Answer. I heard that there was a delay from the steamers getting aground with the pontoons, and there was a delay, as I understood, in the train going down by land, on account of the difficulty of the roads and the inexperience, perhaps, of the officer in command, and it had to be taken by water part of the way; it could not get through by land. I considered, from the reports I received, that these delays resulted mainly from accident and the elements, that no man had any control over. General Burnside telegraphed to me in relation to General Woodbury, thinking that he had not used due diligence, but afterwards told me he was perfectly satisfied with what General Woodbury had done, and that he did not know but that the commanding officer of the train that went down had done his duty also; that he was disposed to make no further investigation of that matter; that he was pretty well satisfied.

Question. Was there any request for you to delay the advance of the men until the boats arrived, or anything of that kind?

Answer. No, sir. I remember this, that General Woodbury, in conversation with me, said that General Burnside could not get down for several days after I told him, and that he could not land the boats until General Burnside arrived. I think I remarked to him that I did not know exactly the day when General Burnside would move; that I could not tell him, as the general did not know himself. While I was at Warrenton he proposed this movement, and he was directed to make all preparations for it, but not to begin it until the President was consulted. I returned on the afternoon of the 13th, and, I think, on the morning of the 14th I had an interview with the President, in which he consented to General Burnside's plans, and I immediately telegraphed to him to go ahead as he had proposed. I understood that there was considerable delay in getting the boats from Aquia down to the Rappahannock river on account of the bad roads, difficulty of transportation, &c., but no other delay than that which would naturally occur over a rough country like that, and accidental delay in laying the bridges was reported to me from the inexperience of the pontoniers who laid the upper bridges; there was considerable delay in that. We could not commence the repair of the railroad until General Burnside took possession of it, as it was all in the possession of the enemy. That was understood between him and General Haupt in my presence. General Haupt went out

with me to make the arrangement for repairing the roads as early as possible. I remember the conversation; he could not land anything, but would have everything down ready as soon as he could, and when he found Gen eral Burnside was in possession he would commence.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. When you were at Warrenton, General Burnside had justassumed the command of the army of the Potomac ?

Answer. Five days before, I think.

Question. Was there, or not, any agreement or understanding between you and General Burnside when you were at Warrenton that the pontoons and army stores, or either of them, should be furnished to him by the authorities here without his looking after them himself?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. I will say army stores necessary for him to cross the river and move forward from Fredericksburg?

Answer. No, sir. I requested General Meigs, as chief quartermaster, and General Haupt, in charge of the railroads, to go with me to consult with General Burnside, and told him that everything was at his disposition; he must make his own requisitions and give his own orders; that I would not interfere except to assist in carrying his views out as much as I could;

whenever anything was reported to me as not being done, that I would render all the assistance in my power, and just previous to that time, with reference to a requisition which he had sent me, I told him not to send me any requisitions, but to make them on the proper heads of departments, and if they did not do their duty, then immediately report it to me, but that I could not attend to any requisitions at all.

Question. When you were there was the time considered that it would take to move the army from where it was to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg?

Answer. No, sir; for it was not determined at that time that the movement should be made.

Question. Was it not determined that it should be made provided the President assented to it?

Answer. Yes, sir; and he was immediately to commence his preparations as though it had been assented to until telegraphed to the contrary, but not to make any movement.

Question. Was, or was not, the time requisite for the movement of the army from where it was to Falmouth considered at that time?

Answer. It may have been spoken of in conversation. We had a long conversation of three or four hours, and it may have been alluded to; nothing definite was decided upon in relation to the time it would take. Indeed, I remarked when I left him that he was of opinion that he would cross a portion of his forces at the fords above the junction of the rivers. That was the opinion that he expressed before I left.

Question. And the residue at Falmouth?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you recollect whether or not there was any discussion when you were there as to the point that it was necessary that the pontoons and the army should arrive at Falmouth at the same period of time, so that the enemy should not know the point designated for the crossing?

Answer. I do not think that was mentioned. This matter, I know, was mentioned, that the pontoons should be there as soon as they could after he had got possession of the road, so that they could be taken down.

Question. At any time did General Woodbury go to you and suggest to you that it would be impossible to get the pontoons or stores at Falmouth so soon as was expected, and that for that reason it would be advisable that the movement of the army of General Burnside should be delayed?

Answer. Not to my recollection. General Woodbury, in conversation-I think a part of the time General Meigs was present-spoke of the difficulty of getting instantly sufficient transportation to go down, and therefore that the train should go by land. The transports were required to get down provisions, and it was suggested that as few as possible should be used for moving the pontoon train.

Question. Since General Burnside has been in command of the army of the Potomac, have all its movements been made according to his judgment and direction, so far as you know?

Answer. Yes, sir; entirely.

By Mr. Wright:

Question. I understand you to say, general, that the delay in the bridges, you think, was caused by the elements and the inefficiency of men, and that there is nobody to blame that you know of?

Answer. I will not say inefficiency of men; but I will say this, that General Burnside reported to me that the officer in command of the land train had not been as efficient as he ought to have been, but he afterwards modified that report. I told him to arrest any person who had neglected his

duty and send him to Washington immediately, and he said to me that he did not think it necessary.

By the chairman:

Question. One more question is suggested to me which I will put. It is, whether you were requested to repair that road before the army left Harper's Ferry?.

The witness: Before General McClellan's army left Harper's Ferry? The chairman: Yes, sir; before they left there were you requested by General McClellan to have that road repaired?

Answer. Not that I remember. I was told that one of his staff-officers had requested it to be repaired, and the answer was immediately made by myself, "We cannot do anything there until he takes possession of the road;" and, moreover, I did not know he was going there, for he had not informed me as to where he intended to go. If at any time any suggestion of that kind was made to me, it was made with reference to some future time, and not as to any immediate action. No request was made, according to my recollection. I will add that if any paper came to me in which an allusion was made to that being done, it was referred by me immediately to the head of the department having charge of it-either to General Haupt or General Meigs.

Question. But you do not recollect any such request?
Answer. No, sir.

DECEMBER 22, 1862.

Brigadier General M. C. MEIGS sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. In your own way give your own explanations of anything that occurs to you to be material to the inquiry we are directed to make as to the battle at Fredericksburg.

Answer. As I presume this inquiry arises principally from the excited state of the public mind and the public press on this subject, and as the statements which have been published show a misapprehension of the true facts of the case, and I see that the press, in some degree at least, holds me responsible for certain failures connected with the pontoon train and 'supplies, and, also, that this committee is called upon by the press to extend its investigation to the desire of General McClellan to have the railroad from Aquia ercek repaired, som e time before the army marched from Harper's Ferry, and the quartermaster's department has been held responsible by the public press for not having done this, I think I had better begin at that point.

Before the army of the Potomac left the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, I received a telegram from Colonel Ingalls, chief quartermaster, dated 6th November, which I have read within a few days. Though I have not got it here, I can remember its substance: He requested me to direct that all the cars that could be obtained should be loaded with commissary and quartermaster's supplies, and placed in convenient positions on the railroad west of Alexandria, so as to be sent over the Manassas Gap road, and over the other railroads radiating from that point, to meet the army on its march. He also requested, in the last sentence of his despatch, that I would cause the road from Aquia creek to Richmond, via Fredericksburg, to be put in repair. I wrote on the back of that telegram, as is my habit, directions to give the orders which I thought were necessary. I sent copies of the telegram to the principal agents of the supply departments, to the commissary general,

in regard to commissary stores, and to the chief quartermaster of this depot, whose duty it is to provide quartermaster's stores, and provide the transportation for them, and to those who had charge of the repairing and running of the military railroads-General Haupt and Colonel McCallum. I inquired what preparation had been made for repairing these roads, and directed those under my orders to be ready to meet the requirements of the despatch. I knew the matter was in good hands, and I took it for granted that all proper preparations had already been made; and I learned on inquiry that they had been-that they were ready.

I remember writing on the back of the telegram that, of course, the repair of the railroad to Richmond would depend upon its being occupied by troops of the United States. It was at that time in possession of the enemy, and it would have been as easy at that time for me to provide barracks in Richmond as to repair the road to Richmond. I saw General Halleck, and mentioned this to him. I do not remember exactly what reply I made to Colonel Ingalls, but on seeing him afterwards I spoke of it, and I understood that this was a despatch written at his own instance, not specifically directed by General McClellan; but in that I may be mistaken. I have not spoken to General McClellan on the subject, and I derive this impression from what I remember of Colonel Ingalls's statement. We had then, I believe, everything nearly ready to repair the road whenever we should be able to get possession of it. We had built there last spring a very large wharf, about a thousand feet in length. There were requisitions on the quartermaster's department to build still larger wharves-one about 1,800 feet long-at the time the corps of General Burnside landed there and went forward to the Rappahannock and Rapidan. I remember at that time advising the authorities that by the time I could get a vessel load of lumber to the place it would be abandoned. And the fact was, that before any progress could be made in building the 1,800 feet additional wharf, the work already constructed there was destroyed, besides the cars and a considerable quantity of stores, and the bridges were burnt, to my great regret. I endeavored to prevent it, but heard of the intention too late. The next time this matter came to my attention in any way was when General Halleck informed me that General Burnside had taken command of the army of the Potomac, and desired to change his base of operations, and requested me to accompany him to Warrenton to see General Burnside. I went with him on the 12th of November, and with us went General Haupt, the director and superintendent of military railroads, appointed by the Secretary of War, who acts in connexion with the quartermaster's department. We furnish the funds, and he is supposed to be under the direction of the department. He is a very able and competent man. There was a good deal of conversation with General Burnside that night which I did not hear. I left General Halleck and himself to discuss the project of campaign, and I entered into it only late ' in the evening. I was informed that the general-in-chief would refer the matter to the President for his approval, and that General Burnside was to carry out his own plans if the President should approve.

I do not think that anything was said to me about pontoons then, but General Burnside asked me how soon I could have supplies ready for his army. I think he asked me how many days it would take to get the supplies to Aquia creek. I told him it could not be done in a day; that we could do a good deal, but that it took time to accomplish so great a movement. Here was an army of over men, the population of a great city, suddenly to be whipped up to break off from its lines of communication, and be transferred to a new position, and their supplies to be landed from a narrow channel, a contracted harbor, with very shallow water; that to supply them with all the necessaries of life was like undertaking to supply

Boston without any previous provision being made. I said it could not be done except with great labor, and that the army must do its own share; that I would collect all the suitable vessels I could, and have them employed in the work. We had a number of vessels, barges, and canal-boats already in the river. Our canal-boats were principally up the canal between here and Harper's Ferry. I said that we would collect them as rapidly as possible, and I would promise to have the supplies at Aquia creck by the time he got there, but that he had three or four thousand wagons with his army, and when he got to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, he must send his wagons down to the Potomac, and let them haul the supplies to the camps; that the railroad could not be repaired in a day; that we did not know the condition of the bridges. He was under the impression, I think, that the bridges had not been burned; they had been burned, however.

I understood that there was not a large force at Fredericksburg. Captain Dahlgren, of General Sigel's staff, had made a dash into Fredericksburg a few days before, and had driven out what little force was there, and I was told by General Heintzelman that in this dash he had burned some bridges. I had the impression that he had burned these very railroad bridges; that they were burned then, and not before; but what were the facts in that matter I do not know. On our way out to Warrenton General Haupt had consulted me as to the best mode of organizing a corps of workmen for the railroad repair and wharf building. I told him there were two regiments of engineer soldiers here under the charge of General Woodbury, already organized; that they were composed principally of mechanics and workmen; that he could get no more intelligent, no more skilful, no better disciplined men, and they would serve both as guards and workmen; and I advised him to ask General Halleck to place a portion of them at least at his disposal, and to order them to Aquia creek. The idea struck him favorably. He requested it, and subsequently orders were given to send down this engineer brigade under General Woodbury.

I did not see at that time General Burnside's letter containing his plan of campaign. When he last visited this city, in conversation with me on this subject, he expressed some surprise that I had not seen it; he thought I had; and he then read it to me. I do not remember how the question of his pontoon train came up at Warrenton. My own recollection of the circumstances is that it occurred to me that if he was going to Fredericksburg he would want pontoons, and I remember that I wrote in pencil an order to General Woodbury to call on the quartermaster at Washington for transportation for his pontoons to Aquia creek. Being under the impression at the time that the bridges were up near Harper's Ferry, and that they would have to be transported from that place, I thought he might need canal-boats, and perhaps horses, to tow them down the canal, and steamers to take them from Washington to Aquia creek. I handed this order to General Halleck, saying, “General Woodbury is an engineer; he is under your orders, not under mine, and it is not proper, therefore, for me to sign this order. If you think it right, I advise you to sign it." He signed it, and it was sent off to the telegraph office. I also wrote a despatch myself to the quartermaster in Baltimore, who was under my orders, directing a copy to be handed in transitu to the quartermaster here, calling on him to send a hundred barges as soon as possible to Washington for the purpose of taking supplies to Aquia creek and Belle Plain. These barges draw but little water, and are available in the river where larger vessels cannot approach the shore. General Haupt was with us. He required no directions, for he was in consultation with General Burnside and General Halleck. He had everything ready. It was perfectly well understood by him and myself, and I think also by General Halleck and General Burnside, (though I do not think