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plete in numbers, discipline, and organization as it ever became. For four months the great marine avenue to the capital of the nation was blockaded, and that capital kept in a partial state of siege by a greatly inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of 150,000 men.

"In the winter of 1861 and 1862 Norfolk could and should have been taken. The navy demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture the career of the Merrimack, which proved so disastrous to our subsequent operations, would have been prevented. The preparation of this vessel was known, and the Navy Department was not without forebodings of the mischief it would do.

"Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans, and promise greater results, it is not the first case in which it has been shown that successful war involves something more than abstract military principles. The true question was to sieze the first practicable moment to satisfy the, perhaps, unreasonable but natural longing of an impatient nation for results to justify its lavish confidence, and to take advantage of an undivided command and untrammelled liberty of action while they were possessed.

"When the army did move, a plan was adopted perfectly certain to invite, nay, compel, interference. And when the army was to go by Annapolis to the lower Chesapeake, I felt confident that one half would scarcely have been embarked before the other half would have been ordered back to Washington. The enemy was then at Manassas,and a feint, even if not reality, of an attack upon Washington was so obvious, so certain to create a panic, which no executive could resist, that interference with the removal of the rest of the army was certain.

"When the enemy fell back behind the Rappahannock, and destroyed the railroad bridges, the circumstances were greatly changed, and there were strong arguments for the line adopted. Yet, results have proved how many reasons there were to be considered, besides the purely military ones, which opposed themselves to the adoption of such a line.

"The facts connected with the withholding of McDowell's corps have been so completely exhibited in the proceedings of the McDowell court of inquiry, that every one who wishes can form his own judgment. Whether it was wise or unwise, it was one of those things resulting from the taking of a line of operations which did not then cover Washington.

"At the time the army of the Potomac landed on the peninsula the rebel cause was at its lowest ebb. Its armies were demoralized by the defeats of Port Royal, Mill Spring, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Roanoke Island, and Pea Ridge; and reduced by sickness, loss in battle, expirations of period of service, &c; while the conscription law was not yet even passed. It seemed as if it needed but one vigorous gripe to end forever this rebellion so nearly throttled. How, then, happened it that the day of the initiation of the campaign of this magnificent army of the Potomac was the day of the resuscitation of the rebel cause, which seemed to grow pari passu with the slow progress of its operations?

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However I may be committed to any expression of professional opinion to the contrary, (I certainly did suggest it,) my opinion now is, that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that they were not held in strong force when our army appeared before them; and we know that they were far from complete. The prestige of power, the morale, were on our side. It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should probably have succeeded. But if we had failed, it may well be doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would be more demoralizing than the labors of a siege.

"Our troops toiled a month in the trenches, or lay in the swamps of Warwick. We lost few men by the siege; but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, impaired their

morale. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that month gained by the enemy we have tasted to our heart's content. They are not yet exhausted.

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The siege having been determined upon, we should have opened our batteries on the place as fast as they were completed. The effect on the troops would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the siege and shortened our labors; and, besides, we would have had the credit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas, as it was, we only induced him to evacuate for prudential reasons.

"Yorktown having fallen, however, as it did, it was right to pursue the enemy with our whole force. But the battle of Williamsburg, fought, as it was, without reconnoitring the position, without concert of action among the different corps and division commanders, and almost without orders, was a blunder which ought not to have happened.

"We knew of this position beforehand, and we knew it was fortified. We might have been sure, if the enemy made a stand there, that it would be a strong one, for he would be fighting for time to get his trains out of our reach. We fought; we lost several thousand men, and we gained nothing. If we had not fought, the next day a battle would in all probability have been unnecessary. But if it had been necessary, we should have had time to have brought up our resources, reconnoitred the position, and delivered our attack in such a way that some result would have flowed from it.

"We had every advantage. Franklin's division landed at West Point on the next day, and Sedgwick's division on the day following. Those two divisions, had the enemy waited another day at Williamsburg, could have cut his communication, and in that case we would have been superior in his front, and have had two divisions in his rear. His hasty retreat, and perhaps his capture, must inevitably have followed, and the great object of keeping Franklin so long embarked, and finally sending him to West Point, would have been accomplished.

"On leaving Williamsburg we should have crossed the Chickahominy, and connected with the navy in the James river. We should then have had a united army, and the co-operation of the navy, and probably would have been in Richmond in two weeks. The fact that we did not know the character of the Chickahominy as an obstacle, (as it lay across our direct road to Richmond,) that our transports were on the York river, and that the railroad furnished a good means of supply to the army, that we wished to connect with McDowell coming from Fredericksburg, &c., determined our route. In taking it we lost essentially all that was worth going so far to gain, viz: the James river approach and the co-operation of the navy.

"The route chosen, two weeks should not have been spent in traversing the forty miles from Williamsburg to Bottom's and New Bridges; and the barrier of the Chickahominy being left unguarded at Bottom's Bridge, no time should have been lost in making use of the circumstance to turn and seize the passage of New Bridge, which might have been done by the 28th of May, and even earlier, had measures been pressed and prepared for it.

"The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those occasions which, if not seized, do not repeat themselves. We now know the state of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing. Although we did not then know all that we now do, it was obvious at that time that when the rebels struck the blow at our left wing, they did not leave any means in their hands unused to secure success. It was obvious enough that they struck with their whole force, and yet we re

pulsed them in disorder with three-fifths of ours. We should have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other two-fifths.

"After it was known that McDowell was called off to another quarter, there was no longer hope of an increase of force by the junction of his corps. There were no other re-enforcements to look for beyond what we received by the middle of the month of June. The rebel force was known or supposed to be constantly increasing by conscription, by the influx of troops from other parts, and by the breaking up of Beauregard's army.

'At last the moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the initiative. We had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th of June our army would have been concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy river, while two corps, at least, of the enemy's force were on the left bank. Whatever course we then took, whether to strike at Richmond and the portion of the enemy on the right bank, or move at once for the James, we would have had a concentrated army and a fair chance of a brilliant result in the first; and in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we would have been in the same case on the morning of the 27th as we were on that of the 28th, minus a lost battle and a compulsory retreat. Or had the fortified lines, thrown up expressly for that object, been held by 20,000 men, as they could have been, we would have fought on the other side with 80,000 men instead of 27,000. Or, finally, had the lines been abandoned, with our hold on the right bank of the Chickahominy, we might have fought and crushed the enemy on the left bank, reopened our communication, and then returned and taken Richmond.

"As it was, the enemy fought with his whole force-except enough left before our lines to keep up an appearance-and we fought with 27,000 men, losing a battle and 9,000 men. By this defeat we were driven from our position, our advance for conquest turned into a retreat for safety by a force probably not greatly superior to our own.

"In view of the length of time which our operations before Richmond consumed, there is now no doubt that the depot at the White House should have been fortified, as well as one or two points on the railroad thence to the Chickahominy; that the téte-de-pont at Bottom's Bridge should have been completed, and likewise tétes-de-pont, or strong positions, prepared to cover the debouchés from our bridges to the left bank of the Chickahominy. With these the army would have possessed freedom of motion to concentrate on either side, and the disastrous battle of the 27th would scarcely have occurred.

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When the army reached the James river it needed no prophet to predict the disasters which have since befallen our country's cause. If the army had sustained itself nobly it cannot be denied that so much fruitless toil, and so much disaster, had deprived it of the élan which results from success alone. It was, moreover, as well as our forces elsewhere, sadly diminished in numbers. On the other hand, the rebel army, from its first low state, had risen up an army most formidable in numbers, excellent in organization, and inspired by a great success. Had its numbers, indeed, approached to that attributed to it200,000 men-there is little doubt that a march upon Washington would have speedily followed our withdrawal to the James.

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From such considerations, as well as those following from the results of past operations, I counselled the immediate withdrawal from the James to reunite with our forces covering Washington."

The report of General Barnard is the only report of the officers engaged in the campaign of the peninsula which your committee have obtained. The report by the commanding general has not yet been made, and the reports of his subordinates have not been sent by him to the department.

CO-OPERATION WITH GENERAL POPE.

General Burnside, with his command, was the first to leave the peninsula. He landed at Aquia and proceeded to Fredericksburg, relieving General King,' who proceeded at once to rejoin his corps (McDowell's) then with General Pope. Soon after, General Burnside was ordered to send all possible assistance to General Pope, and at once ordered two of his three divisions (Reno's and Stevens's) up the Rappahannock. Shortly after that the advance of the army of the Potomac, Fitz-John Porter's corps, reached Aquia, and was sent forward by General Burnside to General Pope. The rest of the army of the Potomac, except Keyes's corps, left to garrison Yorktown, proceeded to Alexandria, and from there joined General Pope. General Sumner stopped at Aquia and debarked a portion of his corps there; but he received orders to re-embark them again and proceed to Alexandria, which he did.

The troops sent to the assistance of General Pope were sent by orders of General Halleck; for those sent from Aquia the orders were given through General Burnside; for those sent out from Alexandria, the orders were given directly to the corps commanders, until General McClellan arrived, on the 26th of August; after which the orders were given through him.

The circumstances connected with the campaign of the army of Virginia have been so fully investigated by the military courts in the cases of General McDowell and General Fitz-John Porter, the proceedings of which were public, that your committee have not deemed it necessary to make so thorough an investigation of that campaign as they would otherwise have done. They refer, therefore, principally to the orders and correspondence, in relation to the delays in the forwarding of General Sumner's and General Franklin's corps from Alexandria to the assistance of General Pope.

At 10 a. m., August 27, General Halleck telegraphs General McClellan that "Franklin's corps should march in that direction [Manassas] as soon as possible." At 10.40 a. m. General McClellan replies: "I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here [Alexandria] in person to inform him as to his means of transportation. Kearney was yesterday at Rappahannock; Porter at Bealton, Kelly's, Burnett's, &c. Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to-day."

At 12 m. on the same day General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan : "Telegrams from General Porter to General Burnside, just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville. McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketts, near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton to re-enforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad."

From General McClellan to General Halleck, same day, sent 12.5 p. m., received 1.40 p. m.:

"My aide has just returned from General Franklin's camp. Reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum, are all in Washington. He gave the order to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once." From same to same, sent 1.15 p. m., received 1.50 p. m.:

"Franklin's artillery has no horses, except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defence. I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope s

troops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough on hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the valley?"

At 1.50 p. m. General Halleck replies:

"Yes; I think Sumner's corps should come to Alexandria. The enemy has appeared at Leesburg, and the commanding officer at Edwards's Ferry asks for cavalry. Have you any to spare him. The enemy seems to be trying to turn Pope's right. Is there no way of communicating with him?"

On the morning of the 28th of August General Halleck telegraphs to General Franklin:

"On parting with General McClellan, about two o'clock this morning, it was understood that you were to move with your corps to day, toward Manassas Junction, to drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just learned that the general has not returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his order, act on this."

At 1.5 p. m. of the same day, the 28th, General McClellan telegraphs to General Halleck:

"Your despatch to Franklin received. I have been doing all possible to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he shall go.

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Please see Barnard, and be sure the works towards Chain Bridge are perfectly secure. I look upon those works, especially Ethan Allen and Marcy, as of the first importance.'

At 3.30 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan:

"Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is re-enforced.” At 4.45 p. m. General McClellan replies:

"Your despatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now. I have sent aides to ascertain the condition of the commands of Cox and Tyler; but I still think that a premature movement in small force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops sent out. I repeat, that I will lose no time in preparing the troops now here for the field, and that whatever orders you may give, after hearing what I have to say, will be carried out." At 8.40 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan :

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There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps towards Manassas; they must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready there will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief."

At 10 p. m. General McClellan telegraphs:

"Your despatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at six (6) o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery here."

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At 10.30 a. m., of the 29th, General McClellan telegraphs to General Halleck : "Franklin's corps is in motion; started about six (6) a. m. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. * If Sumner moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too much alone. What shall be done? Have but three squadrons belonging to army of Potomac. Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders of last night."

Rep. Com. 108-3

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