3 o'clock p. m. Reynolds seems to be holding his own. Things look better somewhat. 3.40 p.m.

Gibbon's and Meade's divisions are badly used up, and I fear another advance on the enemy on our left cannot be made this afternoon. Doubleday's division will replace Meade's as soon as it can be collected; and if it be done in time, of course another attack will be made. The enemy are in force in the woods on our left, towards Hamilton's, and are threatening the safety of that portion of our line. They seem to have detached a portion of their force to our front, where Howe and Brooks are now engaged. Brooks has some prisoners, and is down to the railroad. Just as soon as the left is safe, our forces here will be prepared for a front attack. But it may be too late this afternoon. Indeed, we are engaged in front anyhow.

Notwithstanding the unpleasant items I relate, the morale generally of the troops is good.

4.30 p.m.

The enemy is still in force on our left and front. An attack on our batteries in front has been repulsed. A new attack has just opened on our left. But the left is safe, though it is too late to advance either to the left or front.

DECEMBER 14, 1862-10.10 o'clock a. m. Several new batteries of the enemy appear to have been placed on our front and left. An attack of the enemy seems to be expected soon.

12 m.

Nothing new. Awaiting attack from the enemy every moment. They are placing two new batteries in our front. Constant and annoying skirmish fire. Enemy attempting to pick off gunners and horses of our batteries. Franklin has to maintain a skirmish fire to keep them off.

12.40 p.m.

No development yet of enemy. Skirmishers of enemy very spiteful. Battery of enemy on river enfilades our left. DeRussy to play on it. All agree that the indications are threatening of an attack of massed troops soon on our left and front probably. Enemy digging rifle-pits, however. Must have a development soon of enemy's design.

Franklin wants to hear from you. It is very important to know of the movements of the 9th corps, for Franklin wants to assist by a demonstration, if not attacked before long.

Nothing new as yet. What news from the right

2 p. m.

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1863.

General JOHN GIBBON Sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a captain in the fourth regular artillery, and a brigadier general of volunteers.

Question. What was your rank and command at the battle of Fredericksburg?

Answer. My rank was that of brigadier general of volunteers, and I commanded a division.

Question. Will you state to the committee concisely what was done by you and your command on that day?

Answer. My division occupied the right of the first corps, which brought me into the centre of the left grand division, which was the left wing of the army. I was immediately on the left of General Howe's division of the sixth corps. The night before the battle my division way lying in rear of the Bowling Green or old Richmond road; and on the morning of the 13th of December, somewhere between 7 and 8 o'clock, I was ordered by General Reynolds to cross the road and take a position preparatory to making an attack upon the enemy. The enemy was posted in a wood, and along the Jailroad track, directly in our front. I moved forward the brigades in succession until the leading brigade arrived at a point where we were protected by a slight rise of ground from the fire in front. As I was merely directed to form my line in the field, the men were here ordered to lie down, so as to be protected from the heavy artillery fire which was opened on us from the right and left. Some time between 11 and 12 o'clock the enemy brought some guns upon an eminence directly in front of General Meade's division, which was on my left, and opened a very heavy fire upon his troops and mine. General Meade's batteries, and one of my batteries, which was situated on the left of my line, concentrated their fire on the enemy's guns and soon silenced them-that is, in the course of an hour, I suppose. As soon as the enemy's guns slackened their fire, I saw General Meade's troops moving forward into action, and I at once sent orders to my leading brigade to advance and engage the enemy. Shortly afterwards I ordered up another brigade to the support of the first. The fire was very heavy from the enemy's infantry, and I ordered up the third brigade, and formed it in column on the right of my line, and directed them to take the position with the bayonet, having previously given that order to the leading brigade But the general commanding that brigade told me that the noise and confusion was such that it was impossible to get the men to charge, or to get them to hear any order to charge. The third brigade-my last brigade-went in and took the position with the bayonet, and captured a considerable number of prisoners. During the fighting of the infantry, I was establishing the batteries which belonged to the division in position to assist in the assault. I had just received the report of the success of this third brigade, when, shortly after, I saw a regiment of rebel infantry come out on the left of my line, between myself and General Meade. I recognized them by their colors, and rode up towards a battery that was on my left and directed them to open fire upon that regiment. I was riding back towards the right of my line when I was wounded and left the field-about half-past 2 o'clock in the afternoon, I think.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. What was the force of your command taken into action?

Answer. It was somewhere about 5,000 men; I do not think it was quite that number, but near that.

Question. Were you supported when you went into the attack; and if so, by whom?

Answer. No troops came up in support of my division in time to enable me to hold the position which I had gained. Just before my troops took the railroad track, I met General Stoneman upon the field, who spoke to me and said that he had some troops there. As I had used all my infantry to make the attack, I begged him to give me some regiments to assist me. He said that he had put some of his regiments in support of my battery, which

was on the left of my line; and he afterwards told me that he sent three regiments into the fight. But as I was wounded almost immediately after They did not report to me while I was there.

that, I did not know it.

Question. How many men did you lose?

Answer. The report made to me was 1,249 killed, wounded, and missing out of the division.

Question. How many prisoners did you

take?

Answer. There were 180 prisoners reported.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

January 26, 1863.

On motion by Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, Resolved, That the committee on the conduct of the war be instructed to inquire whether Major General A. E. Burnside has, since the battle of Fredericksburg, formed any plans for the movement of the army of the Potomac, or any portion of the same; and if so, whether any subordinate generals of said army have written to or visited Washington to oppose or interfere with the execution of such movements, and whether such proposed movements have been arrested or interfered with; and if so, by what authority. Attest:

J. W. FORNEY, Secretary.

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1863.

Major General A. E. BURNSIDE sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. You have read the resolution of the Senate under which this committee is now acting. Will you give us a concise history of your administration of the army of the Potomac, from the time of the Fredericksburg battle down to the time when you relinquished the command, embracing within your statement an answer to the points presented in this resolution? Answer. Soon after I met your committee at my camp, I commenced making arrangements for another movement, by sending out reconnoitring parties, by preparing roads, &c. All my papers are on board a schooner which started from Aquia creek for New York city, and which has not yet arrived. I therefore may not give the exact dates in my present statement, but they will not vary more than a day or two from the correct dates. On the 26th of December I ordered the entire command to prepare three days' cooked rations; to fill their wagons with small stores to the amount of ten days' supply; if possible, to have with them at the same time from ten to twelve days' supply of beef cattle, with forage for teams, and cavalry and artillery horses for about the same length of time, and the required amount of ammunition-in fact, to be in a condition to move at twelve hours' notice. I had determined to cross the river some six or seven miles below Fredericksburg, at a point opposite the Sedden House, a short distance below Hayfield. The positions for the artillery to protect the crossing had all been selected, the roads surveyed, and the corduroy necessary to prepare the roads had been cut. It was my intention to make a feint above the town, which could have been turned into a positive assault if I found we were discovered below. But if we were not discovered below, it was my inten

tion to throw the entire command across at the point opposite the Sedden House, and points in its neighborhood where bridges could be built. In connexion with this movement I had organized a cavalry expedition to consist of some two thousand five hundred of the best cavalry in my command, a thousand of them, with four pieces of artillery, to be picked men. And I had detailed a division of infantry from General Hooker's command to accompany this cavalry as far as the upper fords of the Rappahannock, and aid them in crossing. The thousand picked men, with the four pieces of artillery, were to cross the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford; the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford; the Virginia Central railroad at Louisa Court-House; the James river at either Goochland or Carter's; the Richmond and Lynchburg railroad at a point south of there; the Richmond, Petersburg, and Weldon railroad at or near the crossing of the Nottoway; and then to move on through General Pryor's command, and join General Peck at Suffolk, where we were to have steamers in waiting to bring them back to Aquia creek, at least, the men, with their arms and accoutrements; and in case their horses had to be left behind, new horses would be supplied to them. The object of this cavalry expedition was to attract the attention of the enemy, blow up the locks on the James River canal, blow up the iron bridge on the Richmond and Lynchburg railroad at the place of crossing, and destroy the bridge on the Richmond and Weldon railroad over the Nottoway; and, during this movement, I intended to throw my command across the river at the point I have named. The remainder of the cavalry, other than the thousand picked men, was to break off from the main body in the following order: a portion to go up to Warrenton; another portion to go to the neighborhood of Culpeper; another portion was to accompany the thousand picked men as far as Raccoon Ford, from which point they were to turn back. The object of these dispositions was to deceive the enemy as to which one of the columns was the attacking column.

This expedition had got under way, and the brigade of infantry had, I think on the 30th of December, crossed at Richards's Ford, and come back over Ellis's Ford, which would have enabled the cavalry to cross at Kelly's Ford. On that day I received from the President of the United States a telegraphic despatch in, substantially, these words: "I have good reason for saying that you must not make a general movement without letting me know of it." I could not imagine at the time what reasons the President had for sending this telegram, but supposed it related in some way to some important military movements in other parts of the country, in which it was necessary to have co-operation. I at once despatched a messenger to overtake the advance of this cavalry expedition, and order them to halt until further orders; and I simply suspended the order for the general movement. My messenger overtook the cavalry just as they were ready to cross at Kelly's Ford. In the mean time I heard of the raid Stuart had made in the direction of Dumfries, and the rear of Faifax Court House, and sent a second order for a portion of this cavalry to endeavor to cut off Stuart in the neighborhood of Warrenton, in which they did not succeed. I then determined to come up to Washington to see the President, and if possible to ascertain the exact state of the case. I came up to Washington, saw the President, and he frankly told me that some general officers of my command had called upon him, and represented that I was on the eve of another movement; that the order for the preparation of rations, ammunition, &c., had already been issued, and all the preliminary arrangements made; and that they were satisfied that if the movement was made, it would result in disaster. That was about the substance of what the President told me, although he said a great deal more. I was so much surprised at the time at what I heard that it did not make an active impression on my mind as to the exact words.

But I am sure that was the nature of it; and I think he said that he had understood that no prominent officer of my command had any faith in my proposed movement.

I then sat down and gave the President a detailed account of my plans for this movement, at the same time telling him that I was satisfied there was some misgiving on the part of some of my general officers as to making any movement at all at that time. But I said that I was myself satisfied that that movement ought to be made, and I had come to that conclusion without any consultation with the other generals.

The President still expressed misgivings as to the feasibility of making the entire movement, but expressed some regret at the cavalry portion of it being stopped. I told him that that was a portion of the general movement, and that if these picked men were to go around Richmond without having any general movement in co-operation with them, and were to meet with disaster and be captured, it would be a very serious loss to us; and even if they were to meet with success, it would not compensate for the risk, unless we were to take advantage of that success by a general movement; and, besides, if the details of this cavalry movement could be kept quiet-kept secret-it might yet be made in conjunction with the general movement, as I had proposed.

The President then said that he did not feel willing to authorize a continuous movement without consultation with some of his advisers. He sent for General Halleck and Mr. Stanton, and the matter was very fully talked over. He told them what they then for the first time heard of-that these officers had called upon him and made these representations to him, resulting in his telegram to me. I asked him if he would give me the names of those officers. He said he could not. I expressed some opinions in reference to what ought to be done with them, but at the same time said that I should not insist upon having the names, as he had a right to withhold them. General Halleck at the same time expressed the opinion that officers making representations of that kind should have been dismissed the service at once, or arrested at once, or something of that kind. My view was that they should have been dismissed the service.

No definite conclusion was come to, during that conference, in reference to the subject of a movement. I was here at that time for two days.

When I returned to my camp I found that many of the details of the general movement were already known, and was told by a general officer that the details of the cavalry movement were known here in the city of Washington to some sympathizers with the rebellion. I was told that by General Pleasonton. This was some two or three days after my first interview with the President. Of course, I then abandoned the movement in that distinct form, intending to make it in some other form within a few days.

Some correspondence then passed between the President, General Halleck, and myself, copies of which I have among my papers on board the schooner to which I have already referred; but they can be furnished to the committee if desired. The amount of the correspondence was a desire, on my part, to have distinct authority from General Halleck, or from some one else in power here in Washington, to make a move across the river. I stated to them that there was hardly a single general officer occupying a prominent position in my command, who would favor a move of that kind, and that the influence of the President's telegram would still rest upon me, even if it had been recalled; and that his caution to me to run no great risk which might result in the defeat and destruction of the army of the Potomac, still influenced me, and made me reluctant to make a move of that sort without some encouragement from them. I said that I would take the responsibility of the move myself, for I honestly felt that it ought