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Answer. I do not know what General McClellan's intentions are.

Question. I do not speak of his intentions. I merely want your opinion as a military man.

Answer. I have always avoided asking anybody, who was responsible, what his intentions were. If he chose to tell me, I was willing to hear them. But I suppose that General McClellan intends to move whenever, in his opinion, his army is ready. I have been looking for a forward movement at any moment. I am not talking about anything he has said; I am only reasoning about the matter myself. My opinion has not been asked, and I have not been consulted, of which I do not complain. General McClellan has said to me that he wished me to call and see him some evening, as he desired to talk with me over his plans. But we are both busy men, and have little time to spare. I went to his house one evening, but he was out. I have not gone again, for I supposed that when he wanted me he would send for me. That time, I suppose, has not come yet. I have been looking at any moment for a movement; and I suppose that if the Port Royal expedition had realized the hopes of many of its projectors, and had caused a movement of the army of the enemy across the river, a forward movement would have been made by us. It did not cause a movement of that army, and I never supposed it would. If that expedition had been composed of disciplined troops, rather than of troops perfectly green, as many of them were, and had been organized with the intention of striking at Savannah or Charleston, and they had moved forward promptly upon landing, I think we might have struck a great blow there, and that would have disorganized the army over here. The mere taking of that island, although it is important to the navy, and, perhaps, to the country, is not calculated to break up the army of the enemy.

Question. Now, as, in your judgment, the army can and ought to make a movement, what is your idea of the plan to be followed?

Answer. I have thought a great deal about it, but I am not responsible for this movement.

By Mr. Johnson:

Question. Your last remarks were based upon what you supposed were intentions now entertained, and not on any knowledge. Now, in view of the posture of our military position here, and the position of the enemy, what would be your opinion in regard to the policy of a forward movement?

Answer. I take it for granted that General McClellan is equal to his position; I hope that he is. A great commander does not arise more than once in a century, and we have yet to prove whether General McClellan, or anybody in this country, has the elements of a great commander.

Question. We do not want to speak of his abilities, one way or the other; we merely want your opinion in regard to the policy of a forward movement

now.

Answer. I take it for granted that we must make a forward movement; that we cannot make an end of this rebellion until we destroy the Manassas army. If we make a Waterloo battle of it, then the rebellion is ended. But if we should be defeated, then you can judge from the battle of last summer what the effect would be. I think the fate of the nation depends upon the next battle at Manassas. And the responsibilities are so great that any commander should be very careful before he made a move. The expenses of the armies are very exhausting on both sides. It is terrible to us; it must be worse to them. Our paper is at par; theirs is at forty per cent. discount, and, therefore, their expenses must be greatly increased. But they have a despotism there, and no one dares to object. No doubt, in a war, a single commander, with abilities commensurate to his responsibilities, is better than all the generals in the world in council. Napoleon never called a council of war in his life. He talked with

his officers, discovered their plans, but did not tell them what he himself intended to do.

By the chairman:

Question. If we were sure that we had a Napoleon at the head of our army we might feel easy. But, as we are not sure of that, I am not certain but we should have the benefit of the joint wisdom of all our generals?

Answer. We had a consultation before the battle of Bull Run.

By Mr. Johnson:

Question. What force do you think is necessary to make this forward movement, taking it for granted that everything else is suited for it?

Answer. We should have a stronger force than they have. They are men just as good as we are. They are as spirited. They have been longer in the harness than we have; and they have a feeling of bitter anger and hatred towards us which we do not have to them. As far as I can judge, I do not find that feeling among our officers; I do not have it myself, nor do I find that anybody has it. They would fight desperately. But I think that every skirmish we have with them tends to cure the notion of some that one southern man is equal to six yankees. I do not believe that anybody who was at Bull Run or at Drainesville entertains that opinion. Certainly no one who was at Belmont or at Ball's Bluff entertains it. But then the great body of the people, or those. who have not been in conflict with them, still seem to entertain that old notion Question. In thinking this thing over, have you laid down in your mind a plan of a forward movement?

Answer. I do not know the condition of the army here. I do not know the strength of our army, or the strength of the army on the other side. There are various ways of moving forward. It is a military rule never to accept a battle on the field which your enemy selects, if you can help it. And therefore I should not, unless I had an overwhelming force, or was under a strong necessity, attack the batteries and fortifications of Manassas in front.

By the chairman:

Question. Nor would I have done that before.

Answer. It was not done before. No battery at Manassas was attacked by us. The attempt was made-and it was successful-to turn their flank, and they marched out of their intrenchments and fought us. General McDowell's intentions at first were to go south of them; but I understand his engineers advised him to go to the north of them. He found the country was so rough that it was impossible to move his army with safety through the country north of them. He accordingly marched his army to the right, and actually did turn their left flank and drove them two miles to the south of the field of battle. In his own opinion he had gained the victory; and if it had not been for the sudden and unexpected re-enforcement of Johnson's army, he would have held it.

Question. What time did he ascertain that Johnson would probably be down there?

Answer. The battle took place on Sunday. I was satisfied on Saturday that Johnson was there. I had some information which came to me casually; some of it was false. I heard that Lee and Davis were there; that was not true; but Johnson was there. I saw a person afterwards who told me that Johnson himself, and the main part of his army, got in on Friday. I think the brigade that finally repulsed our army arrived at the last moment. Now, if we had had an equal force, say 4,000 or 5,000 men, to have met them, and they had been well handled, we should still have won the victory.

Question. Now, right there, in that connexion. There was a large reserve at Centreville that was not brought up. What was the reason of that?

Answer. I cannot say. That is a question that General McDowell ought to

be able to answer. Perhaps he thought it essential to keep it there. Perhaps he was not able to communicate with them. I think that General McDowell and all our officers at that time were crippled by want of sufficient personal officers to assist him. He had not the proper staff. A great cry is now raised about the expense and extravagance of the staff. I think the best way to illustrate that matter in our army is to compare it with others in that respect. When Napoleon went to Waterloo with 120,000 men, his staff was full of princes, and dukes, and marshals, whose names were famous all over the world. If he wanted to send an order anywhere, he could do so. His rule was to repeat every important order three times, so that if one messenger was shot or captured, or even two, the other could get through with the order. I do not believe that General McDowell had more than two or three men around him after the battle began.

Question. These aides should be military men, I suppose?

Answer. If you can get them. But you must take the best you can get. You cannot take your best instructed men out of the artillery and other arms of the service for that purpose. You must have enough left among them to instruct them. The supply of military men-men of military education—is exhausted: : so that now you must take the most intelligent men you can get.

Question.. What is the reason for this policy, which I think prevails to some extent, of withholding the men of military education from the volunteer force? Answer. Because they are so necessary to our service in the staff. I gave up a number of officers in the quartermaster's department for promotion in the volunteer service, until at last I have been obliged to say I could not consent to spare any more. The man who is offered the place of colonel is very apt to prefer it; and yet a man who is assistant quartermaster with the rank of captain does more work than a colonel, or than even a general sometimes. I have a captain at Port Royal-Captain Saxton-who arranged nearly all the details of that expedition. General Sherman and the officers who commanded the troops were confined pretty much to drilling their troops. There is not a more important officer there than Captain Saxton, nor one in the expedition more able or intelligent. He has a good head, is a bold, energetic, and active officer; but he is only a captain, and can get no promotion, and all the glory of the expedition will be carried off by the general. He was offered a coloneley, but I could not spare him.

Question. You would not lead the army up to Manassas because that is a place where the enemy is prepared for you. Then, inasmuch as you think a movement should be made, you would undoubtedly make it in some other direction. Now, you have reflected a great deal upon the subject, will you tell us what plan of movement you would propose?

Answer. What I say here I perceive is recorded. If what I say about the proposed conduct of the campaign, or what I think about it, should be printed before the movements actually take place, it might give us a great deal of trouble, for it is possible I might have something to do with the final determination of the matter.

Question. I hope you will; but this will not be printed, if at all, until the proper time, when its publication can do no injury. I should like to get your ideas about it.

Answer. My duties have occupied pretty much all my time and all my thoughts. Of course, I have reflected a little upon this, when I have not been hard at work upon other matters. It appears to me there are two ways to get around the enemy's position at Manassas. It is said they are strongly fortified at Manassas and Centreville. There is an extent of twenty-five miles between the Potomac and Centreville. I take it for granted there are roads through the country, so that a movement could be made of the right wing of the army, of which General Banks's command formed a portion, to endeavor to cut off the

Loudon and Hampshire road, and get in the rear between Manassas and the mountains and cut off the Manassas Gap road, and so go on through. Now, the enemy cannot allow us to pass without coming out to give us battle. That is one way. I do not say it is the best. It may be better to throw a bridge over the Potomac at Great Falls. Suppose an army crosses the Potomac there with force enough to beat back whatever force may be at Leesburg, and so pass down along the valley there.

By Mr. Johnson:

Question. Your idea is to turn them this side of the mountains?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is one way. Another way is to go down south of them, take their batteries at Aquia creek, and march to Fredericksburg. It is necessary to have a pretty large force here; for, while we are away, they may make a dash at Washington, and raw troops are liable to sudden and, perhaps, unaccountable panics, and we cannot tell what our troops will do until they have been tried.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. What is to prevent our throwing out a column here across the Occoquan?

Answer. It is an awful country to move an army in. It is almost impossible to move 50,000 men there. It is easily defended in consequence of the woods and ravines there. Suppose you should put 5,000 cavalry in a street in New York, and fill the houses with muskets. They would be no more paralyzed there than 5,000 cavalry placed in these wooded roads in this country.

By the chairman :

Question. In order to go out and cut off these railroads, would not the transportation be very heavy?

Answer. The distance to march is not very great. The men can carry four days' provisions, I think. I suppose they are now sufficiently disciplined to take care of them. They have learned a little by this time of the mode and the necessity of taking care of their provisions. Then we could send a train of provisions in the rear of the army. There would be one or two battles to be fought; and if the movement was successful, that would bring on a general engagement; and if we were successful in that general engagement, that would end the war.

By Mr. Johnson:

Question. How many men do you suppose the enemy have over there?
Answer. I suppose they have 100,000 men.

Question. Would you start a column out towards Manassas at the same time that you'started a column out up here?

Answer. It might be well, perhaps, to make a feint towards Manassas to hold them at that point.

Question. Would they not be compelled to advance and fight or to retreat before these two columns of our army?

Answer. It might. Now, to repulse and drive back an army is one thing; to defeat and destroy it is another thing. If the enemy had followed up our army last July they would have destroyed it. They did not follow it up, because they were beaten themselves. They did not know the condition of our men. They could not have made any defence, but if they had been followed up they would have been hopelessly cut up. 5,000 cavalry would have cut them all up. Now, if we can take a lesson from that, and defeat them, and then throw some cavalry upon them, we will cut them all to pieces. Now, every one of our regiments that has been in a skirmish, and done its duty, begins to feel confidence in itself. The skirmish at Ball's Bluff and the skirmish at Drainesville has created a better

spirit in our whole army. They all begin to think that they can do as well as their brethren have done.

Question. Suppose that we advanced-leaving our fortifications sufficiently manned-with a column of 50,000 men moving towards Manassas, aud another column of 50,000 men moving above here, would that be enough up here? Answer. We cannot tell how many they have.

Question. Our position is better than theirs, if they were to attack us here,

is it not?

Answer. They cannot hurt us here; but they have a fine position where they stand. A detachment was sent up to Difficult creek the other day, and the newspapers say they were met by a body of men that came up from Centreville. Their position at Centreville is about an equal distance from Washington, Alexandria, and Drainesville.

Question. Have you any other plan in your mind now? Suppose the matter was left to you-is there any other plan you might adopt different from the one you have mentioned?

Answer. When a man has the responsibility of deciding such a question he gets all the information he can, and studies all the particulars over that he can. I speak from what little information I have. I do not have it all. Our army is here now. To move it down to one of the rivers of the Chesapeake would be to give them notice of our movements, and it would be difficult to get transportation enough to move an army successfully there.

By Mr. Johnson:

Question. You can meet the enemy here with less land carriage than in almost any other place?

Answer. There it is. If we can crush them there it will end the matter. They come up there and offer themselves to us. General McClellan is of the opinion that that is the backbone of the rebellion, and if that is broken and destroyed the war will be ended. But it will not do for him to run himself against it like a bull against a wall.

Question. Will the morale of the army be increased any, between now and the time the campaign will open in the spring, by their going into winter quarters. Answer. I presume the morale of the army is as good now as it can be. Question. Then it would not improve it to go into winter quarters ?

Answer. No, sir, I think not; rather the other way, The men do not expect to go into winter quarters.

By Mr. Chandler;

Question. Is it your opinion that a movement can be made after the winter rains fairly set in?

Answer. I do not know that we have winter rains here, except that it is warmer than usual now; this is about the usual weather for the season. I have spent many winters here, and have always been able, except in a very few cases, to ride around the country conveniently on horseback.

By the chairman;

Question. Some have spoken of the organization of the army for a great movement; do you consider it now organized ready to take the field for an advance upon the enemy? I will ask you, first, what is its present military organization?

Answer. I understand that it is divided into brigades, which, again, are united into divisions; the cavalry is under the general direction of General Cooke, an experienced officer who commands, I believe, the cavalry of the army. I am not sure, however, whether he does that or only the reserve cavalry. General Stoneman is called the chief of the cavalry of the United States, and

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