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Question. At what do you estimate the whole force across the river there. including the division from General Hooker's command?

Answer. I should suppose there were about 55,000 or 60,000 men.

Question. Why were not more troops used against the enemy, there being over the river from 55,000 to 60,000 men, and only 16,000 or 17,000 engaged?

Answer. I can hardly answer that question. I can only give my opinion that it must have been upon the supposition that the order of General Burnside contemplated a movement down the old Richmond road. General Franklin was ordered to hold a part of his troops for that movement. I suppose that was the reason.

Question. In order that that movement might be made, was it not essential that the point indicated in the order to be taken should have been taken?

Answer. It should have been taken and held, and the movement might then have been made, I suppose?

Question. If that order contemplated that that point should be taken and held, was it not the duty of the general commanding there to use his whole force to take that point-reserving only such portion as might be necessary to hold the heads of the bridges--if the whole force was requisite for that purpose?

Answer. It is very difficult for me to answer that question positively. The commanding officer of the whole force there must judge for himself as to the manner in which he will carry out the orders he has received. We were fighting with the river to our backs, and in case of a serious reverse there, the army would have been destroyed. I suppose it would be necessary, under such circumstances, for a general to hold a pretty large force in reserve; at least to have a large body of his troops ready to resist any counter-attack that might be made by the enemy, should the part of the troops that were engaged in carrying out that order meet with a reverse. Had we gone in with all our force over there and failed, the army would have been destroyed. If a larger force had been up there in time, I would have put it into the attack at once. I was going to put General Doubleday's division in behind Meade, and carry the whole thing through as far as my corps was concerned. But the demonstration made by the enemy on our left was so strong that I had to turn Doubleday square off to the left to meet it; and he did not succeed in driving the enemy off until it was too late to move Doubleday up again to support Meade.

Question. Why was not the attacking force better supported?

Answer. I think it was due to several causes. The troops ordered up did not come up in time to the scene of Meade's attack. I think they did not move rapidly enough under the artillery fire to which they were subjected in coming up.

Question. Why were not more troops placed in position to give immediate support to the attacking force?

Answer. I considered that the attacking force was my corps. I attacked with the whole corps, and there were no other troops that I know of ordered to follow me.

Question. In your judgment, should there not have been other troops in a position to give prompt support to you?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think there should.

Qustion. Who is responsible for that not having been done?

Answer. I can hardly say who is responsible, for I am not acquainted with all the orders that were given.

Question. Did the attacking force, under General Meade, reach the point which it was desired they should take and hold.

Answer. I think not quite. I think they were a little short of it. They got on a road, but it was a by-road, not the main road between the two portions of the enemy's forces.

Question. Did they reach near that point?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Had that point been taken and held as contemplated by the order, what, in your opinion, would have been the result?

Answer. If that point had been taken and held, the enemy would have been obliged to vacate their position. We could have thrown the mass of our troops down below and got in their rear, and reached their line of communications, and they would have been obliged to fall back.

Question. Have you any doubt that, had you been fully supported, you could have taken and held the position indicated in General Burnside's order?

Answer. I think if we had been fully supported with troops sufficient, we could have taken and held it; but, in the operation of doing that, it might have been necessary to have moved the bridges down, or thrown other bridges over below. There was no preparation of that kind made

Question. Why would that have been necessary if you had taken and held that point, and the taking and holding of that point would have causedthe enemy to have retired from their position?

Answer. I consider that all operations of that kind, all military attacks, &c., are so uncertain that it would be necessary in all cases to provide for a failure. I do not mean to say positively that we could have held that point if we had taken it. We might have been so attacked as to have been thrown into confusion, and not have been able to hold the point. If it had been taken and held it would have compelled the enemy to fall back.

Question. Could you reasonably have expected any success against the enemy, if with a force of from 55,000 to 60,000 across the river, you used only 17,000 against the eneny?

Answer. You must take in connexion with the lower operation the one above. I supposed that they had some reference to each other, and that the part of the troops not used in the attack would be used in pursuit, or in some other manner. If they had succeeded in carrying the point above Fredericksburg, then the enemy would have had to fall back, and we could have followed in pursuit with fresh troops we had. All these things have to be decided by the commanding general, I think.

Question. At or about what hour did Meade make the attack?
Answer. I think it was about 12 o'clock, or a little after.

Question. Did he send to you at any time for help?

Answer. He sent to me to say that Gibbon was not advancing on his right. I sent Gibbon orders; and also went over myself, and urged him on. I sent two aides-de-camp, and they were with him there, doing the best they could to help him on. They did not advance as vigorously as they should have done, I think.

Question. Do you recollect at about what time you received this request for aid from General Meade ?

Answer. It was about the time that his men got fairly into the woods, and got near the position of the enemy.

Question. Before or after he pierced their lines?

Answer. To say "pierced their lines" is rather uncertain, rather indefinite. I think it was about the time he got beyond the railroad, and commenced sending back prisoners.

Question. Can you state to us the number of men lost by your respective divisions?

Answer. My impression is that the first reports of the loss of the corps

were between 5,000 and 6,000 killed, wounded, and missing. The number was somewhat reduced afterwards, but the exact amount I do not now remember. It must have been over 4,000 men.

Question. Did Doubleday's division suffer much?
Answer. Considerably less than the others.

Question. Do you know his loss?

Answer. I do not remember. I can furnish the exact losses, if desired. Question. Had you any knowledge of orders from General Burnside to General Franklin during the day, subsequent to the first order under which you acted?

Answer. I have no knowledge of any subsequent orders to General Frankin on that day. I never heard that there were any others.

Question. Were any of General Franklin's troops actively engaged, except those commanded by you?

Answer. None that I know of. The batteries of General Smith's corps were engaged a part of the time, and there may have been some movement on the right which I did not know of. I think a regiment was sent out to take a battery, but I do not know how far it went. Colonel Hatch, the one I have before spoken of [see previous testimony] as having escaped from the prison in Richmond, was killed there. After General Stoneman got on to the field, he took command of his own troops.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. How far was the point of attack by Meade from the river, and how far from the place of crossing?

Answer. I do not think it was more than a mile or a mile and a quarter from the river. It was over two miles from the point of crossing.

Appendix to testimony of General Reynolds.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

December 13-5.55 a. m.

General Hardie will carry this despatch to you and remain with you during the day. The general commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division at least, to pass below Smithfield to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from General Sumner's command up the plank road to its intersection of the telegraph road, where they will divide with a view of seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge. between these points. He makes these moves by columns distant from each other with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear, at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instructions to Generals Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an orderly very soon. You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword, which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be "Scott." I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOHN G. PARKE, Chief of Staff.

Major General FRANKLIN,

Commanding Left Grand Division Army of the Potomac.

A true copy.

JOHN F. REYNOLDS,

Major General Volunteers Commanding.

2d brigade

3d brigade

4th brigade

Artillery

Consolidated morning report of first army corps, commanded by Major General John F. Reynolds, dated December 10, 1862.

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Field return of killed, wounded, and missing, in the first army corps, during the engagement of December 13, 1862.

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Men.

Field return of killed, wounded, and missing, &c.—Continued.

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Recapitulation of killed, wounded, and missing, in first army corps, battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862.

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