On the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th of May the enemy evacuated Yorktown without loss. One of the witnesses testifies that General McClellan was very much chagrined and mortified at the evacuation, as he had made his preparations to open from his batteries on Monday, the 5th of May.

The evacuation was discovered by daylight on the morning of the 4th. Between 10 and 11 o'clock General Stoneman, with the cavalry and some lighthorse artillery, started in pursuit. About 1 o'clock General Hooker, with his division, left Yorktown, with orders to support General Stoneman. Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes also moved out during the day with the whole or portions of their corps. About five miles from Yorktown the division of General Hooker was delayed for some time in consequence of other troops, coming from another direction, getting into the road before him.

In the meantime General Stoneman had overtaken the rear of the enemy with his cavalry, and followed them up closely, keeping up a running fire all the time, until the enemy reached their works in the neighborhood of Williamsburg, when the pursuit was checked. Governor Sprague was sent back to hurry up the infantry support under General Hooker. After considerable delay, finding it impossible to pass the troops ahead of him, General Hooker turned off and proceeded by another road, of which he had obtained information from some of the inhabitants; marched till 11 o'clock that night, renewed the march at daylight, and came up to the advanced works of the enemy a little after 7 o'clock, about a half a mile from Fort Magruder, and at once engaged the

enemy.

There seems to have been great misapprehension and confusion in relation to the management of the troops at Williamsburg. When the pursuit first commenced on Sunday, General Heintzelman was instructed by General McClellan to take charge of operations in front. On the morning of Monday orders were sent to General Sumner to take the command; General McClellan remained behind in Yorktown to superintend the sending two divisions up the York river to West Point. A heavy rain set in on Sunday, rendering the roads almost impracticable for the passage of troops. The troops of the different commands became mingled-divisions and brigades, to some extent, were separated from each other—and it seems to have been difficult to get the troops up in time.

During Monday forenoon General Hooker, finding himself hard pressed by the enemy, and understanding that General Sumner had 30,000 troops with him, sent repeatedly for re-enforcements. So did General Stoneman and General Heintzelman, but no re-enforcements arrived. General Sumner states that, having sent General Hancock to the right, he had at the centre only about 3,000 infantry-the cavalry there not being fitted for operations against the enemy, on account of the country being so wooded. Upon receiving the call for re-enforcements to be sent to the left to General Hooker, he sent staff officers to hurry up troops from the rear, his own corps being some ten miles off, and ordered Kearney to re-enforce Hooker. Re-enforcements not coming up to General Hooker as soon as needed, or perhaps expected, the Prince de Joinville and Governor Sprague went to Yorktown to urge General McClellan to come up to the front, and take charge of matters there. Governor Sprague arrived at Yorktown about 1 o'clock, having been about an hour in going down. He testifies that when General McClellan was told the condition of affairs at the front, he remarked that he had supposed "those in front could attend to that little matter." After some time General McClellan started from Yorktown, and reached the vicinity of Williamsburg about 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

By that time General Kearney had reached the field and re-enforced General Hooker, taking command, being the senior in rank to General Hooker. General Hancock had been engaged on the right, but, upon being re-enforced, had succeeded in repulsing the enemy, losing about forty men. The principal fighting was done by the troops under General Hooker, his division sustaining a loss of

about 1,700 men. Before he was re-enforced, his troops were obliged to hold their position with the bayonet and such ammunition as the men could obtain from the bodies of those who had fallen, the roads being so muddy that it was impossible to bring up fresh ammunition.

That night the enemy evacuated their position at Williamsburg. General McClellan states that after he arrived on the field he was so satisfied that the enemy had been beaten and would be compelled to evacuate their position that night or be taken at a great disadvantage, that he countermanded orders to the divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick and sent them back to Yorktown.

The next day the pursuit was continued for a short distance by General Stoneman and the cavalry, with a small body of infantry. Several of the generals testify that, had the enemy been promptly followed up after the battle of Williamsburg, they could have been followed right into Richmond-one of them says without firing a gun. General McClellan says that the roads were so bad, in consequence of the rains, that it was impracticable to make a vigorous pursuit. The battle of Williamsburg appears to have been fought under many and serious disadvantages. Nothing was known of the nature of the country or the defensive works of the enemy until our troops arrived before them; there was no controlling mind in charge of the movements; there was uncertainty in regard to who was in command; each general fought as he considered best; and, by the time the general commanding appeared on the field, the principal part of the fighting was over.

Some three or four days were spent at Williamsburg for the purpose of bringing up supplies, &c., and then the line of march was taken up for the Chickahominy. It was about the time that the army left Williamsburg that Norfolk was taken and the Merrimack destroyed. But preparations had been made before those events occurred to have supplies sent up York river instead of the James, and the line afterwards followed was adopted. The consequence was, that the gunboats were of little or no service in the operations against Richmond, and remained entirely inactive, except in some operations against Fort Darling, until they were called upon to protect the army when, in July, it fell back to the James river.

The distance between Williamsburg and the line of operations on the Chickahominy was from forty to fifty miles, and the army was about two weeks in moving that distance. The first troops that crossed the Chickahominy were the corps of General Keyes, which crossed on the 24th of May, followed by the corps of General Heintzelman on the 25th. The rest of our army remained on the left bank of the Chickahominy until the battle of Fair Oaks, when the corps of General Sumner crossed to the assistance of Generals Heintzelman and Keyes. General McClellan continued calling for re-enforcements, representing that the force of the enemy in his front was superior to his own, and that the force under General MeDowell would do more for the protection of Washington, if sent to his army, than in any other position in which it could be placed. In a letter written on the 21st of May he asks that General McDowell's corps sent to him by water rather than by land, as the more expeditious mode, and that he and his forces be explicitly placed under his orders, "in the ordinary way." He closes his letter by saying:

be

"I believe there is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can; but, in any event, I shall fight it with all the skill, and caution, and determination that I possess. And I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my government or that it may close my career."

In reply to the request of General McClellan that General McDowell should join his forces by water, the President writes, on the 21st of May: "McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shall be resisted, in which case

the force resisting him will not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he will reach you in five days after starting; whereas, by water, he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Franklin's single division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it."

Preparations were accordingly made for General McDowell to leave Fredericksburg on the 25th of May to join General McClellan. Just at that time, however, Jackson commenced his expedition down the Shenandoah valley, and General McDowell, together with General Frémont, from Western Virginia, was sent to the assistance of General Banks and to intercept Jackson in his retreat. Upon being informed of this, General McClellan replied that the movement of Jackson was probably intended to prevent re-enforcements being sent to him. The President replied, giving him full information as to the condition of affairs in the valley, and closed by saying:

"If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach we should be utterly helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you now have.”

On the 31st of May and the 1st of June the battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks were fought. As there has been so much controversy in regard to the conduct of some of the troops engaged in that battle, your committee will refer more particularly to the testimony of General Casey, who commanded the advanced division, upon which the attack was first made. General Casey states that, when the campaign of the peninsula commenced, his division consisted principally of raw and inexperienced troops. They had suffered greatly from the labors and exposures incident upon the seige of Yorktown and the advance of the troops up the peninsula. Some of them had been for weeks without shelter, being compelled to leave their camp equipage behind when ordered on the pursuit of the enemy after the evacuation of Yorktown. That division took the lead across the Chickahominy, taking up a position at Seven Pines, where it established itself by throwing up intrenchments and cutting abatis.

A few days before the battle of Seven Pines, contrary to the advice and opinion of General Keyes and General Casey, the division was ordered threequarters of a mile to the front, within six miles of Richmond, the pickets extending to within five miles. They had no support on their right or their left, the remainder of the corps to which they belonged (Keyes) being in their rear. They at once commenced digging rifle-pits and cutting abatis, the pickets at night being attacked by the enemy, who were repulsed. About 11 o'clock on the morning of the 31st the pickets reported the enemy approaching, and an aide of General Johnson was captured and brought in with important papers upon him. General Casey, with this aide and his general officer of the day, went to General Keyes and reported the circumstances to him. General Keyes testifies that for some days before the attack he sent to General McClellan reports of his condition, the threatening attitude of the enemy in his immediate vicinity, and urged that General Sumner be sent across to his support. This was not done, however, until after the attack commenced. Reports continued to come in of the approach of the enemy. The division was called out and formed, the working men called in, and preparations made to meet the coming attack. Two lines of battle were formed-one in the rifle-pits, and another, composed of five or six regiments and four pieces of artillery, about one-third of a mile in advance. A regiment had previously been sent out to support the pickets. About 20 minutes to one o'clock the enemy commenced the attack in force. supposed to amount to about 35,000 men, attacking in front and on both flanks. After fighting for some time, the enemy continuing to come on in force, the forces in front fell back to the rifle-pits, and fought there until nearly surrounded. Re-enforcements had been promised, and General Casey had selected the position to which they were to be assigned; but no re-enforcements came up to

his position until just before he was forced to fall back from his second line, when a single regiment arrived. After about three hours' fighting the division fell back from its second line with a loss of 1,433 in killed, wounded, and missing. In the course of an hour after Casey's division had been driven back, the remainder of our forces were swept back from a mile and a half to two miles from Casey's first line, when the enemy were checked, and the fighing ceased for the day.

During the battle General Sumner, whose corps was on the left bank of the Chickahominy, was ordered by General McClellan to hold his forces in readiness to cross. General Sumner not only did that, but at once called out his forces and moved them until the heads of the columns were at the bridges ready to cross, thereby saving between one and two hours. When the order came to cross he immediately moved his forces in the direction of the field of battle, came up with and engaged the enemy, and relieved the pressure upon the troops engaged on his left.

The next day, the 1st of June, the enemy attacked General Sumner at Fair Oaks. General Hooker, who had been ordered forward the day before by General Heintzelman with one-half of his division, hearing the firing of the enemy upon General Sumner's forces, proceeded at once in that direction and engaged the enemy. In a short time the enemy were repulsed, and fell back in confusion. There was no communication between the forces under General Sumner and those under General Heintzelman, (Hooker's,) but each fought as he deemed best under the circumstances. General McClellan was with the main part of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy. After the fighting was over he came across to the right bank of the river.

On the morning of Monday General Heintzelman ordered General Hooker to make a reconnoissance in force, which he did, advancing to within four miles of Richmond, meeting with no resistance except a little from the enemy's pickets. Upon being informed by General Heintzelman of what he had done, General McClellan ordered the troops to be recalled and ocupy the position that had been held by Casey's division.

The officers engaged in that battle, who have been examined, testify that the army could have pushed right on to the city of Richmond with little resistance; that the enemy were very much broken and demoralized, throwing away arms, clothing, &c., that might impede their flight. General McClellan seems to have contemplated an immediate movement upon Richmond, for, the day after the battle, June 2, he writes to the Secretary of War:

"The enemy attacked in force and with great spirit yesterday morning, but are everywhere most signally repulsed with great loss. Our troops charged frequently on both days, and uniformly broke the enemy. The result is, that our left is within four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fort Monroe. But the morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much. I do not fear for odds against me. The victory is complete, and all credit is due to the gallantry of our officers and men.

The movement was not made, however, as General McClellan states, because of the high stage of water and the bad roads.

On the 6th of June McCall's division of General McDowell's corps was ordered to join the army on the peninsula. On the 8th of June General McClellan telegraphs: "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment that McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery." On the 10th or 11th of June McCall's troops commenced arriving at the White House.

Preparations continued to be made in Washington to send down by land from Fredericksburg the remainder of General McDowell's corps, he being directed

to co-operate fully with General McClellan, but retaining an independent command. This does not appear to have been in accordance with General McClellan's wishes; for, on the 16th of June, he telegraphs to the Secretary of War:

"It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him immediately upon his arrival. That request does not breathe the proper spirit; whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed General McDowell should wish the general interest to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command. If I cannot fully control all his troops I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results."

On the 18th of June General McClellan telegraphs to the Secretary of War that he has received information from deserters to the effect that troops have left Richmond to re-enforce Jackson; that the movement commenced on the 8th; and that, if re-enforcements have gone to Jackson, they are probably not less than 10,000 men; that he cannot vouch for the truth of the statement, but that it seems pretty certain that it is believed in Richmond and among the rebel troops. To this the President replies, on the same day, that the information is corroborated by a despatch from General King at Fredericksburg, and remarks: "If this is true, it is as good as a re-enforcement to you of an equal force."

On the same day General McClellan telegraphs to the President:

“A general engagement may take place at any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works. If ten or fifteen thousand men have left Richmond to re-enforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries." The returns of General McClellan to the Adjutant General's office give the following as the strength of the army on the peninsula on the 20th of June: Present for duty, 115,102; special duty, sick and in arrest, 12,225; absent 29,511-total, 156,838.

About this time the rebel general, Stuart, with his cavalry, made his celebrated raid, making the entire circuit of our army unharmed, and discovering the nature of our communications with the York river.

On the 24th and 25th of June General McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War that he is informed by deserters and contrabands that Jackson is contemplating an attack upon his right and rear. As this despatch of General McClellan, and the one of the President in reply, are dated immediately previous to the "seven days' battle," they are given here in full.

"Received 8.50 p. m

"MCCLELLAN'S, June 25, 6.15 p. m. "I have just returned from the field, and find your despatch in regard to Jackson. Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the suppo sition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court-House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong re-enforcements, in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds, if these reports be true; but this army will do all in the power of man to hold their position and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority of numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of re-enforcements; that this was the decisive point; and that all the available means of the government