with this view were constantly made by the engineers, roads and bridges. across the ravine which separated our right wing from the enemy prepared, &c. At the same time several batteries were constructed, under the direction of Captain Duane, on the left bank of the Chickahominy, either to operate upon the enemy's positions and batteries opposite or to defend our bridges, &c. They were,

This last was armed with 4 siege ordnance, I think, and used with success against the enemy's batteries. Several of these siege guns and the two 8-inch siege howitzers were brought up to put either in or in the vicinity of redoubts Nos. 3, 4 and 5

Our reconnoissances showed that the enemy was throwing up works on the further side of the large "wheat field” and in the neighborhood of "Old Tavern;" also in front of our lines from redoubt No. 2 to No. 5. It was impossible to distinguish the exact character of these works, though most of them were probably little more than rifle-pits.

In order, as I understood it, to drive back the enemy's pickets and to throw forward our own, General Hooker was ordered on the 25th to push his division forward, through the woods, to the clearing three-fourths of a mile beyond his lines and between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. Hearing the firing in the afternoon I went to that locality and pushed forward on the Williamsburg road to the further edge of woods, (then held by our troops,) with a hope of getting some better knowledge of the ground and works of the enemy. An opening 1,200 or 1,500 yards extended before me, and I saw guns in position, and tents partially hid by a depression in the ground, but no appearance of works. In returning my horse was struck by a shell and disabled.

In view of an advance to drive the enemy from the "wheat field" on our right, it was decided, as a preliminary, to construct an epaulment for putting our guns on a commanding point on the edge of the field and near our picket lines. Colonel Alexander, with a large detail, broke ground, at dark on the night of the 26th, within musket range of the enemy's pickets, and succeeded by morning in obtaining cover without loss. The enemy did not. interfere in any manner with the execution of this work, having, probably, other designs.

It had been known, some days previous to this, that Jackson's command had reached Frederickshall Station, on its way from the Shenandoah, and there was presumptive evidence that an attack on our right wing was meditated by the concentrated forces of the enemy, and that, too, on the 27th. It was understood by me to be the intention of the commanding general to concentrate our own forces either on one side or other of the Chickahominy, and so far as I could infer from a conversation, in which no positive decision was announced on his part, the plan to which preference was given was, after the enemy's plans should be sufficiently developed, to withdraw from the left bank of the Chickahominy, concentrate on the right bank, and attack Richmond while the enemy was massed on the other side. Indeed, the work thrown up on the night of the 26th was understood to be a preparation for an attack to be made on the morning of the 27th.

On the afternoon of the 26th I was told by the commanding general that, in case of withdrawing from the other side, (left bank,) he would still be glad to maintain his hold on that side, in order to be able to recross should events make it necessary or desirable. I said to him that I thonght with

any small force it was impracticable to hold the debouches of all our bridges, or even those from Duane's down to Sumner's upper bridge; but that, possibly, the heads of the two important bridges, "Alexander and Woodbury's" and "Sumner's upper bridge," (which were within a few hundred yards of each other,) might be held. He desired me to go that afternoon and reconnoitre the ground for a position for that purpose. This was probably about 4 p. m.

I left the headquarters camp (then rear of Dr. Trent's) as soon as I could get my horses, and proceeded on this reconnoissance. I had passed the Chickahominy when I was overtaken by an aide-de-camp, (Lieutenant Custer,) who informed me that the commanding general desired to modify his instructions; that he wished me to reconnoitre a position extending from near Dr Gaines's to Barker's mill-pond. He (Lieutenant Custer) asked for my map and sketched with a pencil a line extending between those limits. How, or by what forces, it was intended to occupy that position, I was not informed.

I took the road by "McGee's house" to "New Coal Harbor" and to Dr. Gaines's; thence back on to the spur on the right of Dr. Gaines's; thence through the woods to New Coal Harbor again; thence to Old Coal Harbor; thence by the road to "Despatch Station" to near where I started; thence by the same road to near Barker's saw-mill.

It was late when I commenced, and I had been obliged to ride fast. When I reached Barker's mill it was getting dark, and I proceeded from thence back to camp. I thought that a position, moderately favorable for a large force to fight a battle in equal or not greatly inferior numbers, might be taken along this line, but not one which gave any very decided advantages. According to the force in which it was occupied, its left would rest on the first spur to the right (east) of Dr. Gaines's house, embracing the woods; or, contracting the front, rest on the spur where "Watts's" house is, partially embracing the woods in front, and running in front of McGee's house; the right would extend past McGee's house, along the "Despatch Station' road, through the woods, to the eminence near where a house is marked on the map, or, perhaps, still better, keep along the edge of the woods towards. the Chickahominy.

When I returned to headquarters camp, after dark, I found that the commanding general had left for General Porter's camp, having been summoned either by General Porter himself or by the sound of the attack made late that afternoon. At 10 p. m. I received a telegram directing me to repair at once to General Porter's headquarters. I reached there about midnight, and found the commanding general and General Porter together, in bivouac, (all camp equipage, wagons, &c., having been sent to the other side.) After explaining on the map to the commanding general what I had done in the afternoon, he arose to leave, intimating that he desired me to remain with General Porter. On his leaving, General Porter seemed to be in doubt whether he should withdraw his troops from their actual positions. Finding he had no positive instructions, I told him that I supposed it indispensable to fall back at least to the position covering the bridges, in order to put himself in communication with the rest of the army, and he issued his orders to this effect about 1 a. m., (27th,) and at dawn or early daylight the troops were in motion, near us, falling back.

At this time the doubts seemed to have revived in General Porter's mind as to the expediency of the movement, he alleging the probability of McCall's division being cut to pieces in the operation. I could only repeat my conviction that it was indispensable, in order to put himself in connexion with the rest of the army, and it was continued, and we proceeded together to the ground I visited the evening before. On the way, or before starting,

he asked me how many troops I thought he ought to be re-enforced with. I replied, substantially, that I could not answer the question; that, according to any understanding I had of the matter, I supposed the whole army was to fight on one side or the other; that I had all along supposed he was to retire to the other side.

After reaching the ground, he put his left on the spur of "Watts's house;" and, riding further along the position, he concluded he could not extend his right beyond the clearing and spur where McGee's house is. After this I returned to headquarters, presuming that, in reference to the arrangements of the day, the commanding general might have further instructions for me. I reached headquarters about 9 or 10 a. m., and being informed that the commanding general was reposing, I went to my tent and remained there until afternoon.

I have gone somewhat minutely into the history of my connexion with that battle-field, because upon this battle, fought by General Porter, with 27,000 men, hinged the fate of the campaign.

On the afternoon of the 26th, Lieutenant Reese was sent by Capt. Duane, (who had orders, I presume, direct from headquarters,) to destroy the "Upper "Trestle" and "New Bridge." He found the first already taken up by a detachment of the engineer brigade, the trestles being destroyed and the flooring collected on the bank for burning. He took up the pontoons of the two bridges at New Bridge, loaded them with the flooring, and attempted to float them down the stream to the lower trestle bridge; but, being unable to get them along the channel, scuttled and sunk them one or two hundred yards below the bridge site. The afternoon of the 27th Colonel Alexander thorough destroyed Duane's Bridge. General Porter's forces passed over the two lower bridges in the night, and Captain Duane had orders to see all those bridges destroyed..

That night it was understood, I believe, that the army was to march to the James River. General Woodbury received orders from headquarters to proceed immediately to the White Oak swamp and construct bridges, and I was ordered, at an early hour the next morning, to send out all the engineers to aid in the same, and to explore the roads. Having retired to the headquarters' camp at Savage's Station, suffering with a violent headache, I was unable to go out in person in the morning. In the course of the day Captain Duane's battalion, which had been engaged destroying the lower bridges, arrived at the headquarters' camp. I directed him to continue on, by the shortest route he could find, to the vicinity of points of crossing the White Oak swamp, and myself started by the beaten road to White Oak Bridge.

I found that General Woodbury had rebuilt the bridge, (with the addition of side bridges for infantry or cavalry,) and repaired the corduroy road through the swamp, and that, at a point about a mile and a quarter further up the stream, he had built another bridge. This point, it should be observed, was the site of an old ford, (Bracket's,) to which a road conducted on each :side.

In reference to the White Oak swamp it may be observed that the stream itself is quite insignificant, but that, like the Chickahominy, it is bounded by swamps on each side, of which the width is about two hundred (200) yards. The extensive wooded region, shown on the Henrico county map, on the north side of the swamp, and usually included in that designation by us, was generally dry and firm, affording good roads. To make a bridge across the swamp involved, of course, not merely bridging the stream, but the cutting of heavy timber, and the making of a raised corduroy over this two hundred yards of swamp. Besides which, unless each bridge had an independent wagon road through the forest, it added little to our facilities, since

the moving of our immense wagon trains was the principal difficulty of the problem.

I found the upper bridge I have mentioned pretty well advanced to completion, and Major Magruder, of the 15th New York, in charge of the work, promised it should be done before he left off work that night. I was not satisfied with the approaches, however, and feared that the first few wagons which passed would make them impracticable. I found, too, that there was, as yet, no established connexion or fixed route by which the troops and trains near Savage's Station were to reach this bridge. I started back to make this connexion, and met Captain Duane with his battalion. I directed him to make it his business to keep this bridge and corduroy practicable, and to examine the vicinity to see if there was any other practicable crossing; after which I continued the exploration of the road to connect with the Williamsburg road, near the "blacksmith's shop." It was owing to this personal reconnoissance that a connexion with the New Bridge was established, and troops and wagons put upon this route that night.*

In the evening I ordered Lieutenant Colonel Alexander to take with him Lieutenants Comstock and Farquhar and reconnoitre the country in reference to the march and probable new positions of the army. The accompa nying extract from his report (mårked sub-report No. 6) will make known his services.

The headquarters left Savage's Station between 2 and 3 a. m., June 29th. I separated from them and proceeded at once to the camp of Captain Duane, following the route I had examined the night before, and over which General Sykes's division had passed during the night. The road was in good condition, but I found the corduroy over the swamp required constant attention, and, recognizing the inutility or rather impossibility of constructing for the emergency any other crossing, (Captain Duane's officers having been making additional explorations,) I directed him to make it his especial business to keep this route practicable. Portions of the wagon trains and General Heintzelman's corps passed at this bridge during the day. From this point I proceeded to the "White Oak Swamp Bridge," and found the trains and troops rapidly passing. I then rejoined the headquarters at the house just beyond (south side of) the swamp. As the passage of the army through or over this "swamp" was one of the difficulties of the march, I deem these particulars worthy of record.

General Keys's corps had crossed on the 28th, with orders to take a position to cover our debouches from the swamp and our line of march towards the James. General Woodbury had been directed to communicate with him and assist him by reconnoissances, and Lieutenant McAlester had been ordered by me to proceed to his positions and make such arrangements there, such as "slashings," obstructing roads, &c., as he could. Colonel Alexander had, also, in execution of the duties assigned him, been on this ground and communicated with the commanding general concerning it.— (See sub-report No. 6.)

On the morning of the 30th General Woodbury made a reconnoissance between the Charles City and Long Bridge roads, assisting Generals Kearny and McCall in posting their troops, and I went out on all the different roads, arriving at 12 or 1 p. m. at Malvern Hill. At this time the danger seemed (to me) that the "Quaker road," over which our trains were passing, would be taken in flank by the cross roads which I had observed to exist from near

• General Heintzelman's corps reached this bridge by another route; but this would not have answered for other portions of the army, nor for the wagon trains.

This route is not delineated on the "campaign map."

"Bulten's" or "Warriner's," striking the "Quaker road" near Malvern Hill.— (See campaign map, No. 3.) I did not know what the general arrangement of troops was, nor could I see the commanding general, who was not on the field, but I mentioned the circumstance to General Porter, whose troops held the hill. Later in the day you directed me to post some of the reserve artillery, and I took it to the right and front of Dr. Mellert's house, facing the debouche from the woods of the dangerous roads of which I speak, and through which I had previously penetrated to within a half or three-quarters of a mile of the Newcastle road. While I was posting these batteries General Porter joined me, and established Morrell's division on this line. About this time (perhaps 4 p. m.) the action commenced on the Newcastle road. So near to us was it that a shell (whether from friend or foe could not be known) struck near where we were.

Shortly after the enemy opened upon us with his artillery, from the woods which skirted the bottom lands to the left or west of Malvern Hill. A brisk cannonade took place in which we had the better. The gunboats took part in this, and, though there seemed to be indications of force on the Richmond road, our position was found too strong to be assailed from this quarter.

I passed the night at Dew's house, (General Porter's headquarters,) where the commanding general came and remained until 12 or 1 o'clock of the night. The engineer brigade (a detachment of which had destroyed the "White Oak Swamp Bridge") and engineer battalion had proceeded to camp near the headquarters, Haxall's Landing.

The news of the action on the New Market road had been favorable. Subsequently and at a late hour it was reported that McCall's division had been routed with the loss of its general officers, and somewhat later, probably about midnight, it was known that General Franklin was falling back, and that Sumner and Heintzelman were necessarily following his example. This left no latitude of judgment as to the arrangements for the next day. I was ordered to reconnoitre and assist in putting the troops in position as they came in. I went out carly to get a more general view of the hill and its connexions, and afterwards, assisted by Brigadier General Humphreys, (chief of topographical engineers,) Colonel Hudson, Captain Mason, and one or two other aides of the commanding general, I directed the formation of the line

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Leaving the dispositions to be made here by others, I then went to Haxall's to see how our communications with the James river were to be covered. I found the commanding general had put Franklin's corps in position for this purpose. I directed General Woodbury and Captain Duane to make 'slashings" on the road intersecting our long line, which, exceedingly strong at Malvern, was weak elsewhere. In the meantime, Brigadier General Humphreys, with great labor, had succeeded in running a line through the dense woods of the Turkey creek bottom, and posting troops so as to connect our left on Malvern Hill with our right in front of Haxall's.

A further retreat to Harrison's Landing was ordered for that night, (July 1st,) it being difficult to keep open our communications with the transports at Malvern. I made a reconnoissance at daylight, July 2d, to form some idea of the position. Entirely ignorant of the locality, having arrived in the darkness of the night, it took some time to get a clear idea of it; a pouring rain, which commenced soon after sunrise, being unfavorable to distant vision. Finding a broad estuary to the northward, I followed it down be yond Westover, to ascertain that there was neither bridge nor ford leading out of it. I then hastened back, to find at the entrance of this cul-de-sac a temporary position where our rear guard could cover its mouth, for the main body of the army was now pouring in. Having done this, I returned to the camp and reported, as speedily as possible, to the commanding gen