Reports of Committees: 30th Congress, 1st Session - 48th Congress, 2nd Session, Količina 2 |
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Zadetki 1–5 od 100
Stran 7
... enemy was variously estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men . Those who formed the highest estimate based their opinion upon information received at headquarters . As to the strength of the enemy's position , the general impression ...
... enemy was variously estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men . Those who formed the highest estimate based their opinion upon information received at headquarters . As to the strength of the enemy's position , the general impression ...
Stran 10
... enemy's communication , while mine would ? " 5. In case of disaster , would not a safe retreat be more difficult by ... enemy were driven from their batteries on the Potomac . At this point it may be well to consider the principal ...
... enemy's communication , while mine would ? " 5. In case of disaster , would not a safe retreat be more difficult by ... enemy were driven from their batteries on the Potomac . At this point it may be well to consider the principal ...
Stran 11
... enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Ches- apeake bay . " L. THOMAS , Adjutant General . " " ABRAHAM LINCOLN . Before the movement by way of Annapolis could be executed , the enemy abandoned their batteries upon ...
... enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Ches- apeake bay . " L. THOMAS , Adjutant General . " " ABRAHAM LINCOLN . Before the movement by way of Annapolis could be executed , the enemy abandoned their batteries upon ...
Stran 12
... enemy's vessel , the Merrimac , can be neutralized ; second , that the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac ; third ...
... enemy's vessel , the Merrimac , can be neutralized ; second , that the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac ; third ...
Stran 17
... enemy's lines . General McClellan states that he moved from Fortress Monroe sooner than he otherwise would have done , upon hearing that the enemy were sending down re - enforcements . All the testimony goes to prove that when our ...
... enemy's lines . General McClellan states that he moved from Fortress Monroe sooner than he otherwise would have done , upon hearing that the enemy were sending down re - enforcements . All the testimony goes to prove that when our ...
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Pogosti izrazi in povedi
a. m. to-morrow Adjourned to 11 advance Alexandria Answer Aquia creek arrived artillery attack batteries battle battle of Williamsburg Bottom's Bridge bridge brigade Burnside Captain cavalry Centreville chairman Chandler Chickahominy Colonel committee met pursuant corps cross despatch direction division enemy enemy's fight following witnesses force Fort Monroe fortifications Fortress Monroe Franklin Fredericksburg Frémont front G. B. MCCLELLAN General-in-Chief Gooch guns H. W. HALLECK Harper's Ferry HEADQUARTERS ARMY Heintzelman horses infantry James river Major General H. W. Major General MCCLELLAN Manassas McDowell miles military morning move movement night o'clock Odell officers operations opinion peninsula pontoons position Potomac President pursuant to adjournment quartermaster Question railroad Rappahannock re-enforcements rebels received regiments retreat Richmond road Secretary Secretary of War sent side Sumner supplies suppose telegraph tion troops wagons WAR DEPARTMENT Warrenton Washington Williamsburg York river Yorktown
Priljubljeni odlomki
Stran 76 - State from the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House of Representatives in whichsoever house it shall last have been so approved, and he shall carefully preserve the originals.
Stran 525 - In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.
Stran 340 - I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you.
Stran 310 - Ordered: That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as in the opinion of the general-in-chief and the commanders of all the army corps shall leave said city entirely secure.
Stran 24 - I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted and shall omit no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can- A.
Stran 46 - You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania; but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he docs so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.
Stran 9 - MY DEAR SIR: — You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac — yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.
Stran 45 - As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named.
Stran 44 - The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south.
Stran 11 - That any movement, as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March, instant, and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day.