Question. And when you commenced the preparations did that at once give notice to the enemy of what was going on?

Answer. The enemy were apprised that some movement was going on, but as to the point or locality of crossing they were, I believe, in the dark. Question. What was that proposed movement, suppose you had succeeded in making the crossing that was anticipated?

Answer. We intended to cross the river, and, turning the left of Lee, get into his rear.

Question. In the first proposed movement it was intended to cross below Fredericksburg and turn Lee's right?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question And the last proposed movement was to cross above Fredericksburgh and turn his left.

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. This last movement was not interfered with, but stopped by the condition of the roads and the fact that the enemy had got notice of its progress before it was accomplished?

Answer Yes, sir.

Question. Was there any advantage in the movement by crossing above Fredericksburg over that of crossing below?

Answer. That is a question difficult to answer.

Question. I mean to ask you this: Was there any more probability of success of this second movement, if carried out, than there was of the first movement had that not been interrupted?

Answer. I think there was stronger probability of success in the second movement than there was in 'the first, for the reason that it was intended as a surprise, and it would have been a surprise if we had come to time, and the storm had not interfered; whereas in the other case the enemy were prepared by having a force ready to oppose us.

Question. Do you know in what manner the enemy became informed of the movement?

Answer. I do not; but my opinion is that they have spies within our lines who furnish them information continually. Where the officers on the other side see a train of wagons and artillery moving in a certain direction, they would interpret it their own way.

Question. After the rains commenced would it have been possible to have made this second movement even if the enemy had not had notice of your movement?

Answer. It would have been hazardous. I doubt the possibility of our being able to carry artillery across, or, at least, further than across to the opposite bank. It would have been next to an impossibility to move the artillery from the banks up the heights.

Question. Were these two officers of whom you have spoken, Newton and Cochrane, on leave of absence in Washington at the time these representations to the President are supposed to have been made?

Answer. I think they were.

By Mr. Wade:

Question. You have said that preparations for a movement had been made and that the movement had commenced when this order came from Washington?

Answer. Yes, sir; and that it was then delayed until General Burnside came to Washington and consulted the President.

Question. Was the order rescinded on his application to the President? Answer. I cannot answer, as I do not know.

Question. How long was the movement interrupted and delayed by reason of this order of the President?

Answer. I cannot state exactly, ten days or two weeks.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Was the last contemplated expedition General Burnside's own, or was it the result of a council of war?

Answer. I believe it was his own.

Question. Do you know whether it met with the judgment of the com manders of divisions?

Answer. That question I cannot answer, as I do not know.

Question. Did they heartily co-operate in the movement?

Answer. It was with them simply a question of receiving orders and obeying orders. The matter was not referred to them, nor was there any advice asked or sought.

Question. So far as you can judge, as a military man, were the orders they received in reference to the movement promptly complied with?

Answer. I think they were, so far as the circumstances would allow. Question. Do you know whether they protested against the movement in writing or otherwise?

Answer. I do not think they did. I know of no protest.

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1863.

General JOHN NEWTON sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers in the United States army, at present commanding a division.

Question. Who were your superior officers at the time of the battle of Fredericksburg, and who are they now?

Answer. At the time of the Fredericksburg battle Major General W. F. Smith was my corps commander, and Major General W. B. Franklin was the commander of the left grand division, in which I was serving. I understand that Major General Sedgwick has now been assigned to the command of the 6th army corps, of which my division forms a part. The left grand division has been broken up; we have no grand divisions now.

Question. You were in General Franklin's grand division at the time of the battle of Fredericksburg, and until he left the army of the Potomac? Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Have you at any time made any communication to the President of the United States, the Secretary of War, or General Halleck in relation to any contemplated movements of General Burnside, or been present when any such communications were made?

Answer. I have made a communication verbally to the President. And while I am on this subject I would ask permission of the committee to go somewhat into detail upon it, because I could not otherwise give the whole truth, or give the whole bearing of the subject.

Question. You can do so.

Answer. Subsequent to the battle of Fredericksburg-between that time and the latter part of December-I became painfully aware that the troops of my division and of the whole army had become exceedingly dispirited. This conviction on my mind was not of my own seeking. The superior officers of my command, in incidental conversation with me, just as we would meet from day to day, socially, considered it their duty to tell me that the troops were dispirited and dejected. I heard from other commanders, inde

pendent of me entirely, the same account of their troops. From all that I heard I was decidedly of the opinion that the dissatisfaction of the troops arose from a want of confidence in General Burnside's military capacity. That conviction was absolute in my mind; I could not get over it; that was the ground of complaint.

This appeared to me to be a most important fact. It seemed to have arisen spontaneously among the troops themselves. The higher officers of the army, as a rule, so far as I have observed, are cautious in their conversations in regard to matters like that. They converse together, but not with their junior officers; I mean those below the rank of generals, as a general rule. I became perfectly satisfied, from these circumstances, that this dissatisfaction among the troops was spontaneous. It existed among the troops, and among what we call the line officers of the regiments.

About the 30th of December I obtained permission to visit my family, and I determined that when I came to Washington I would lay this state of things before some prominent individual in the confidence of the government, and let him decide on it, whether it was of sufficient importance or not, to act upon it.

Let me state that this action was of my own accord, and on my own responsibility entirely. I was not urged or persuaded to it by any superior or any inferior officer. It was entirely a private matter of my own.

General Cochrane accompanied me to Washington. I was glad of General Cochrane's company, because knowing nobody in Washington I thought I could not obtain the proper introduction except through gentlemen like General Cochrane, who were well acquainted here. We arrived here about 3 o'clock. General Cochrane went out for the purpose of seeing some members of this very committee, and I think some other members of Congress ; merely for the purpose of having a free conversation on these things, and for the objects I have already stated. Late in the afternoon General Cochrane returned and informed me that he had found nobody, but that the President was ready to see me; I went with him to the President's house at once, saw the President, and the conversation opened.

Now there were a great many things said at that conversation that I do not think have any important bearing upon this subject, nor do I think that it is in my power, not having a very good memory for the mere by-play conversation any how, to give a perfectly accurate version of that conversation.

I considered, in the first place, that although I should have much preferred speaking with other gentlemen in Washington and getting their advice and judgment on these things, yet, after all, the President of the United States was the one to whom to speak in regard to a matter which I did not consider purely military, viz: the condition in which the army found itself. I also found myself in a very delicate position in this conversation. I did not wish to tell the President; and I did not tell him at any one time that the troops had no confidence in General Burnside. I could not tell him that, although, so far as I was concerned, that was my firm belief. But that was a most delicate thing for me to say, and therefore I had to go, as it were, around it indirectly, and that made the conversation very desultory, and there were a great many things said not necessary to the point in question. At the time I came up to Washington General Burnside had not, to my knowledge, formed any plan of movement. He was talking about a particular part of the river to be crossed, and a movement was agitated. I saw the place where he intended to cross, and it appeared to me to be as bad, if not a little worse, than the place we had crossed at the first time.

Now I wish to say that my conversation with the President would have had no effect in destroying this movement, even if it had been decided upon,

for the reason that General Burnside told General Franklin that he had given it up, before I saw the President. I was not aware of that fact, however. Still he told him that before I saw the President, on the morning of the very day that I came up here; and I did not see the President until late in that day.

I spoke of this movement as designed merely, "talked of," is probably the best way to express it. This is the only movement, even of a hypothetical nature, that I knew of, with which anybody could be said to have interferred in any sense of the word at all.

I disclaimed to the President any intention to interfere with the military authorities in any way. I considered it my duty, if I was true to my country, to let somebody in authority know what were my convictions of the state of the army; for I felt that if that army should be again defeated at that point or anywhere along the Rappahannock, it would not be a mere defeat, as before, but it would be a destruction. I felt that the very existence of the country was at stake, and that was the only motive I had in doing as I did.

When the conversation was first opened, as I have already explained, it was very delicate, and I had formed no plan of conversation at all. I could merely get into a conversation, and I had to do it indirectly, because I could not say directly to the President that the whole trouble was that the privates had no confidence in General Burnside. I had to get around that the best way I could.

At first the President misunderstood our object in coming there, and thought we were coming to injure General Burnside, and even to suggest somebody for commander of the army. But the President was quickly assured that we had no man in our minds to command the army; that we had no intention to injure General Burnside; that our sole intention was to express the facts as to the condition of the army.

About the last words I said, I requested the President not to believe what I stated merely because I had stated it, because it was only my opinion after all; and that my object in coming was to put him in possession of that opinion, so that he might investigate it, if he chose to do so, afterwards. And when we were about going away the President expressed himself gratified with the conversation, and said that he hoped that good would result from it. And, if I remember rightly, he also expressed great surprise that any movement was ever agitated; it seemed to be without his knowledge. That is about all, I think.

Question. Can you not state to the committee more definitely the statements which you made to the President?

Answer. I have already stated, I think, about the point at which General Burnside was talking of crossing. That came up in the conversation, and I gave the President my military opinion about it. But, as I have before remarked, I was not aware that General Burnside had selected that point, only that it was a thing talked of, that is about the most definite thing I remember. The President made some remarks about portions of the army being demoralized, and would not fight. I expressed a difference of opinion upon that subject, and said that I thought that they would fight. There were a great many little things that were said there that have no bearing whatever upon this subject If I could have gone to the President and said to him, "Mr. President, the army has no confidence in General Burnside; that is the whole trouble down there," my conversation would not have lasted five minutes; but that was manifestly improper, I could not say it, although I did believe it firmly, and I took particular care not to say it. I wish to remark that I never did regard the troops down there as demoralized. I told the President I believed they would fight. My meaning was this: that

they would fight to a certain extent, but they would not fight with that rush and impetuosity which the situation of affairs on the Rappahannock absolutely demanded as the first element of success. That is all I have to say on that point. The President and I had a long conversation in regard to the position down there on the Rappahannock, where it was contemplated or talked of crossing; a place called Muddy creek, or near Muddy creek. I explained to the President, as well as I could, the position there. him that I had made a very rapid ride over the ground, and that I thought it would require a very lengthened, particular, and minute observation in order to decide absolutely on any one point. But the place struck me very unfavorably, as I have already said. We had quite a detailed conversation on that subject. I spoke to him of several obstacles there. He spoke to me of the ground above Fredericksburg. I remarked that I had not seen it, and therefore could not judge of it.

That was about the sum and substance, excepting the by-play of conversation and the correcting misapprehensions as they arose.

Question. State to the committee, as definitely as you can, what you said to the President about the condition of the troops, and in relation to the commanding general, if anything?

Answer. All that I remember is what I have already stated as to my general object in the conversation.

Question. I do not refer to your object, but to your statements.

Answer. The object explains them. I endeavored to explain that the troops were dispirited. I remember now something on that point which has just occurred to me. That which I remember most distinctly was that the President expressed some doubts about a particular portion of the army fighting, or rather he said to me that what I said gave him doubts of them. I hastened to correct that, because that was not my intention. I told him that that particular portion of the army would fight; that I could guarantee

that.

I have already explained to the committee what I meant by the term "fighting." I meant that they would fight as soldiers will ordinarily fight, but not with that spirit and impetuosity that were absolutely necessary in our situation down there. That is, I feared so.

I now remember also something about General Burnside. In the conversation in regard to this very point of crossing, near Muddy creek, this thing came up. I gave the President an account of an examination I had made of it. It was under these circumstances. I had gone over to General Burnside's quarters solely to inquire about means of transportation up to Washington. While I was there General Burnside told me that he had sent General Woodbury and General Franklin down to this place. I mentioned to him that General Franklin wanted me to go with him; as I was an old engineer officer he thought it would be well for me to go, but that I did not care much about it, and it did not occur to me as of much importance, and I had not gone. General Burnside then asked me particularly if I would not go down and join General Franklin, and look at that place. General Franklin had the start of me, and I never overtook him. I rode along the river and made an examination for myself. General Burnside wished us to report at a certain hour, and that made the examination comparatively hasty. When we had come back we found that General Burnside appeared to be much more in the humor of crossing, and that, too, before we could make our report to him. He seemed to receive our report with a great deal of disfavor when we could not say that it was a good point to cross.

That was about all that took place, and that was about all that I said to the President. Your question reminded me of that; I had nearly forgotten it.