meaning of the telegrams I sent him. I telegraphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving General Lee the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington. I thought General McClellan should keep more upon the Potomac, and press forward his left rather than his right, so as the more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry, which was the point then in most immediate danger; that he was pushing forward his right too fast relatively to the movements of his left-not that the army was moving too fast or too far from Washington."

The letter of General Halleck of September 13, referred to by General McClellan, is as follows:

"Sent 10.45 a. m.

"WAR DEPARTMENT, "Washington, D. C., September 13, 1862. "MAJOR GENERAL MCCLELLAN: Yours of 5.30 p. m., yesterday, is just received. General Banks cannot safely spare eight new regiments from here, You must remember that very few troops are now received from the north nearly all being stopped to guard the railroad. Four regiments were ordered to General Dix to replace Peck's division. Porter took away yesterday over 20,000. Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am of opinion that the enemy will send a small column towards Pennsylvania, so as to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac, and those he may cross over.

"In your letter of the 11th you attach too little importance to the capital. I assure you that you are wrong. The capture of this place will throw us back six months, if it should not destroy us. Beware of the evils I now point out to you. You saw them when here, but you seem to forget them in the distance. No more troops can be sent from here till we have fresh arrivals from the north."

The letter from General McClellan of the 11th, to which General Halleck here refers, contains the following:

"I believe this army fully appreciates the importance of a victory at this. time, and will fight well; but the result of a general battle, with such odds as the enemy now appears to have against us, might, to say the least, be doubtful; and, if we should be defeated, the consequences to the country would be disastrous in the extreme. Under these circumstances, I would recommend that one or two of the three army corps now on the Potomac, opposite Washington, be at once withdrawn, and sent to re-enforce this army. I would also advise that the force of Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry, where it can be of little use, and is continually exposed to be cut off by the enemy, be immediately ordered here. This would add about 25,000 old troops to our present force, and would greatly strengthen us.

"If there are any rebel forces remaining on the other side of the Potomac, they must be so few that the troops left in the forts, after the two corps shall have been withdrawn, will be sufficient to check them; and with the large cavalry force now on that side, kept well out in front to give warning of the distant approach of any very large army, a part of this army might be sent back within the intrenchments to assist in repelling an attack. But even if Washington should be taken while these armies are confronting each other, this would not, in my judgment, bear comparison with the ruin and disasters which would follow a single defeat of this army. If we should be successful in conquering the gigantic rebel army before us, we would have no difficulty in recovering it. On the other hand, should their force prove sufficiently powerful to defeat us, could all the forces now around Washington be sufficient to prevent

such a victorious army from carrying the works on this side of the Potomac after they are uncovered by our army? I think not."

Your committee having gone so fully into the details of the Peninsula campaign, do not deem it necessary to devote so much space to the campaign in Maryland. The same mind that controlled the movements upon the Peninsula controlled those in Maryland, and the same general features characterize the one campaign that characterized the other. In each may be seen the same unreadiness to move promptly and act vigorously; the same desire for more troops before advancing; and the same references to the great superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy. Your committee, therefore, content them

selves with referring briefly to the leading operations of the campaign.

In relation to the surrender of Harper's Ferry, your committee have not deemed it necessary to take much testimony upon that subject. The military commission which was convened in this city in October last fully investigated that subject, and their report has been given to the public. Attention is called merely to two telegrams of September 11, which passed between General McClellan and General Halleck, and which are as follows:

"ROCKVILLE, September 11-9.45 a. m.

"Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, I understand, with 9,000 troops. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered at once to join me by the most practicable

"Washington, D. C., September 11, 1862.-Sent 2.20 p. m. "There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you at present. The only chance is to defend his works until you can open a communication with him. you do so, he will be subject to your orders.

"Major General MCCLELLAN, Rockville."

When

"H. W. HALLECK,
"General-in-Chief.

On the 14th of September the battle of South Mountain was fought-the troops at Turner's Gap being under command of General Burnside, and those at Crampton's Gap being under the command of General Franklin-resulting in the enemy retiring to the vicinity of Sharpsburg.

On the 17th of September the battle of Antietam was fought. It was commenced by General Hooker on the right, at dawn, our troops driving the enemy before them and gaining an important position. When General Hooker was wounded and taken from the field, General Sumner took command of our right. General Sumner had been ordered to hold his corps in readiness to advance an hour before daylight, but did not receive the order to advance until twenty minutes past 7 o'clock in the morning. General Mansfield, who had come up to the support of General Hooker, had been killed. Our troops, seeing their leaders fall, and being very heavily pressed by the enemy, were forced back for some distance from the advanced position General Hooker had reached; but finally, with the assistance of the troops brought up by General Sumner, checked the enemy's progress and maintained their position.

On the left, General Burnside, about 10 o'clock, was ordered to attack the enemy at the bridge across the Antietam in his front, and to effect a crossing there. The advance of General Burnside was met by a most obstinate resist

ance on the part of the enemy, and it was not until half-past 1 o'clock that the bridge was carried. By 3 o'clock General Burnside's whole command had crossed and taken position on some elevated ground just above the bridge. He was then ordered to take the heights commanding the town of Sharpsburg, which was done after desperate fighting. By that time the enemy on our left had been re-enforced by withdrawing some of their troops from opposite our right, where our advance had been checked, and General Burnside was compelled to give up some of the ground he had succeeded in occupying. He had sent to General McClellan for re-enforcements, but received in reply that there were none to be had, but he must hold the bridge at all hazards.

The corps of General Fitz John Porter, in the centre, was not brought into action at all. General Hooker testifies that he had been given to understand that there were to be attacks made simultaneously on the right, centre, and left of our army. He attacked at dawn; but General Burnside on the left was not ordered to attack until 10 o'clock, and there was no attack made in the centre by General Porter.

In regard to the manner of conducting the attack at Antietam, General Sumner testifies :

"I have always believed that, instead of sending these troops into that action in driblets as they were sent, if General McClellan had authorized me to march these 40,000 men on the left flank of the enemy, we could not have failed to throw them right back in front of the other divisions of our army on our left-Burnside's, Franklin's, and Porter's corps. As it was, we went in, division after division, until even one of my own divisions was forced out. The other two drove the enemy and held their positions. My intention at the time was to have proceeded entirely on by their left and move down, bringing them right in front of Burnside, Franklin, and Porter.

"Question. And all escape for the enemy would have been impossible? "Answer. I think so."

The battle closed at dark, our army having gained some little advantages, at a heavy loss, but nothing decisive. The attack was not renewed the next day, the two armies occupying the positions held by them at the close of the yesterday's battle.

In relation to the policy of renewing the attack on the day after the battle General McClellan testifies :

"The next morning (the 18th) I found that our loss had been so great, and there was so much disorganization in some of the commands, that I did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day, especially as I was sure of the arrival that day of two fresh divisions, amounting to about 15,000 men. As an instance of the condition of some of the troops that morning, I happen to recollect the returns of the first corps-General Hooker's-made the morning of the 18th, by which there were about 3,500 men reported present for duty. Four days after that the returns of the same corps showed 13,500.

"I had arranged, however, to renew the attack at daybreak on the 19th, but I learned some time during the night or early in the morning, that the enemy had abandoned his position. It afterwards proved that he moved with great rapidity, and, not being encumbered by wagons, was enabled to get his troops across the river before we could do him any serious injury. I think that, taking into consideration what the troops had gone through, we got as much out of them in this Antietam campaign as human endurance would bear."

The testimony of General Burnside, on the subject of renewing the attack upon the enemy the day after the battle, is as follows:

"Question. Did you express any opinion to General McClellan, or to any

one at headquarters, in relation to renewing the attack the next day; and if so, what opinion did you express?

"Answer. I did express an opinion to General McClellan on the subject. After my command was all in position-say half-past 8 o'clock at night-I went over to General McClellan's headquarters, at Keedysville, and expressed the opinion to General Marcy, his chief of staff, that the attack ought to be renewed the next morning at 5 o'clock. I also expressed the same opinion to other members of General McClellan's staff. General Marcy told me that I ought to see General McClellan and tell him what I thought of the matter. I went into General McClellan's tent, and in the course of the conversation I expressed the same opinion to him, and told him that if I could have 5,000 fresh troops to pass in advance of mine, I would be willing to commence the attack on the next morning. He said that he had been thinking the matter over and would make up his mind during the night, and if I would send a staff officer to his headquarters, to remain there over night, he would send me orders early in the morning; and if he concluded to renew the attack, he would send me the necessary men. I did send the staff officer over, but General McClellan concluded not to renew the attack the next day?

"Question. Would there have been any difficulty in furnishing the 5,000 fresh troops which you desired, as the corps of General Fitz John Porter, some 15,000 or 20,000 men, had not been engaged?

Answer. There would have been no difficulty in furnishing the 5,000 fresh troops. In fact, General McClellan did send General Morell's division, of quite that strength, to report to me, but not with orders to me to renew the attack." General Franklin testifies:

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day?

Question. Were you consulted in relation to renewing the attack the next

"Answer. When General McClellan visited the right in the afternoon, I showed him a position on the right of this wood I have already mentioned, in which was the Dunker church, which I thought commanded the wood, and that if it could be taken, we could drive the enemy from the wood by merely holding this point. I advised that we should make the attack on that place the next morning, from General Sumner's position. I thought there was no doubt about our being able to carry it. We had plenty of artillery bearing upon it. We drove the enemy from there that afternoon, and I had no doubt that we could take that place the next morning, and I thought that would uncover the whole left of the enemy.

"Question. If that had been made, and that point had been carried, what would have been the effect upon the enemy

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?

Answer. It would have been very disastrous to them.

'Question. What reasons were given for not making the attack the next morning?

"Answer. I did not hear the direct reason of the general commanding, but I have understood that the reason was, that he expected some fifteen thousand new troops-those which would make the thing a certain thing—and he preferred to wait to make this attack on the right, until these new troops came.

"Question. And that delay gave the enemy an opportunity to escape? "Answer. I think it did."

On the night of the 18th of September the enemy abandoned their position and retired across the Potomac into Virginia, without molestation. Our army slowly followed, and took up a position along the Potomac, on the Maryland side, occupying Maryland Heights on the 20th, and Harper's Ferry on the 23d. General McClellan, on the 29th of September, reports our losses at South Mountain at 2,325; at Antietam, 12,469-total losses in both battles, 14,794

In relation to the losses of the enemy in both those battles, in killed, wounded, prisoners, and stragglers, General McClellan says:

"It may be safely concluded, therefore, that the rebel army lost at least 30,000 of their best troops in their brief campaign in Maryland."

After the battle of Antietam General McClellan called for re-enforcements, and announced his determination to fortify Maryland Heights, making a requisition on General Wadsworth, then in Washington, for 2,000 contrabands for that purpose. On the 27th of September he writes to General Halleck :

"My present purpose is to hold the enemy about as it now is, rendering Harper's Ferry secure, and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side. Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the great advantage of a secure debouche; but we cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise supply a greater number of troops than we now have on the Virginia side at that point. When the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry, and then acting according to circumstances, viz: Moving on Winchester if, from the position and attitude of the enemy, we are likely to gain a great advantage by doing so; or else devoting a reasonable time to the organization of the army and instruction of the new troops preparatory to an advance on whatever line may be determined. In any event, I regard it as absolutely necessary to send new regiments at once to the old corps for purposes of instruction, and that the old regiments be filled at once.

"My own view of the proper policy to be pursued is to retain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, and to send everything else available to re-enforce this army. The railroads give us the means of promptly re-enforcing Washington, should it be necessary. If I am re-enforced as I ask, and am allowed to take my own course, I will hold myself responsible for the safety of Washington."

On the 7th of October General Halleck replies. After referring to the draft expected in some of the northern States, he says:

"But you cannot delay the operations of the army for these drafts. It must move, and the old regiments must remain in their crippled condition. The convalescents, however, will help a little. The country is becoming very impatient at the want of activity of your army, and we must push it on.

"I am satisfied that the enemy are falling back toward Richmond. We must follow them and seek to punish them. There is a decided want of legs in our troops. They have too much immobility, and we must try to remedy the defect. A reduction of baggage and baggage trains will effect something; but the real difficulty is they are not sufficiently exercised in marching; they lie still in camp too long.

“After a hard march, one day is time enough to rest; lying still beyond that time does not rest the men. If we compare the average distances marched per month by our troops for the last year with that of the rebels, or with European armies in the field, we will see why our troops march no better. They are not sufficiently exercised to make them good and efficient soldiers."

On the 1st of October General McClellan asked for authority to build a double track suspension bridge and a permanent wagon bridge across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, which General Halleck declined to give. About that time the President visited the army. After his return to Washington the following order was sent to General McClellan by General Halleck :