division was in line about a quarter of an hour before the enemy arrived. The enemy attacked me twenty minutes of 1 o'clock. I had sent out the 103d Pennsylvania regiment to the front, for the purpose of sustaining the pickets, some time before this. The enemy soon crowded upon me, and attacked me in front and on both wings in force, I suppose, of about 35,000 men.

Question. How large a force was your division?

Answer. Only 4,380 men. We fought them there on that front line. We had four pieces of artillery, which were very effective. The enemy pressed upon me so hard that, in order to save my artillery, I ordered a charge of four regiments of infantry, and I never saw a handsomer thing in my life than that charge was. They drove the enemy away back into the woods; but he still came on in force, crowded upon us in superior numbers, and we were obliged to fall back from our front line to the rifle-pits. We there fought them until we were almost surrounded.

Question. How was it supposed that you with 4,000 men could stand there against 35,000 men?

Answer. That I do not know. I was promised re-enforcements. General Keyes said that he would send me Abercrombie's brigade, and I selected the position to which I would assign it; but it did not come. A regiment came up just before we were compelled to retreat from our second line. We fought the enemy for about three hours before they drove my reserved line.

Question. How many men did your division lose in that battle?

Answer. We lost 1,433 killed, wounded, and missing. The enemy came down on General Keyes's second line and completely swept it away. And although General Heintzelman came up with one division-Kearney's-we could not take back our lines again. Couch's line was swept away, and in about an hour we were driven back. General Keyes's corps, re-enforced by General Heintzelman, were driven back about two miles from my first line. All that saved our army from a disastrous defeat, in my opinion, was General Sumner coming over about 6 o'clock. I have always claimed that my division, by its obstinate resistance, saved that army, for it enabled Sumner's division to come over in time. Colonel Sweitzer, of General McClellan's staff, who went to the enemy's line on a flag of truce, had a conference with Major General Hill, who commanded a division at that battle. The colonel, after some conversation with the general, asked him the following question, to which he requested a candid reply; Question. "There has been considerable discussion and disagreement. about the conduct of Casey's division. What is your candid opinion of it." General Hill replied: "I know that it has been animadverted and censured. We are very much surprised at it. The division fought as well as I ever want to see men fight; and after it gave way we did not find anything else to fight. Any censure of General Casey would be very unjust." Colonel Simpson of the New Jersey volunteers, and an officer of the topographical engineers, who was a prisoner in Richmond, informed me that the confederate officers expressed much surprise that any censure had been cast on my division; "that it fought with more obstinacy than any other fighting on that day, and that the determined resistance saved the army of the right bank of the Chickahominy from a disastrous defeat." General Heintzelman, in his report of that battle, makes a statement that has no foundation in fact. He states that an officer reported to him that more men were killed in their tents, bayonetted there, than were killed outside. I do not think there was a man bayonetted in his tent. I saw this morn ing Brigade Surgeon Smith, who was there, and he informed me that he examined into that matter particularly, and that he did not find a man who was killed in that way. The truth of the matter is just this: my division was placed in an entirely false position, and unjust aspersions were cast upon it, whether designedly or not those who did it know best themselves. The enemy retained possession of my works until Monday morning, and then evacuated them and

retreated. No one drove them out. General McClellan was not on the field of battle until after the enemy evacuated. General Heintzelman did not get up until nearly four o'clock on Saturday, and the enemy attacked me at 20 minutes to one o'clock.

Question. Where was General McClellan while that battle was being fought? Answer. He was on the other side of the Chickahominy. If our forces had pushed on that Monday morning we should have gone right into Richmond, in my opinion. I got on the ground just as General Hooker was taking possession, after the rebels evacuated. They had left wagons full of muskets standing in the road; and where they were burying their dead, they had thrown down their hoes and spades and left them. Some of our men who had been taken prisoners, and left behind by the enemy, reported that the enemy was in a state of perfect demoralization. I desire to make one statement here in justice to the 103d Pennsylvania regiment. In my report I did not do them justice. I am satisfied of that from facts which have since come to my knowledge, and from the statements of the enemy themselves. It was a new regiment, had been in service but a short time, and was submitted to a terrible ordeal. The enemy say that the head of their strong column was really checked by that one regiment and the pickets it had been sent out to support. The colonel and lieutenant colonel of the regiment were not with them. They were commanded by a major, and lost 80 or 90 in killed and wounded. They did as well as raw troops could be expected to do under the circumstances.

Question. What prevented the bringing our whole army across the Chickahominy, and making a final assault on Richmond right after that victory? Answer. That should have been done, in my opinion.

Question. What reason was given for not doing it?

Answer. One reason was that the Chickahominy was very high at the time. General McClellan remained there three weeks. Rumor was rife in the army that he was about attacking the enemy day after day, still our army lay there for three weeks, until Stuart made his raid around it, and learned how we were situated. Jackson then came down and re-enforced the rebel army, and then they swept us down to the James river.

Question. Do you believe there would have been much difficulty in an energetic general having taken Richmond, and destroyed the rebel army there, with the force that General McClellan had?

Answer. I think that if General McClellan had possessed that quality of a great general we should have taken Richmond.

Question. What did he do?

Answer. I do not know. In regard to General McClellan, I am perfectly willing to say that he is a man of talents, but he does lack some of the qualities of a great general.

Question. What did he expect to accomplish by laying there and making those intrenchments?

Answer. I cannot tell.

Question. Were not the enemy being re-enforced faster than he could possibly be?

Answer. I think so. I think he should have pushed right on after the battle of Fair Oaks. I do not know why he did not cross and attack and win the battle.

Question. Were you in the series of battles which drove our army across the peninsula?

Answer. I was not. In the latter part of June I was relieved from the command of my division and sent to the White House, as it was considered necessary to hold that place in force, in order to keep our communications open.

Question. Was General McClellan at any time on the field of battle so as to take note of the merits or demerits of officers?

Answer. He was not at the battle of Fair Oaks; and I never heard that he was at any other on the peninsula, except, perhaps, at the battle of Malvern. After evacuating the White House I went around to the James river, and arrived at Harrison's Landing just after our army reached there. I saw at once that if our army had retreated they had made a precipitate one. The men were much crowded together there; and the entire army was massed on the river within a space of three miles. I went up and saw General Seymour, who told me that the day before, on the 3d of July, the enemy had thrown shells into his camp. The enemy had come down with some artillery upon our army massed together on the river, the heights commanding the position not being in our possession. Had the enemy come down and taken possession of those heights with a force 20,000 to 30,000 men, they would, in my opinion, have taken the whole of our army, except that small portion of it that might have got off on the transports. I felt very much alarmed for the army until we had got possession of those heights and fortified them. After that was done it was a strong position.

Question. We are said to have whipped the enemy at Malvern?

Answer. I think we did. It was mostly an artillery fight. There is no doubt the enemy were repulsed there. Nevertheless, it was, from what I have seen, a precipitate retreat that was made to Harrison's Landing.

Question. And without taking the precaution to seize the heights that really commanded the position of our army?

Answer. Yes, sir. The only thing that saved us there was, I think, the rain, which prevented the enemy from pushing their masses forward; otherwise, nothing would have saved that army.

In regard to our position on the Chickahominy, it appears to me that our base line was not a good one. That railroad was the base line. But, as it was, the moment that Jackson cut that railroad the White House was good for nothing, and we were obliged to evacuate it. We got off what we could, and what we could not get off we destroyed. The enemy's pickets were in sight of our pickets before I left the White House.

Question. What is your opinion of the propriety of moving on Richmond by way of the peninsula instead of direct from Washington?

Answer. Of the three plans submitted to the government, as I understand them, I think the one the President desired to have adopted was the best: to move down on the right from here.

Question. What was the advantage of that plan?

Answer. It covered Washington, and avoided the necessity of leaving a large force here for its protection. It interposed between the enemy and Washington a force which would have enabled us to take from Washington more troops than we otherwise could. When the enemy went to the peninsula, there was not force enough left in Washington.

Question. In your judgment, were as many troops spared from here for the peninsula campaign as prudence would permit?

Answer. Decidedly so. I think the President was perfectly right in keeping McDowell back, under the circumstances. This city should always be independent of armies operating in the field, unless they are interposed between it and the enemy. After garrisoning the forts here, this city should have a corps d'armée of three divisions, each division of three brigades, and each brigade of five regiments. That force should be for the defence of Washington, and also a sort of school of instruction for the preparation of raw troops for the field. As those troops became organized and disciplined, they could be sent into the field to reenforce our armies there, and others that were raw put in their places here. Of this corps d'armée, two divisions should be stationed across the river, and one division stationed on this side, ready at any time to proceed to any portion of the defences that might be attacked. These forts not being regular fortifica

tions, might be carried by the enemy, unless you had this mobile force I speak of ready at any time to go to the assistance of the troops in the forts.

Since August last I have received here 150,000 men, and organized them for the field.

And, what is of more importance than anything else, this government, whenever it employs any one to manage its armies, should take men whose hearts are in the matter. A man with half the ability, if his heart is in the matter, is better than a man with double the ability if his heart is not in it. I am for carrying on this war until the rebellion is crushed out, or there is a man left. If this rebellion triumphs, this republic is gone forever.

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1863.

Lieutenant Colonel RUFUS INGALLS Sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army of the Potomac? Answer. I am a lieutenant colonel, aide-de-camp, and am now the chief quartermaster of the army of the Potomac.

Question. When did you first become connected with that army?

Answer. Immediately upon its first organization under General McClellan, about the last of July, 1861, in this city.

Question. At what time did the army of the Potomac become organized and ready for active operations?

Answer. General McClellan commenced organizing the army by very nearly the first of August. He was put in command, I think, the latter part of July. My first position was that of chief quartermaster of that portion of the army of the Potomac on the south side of the Potomac. I was with the troops all the time. My position was at Washington. The army was organized, I should suppose, and ready for any operations General McClellan might wish to conduct, as soon as the middle or latter part of September. In October I considered it in a high state of organization.

Question. Do you remember how the weather was then, and what facilities there were for army movements?

Answer. The weather until January was very good-as good as could be expected. So far as my recollection goes, without reference to my notes, the weather in October and November was very good.

Question. What military necessity prevented the movement of the army earlier than spring?

Answer. I do not know. There is none that I can think of, unless those things which commanding generals take into consideration-things I was not called to decide upon. But to a spectator there did not appear to me any very great obstacle. The enemy were reported in large numbers, and strongly intrenched at Manassas.

Question. Do you know what means were ever taken to ascertain the strength of the enemy during that period?

Answer. I do not know with any degree of accuracy. I know I was as inquisitive, perhaps, as anybody else. But I do not believe that I had any means of knowing. I think General McClellan had an organization for collecting that sort of information. It was not gathered through my department. Question. You accompanied the army on its campaign on the peninsula ? Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you give us an account of that campaign; what time the

army arrived on the peninsula; in what numbers; and those incidents in regard to its movement which to you seem to be important?

Answer. I had charge of the embarkation from Alexandria until about twothirds of the army had embarked, when I went myself to the peninsula. General McClellan started, I think, on the 1st of April; I started two days later, on the 3d. Fortress Monroe was our first point; I went from there to Cheeseman's creek, where I established a quartermaster's depot. I was not chief quartermaster at that time, General Van Vliet was the chief quartermaster, but I had the chief charge under him, and had the establishing of depots for supplying the army. I was not at the headquarters until I succeeded General Van Vliet, in July last.

Question. How was that army supplied with commissary stores and the like?

Answer. Excellently; no army in the world was ever better supplied than the army of the Potomac, from its organization up to the present time. I have been with it day by day, and know of no time when it was not well supplied with subsistence and quartermaster's stores.

Question. What was the condition of the enemy at Yorktown as to numbers, strength of position, &c.?

Answer. After the evacuation of Yorktown we learned that his numbers had been very small; but up to that time I do not believe that any of us knew what his strength was.

Question. What caused the delay in attacking that place at first, before the enemy had increased his strength by additional numbers, fortifications, &c.?

Answer. When the march of the army was made from Fortress Monroe they came upon the enemy; and it is very likely that the general got the idea that the enemy was in greater force than subsequently turned out to be the case. The skirmishing, and that sort of thing, together with the other information he got, I imagine, led the general to believe that the enemy were more strongly intrenched and in greater force than they actually were; else he would not have sat down before a place like Yorktown, and besieged it so elaborately as he did. We were there a long time, establishing large batteries and investing the place. If the general had known that there had been not more than 10,000 men there, I fancy that would not have been done.

Question. How early did you ascertain anything that was reliable about the numbers of the enemy?

Answer. I cannot say. I heard a great many conjectures from day to day. How accurate the information was that the general obtained I do not know; I should say that it was rather inaccurate most of the time.

Question. Were you with the army at the battle of Williamsburg?

Answer. At the time of the battle of Williamsburg I was at Yorktown. I went from Cheeseman's creek, where our first great depot was, to Yorktown, and was establishing the landings and landing supplies at Yorktown while the battle at Williamsburg was going on; that was my duty at that time. Question. Did you accompany the army on to Fair Oaks?

Answer. I was in charge of the depot at White House at the time the army was at Fair Oaks. My post then was at White House.

Question. You were not present at any of the subsequent battles?

Answer. No, sir; I was present at everything that occurred at headquarters after I became chief quartermaster.

Question. What amount of military stores were destroyed at White House, or about there?

Answer. There were none of any very great importance. There was some pork destroyed and some whiskey belonging to the commissary department. There were, also, the stores on one of the trains that I was going to send out at the time the rebels got possession of the road. Most of the stores on that train