Upon the receipt of that telegram, steps were immediately taken to halt the cavalry expedition where it then was (at Kelly's Ford) until further orders. A portion of it was shortly afterwards sent off to intercept Stuart, who had just made a raid to Dumfries, and the neighborhood of Fairfax Court-House, which it failed to do.

General Burnside came to Washington to ascertain from the President the true state of the case. He was informed by the President that some general officers from the army of the Potomac, whose names he declined to give, had called upon him and represented that General Burnside contemplated soon making a movement; and that the army was so dispirited and demoralized that any attempt to make a movement at that time must result in disaster; that no prominent officers in the army of the Potomac were in favor of any movement at that time.

General Burnside informed the President that none of his officers had been informed what his plan was, and then proceeded to explain it in detail to the President. He urged upon the President to grant him permission to carry it out, but the President declined to do so at that time. General Halleck and Secretary Stanton were sent for, and then learned, for the first time, of the President's action in stopping the movement; although General Halleck was previously aware that a movement was contemplated by General Burnside, General Halleck, with General Burnside, held that the officers who had made those representations to the President should be at once dismissed the service. General Burnside remained here at that time for two days, but no conclusion was reached upon the subject.

When he returned to his camp he learned that many of the details of the general movement, and the details of the cavalry expedition, had become known to the rebel sympathizers in Washington, thereby rendering that plan impracticable. When asked to whom he had communicated his plans, he stated that he had told no one in Washington, except the President, Secretary Stanton, and General Halleck; and in his camp none knew of it, except one or two of his staff officers who had remained in camp all the time. He professed himself unable to tell how his plans had become known to the enemy.

A correspondence then took place between the President, General Halleck, and General Burnside. General Burnside desired distinct authority from General Halleck, or some one authorized to give it, to make a movement across the river. While urging the importance and necessity for such a movement, he candidly admitted that there was hardly a general officer in his command who approved of it. While willing to take upon himself all the responsibility of the movement, and promising to keep in view the President's caution concerning running any risk of destroying the army of the Potomac, he desired to have at least General Halleck's sanction or permission to make the movement. General Halleck replied that while he had always favored a forward movement, he could not take the responsibility of giving any directions as to how and when it should be made.

General Burnside then determined to make a movement without any further correspondence on the subject. He was unable to devise any as promising as the one just thwarted by this interference of his subordinate officers, which interference gave the enemy the time, if not the means, to ascertain what he had proposed to do. He, however, devised a plan of movement, and proceeded to put it in execution. As is well known, it was rendered abortive in consequence of the severe storm which took place shortly after the movement began.

General Burnside states that, besides the inclemency of the weather, there was another powerful reason for abandoning the movement, viz: the almost universal feeling among his general officers against it. Some of those officers freely gave vent to their feelings in the presence of their inferiors.

In consequence of this, and also what had taken place during the battle of

Fredericksburg, &c., General Burnside directed an order to be issued, which he styled general order No. 8.

That order dismissed some officers from the service, subject to the approval of the President, relieved others from duty with the army of the Potomac, and also pronounced sentence of death upon some deserters who had been tried and convicted.

General Burnside states that he had become satisfied that it was absolutely necessary that some such examples should be made, in order to enable him to maintain the proper authority over the army under his command. The order was duly signed and issued, and only waited publication.

Two or three of his most trusted staff officers represented to General Burnside that should he then publish that order, he would force upon the President the necessity of at once sanctioning it, or, by refusing his approval, assume an attitude of hostility to General Burnside. The publication of the order was accordingly delayed for the time.

General Burnside came to Washington and laid the order before the President, with the distinct assurance that in no other way could he exercise a proper command over the army of the Potomac; and he asked the President to sanction the order, or accept his resignation as major general. The President acknowledged that General Burnside was right, but declined to decide withont consulting with some of his advisers. To this General Burnside replied that, if the President took time for consultation, he would not be allowed to publish that order, and therefore asked to have his resignation accepted at once. the President declined to do.

This

General Burnside returned to his camp, and came again to Washington that night at the request of the President, and the next morning called upon the President for his decision. He was informed that the President declined to approve his order No. 8, but had concluded to relieve him from the command of the army of the Potomac, and to appoint General Hooker in his place. Thereupon General Burnside again insisted that his resignation be accepted. This the President declined to do; and, after some urging, General Burnside consented to take a leave of absence for thirty days, with the understanding that, at the end of that time, he should be assigned to duty, as he deemed it improper to hold a commission as major general, and receive his pay without rendering service therefor. General Burnside objected to the wording of the order which relieved him from his command, and which stated that it was at his own request, as being unjust to him and unfounded in fact; but upon the representation that any other order would do injury to the cause, he consented to let it remain as it then read.

The foregoing statement of the facts proved, together with the testimony herewith submitted, so fully and directly meet the requirements of the resolution referred to them, that your committee deem any comment by them to be entirely unnecessary.

CONCLUSION.

Your committee think it better to submit the testimony which they have taken in relation to the conduct of the war, without criticism to any considerable extent of military plans or movements, leaving each reader to form his own conclusions from the testimony, and such opinions of competent military men as it may contain.

As they look back over the struggle of the past two years, they feel that although we have not accomplished all that we hoped and expected within the time, still the great progress made gives us full assurance of final success.

When the government took its first active steps toward resisting the rebellion the rebels had been for more than five months actively and openly making preparations to resist its authority and defy its jurisdiction. They had usurped

the control of the machinery of one State government after another, and thus overawed the loyal people of those States. They had even so far control of the federal government itself as to make it not only acquiesce, for the time being, in measures for its own destruction, but contribute to that end. They had seized and taken into their own possession the arms and munitions of war of the government. They had scattered and demoralized the army, and sent the navy to the most distant parts of the world. There was treason in the Executive mansion, treason in the cabinet, treason in the Senate and the House of Representatives, treason in the army and the navy, treason in every department, bureau and office connected with the government. When the new administration came into power it was necessarily obliged to adopt its measures with the greatest caution, scarcely knowing friend from foe. An army and navy had to be created. There was scarcely a battalion of loyal national troops to protect the capital; and the first sense of security felt in the capital was when the volunteer troops entered it, summoned from their homes for its protection. At the same time it was with great difficulty that the loyal people could make themselves believe that any serious resistance to the authority of the government would be attempted. There was not wanting those who confidently asserted that it was but an outburst of disappointed partisan spirit, which they predicted would yield to an exhibition of force, and a determined and united spirit on the part of the people of the loyal States to suppress it. Instead of such an easy suppression, we have spent two years, almost, in warfare. We have thrown into the field a million of men. We have poured out our resources like water, and we find ourselves still engaged in the fearful struggle.

But the national cause is not the only one for which false anticipations were formed-for which the present condition of things presents a striking contrast with the early visions of its supporters. Those who heard, in Congress and elsewhere, the extravagances of the conspirators will know what were their hopes, what their expectations.

A speedy march upon the capital; a speedy overthrow of the legal government; a speedy submission of a people too pusillanimous to maintain their rights; and a speedy subjection of the whole country to the assumptions of the south, were the prominent features of their delusion.

The conspirators taught their people to believe that if war came it would not be on their soil. As yet, the hostile foot has. scarcely trod the soil of a free State, and it is upon the soil of the States in open rebellion that the contest has mainly been waged.

The rebels found themselves, almost without resistance, in possession of every fort and harbor on the sea-coast of the revolted States, except Fort Pickens, (Pensacola harbor,) and the isolated fortifications and harbors of Tortugas and Key West. They were, for the time being, masters of the territory of the revolted States, of the depots, arsenals, and fortifications of the government, and had high hopes that all the slaveholding border States would soon be united with them. The fact that so many of these States hold to-day their true and loyal position in the government demonstrates that true patriotism and loyalty is not confined to any section of the country, and gives full assurance that the government will be maintained, its jurisdiction over every foot of our territory established, and our nationality vindicated.

The events of the past two years are too fresh in the memories of all to require recapitulation.

Your committee will, however, briefly call attention to the fact that, from the commencement of active military and naval operations in the winter and spring of 1862, almost uninterrupted success for eight months attended all our operations, resulting in vast conquests. The triumphs of the navy at Hatteras, Port Royal, and Fort Henry, were followed by the victories and conquests of the army at Mill Spring, Fort Donelson, and Roanoke island. Missouri was

wrenched from the rebel grasp, and the rebel armies driven into Arkansas, where they were defeated in a pitched battle at Pea Ridge.

By the capture of Fort Donelson Kentucky was permanently redeemed, the capital of one of the largest revolted States seized, her great rivers laid open to our flotillas, and the war carried to the borders of the Gulf States. The rebel strongholds on the Mississippi, Columbus, Island No. 10, Fort Pillow, together with Memphis, the most important commercial city of the State, fell into our hands.

The autumn of 1861 had witnessed the important capture of Hatteras and Port Royal by the navy. These successes were followed through the combined operations of the army and navy, in the winter and spring of 1862, by the capture of Roanoke island and Newbern, Beaufort and Fort Macon, and by the reduction of the important fort, Pulaski, controlling the entrance to the Savannah river; of Fort Clinch, controlling the harbor and railroad depot of Fernandina; of Fort Marion, at St. Augustine. By the first-named operations we acquired control of the spacious inland waters of North Carolina, (Albemarle and Pamlico sounds,) and their adjacent shores, and of one of her two important.seaports-Beaufort. By the last, we made ourselves masters of the rich sea islands and important harbors extending along the coast from Charleston to St. John's; leaving in the possession of the rebels, on the Atlantic coast, but two harbors, Charleston and Wilmington.

But the brilliant triumphs of our army and navy elsewhere, were surpassed by the capture of the great city of the Gulf, the depot of the great valley of the Mississippi-New Orleans; an achievement which, estimated by the importance of the conquest and the noble daring of its execution, is scarcely surpassed in history. By this important conquest we obtained control of a large portion of Louisiana, and accomplished the most important and difficult step towards obtaining the entire control of the Mississippi river, and caused the surrender of the harbor of Pensacola with the forts yet held by the rebels.

In these hastily sketched military and naval operations, extending in the west through the States of Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, and Kentucky, and on the Atlantic seaboard from Hatteras to Florida, and on the Gulf from Pensacola to the mouths of the Mississippi, we really made conquests as vast as it often falls to the lot of the most powerful and warlike nations to make in so short a period of time. We pushed our conquests by land through Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee to the very boundaries of the Gulf States; obtained control of the Mississippi river, except about 200 miles; occupied the coasts of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia-a large portion of Louisiana; seized every important fort and harbor in the rebel territory, save three (Wilmington, Charleston, and Mobile,) reducing to a corresponding extent the labors of the blockading squadron; captured fourteen permanent sea-coast forts, among which were the largest on the southern coast, such as Pulaski, Barrancas, McRae, Jackson, and St. Philip. Following these conquests was the reduction of Yorktown and the evacuation of Norfolk, by which the waters of the James and York rivers were.laid open to our fleets, and the rebels deprived of the facilities furnished by a great navy-yard, and compelled to destroy their only means of menacing our fleets in Hampton roads-the Merrimack.

Had the success of the army of the Potomac during this period corresponded with the success of our arms in other parts of the country, there is reason to believe that the termination of the campaign of 1862 would have seen the rebellion well-nigh, if not entirely, overthrown.

Had Norfolk been captured during the winter of 1861-'62, and the Merrimack taken possession of or destroyed, the way to Richmond, by means of the James river, would have been open, and the fatal delays of the Peninsula avoided. Or had the enemy, when at Manassas-during the autumn of 1861 or winter of 1861-'62-been compelled to have come out from his intrenchments and give us battle, as he might have been by threatening or actually interrupting

his communication between Richmond and Manassas, on which he wholly depended for supplies-a line so long and difficult to maintain that we subsequently did not deem it practicable for us-we could have met him with an army greater than it was ever proposed to take against Richmond, and either have opened the way to the rebel capital or made it unnecessary to go there.

In military movements delay is generally bad-indecision is almost always fatal. In our movements we seem to have too often forgotten that momentum is made up of weight and velocity; that the force of the blow may depend as much upon the celerity of the movement as upon the weight of the body moved. The world's history shows that the successful general has met his enemy the day before he was expected-not the week or month after. Some of our points of attack have been so clearly indicated to the enemy beforehand, and our movements made with so much delay and hesitation, that he has been able not only to fortify his positions and concentrate his forces, but even to call into the field new armies to meet us. At such points we have failed.

It is particularly worthy of note that, in the reverses which followed the failure of the Peninsula campaign, at the time when the army of the rebels had reached its greatest strength and its highest state of enthusiasm, they did not permanently regain any territory or recapture and hold any of the important or controlling points before held by us on rebel soil. Their marches upon Washington, Maryland, and also Louisville, were little more than raids, from which they were obliged to retire before our opposing forces. This fact clearly shows that while it is impossible for us to constantly retain military possession of all the vast rebel territory over which we may be called upon to pass in our operations against their armies, still the territory once held or occupied by us cannot be permanently regained by them—a sure indication of our ultimate success.

The past, notwithstanding its errors and reverses, is full of encouragement, and gives full assurance of final success. No great war was ever conducted by any people or government without great mistakes-giving to the critics of the time and those of succeeding generations a wide and ample field for their labors. No people on earth were ever called suddenly into a great war more totally unprepared than were the loyal people of this government. We felt so well assured of our position among the powers of the world that we had almost concluded we had fought our last battle, and our army and navy had come to be regarded by many as useless appendages to the government. We had concluded that, doing justice to the nations of the world, we should receive justice in return; and the loyal portion of the people were devoting all their energies and powers to the arts of peace, the advancement of civilization, the development of the rich and varied resources of our new and great country; and in these every man found full occupation for his talents and a wide field for his ambition-no man even dreaming that the parricidal arm would ever be raised against a government so mild in its sway, so benignant in its influence over all its subjects.

It was indeed difficult for a people thus engrossed, suddenly and almost without warning, to turn its attention to war. The rebels believed us to be so entirely devoted to the pursuits of peace that we should yield to their demands rather than be diverted from them; and hence their nefarious attempt to overthrow this free government and erect on its ruins that horrid deformity, a government with human slavery for its corner-stone. How terribly they have been mistaken the past has already shown; and yet the energies, and powers, and resources of the loyal people have hardly begun to be applied to the suppression of the rebellion. They must meet and contend in battle with that strength, and power, and intelligence which has built factories and workshops, railroads and steamboats, covered the ocean with ships, and filled the markets of the world with the product of its brain and hands; and they will find these no less powerful for destruction than for production, when once fully applied in that direction.