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At 12 m. General McClellan telegraphs:

"Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation."

In another despatch of same date he telegraphs:

"Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance?"

At 3 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan:

"I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going further; otherwise he will push on towards Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses."

At 2.40 p. m. the President asks of General McClellan :

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'What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What, generally?"

At 2.45 p. m., received 3.30 p. m., General McClellan replies:

"The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring towards Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First. To concentrate all our available forces to • open communication with Pope. Second. To leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer."

At 4.10 p. m. the President replies:

"Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit: 'to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,' is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels."

At 7.50 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan:

"You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience. That corps must push forward, as I directed, to protect the railroad and open our communications with Manassas."

To this General McClellan replies, at 8 p. m., received 8.50 p. m.:

"It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. General Franklin remained here until about 1 p. m., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow. In regard to to-morrow's movemeets I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to me."

At 10 p. m. General McClellan telegraphs:

"Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to General Franklin to place himself in communication with General Pope, by advancing as soon as possible, and at the same time cover the transit of Pope's supplies."

At 10 p. m. General McClellan forwards to General Halleck a despatch received from General Franklin, at Anandale, dated 7.15 p. m., in which General Franklin gives rumors concerning the battle of that day, closing thus :

"Pope is said to be very short of provisions, and the country will not support him."

At 5 a. m. of the 30th of August General Pope sent a despatch to General Halleck, received at 3.20 p. m., from battle-field near Groveton, Virginia, containing an account of the battle of the day before, and closing as follows:

"I think you had best send Franklin's, Cox's, and Sturgis's regiments to Centreville, as also forage and subsistence. I received a note this morning from General Franklin, written by order of General McClellan, saying that wagons and cars would be loaded and sent to Fairfax Station as soon as I would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them out. Such a request, when Alexandria is full of troops and we fighting the enemy, needs no comment. Will you have these supplies sent, without the least delay, to Centreville?"

At 9.40 a. m., August 30, General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan : "I am by no means satisfied with General Franklin's march of yesterday, considering the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Anandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the quartermaster's department could have given him plenty of transportation, if he had applied for it, any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with General Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly." At 11 a. m. General McClellan telegraphs:

"Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in the vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest, via Columbia Pike, on Anandale and Fairfax Court-House, if this is the route you wish them to take. He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move also when he arrives?” At 12.20 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs:

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"I think Couch should land at Alexandria and be immediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops where the fighting is. Let me know when Couch arrives, as I may have other information by that time. * Send transports to Aquia to bring up Burnside's command. I have telegraphed to him, and am waiting his answer."

At 2.15 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs:

"Franklin's and all of Sumner's corps should be pushed forward with all possible despatch. They must use their legs and make forced marches. Time now is everything."

At 5 p. m. General McClellan telegraphs to General Halleck :

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Major Hammerstein, of my staff, reports, from two miles this side of Centreville, at 1.30 p. m., that Franklin's corps was then advancing rapidly. Sumner's corps moved at 1.45 p. m. The orderly who brought the despatch from Hammerstein states that he learned that the fighting commenced five miles beyond Centreville, and that our people had been driving them all day. Hammerstein says all he learns was favorable."

At 10.10 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan :

"All of Sumner's corps on the south side of the river, not actually required in the forts, should march to Pope's relief. Replace them with new regiments. Franklin should also be hurried on to re-enforce Pope."

On the same day-August 30, hour not given-General McClellan sent the following to General Halleck :

"Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria, he has been using every effort to get transportation for his extra ammunition. But he was uniformly told by the quartermasters here that there

was none. disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his corps, at 6 a. m. yesterday, he procured twenty wagons to carry a portion of his ammunition, by unloading some of General Banks's supply train for that purpose.

"General Sumner was one entire day in endeavoring, by application upon quartermasters and others, to get a sufficient number of wagons to transport his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march without it. "I have this morning sent all my headquarters train that is landed to be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin, but they will not go far towards supplying the deficiency.

"Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quartermaster last night, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward under an escort at one a. m. via Alexandria.

"Every effort has been made to carry out your instructions promptly. The difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the greater part of the transportat on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons. At all events, such is the state of the case as represented to me by the quartermaster, and it appears to be true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you."

At 10.45 a. m. of the 31st of August General Pope sends the following to General Halleck, from Centreville:

"Our troops are all here, and in position, though much used up and worn out I think it would, perhaps, have been greatly better if Sumner and Franklin had been here three or four days ago. But you may rely upon our giving them (the enemy) as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital. The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnoissance in our front at Cub Run, whether in advance of an attack to-day I don't yet know. I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose."

On the 2d of September General Pope was ordered to fall back to the vicinity of Washington, where his army came under the command of General McClellan.

The following is from the testimony of General Halleck :

"Question. Had the army of the Peninsula been brought to co-operate with the army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment, as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat?

"Answer. I thought so at the time, and still think so."

In relation to the command of General McClellan, he himself testifies as follows:

"Question. What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of General Pope?

"Answer. I was for some little time-one or two days, two or three days, perhaps without any position; merely at my camp, without any command. On Monday, the 1st of September, I received verbal instructions from General Halleck to take command of the defences of Washington. I was, however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming any control over the troops under General Pope. I think it was on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally by the President and General Halleck to go out and meet the army which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it approached the position that I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it prop erly."

The testimony of General Halleck upon the same point is as follows:

"Question. What was the position of General McClellan in regard to the troops of the army of the Potomac as they landed at Aquia Creek and Alexandria? Were they under his command; and if so, how long did they remain under his command?

"Answer. General McClellan retained the command of the army of the Potomac as it landed at those two points, except such portions of it as were sent into the field under General Pope. Those portions were considered as temporarily detached from his command, but still belonging to his army, and he was directed that all orders sent from him to the troops as detached, while under General Pope's immediate command, must be sent through the headquarters at Washington. He retained command of all the troops of his army as they landed at those places until sent into the field, and reported to General Pope; and they continued to remain under his command, with the exception of the detachments, until General Pope's army fell back on Washington, when all came under General McClellan's command. On his (General McClellan's) arrival at Alexandria he was told to take immediate command of all the troops in and about Washington, in addition to those which properly belonged to the army of the Potomac. Some days after he had been verbally directed to take such command he asked for a formal order, which was issued from the Adjutant General's office. The order issued from the Adjutant General's office was after General Pope's army commenced falling back, and was dated September 2; but General McClellan had been in command ever since his arrival in Alexandria.

"Question. At what time did he arrive in Alexandria?

"Answer. He arrived at Alexandria on the 26th of August. The formal order was issued that he might have no difficulty with General Pope's forces; that they might not question his authority."

CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND.

Very soon after General Pope and his army fell back on Washington the rebel army entered Maryland. Preparations were immediately made by the authorities in Washington to follow them.

In relation to the command of the army in Maryland your committee will quote from the testimony of General McClellan and General Halleck. The testimony of General McClellan is as follows:

"Question. What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of General Pope?

"Answer. I was for some little time-one or two days, two or three days, perhaps without any position; merely at my camp, without any command. On Monday, the 1st of September, I received verbal instructions from General Halleck to take command of the defences of Washington. I was, however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming any control over the troops under General Pope. I think it was on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally by the President and General Halleck to go out and meet the army which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it approached the position which I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it properly.

"Question. How long did you remain in command of the defences of Washington, and what orders did you next receive, and from whom?

"Answer. I do not think that order, assigning the defences of Washington, was ever rescinded, or any other one issued in its place. I had only verbal communications with General Halleck before I started on the Antietam campaign. And it was never definitely decided, up to the time that I left, as to whether I was to go or not. I asked the question two or three times of General Halleck, whether I was to command the troops in the field, and he said it had not been

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determined. And I do not think that it ever was. I think that was one of those things that grew into shape itself. When the time came I went out." The following is the testimony of General Halleck upon that point:

"Question. By whose orders was General McClellan placed in command of the army that left Washington to operate in Maryland; and were these orders verbal or in writing?

"Answer. As I stated the other day, the order was given verbally to General McClellan by the President, at General McClellan's house, about 9 o'clock in the morning, previous to General McClellan leaving the city for Rockville.

"I will add that General McClellan, in virtue of his being placed in command of the fortifications of Washington and the troops for defence within them, was really in command of all the troops here at that time. The question was discussed by the President for two or three days as to who should take command of the troops that were to go into the field. The decision was made by himself, and announced to General McClellan in my presence. I did not know what the decision was until I heard it thus announced."

In regard to the instructions given to General McClellan his testimony is as follows:

"Question. Did you have any interview with the President in relation to taking command of the troops for the Maryland campaign, or receive any instructions from him on that point?

"Answer. I do not think he gave me any instructions after that morning, when I was told to take command of the army in front of Washington. I do not think he gave me any instructions about the Maryland campaign.

"Question. After you commenced the movement did you receive any instructions from any one?

"Answer. I received some telegrams, that might be looked upon in the nature of instructions, from General Halleck and from the President. The general tenor of General Halleck's despatches was that I was committing an error in going so far away from Washington; that I was going rather too fast. He had the impression that the main force of the enemy was on the south side of the Potomac, and that they had only a small force in front of me to draw me on, and then they would come into Washington in rear. As late as the 13th of September, I recollect a telegram of General Halleck in which he pressed that same idea, and told me that I was wrong in going so far away."

The testimony of General Halleck upon that point is as follows:

"Question. What instructions, if any, were given to General McClellan in regard to the conduct of the campaign in Maryland?

"Answer. The day the President gave General McClellan directions to take command of the forces in the field, we had a long conversation in regard to the campaign in Maryland. It was agreed between us that the troops should move up the Potomac, and, if possible, separate that portion of General Lee's army which had crossed the Potomac from the remainder on the Virginia side. There were no definite instructions, further than that understanding between us, as to the general plan of the campaign.

"I submit herewith copies of despatches to and from General McClellan, after he left Washington to take command of operations in Maryland, to the time that he was relieved from command. These papers comprise all the despatches sent to and received from General McClellan, so far as I know, except a letter dated October 13, addressed to him by the President, and which was shown to me just as the President was about to despatch it to General McClellan, and General McClellan's reply, dated October 17." [The letter of the President, with the reply of General McClellan, is incorporated in another part of this report.] In regard to General McClellan going too fast or too far from Washington, there can be found no such telegram from me to him. He has mistaken the

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