"WAR DEPARTMENT, "Washington, D. C., October 6, 1862.

"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good.

If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operations, you can be re-enforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt, and where you intend to cross the river; also to what point the re-enforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges or repairing railroads. "I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

"Major General MCCLELLAN."

"H. W. HALLECK,
"General-in-Chief.

To this General McClellan replies on the same day:

"It is important, in making my decision regarding the route to be taken by the army, that I should know, first, what description of troops I am to be reenforced with upon the Shenandoah route, and also upon the other route between the enemy and Washington; whether they are to be old or new troops, or what proportion of each. If possible, I should be glad to have Peck's division sent to me, if it can be got here within a reasonable time.

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Second. Will you inform me what the present condition of the Alexandria and Leesburg railroad is; also the Manassas Gap railroad; and what time it would require to put them in working order? It is believed that the Harper's Ferry and Winchester railroad is not materially injured."

To this General Halleck replies on the 7th:

"The Manassas Gap road can be repaired in a few days. The Leesburg road is much more injured. You can reach the former in less time than would be required to repair the latter. The troops to be sent you will be partly new and partly old-mostly new."

On the same day General McClellan telegraphs:

"After a full consultation with the corps commanders in my vicinity, I have determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah for immediate operations against the enemy now near Winchester. On no other line north of Washington can the army be supplied, nor can it on any other cover Maryland and Pennsylvania. Were we to cross the river below the mouth of the Shenandoah, we would leave it in the power of the enemy to recross into Maryland, and thus check the movements. In the same case we would voluntarily give him the advantage of the strong line of the Shenandoah, no point of which could be reached by us in advance of him. I see no objective point of strategical value to be gained or sought for by a movement between the Shenandoah and Washington. "I wish to state distinctly that I do not regard the line of the Shenandoah valley as important for ulterior objects. It is important only so long as the enemy remains near Winchester. And we cannot follow that line far beyond that point, simply because the country is destitute of supplies, and we have not sufficient means of transportation to enable us to advance more than 20 or 35 miles beyond a railroad or canal terminus. If the enemy abandon Winchester and fall back upon Staunton, it will be impossible for us to pursue him by that

route, and we must then take a new line of operations based upon water or railway communication.

"The only possible object to be gained by an advance from this vicinity is to fight the enemy near Winchester. If they retreat we have nothing to gain by pursuing them, and, in fact, cannot do so to any great distance. The objects I proposed to myself are to fight the enemy, if they remain near Winchester; or, failing in that, to force them to abandon the valley of the Shenandoah, there to adopt a new and decisive line of operations which shall strike at the heart of the rebellion.

"I have taken all possible measures to insure the most prompt equipment of the troops. But, from all that I can learn, it will be at least three days before the first, fifth, and sixth corps are in readiness to move from their present camps. They need shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter tents, &c. I beg to assure you that not an hour shall be lost in carrying your instructions into effect.

"Please send the re-enforcements to Harper's Ferry. I would prefer that the new regiments be sent as regiments not brigaded, unless already done so with old troops. I would again ask for Peck's division, and, if possible, Heintzelman's corps. If the enemy give fight near Winchester, it will be a desperate affair, requiring all our resources. I hope that no time will be lost in sending forward the re-enforcements, that I may get them in hand as soon as possible." On the 10th of October the rebel General Stuart made his raid into Pennsylvania, returning into Virginia, having made the entire circuit of our army. On the 13th General McClellan reported to General Halleck the result of the raid, and ascribed its success to the deficiency of our cavalry, and urged "the imperative necessity of at once supplying this army, including the command of General Banks, with a sufficient number of horses to remount every dismounted cavalry soldier within the shortest possible time. If this is not done be constantly exposed to rebel cavalry raids.”

we shall To this General Halleck replies: "Your telegram of 7 p. m. yesterday is just received. As I have already informed you, the government has been and is making every possible effort to increase the cavalry force. Remounts are sent to you as rapidly as they can be procured. The President has read your telegram, and directs me to suggest that if the enemy had more occupation south of the river, his cavalry would not be so likely to make raids north of it." On the 13th of October the President wrote to General McClellan concerning the operations of the army. And on the 17th of October General McClellan wrote in reply. The letter of the President and the reply of General McClellan are as follows:

"MY DEAR SIR: You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?

“As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpeper Court-House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored.

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Again: one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is, 'to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own.' You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.

"Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his.

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You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was, that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize if he would permit. If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move towards Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say 'try;' if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

"Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy, is remarkable, as it were by the different spokes of a wheel, extending from the hub towards the rim; and this, whether you move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket, and Fredericksburg, and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and, finally, the Potomac, by Aquia creek, meet you at all points from Washing

ton.

The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, five miles; Gregory's, thirteen; Snicker's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty-eight; Manassas, thirty-eight; Chester, forty-five, and Thornton's, fifty-three. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When, at length, running for Richmond ahead of him, enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

"Yours, truly, "Major General MCCLELLAN."

"A. LINCOLN

"Camp in Pleasant Valley, October 17, 1862. SIR: Your letter of the 13th instant reached me yesterday morning, by the hands of Colonel Perkins.

"I had sent out strong reconnoissances, early in the morning, in the direction of Charlestown, Leetown, &c., and, as sharp artillery firing was heard, I felt it incumbent to go to the front. I did not leave Charlestown until dark, so that I have been unable to give to your excellency's letter that full and respectful consideration which it merits at my hands.

"I do not wish to detain Colonel Perkins beyond this morning's train. I therefore think it best to send him back with this simple acknowledgment of the receipt of your excellency's letter. I am not wedded to any particular plan of operations. I hope to have, to-day, reliable information as to the position of the enemy, whom I still believe to be between Bunker Hill and Winchester. I promise you that I will give to your views the fullest and most unprejudiced consideration, and that it is my intention to advance the moment my men are shod, and my cavalry are sufficiently renovated to be available.

"Your excellency may be assured that I will not adopt a course which differs at all from your views, without first fully explaining my reasons, and giving you time to issue such instructions as may seem best to you. "I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"His Excellency the PRESIDENT."

"GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, "Major General, United States Army.

General McClellan continued to ask for re-enforcements-for horses-saying that the issue to his army was only 150 per week; and for clothing, stating that his army needed shoes and other articles of clothing, and "had for some time past been suffering for the want of it," and that he was "constrained to believe that it was in a great degree owing to the want of proper action on the part of the quartermaster's department." The subject was referred to the quartermaster general, and he was called upon for a statement in regard to the matter. There was inuch correspondence upon the subject between General Halleck, General McClellan, and General Meigs. The result of the examination is fully stated in the following communication of the Secretary of War, of the 27th of October, and the reply of General Halleck, of the 28th of October:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, "Washington City, October 27, 1862. GENERAL: It has been publicly stated that the army under General McClellan has been unable to move, during the fine weather of this fall, for want of shoes, clothing, and other supplies. You will please report to this department upon the following points:

"First. To whom, and in what manner, the requisitions for supplies to the army under General McClellan have been made since you assumed command as general-in-chief; and whether any requisition for supplies of any kind has since that time been made upon the Secretary of War, or communication had with him, except through you?

"Second. If you, as general-in-chief, have taken pains to ascertain the condition of the army in respect to the supplies of shoes,. clothing, arms, and other necessaries; and whether there has been any neglect or delay, by any department or bureau, in filling the requisitions for supplies; and what has been, and is, the condition of that army, as compared with other armies, in respect to supplies? "Third. At what date, after the battle of Antietam, the orders to advance

against the enemy were given to General McClellan, and how often have they been repeated?

"Fourth. Whether, in your opinion, there has been any want in the army under General McClellan of shoes, clothing, arms, or other equipments or supplies, that ought to have prevented its advance against the enemy when the order was given?

"Fifth. How long was it after the orders to advance were given to General McClellan before he informed you that any shoes or clothing were wanted in his army, and what are his means of promptly communicating the wants of the army to you, or to the proper bureaus of the War Department?

"EDWIN M. STANTON,

"SIR: In reply to the several interrogatories contained in your letter of yesterday, I have to report:

"First. That requisitions for supplies to the army under General McClellan are made by his staff officers on the chiefs of bureaus here; that is, for quartermaster's supplies by his chief quartermaster on the quartermaster general; for commissary supplies by his chief commissary on the commissary general, &c. No such requisitions have been, to my knowledge, made upon the Secretary of War, and none upon the general-in-chief.

"Second. On several occasions General McClellan has telegraphed to me that his army was deficient in certain supplies. All these telegrams were immediately referred to the heads of bureaus, with orders to report. It was ascersained that in every instance the requisitions had been immediately filled, except one, where the quartermaster general had been obliged to send from Philadelphia certain articles of clothing, tents, &c., not having a full supply here. There has not been, so far as I could ascertain, any neglect or delay in any department or bureau in issuing all supplies asked for by General McClellan, or by the officers of his staff. Delays have occasionally occurred in forwarding supplies by rail, on account of the crowded condition of the depots or of a want of cars; but whenever notified of this, agents have been sent out to remove the difficulty. Under the excellent superintendence of General Haupt I think these delays have been less frequent and of shorter duration than is usual with freight trains. Any army of the size of that of General McClellan will frequently be for some days without the supplies asked for, on account of neglect in making timely requisitions, and unavoidable delays in forwarding them, and in distributing them to the different brigades and regiments. From all the information I can obtain, I am of the opinion that the requisitions from that army have been filled more promptly, and that the men, as a general rule, have been better supplied than our armies operating in the west. The latter have operated at much greater distances from the sources of supply, and have had far less facilities for transportation. In fine, I believe that no armies in the world, while in campaign, have been more promptly or better supplied than ours.

"Third. Soon after the battle of Antietam General McClellan was urged to give me information of his intended movements in order that, if he moved between the enemy and Washington, re-enforcements could be sent from this place. On the 1st of October, finding that he proposed to operate from Harper's Ferry, I urged him to cross the river at once and give battle to the enemy, pointing out to him the disadvantage of delaying till the autumn rains had swollen the Potomac and impaired the roads. On the 6th of October he was peremptorily