23 Can. Cr. Cas. 7, at 19; R. v. Burke, 24 O.R. 64. The proper course would be to move to have it quashed. Giroux v. The King, supra. Procedure. Sheriff to notify judge after committal of accused.-Notice to prosecuting officer when judge does not reside in county. 826. Every sheriff shall, within twenty-four hours after any prisoner charged as aforesaid is committed to gaol for trial, notify the judge in writing that such prisoner is so confined, stating his name and the nature of the charge preferred against him, whereupon, with as little delay as possible, such judge shall cause the prisoner to be brought before him. 2. Where the judge does not reside in the county in which the prisoner was committed, the judge having received the notification and having obtained the depositions on which the prisoner was committed, if any, may forward them to the prosecuting officer with instructions to cause the prisoner to be brought before him instead of the judge, naming as early a day as possible for the trial in case the prisoner shall elect to be tried by the judge, without a jury, and the prosecuting officer shall, in such case, with as little delay as possible cause the prisoner to be brought before him. Origin]-Sec. 766, Code of 1892. Sheriff's notice to judge]-Sec. 826 provides that "every sheriff shall, within 24 hours after any person charged as aforesaid is committed to gaol for trial, notify the judge," etc. That means 24 hours, not after the justice has made the order committing, but 24 hours after the party is actually committed to prison and is taken in custody there. The language of a statute of this character is to be strictly construed. R. v. Tetreault (Sask.) 17 Can. Cr. Cas. 259. Duties of the prosecuting officer]-Under sec. 826 (2) and the first part of secs. 827-8, the duty which now may be discharged by the prosecuting officer in taking the election and re-election is one which was formerly discharged by the judge alone, and is of a judicial nature; then under sub-secs. 3 and 4 of 827 and 833 the duties are primarily those of a ministerial officer of the court; then under sec. 828 in the granting or withholding the consent for re-election after indictment, required by the proviso, there is the discharge of a duty quite distinct from either of the foregoing and pertaining more to the powers of the Attorney-General as représenting the Crown. R. v. Jun Goon, (1916) 10 W.W.R. 24, 25 Can. Cr. Cas. 415, 425, 22 B.C.R. 381, 33 W.L.R. 761. Ontario tariff of sheriff's fees] (34.) Notification to judge, for each prisoner .... $1.00 (35.) Bringing up each prisoner before judge, to elect as to .... 2.00 2.00 Persons jointly accused]-See sec. 829. Arraignment. The charge. The option.-Procedure where accused consents to trial without jury.-Prosecuting officer prefers charge. 827. The judge, having first obtained the depositions on which the prisoner was so committed, if any, or the prosecuting officer, as the case may be, shall state to the prisoner, (a) that he is charged with the offence, describing it; 2. If the prisoner has been brought before the prosecuting officer, and consents to be tried by the judge, without a jury, the trial shall proceed on the day named by the judge in the manner provided by the next following subsection. 3. In such case or if the prisoner has been brought before the judge and consents to be tried by him without a jury, the prosecuting officer shall prefer the charge against him for which he has been committed for trial, and if, upon being arraigned upon the charge, the prisoner pleads guilty, the prosecuting officer shall draw up a record as nearly as may be in form 60. 4. Such plea shall be entered on the record, and the judge shall pass the sentence of the law on such prisoner, which shall have the same force and effect as if passed by a court having jurisdiction to try the offence in the ordinary way. Origin]-Sec. 767, Code of 1892. Manner of taking option on arraignment]-The judge is to "state" to the accused what offence he is charged with, and the offence is to be "described." Sec. 827. There is no essential difference in the stating of the offence at this stage and the preferring of the charge on his arraignment for trial. R. v. Jun Goon, 10 W.W.R. 24 at 29, per Martin, J.A.; 22 B.C.R. 381, 33 W.L.R. 761, 25 Can. Cr. Cas. 415. Recording the consent]-An entry shall be made 'of the consent at the time the same is given" (sec. 825). In sec. 1152, it is declared that the several forms in this Part, varied to suit the case or forms to the like effect, shall be deemed good, valid and sufficient in the cases thereby respectively provided for." Code form 60 is headed "sec. 827" and the recital is as follows: "and asked by me if he consented to be tried before me without the intervention of a jury, consented to be so tried." There is nothing about information of the chance of being admitted to bail. In view of these provisions it has been held that parliament did not contemplate that there should be any recital in the conviction of the fact that the prisoner had been given the information about the chance of bail, though it was the duty of the judge to give it, but that, on the contrary, it was intended that the recital in the statutory form would suffice to show the jurisdiction. R. v. Therrien (No. 1), 25 Can. Cr. Cas. 275 (Que.); R. v. Mali (No. 1) (1912) 1 W.W.R. 766, 22 Man. R. 29, 19 Can. Cr Cas. 184, 1 D.L.R. 256, and R. v. Mali (No. 2), (1912) 1 W.W.R. 1047; 19 Can. Cr. Cas. 188, 1 D.L.R. 484, 20 W.L.R. 601, 22 Man. R. 29. Fixing day for trial is directory only and does not affect jurisdic tion]-The County Court Judge's Criminal Court is a Court of Record, for the trial of certain criminal offences, and the judge thereof for all purposes and proceedings connected therewith and relating thereto, has all the powers of a Court of Record, and a prisoner who elects to be tried before such court submits himself not to the particular judge but to the County Court Judge's Criminal Court, which court does not lose jurisdiction over him until he is tried for the offence for which he is committed. R. v. Stewart, 43 N.S.R. 353, 15 Can. Cr. Cas. 331. The mere fact that the judge of the court is not present on the day fixed for the trial cannot possibly affect the jurisdiction of the court, which arises and continues by reason of the prisoner's election to be there tried. The fixing of a particular day for the trial has nothing to do with giving jurisdiction; it is simply a matter of procedure of a directory character. The fact that the judge has named a day for the trial, and does not then try the prisoner as intended, in no way prevents or limits his power to fix another day on which the trial takes place. R. v. Stewart, 43 N.S.R. 353, 15 Can. Cr. Cas. 331. If prisoner consents to a speedy trial, the charge is to be preferred and tried]-To prefer a "charge" under the Speedy Trials sections of the Code is preferring a document very analogous to an indictment. The statute requires a statement which is an indictment to all intents and purposes. R. v. Lonar, 25 N.S.R. 124; R. v. Inglis, 25 N.S.R. 261; R. v. Cross (1909) 14 Can. Cr. Cas. 171, 43 N.S.R. 320. At the opening of a "speedy trial" the clerk of the peace or other prosecuting officer reads to the accused the charge laid against him upon which he was committed for trial, and also such additional charges as may by leave of the judge be preferred by the prosecuting officer. Code secs. 827, 833, 834. When this is done the preferring of the charge is complete and constitutes the first part of the arraignment, the second part of which consists in asking the accused if he is guilty or not guilty. R. v. Jun Goon, 10 W.W.R. 24 at 29, 22 B.C.R. 381, 33 W.L.R. 761, 25 Can. Cr. Cas. 415. Joinder of counts in the charge]-Secs. 856 and 857 will apply to the joinder of counts in the charge in like manner as they do to joinder of counts in an indictment. R. v. Cross (1909) 43 N.S.R. 320, 14 Can. Cr. Cas. 171. Added or substituted charges]-Code sec. 834. Sub-sec. (3)-The "prosecuting officer" to prefer the charge]—The due appointment of a person as prosecuting officer is not a question of jurisdiction, using that word in its proper sense, namely, the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. R. v. Jun Goon, 10 W.W.R. 24, 22 B.C.R. 381, 25 Can. Cr. Cas. 415. Whether or not a matter is presented in a formal way under the speedy trials clauses by a person who professes to act as "Crown Counsel" is not a question of jurisdiction; the words " Crown Counsel " subjoined to the signature of counsel conducting the prosecution may, if necessary, be rejected as surplusage. R. v. Jun Goon, supra. Counsel may be appointed ad hoc to prosecute cases at a session of the County Court Judge's Criminal Court without any formal appointment being produced or proved at the trial. The authority may be merely by telegram or telephone message and on counsel stating that he appears for the Crown it is competent for the judge to recognize his appointment as prosecuting officer, and to act upon the charge preferred by him if it is within the depositions. R. v. Jun Goon, 10 W.W.R. 24. Prisoner may be bailed whether electing for or against speedy trial]-Code secs. 836, 837. Form of record when the prisoner pleads guilty]-Code form 60, following sec. 1152. Sentence may include costs and expenses]-See sec. 1044. Defects of form]-The omission to affix a law stamp to a warrant of arrest would not affect the validity of the proceedings subsequent to the execution of the same, the defect, if any, being cured by sec. 669 of the Code. R. v. Hamelin, 16 Que. K.B. 501, 13 Can. Cr. Cas. 333. The accused who has pleaded to the information, given security for his appearance and asked for a speedy trial cannot attack the legality of his arrest on the ground that the warrant does not bear law stamps under the Quebec tariff, and if the proceedings are instituted by the Crown no stamps are required. R. v. Rodrigue, 9 Que. P.R. 122, 13 Can. Cr. Cas. 249. Where the information which preceded the preliminary enquiry was used in place of a formal "charge on a speedy trial, and the accused moved to quash it as such, he thereby treats it as a de facto charge and cannot object to the lack of a formal document, at least where no prejudice is shown. R. v. Daigle, 23 Can. Cr. Cas. 92, 18 D.L.R. 56. Annexing a new count written on a separate paper to the formal charge signed by the prosecuting officer is sufficient where done by such officer to incorporate the new count in the formal charge upon an amendment made by leave of the trial judge. A speedy trial on the new count to which the accused gave his consent to speedy trial and pleaded will not be set aside for alleged informality in, or lack of signature of the prosecuting officer under such circumstances. R. v. Wilson, 22 Can. Cr. Cas. 161, 5 W.W.R. 620, 26 W.L.R. 148 (Sask.). Demand of jury trial.-Re-election.-Procedure thereon. 828. If the prisoner on being brought before the prosecuting officer or before the judge as aforesaid demands a trial by jury, he shall be remanded to gaol. 2. Any prisoner who has elected to be tried by jury may, notwithstanding such election, at any time before such trial has commenced, and whether an indictment has been preferred against him or not, notify the sheriff that he desires to re-elect, and it shall thereupon be the duty of the sheriff and judge or prosecuting officer to proceed as directed by sec. 826. 3. Thereafter unless the judge, or the prosecuting officer acting under subsection 2 of sec. 826, is of opinion that it would not be in the interests of justice that the prisoner should be allowed to make a second election, the prisoner shall be proceeded against as if his said first election had not been made. 4. Provided that if an indictment has been preferred against the prisoner the consent of the prosecuting officer shall be necessary to a re-election, and in such case the sheriff shall take no action upon being notified of the prisoner's desire to re-elect unless such consent is given in writing. Origin]-8-9 Edw. VII, Can., ch. 9, sec. 2; sec. 767, Code of 1892. When re-election permissible]-Under the Speedy Trials Act, as it was originally passed, it was held in Ontario that a person arraigned before a county court judge and electing against a speedy trial without a jury, had no absolute right, after being remanded, of re-election: Reg. v. Ballard (1897), 1 Can. Cr. Cas. 96, 28 Ont. R. 489; |