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Consolidated morning report of first army corps, commanded by Major General John F. Reynolds, dated December 20, 1862.

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Question. What is your present position in the army?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers, and command the first division of the third corps of the army of the Potomac.

Question. Were you in the battle of Fredericksburg on the 13th of December last?

Answer. I was.

Question. What command had you at that time?

Answer. I commanded the same division I now do, at that time in the corps of General Stoneman.

Question. Will you state what orders you received that day, and what was done by you and your command in pursuance of those orders?

Answer. I reached the Rappahannock river at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 13th, at the bridges constructed by General Franklin, and remained there with my division under arms waiting orders to cross. At 10 o'clock in the morning I received a written order from General Stoneman to cross

with my division, and to proceed to the left and report for orders to General Reynolds. I did so immediately, and reached the left about 11 o'clock, and found Meade's division in line, and was told by General Reynolds that General Meade was to attack. I was ordered to bring my division up immediately in the rear of Meade, in order to support his attack. At this time the cannonading of the enemy was very heavy and productive of great loss to us. It was not very heavy upon my command, although it was in an open field. The "old Richmond road," I think it is called, was on the lower part of the field, on the side of the field next the river, with heavy hedges skirting it, and with but two narrow entrances through which I moved my command and formed in line of battle, in two lines, in rear of Meade's division. I then received an order from General Reynolds to retire my command from the field, not to expose them to this cannonading, which was commenced when Meade advanced. I began the movement at the same time that I saw Meade advance to the attack. In about fifteen minutes from the time I commenced my movement, and when about two regiments from each brigade of my division had passed through these narrow passes, one of Meade's staff officers came to me with a request from General Meade to send re-enforcements to his support, and to bring my command forward. I pointed the officer to General Reynolds, who was on the field, and said that I had just received an order from him (General Reynolds) to retire my command; but that on hearing from General Reynolds I would advance immediately; and I sent the staff officer to General Reynolds. Then, seeing the troops under General Meade beginning to fall back, I ordered four regiments to advance-the 38th and 40th New York, the 57th Pennsylvania, and the 4th Maine-under General J. Hobart Ward. And I immediately rode up to General Reynolds and asked permission to bring my guns forward-two batteries on the crest of the hill. I received the permission, and at once brought forward the two batteries-the only two in my command-and opened upon the enemy in order to cover this movement of General Meade. As I advanced with my command to the crest of the hill I found Meade's entire command-two divisions-in utter confusion, and flying in all directions without order from the field. At General Meade's request I tried to stop the rout with my command, and deployed two regiments to try to stop the fugitives; but it was useless; they went right through us. The enemy pursued them closely, with great slaughter, as they fled from the field. The pursuit was so close that they came within fifty yards of my guns; I think it was Earle's division of the enemy that came so close. I opened upon them with cannister from four batteries-my two batteries, and two batteries of Meade's division, of which I had taken command—and drove them back. There were no troops in my rear, between my command and the river, except those demoralized troops of General Meade's division; and which he said were unreliable and could not be depended upon for any further service. I asked General Reynolds, then, what further was to be done. I received orders from him to try and hold the crest of this hill, in order to prevent the enemy from getting through and attacking the division under General Doubleday. That was on my left and connecting with the Rappahannock. The line on the left formed an angle and connected with the river. I held the enemy's line within 300 yards. There was constant firing that afternoon between my advanced line and the enemy. At four o'clock they opened upon us in this open field with some ten guns, which they had planted on the crest of the hill occupied by them, and which we silenced in less than half an hour. At about six o'clock in the evening I received an order from General Reynolds himself to remain in command of that line during the night, and to try to hold the position that I then occupied. I remained on the field, in this same position, until eleven o'clock on Rep. Com. 108- -45

Monday night, the 15th, when I received orders from General Stoneman, who had then resumed command of his corps, to retire across the Rappahannock river, which I did. The loss of my division in the fight upon Saturday, in killed and wounded, was 961. The strength of my division was about 7,000.

Question. Did you receive more than one request from General Meade to send him re-enforcements prior to his retiring?

Answer. I did not; and there was no delay on the part of my command in complying with that request. I immediately commenced the movement, reversed the order of leaving the field, and commenced to go back again into line, and ordered General Ward to advance with four regiments. The request was for two regiments, but I sent four, because my regiments were small. Those four regiments advanced beyond where Meade had gone, and covered the retreat of Meade at great loss to themselves. Those four regiments lost 600 men, and General Ward reported that they advanced beyond where Meade had advanced.

Question. With what force was Meade actually supported in his attack? Answer. The attack was made by Meade's division, and by Gibbon's division, on the right of Meade's division. My command was immediately in the rear of Meade's division. I should think that in those two divisions there were about 8,000 men that made the attack, supported by my division of about 7,000 men. The field was entirely deserted by those two divisions; there was not a man of them who remained near there. To the right of my division there was a gap without a soldier, without a man.

Question. Should there not have been troops in position to have supported you when you repulsed the enemy; and if there had been would you not have gained possession of the crest of the hill in your front?

Answer. I had no doubt at the time that I could have gained the crest of the hill with my division alone when the enemy retired from their pursuit, but when the attack was made by not exceeding 8,000 men, when there was 60,000 men on the field there, I thought that it was a mere feint, a mere diversion, and that the main attack was to have been on the right. If the main attack was to have been on the left, we ought to have had a great many more troops in the attack. In my opinion there were sufficient troops on the left, under General Franklin, to have carried the whole crest of the hill in our front.

Question. Do you mean that there were sufficient to have carried and held it?

Answer. Without a doubt.

Question. In your opinion what would have been the result if that point had been carried and held?

Answer. Complete success on our part, I think.

Question. What was done on the left, after the pursuit of the enemy was checked by your troops?

Answer. After the repulse of the enemy by my division there was a gap of considerable extent between my right and the left of Smith's corps of General Frankin's grand division. This gap was not closed until three or half past three o'clock, when Sickles's division of Stoneman's corps formed on my right. At about 6 o'clock Newton's division was formed in my rear, but was removed again at about 10 o'clock on Saturday night.

Question. Did you make any communication to General Franklin, or do you know of any communication having been made to him, which led to the advance of troops to fill up the gap on your right?

Answer. General Stoneman was with me after the repulse of the enemy, and as we rode to the right and found no troops there, he left me, saying

that he would see General Franklin and have the connexion completed ; have troops sent to fill up this gap.

Question. What was the condition of the enemy's line at the point where the attack was made?

Answer. It was naturally a very strong position, but when the attack was made there had been but little work done upon it. It was very much strengthened on Saturday night and Sunday night; they were at work upon it constantly upon both nights-chopping timber and throwing up earthworks.

Question. Do you know any reason why the attack was not renewed after the repulse of Meade's division?

Answer. I do not.

Question. Was there, or not, sufficient time left for another attack to have been made that day?

Answer. There was sufficient time to have made another attack. The repulse of Meade's division was about two o'clock, I should think; perhaps a little before two o'clock.

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1863.

General WILLIAM B. FRANKLIN recalled and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Will you describe fully and particularly what was done by the left wing of our army at the battle of Fredericksburg, or that portion of it under your own command?

Answer. On the 11th and 12th of December last, the left wing, composed of the first and sixthcorps, crossed the Rappahannock, by bridges, about a mile and a half or two miles below Fredericksburg. Both corps were in position by 1 o'clock in the afternoon of the 12th, and we remained in position during that night. General Reynolds's corps was on the left of the position, having its left on the river, and its right extending towards the hills. General Smith's corps was nearly at right angles to General Reynolds's corps, and was posted nearly parallel to the old Richmond road; its right extended across Deep Run.

About 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 12th, General Burnside came down to look at the condition of things. He appeared to be pleased with the appearance of affairs on the left, and had a long conversation with General Smith and myself. I urged him to give orders which would enable me to put the command in such a position that a very strong attack could be made there at daybreak the next morning. He left at 6 o'clock without consenting to make the attack, or without saying that he would not do it. The last thing I said to him was to give me the orders as soon as possible at any rate, whatever they were. He said I should have them in the course of two or three hours. I then said: "I hope they will be here before 12 o'clock tonight at any rate."

Some time after midnight I got very nervous about not receiving any orders, and sent an aide-de-camp to the telegraph office. He soon came back and said that he had heard from headquarters, and that the orders were then being prepared and would soon come down. About 7 o'clock the next morning I received the following order:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"December 13-5.55 a. m.

"General Hardie will carry this despatch to you and remain with you during the day. The general commanding directs that you keep your whole

command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from General Sumner's command up the plank road to its intersection of the telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He makes these moves by columns, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instructions to General Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an orderly very soon. You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be 'Scott.'"

This was signed by General John G. Parke, chief of staff.

I consulted with my corps commanders about this order, as it was not what we expected, and concluded that it meant that there should be what is termed an armed reconnoissance, or an observation in force made of the enemy's lines, with one division; that in order that that division might not be utterly destroyed, I was to keep it well supported, but that the main point of the order, twice referred to, was that the command should be kept in readiness for a rapid movement along the Richmond road.

I directed General Reynolds to carry out so much of the order as refers to an attack with one division, and General Meade was designated to make that attack with his division. General Gibbon was to support it on the right, and General Doubleday was held in reserve for any emergency that might arise.

As soon as General Meade was in motion a large force of the enemy was turned on our extreme left, and General Reynolds stopped Meade and sent Doubleday's division to drive them off. They were in such position that they could fire into Meade's rear as he advanced, so that it was absolutely necessary that he should be stopped until the enemy could be driven off. While he was stopped, and Doubleday was advancing, I sent for one of General Stoneman's divisions, which was on the other side of the river at the bridges. This division-General Birney's division-I directed to be crossed, and before it reached the field I sent an aide-de-camp to direct General Birney to report to General Reynolds. General Birney did so report, but before he got up General Meade had advanced into the woods; had a severe fight with the enemy; had driven them, so he reported to me, so that his men were on the crown of the hill, when they were fallen upon by an immensely superior force of the enemy and driven back.

By this time two regiments of Birney's division had arrived on the field, and General Reynolds immediately put them in; but they were also driven back, and it was not until the main body of Birney's division came up that they were able to retrieve themselves at all so as to hold any part of the woods.

While this was going on, General Gibbon had also advanced on Meade's right as a support. He had become engaged with the enemy, was wounded about half-past two and had to leave the field, and shortly afterwards his division retired.

By this time the second division of General Stoneman, which I had also ordered up, came up and took the place of Gibbon's division, and those two

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