regular cavalry here you think we could dispense with the rest at any rate.

Answer. I do not think the rest would be of any service to us at all if we had the whole six regiments of regular cavalry here-there are six regiments of regular cavalry.

Question. And according to what you have said that would be ample, if not more?

Answer. Yes, sir, I think so. In saying that, I proceed upon my knowledge of the country so far as I saw it last summer. Question. Have you thought of any other plan of a campaign besides that of moving right out to Manassas ?

Answer. Oh, yes, sir; I have never thought from the beginning that the proper way into Virginia was through Manassas.

By Mr. Johnson:

Question. Now take the line of the Potomac. Suppose that we were not to make any offensive movement; how many men would be necessary here to occupy a merely defensive position?

Answer. I should judge about 35,000 men would be necessary.

Question. Then 50,000 men would be amply sufficient to occupy a defensive position?

Answer. I think so.

Question. Then to begin with the army of the Potomac here. Suppose we have 35,000 men to occupy a defensive position. Then suppose you start a column towards Manassas-not upon it, but towards it-to hold them in check there, and another column to the left of Manassas.

Answer. On the Virginia side of the Potomac you mean.

Question. Yes, sir, and looking south. Start one column towards Manassas, not upon it, unless they come out and fight us, and then another column upon the left of Manassas. And then start a column by the way of York river or James river, or from Fortress Monroe, to cut off the railroad into North Carolina. Then we should have the blockade complete clear around from Baltimore to Galveston, or approximating completion. We have Western Virginia all right. We will leave the operations on the Mississippi out of view for the present. Suppose these things to be done that I have indicated. Then would the policy be a good or a bad one to start a column-begin, for instance, back upon Pennsylvania, which is loyal, and then upon Ohio and Indiana, which are Unionstart this column; as you approach Kentucky, it is Union, and Eastern Tennessee is Union. The railroad beginning at Richmond and running to Lynchburg, and down through Georgia and Alabama, and connecting with several roads running west to Memphis, and down into Mississippi-this railroad and its connexions are the great artery, the vital source that keeps this southern confederacy together. Now, with the Potomac safe; the blockade complete; with this column at Fortress Monroe; with Western Virginia all safe; if a column should march into Eastern Tennessee and take a position upon that great railroad, what would prevent us from winding up this southern confederacy in six months? We leave our forts here with a sufficient force to defend them, in case our columns are driven back-say, 35,000 men. Then how strong would you want the column to march towards Manassas, the column to march to the left of that, the one from Fortress Monroe, and then how strong would you want the column to intercept and cut off the railroad in Eastern Tennessee, or at some other accessible point?

Answer. I would like to understand about the two columns to march from here into Virginia.

Question. I take it for granted that if they should advance upon us to fight us, we should turn their rear. If they should retreat, they would have to do it before both of our columns. If the column from Fortress Monroe advances, it would cut off the railroad into North Carolina, stopping supplies from that direction, and making the blockade complete. And then if this railroad in Eastern Tennessee is cut off how are they to subsist?

Answer. I like the idea of the column from Fortress Monroe. But I do not like that of the two columns here, because I think that wherever we attempt to strike a blow now we should be sure of success. Now, if we attempt to push

two strong columns from our army of the Potomac into Virginia we should not have enough to make it sure at York river. Therefore, it seems to me, the best policy would be to take the whole strength of this army of the Potomac and pitch it into Virginia at some one point. If you land on York river or on the Rappahannock, then you can march over to Richmond, and have a general battle in front of Richmond, or, if necessary, besiege it and batter it down. If that was done in a rapid way, I believe it would take all the enemy at Manassas by surprise, and they would be bound to evacuate their position there and go down to Richmond to fight us. There would then be no use of two columns here. Of course, the newspapers would have to keep entirely quiet upon the subject. It should be done in one week from the time it was begun, if possible. It would take them at Manassas by surprise, and they would be obliged to leave their quarters there and rush down to Richmond, no matter in what condition the roads were, and fight us there just where we pleased.

By the chairman :

Question. And there would be but little transportation needed?

Answer. I think that in two days' time after our landing on the York or the Rappahannock river we could march to Richmond.

By Mr. Johnson:

Question. How far would it be to Richmond?

Answer. Some twenty-five miles from the place of landing on the York river. They have a strong work at West Point, at the head of that river, built by a man named Talcott.

By the chairman :

Question. You would have to take that?

Answer. No, sir; we could turn that-get around it. Now, this railroad from Richmond to Manassas is the only way they would have to bring their troops from Manassas to Richmond. And if we could get there with only two or three days' notice to them, we could be there at Richmond before they could get more than half the number of troops there that we could have.

By Mr. Johnson :

Question. Then your idea your own opinion, not that of anybody else— with the lights before you, would be to push in a column from Fortress Monroe ? Answer. I would not land at Fortress Monroe. I would land on the Rappahannock, or at some point further up than Fortress Monroe.

By the chairman:

Question. You would start from Fortress Monroe?

Answer. Perhaps so. I would do anything to avoid land transportation. By Mr. Johnson:

Question. How many men would you want to carry out that expedition? Answer. About 125,000; because I have no idea it can be carried out without the whole country knowing all about it. And the moment it is known to them at Manassas what we are going to do, that moment the whole army at Manassas is going down. Now, when this expedition is organized, if we should organize such an expedition, I believe if we could destroy the railroad bridge across the Rappahannock it would be worth 50,000 men to us.

Question. If we advance the columns here as I suggested, it would place them in a very perilous condition to retreat. And if, at the same time, a column is moving up towards Richmond, the way you indicate, they would be in a still more perilous situation.

Answer. If you make them retreat across the Rappahannock, they would destroy the bridge there, and have a very strong position there. And one man

there to defend would be worth three to attack. It would take a great many more men to cross the Rappahannock in their face, if they destroy that bridge, as they undoubtedly would do, than we can afford to give.

Question. Could not these two columns from here, and the column from Fortress Monroe, be moved at the same time?

Answer. I agree with you that it is very necessary to keep up the idea in their minds that we are going to advance here; and perhaps it is only a difference between us as to the mode of doing so.

Question. I should think they would be disinclined-with an enemy right behind them, as we would be-to withdraw their whole force and direct it to any one point. Our works here behind us would be perfectly secure. And if we throw out two large columns-the one to threaten an advance, and the other to turn their rear-they must retreat or fight.

Answer. I believe if you sent forward this force from here, any column less than 50,000 men would be apt to be whipped. I think they would be willing to stand here and risk a battle, if they thought they had any chance of winning that battle, and let us go down there and do what we pleased; because if they should whip us in front of Washington here, I do not care how many of us should be down there, the effect would be terrific, for we could not fight with much spirit there, if we had been whipped here.

By the chairman :

Question. How many men do you think they have over there?

Answer. I think they have from 180,000 to 200,000 men distributed north of Richmond towards Washington. I get my information from officers connected with General McClellan's staff. I have no means of my own of getting information on the subject. I have caught fellows who came from their lines, and inquired of them; but I do not believe anything they tell me.

By Mr. Johnson:

Question. Then your opinion would be against making a forward movement from the Potomac here?

Answer. Entirely against it.

Question. And in favor of pushing a column up on one of those points you have been speaking of?

Answer. Yes, sir; making the grand point of operations down on the Chesepeake.

Question. And your position here would be entirely defensive?

Answer. Entirely so.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. And you think that for defensive operations 35,000 men here are enough?

Answer. Yes, sir. I would remark here that with regard to the cavalry I may have been speaking entirely too fast in what I said about the necessity for them. The cavalry I was talking about was the cavalry of the army of the Potomac. If you are going to keep a force back here to defend these forts, you must have more cavalry than I estimated for before. You must have cavalry as a part of that force in order to keep communications up between these forts, for cavalry is the arm of the service to do that.

By the chairman :

Question. We do not wish to dispense with one single man or horse that is necessary to effect this object; but as it is a great burden upon the treasury, if military men of experience say there are more cavalry here than can be useful, we want to get rid of them as soon as possible.

Answer. We have a great many more than is useful, I think.

Question. We must look at our position from a financial as well as a military point of view, and therefore the necessity of a movement when it can be made. The roads are good; you have all the transportation you need, or you can doubtless get it very soon. If you are going to make a movement at all, what reason is there why you should not make it very soon?

Answer. I do not think that, with the information I have, I am competent to judge of that, but I will tell you what I think about it. Here is Burnside's expedition getting off from Annapolis; that expedition must get off before we can do anything, because the whole energies of the quartermaster's department are directed now to getting up stores and men for that expedition. As soon as that gets off, then comes the time for this other, because I take it for granted that the troops that are to go from this army of the Potomac, wherever they go to, must start from Annapolis, unless we want to run the gauntlet of the Potomac, which surely would be an act of folly, for all they would have to do would be to throw a force there, sink some of our ships, and thus ruin the whole thing. Question. Is there not some method by which their batteries upon the Potomac might be attacked from the rear and taken so as to open navigation there?

Answer. I believe a general engagement, if we whip them, would free us from them entirely they will leave every battery there, because we should then be free to get in their rear.

Question. It is certainly a great disadvantage to us now to have to bring all our forage and provisions here as we are now obliged to do.

Answer. An attempt to take those batteries now would necessarily be like a move on to Manassas. The only way to do it is to march the left hand column spoken of here down and get in their rear. To do that we must cross Occoquan, and they are in great force just on the other side, and we would have a general engagement down just beyond Occoquan, and it might turn out to be another Bull Run. I think our chances for whipping them would be less there than to move on Manassas.

The chairman: We must run some risk; we cannot keep such an army as this without doing something; we must get money for the army, and to get that we must do something, and do it as soon as it ca.. be done; we must run a little hazard. If they are the best fighters they will whip us at last, and I do not know but what they are. Certainly if their armies are more numerous than ours, and if they are as well officered and manned as ours, they will succeed. We must do something.

By Mr. Julian:

Question. Why were the rebels allowed to blockade the Potomac ?

Answer. That was done immediately after the battle of Bull Run, when we were not in a condition to move one step further down the Potomac than we then were at Alexandria. They went to work as soon as the Bull Run battle was fought, and began those works on the river. I cannot tell why they were allowed to do so, except that we were not strong enough then to prevent it. I think the reconnoissances along the river with the navy should have informed us where those works were before they did.

Question. Could that not have been prevented prior to the battle of Bull Run by our taking possession of the important points on the river?

Answer. I think we might have taken Matthias Point and held it all this time; that is the most important point on the river.

The chairman: I think myself we should have occupied Manassas.

The witness: I remember perfectly well that when the first plan of the campaign was considered by General McDowell, it involved the taking of Manassas immediately after the occupation of Alexandria. General McDowell ought not be held responsible for the plan of campaign that involved the battle