ordered to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good.' It will be observed that three weeks have elapsed since this order was given.

"Fourth. In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy. Had he moved to the south side of the Potomac he could have received his supplies almost as readily as, by remaining inactive, on the north side.

Fifth. On the 7th of October, in a telegram, in regard to his intended movements, General McClellan stated that it would require at least three days to supply the first, fifth, and sixth corps; that they needed shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter tents. No complaint was made that any requisitions had not been filied; and it was inferred from his language that he was only waiting for the distribution of his supplies.

"On the 11th he telegraphed that a portion of his supplies, sent by rail, had been delayed. As already stated, agents were immediately sent from here to investigate this complaint; and they reported that everything had gone forward. On the same date (the 11th) he spoke of many of his horses having broken down by fatigue. On the 12th he complains that the rate of supply was only 150 horses per week for the entire army, there and in front of Washington. I immediately directed the quartermaster general to inquire into this matter, and to report why a larger number was not furnished. General Meigs reported on the 14th that the average issue of horses to General McClellan's army, in the field and in front of Washington, for the previous six weeks, had been 1,450 per week, or 8,754 in all; in addition, that a large number of mules had been supplied; and that the number of animals with General McClellan's army, on the Upper Potomac, was over 31,000. He also reported that he was then sending to the army all the horses he could procure.

"On the 18th General McClellan states, in regard to General Meigs's report, that he had filled every requisition for shoes and clothing: General Meigs may have ordered those articles to be forwarded, but they have not reached our depots; and unless greater effort to insure prompt transmission is made by the department of which General Meigs is the head, they might as well remain in New York or Philadelphia, so far as this army is concerned.' I immediately called General Meigs's attention to this apparent neglect of his department. On the 25th he reported, as the result of his investigation, that 48,000 pairs of boots and shoes had been received by the quartermaster of General McClellan's army at Harper's Ferry, Frederick, and Hagerstown; that 20,000 pairs were at Harper's Ferry depot on the 21st; that 10,000 more were on their way; and 15,000 more ordered. Colonel Ingalls, aide-de-camp and chief quartermaster to General McClellan, telegraphed on the 25th: The suffering for want of clothing is exaggerated, I think; and certainly might have been avoided by timely requisitions of regimental and brigade quartermasters.' On the 24th he telegraphed to the quartermaster general that the clothing was not detained in the cars at the depots; such complaints are groundless. The fact is, the clothing arrives and is issued; but more is still needed. I have ordered more than would seem necessary, from any data furnished me. And I beg to remind you that you have always very promptly met all my requisitions, as far as clothing is concerned. Our department is not at fault. It provides as soon as due notice is given. I foresee no time when an army of over 100,000 men will not call for clothing and other articles.'

"In regard to General McClellan's means of promptly communicating the wants of his army to me, or to the proper bureaus of the War Department, I repeat that, in addition to the ordinary mails, he has been in hourly communi cation with Washington by telegraph.

Rep. Com. 108—4

"It is due to General Meigs that I should submit herewith a copy of a telegram received by him from General McClellan.-[See documents.]

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON,

"Secretary of War."

"H. W. HALLECK,

"General-in-Chief.

On the 21st of October General McClellan informs General Halleck that he has nearly accomplished supplying his army with the clothing absolutely necessary for marching. He complains, however, of his want of cavalry, and concludes:

"Without more cavalry horses our communications, from the moment we march, would be at the mercy of the large cavalry force of the enemy, and it would not be possible for us to cover our flanks properly, or to obtain the necessary information of the position and movements of the enemy in such a way as to insure success. My experience has shown the necessity of a large and efficient cavalry force. Under the foregoing circumstances, I beg leave to ask whether the President desires me to march on the enemy at once or to await the reception of the new horses, every possible step having been taken to insure their prompt arrival."

To this General Halleck replies on the same day, at 3.30 p. m.: "Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the President. He directs me to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th instant. If you have not been, and are not now, in condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. The President does not expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity." On the 22d of October General McClellan telegraphs:

"After full consultation, I have decided to move upon the line indicated by the President in his letter of the 13th instant, and have accordingly taken steps to execute the movement. I will inform you, from time to time, of the occupation of Leesburg, Hillsborough, Snickersville, &c. I shall need all the cavalry and other re-enforcements you can send me from Washington."

On the 23d General Halleck replies:

66

Should you move as proposed in your telegram of yesterday, I can send about 20,000 men from Washington to re-enforce you."

On the 25th of October General McClellan transmits to General Halleck a report of Colonel Robert Williams, commanding a detachment of cavalry, in which it is stated that nearly half of his horses are unsound, from “sore tongue, grease, and consequent lameness and sore backs," and that "the horses which are still sound are absolutely broken down from fatigue and want of flesh."

To this the President replies to General McClellan on the same day :

"I have just read your despatch about sore tongue and fatigued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?"

General McClellan replies on the same day :

"In reply to your telegram of this date, I have the honor to state, from the time this army left Washington, on the 7th of September, my cavalry has been constantly employed in making reconnoissances, scouting, and picketing. Since the battle of Antietam six regiments have made a trip of 200 miles, marching 55 miles in one day, while endeavoring to reach Stuart's cavalry. General Pleasonton, in his official report, states that he, with the remainder of our available

cavalry, while on Stuart's track, marched 78 miles in 24 hours. Besides these two remarkable expeditions, our cavalry has been engaged in picketing and scouting 150 miles of river front since the battle of Antietam, and has made repeated reconnoissances since that time, engaging the enemy on every occasion, and, indeed, it has performed harder service since the battle than before. I beg that you will also consider that this same cavalry was brought from the peninsula, where it encountered most laborious service, and was, at the commencement of this campaign, in low condition, and from that time to the present has had no time to recruit. If any instance can be found where overworked cavalry has performed more labor than mine since the battle of Antietam I am not conscious of it."

The following is the reply of the President:

"Yours, in reply to mine, about horses, received. Of course, you know the facts better than I. Still, two considerations remain: Stuart's cavalry outmarched ours, having certainly done more marked service on the peninsula and everywhere since. Secondly, will not a movement of our army be a relief to the cavalry, compelling the enemy to concentrate instead of "foraging" in squads everywhere?"

On the 27th of October, General McClellan telegraphed to the President:

"Your excellency is aware of the very great reduction of numbers that has taken place in most of the old regiments of this command, and how necessary it is to fill up these skeletons before taking them again into action. I have the honor, therefore, to request that the order to fill up the old regiments with drafted men may at once be issued."

To this the President replies as follows, on the same day :

"Your despatch of 3 p. m., of to-day, in regard to filling up old regiments with drafted men, is received, and the request therein shall be complied with as far as practicable.

"And now I ask a distinct answer to the question: Is it your purpose not to go into action again until the men now being drafted in the States are incorporated in the old regiments?"

The following is General McClellan's reply-after referring to previous communications in relation to filling up the old regiments, he says:

"In the press of business, I then called an aide, and telling him I had conversed with you upon the subject, I directed him to write for me a despatch, asking your excellency to have the necessary order given. I regret to say that this officer, after writing the despatch, finding me still engaged, sent it to the telegraph office without first submitting it to me, under the impression that he had communicated my views. He, however, unfortunately added, 'before taking them into action again.' This phrase was not authorized or intended by me. It has conveyed altogether an erroneous impression as to my plans and intentions. To your excellency's question I answer distinctly that I have not had any idea of postponing the advance until the old regiments are filled by drafted men. I commenced crossing the army into Virginia yesterday, and shall push forward as rapidly as possibly, to endeavor to meet the enemy."

Your committee would say that, in their opinion, a staff officer who could, from negligence or other cause, add to a despatch from the general commanding an army to the President, that which "was not authorized or intended,' should at least be assigned to some other duty.

The movement of the army across the river, which was commenced upon the 26th of October, continued slowly, until on the 5th of November General McClellan announced to the President that the last corps of his army finished crossing on the 3d of November, just four weeks from the time the order to cross was given.

In the letter to the Pesident, of the 17th of October, General McClellan writes:

"Your excellency may be assured that I will not adopt a course which differs at all from your views without first fully explaining my reasons and giving you time to issue such instructions as may seem best to you."

General McClellan was relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac, in pursuance of the following orders:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

"Washington, D. C., November 5, 1862 "GENERAL: On receipt of the order of the President, sent herewith, you will immediately turn over your command to Major General Burnside, and repair to Trenton, New Jersey, reporting on your arrival at that place by telegraph for further orders.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"Major General MCCLELLAN,

"H. W. HALLECK,
"General-in-Chief.

"Commanding, &c., &c."

"WAR DEPARTMENT,

"Adjutant General's Office, Washington, November 5, 1862. "General Orders No. 182.]

"By direction of the President of the United States it is ordered that Major General McClellan be relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac, and that Major General Burnside take the command of that army. "By order of the Secretary of War.

"E. D. TOWNSEND, "Assistant Adjutant General."

OPERATIONS UNDER GENERAL BURNSIDE.

Upon assuming command of the army of the Potomac, General Burnside at once determined to follow the line of operations which he had previously suggested to General McClellan; that is, to make Fredericksburg the base of his operations. He assumed command on the 7th or 8th of November, and on the 9th forwarded to Washington his proposed plan of operations. On the 12th of November General Halleck came to Warrenton, and, with General Meigs, had a conversation with General Burnside upon the future movements of the army. General Burnside stated that his plan was "to concentrate the army in the neighborhood of Warrenton; to make a small movement across the Rappahannock, as a feint, with a view to divert the attention of the enemy, and lead them to believe that we were going to move in the direction of Gordonsville, and then to make a rapid movement of the whole army to Fredericksburg;" for the reason that "we would all the time be as near Washington as would the enemy, and after arriving at Fredericksburg we would be at a point nearer to Richmond than we would be even if we should take Gordonsville."

General Burnside desired to have provisions and forage, together with pontoons to enable the army to cross the Rappahannock. General Meigs testifies that while at Warrenton he wrote an order to General Woodbury, in Washington, to call on the quartermaster at Washington for transportation for the pontoons to Acquia creek, which order General Halleck signed, and it was sent off to the telegraph office.

General Woodbury states that he received that order on the morning of the 13th of November. He testifies:

"General Halleck's order to me of the 13th made it apparent that the army was preparing to march to Fredericksburg. As to the time when the movement

would be made I never received any information. Fearing, however, that the movement would be precipitate I went to General Halleck's office, and urged him to delay the movement some five days, in order that the necessary preparations might be made to insure its success. To this he replied that he would do nothing to delay for an instant the advance of the army on Richmond. I rejoined that my suggestion was not intended to cause delay, but rather to prevent it. In making this suggestion I had reference not only to the pontoon train, but the landings still to be created for the quartermaster and commissary departments."

General Halleck testifies:

In

"I will state that all the troops in Washington and its vicinity were under the command of General McClellan when he was relieved, and he issued his orders directly to the commanding officer of Washington, with one single restriction that no troops should be moved from the command of Washington until I was notified by General McClellan or the commanding officer here. all other respects they were all under his direction. General Burnside, when he relieved him, was told that they remained precisely the same as before. On my visit to General Burnside, at Warrenton, on the 12th of November, in speaking about the boats and things that he required from here, I repeated to him that they were all subject to his orders with that single exception. To prevent the necessity of the commanding officer here reporting the order for the boats here, the order was drawn up upon his table, and signed by me, directly to General Woodbury, on the evening of the 12th, I think-the evening that I was there. I saw General Woodbury on my return, and he told me he had received the order. I told him that in all these matters he was under General Burnside's direction. I had nothing further to give him, except to communicate that order to him. In conversation with him and General Meigs, it was proposed that the train of pontoons should go down by land, as they could be gotten down sooner in that way, without interfering with the supplies which had to be sent to Aquia creek. I gave no other order or direction in relation to the matter than that; all other matters were under General Burnside's direction. He also informed me, while at Warrenton, that Captain Duane, chief of the engineers, had also sent an order to Harper's Ferry for the pontoon train there to go down. The order had been issued. They being under General Burnside's immediate and direct command, I did not interfere at all in relation to them.

"Question. Do you know whether there was any delay in starting them, or in their progress there?

"Answer. I heard that there was a delay from the steamers getting aground with the pontoons; and there was a delay, as I understood, in the train going down by land, on account of the difficulty of the roads, and the inexperience, perhaps, of the officers in command, and it had to be taken by water part of the way; it could not get through by land. I considered, from the reports I received, that these delays resulted mainly from accident and the elements, that no man had any control over. General Burnside telegraphed to me in relation to General Woodbury, thinking that he had not used due diligence; but afterwards told me he was perfectly satisfied with what General Woodbury had done, and that he did not know but what the commanding officer of the train that went down had done his duty also; that he was disposed to make no further investigation of that matter; that he was pretty well satisfied.

"Question. Was there any request for you to delay the advance of the men until the boats arrived, or anything of that kind?

"Answer. No, sir. I remember this, that General Woodbury, in conversation with me, said, that General Burnside could not get down for several days after I told him, and that he could not land the boats until General Burnside arrived; I think I remarked to him that I did not know exactly the day when