City of Quebec (No. 1), 16 Can. Cr. Cas. 253; Tremblay v. City of Quebec (No. 2), 16 Can. Cr. Cas. 487.

If the owner of a house leases it to another person for the purpose of keeping a disorderly house, or does so with the knowledge and with his concurrence that it is to be so used and kept, he, in leasing the house would aid the lessee to commit the offence of keeping a disorderly house, and he consequently would become liable equally with the actual offender for the offence committed and he would be prosecuted, tried, convicted and punished as a principal. In such cases, the indictment, or the information, may either simply charge the accessory or aider with the offence committed by the person aided, or may state the aid which was given and charge the accessory's or aider's participation by reason thereof in the offence committed. R. v. Roy, 9 Que. Q.B. 312; and see also sec. 228A as to the liability of the landlord for knowingly permitting such use of his premises.

Where the alleged abettor and the alleged principal are jointly indicted as principals, there may be a conviction of the abettor for counselling the crime, although the alleged principal is acquitted. R. v. Burton, 13 Cox, C.C. 71.

A person is not an accessory if, without any guilty knowledge, he acts as broker for the parties entering into stock transactions which as between them were gambling transactions, prohibited by Code, sec. 231. R. v. Dowd, 17 Que. S.C. 67; 4 Can. Cr. Cas. 170.

An act done which may enter into the offence, although the crime may be complete without it, may be considered as a continuation of the criminal transaction so as to make the participator an aider and abettor, although his participation occurs only after such acts have been done as in themselves would constitute the crime. R. v. Campbell, 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 357.

To establish a conviction for “counselling and procuring” another to bribe a peace officer, it is essential to prove that the peace officer had in fact been bribed. R. v. Ryan, 22 Can. Cr. Cas. 115.

But if an official offers himself as a man to be bribed he thereby "counsels" those to whom he makes the offer and may be convicted, although they do not respond to the advances by making him any offer. Brousseau v. The King (1917), 56 S.C.R. 22, affirming 26 Que. K.B. 164, 28 Can. Cr. Cas. 435, in the result.

A statutory prohibition may be so wide in its terms that noncompliancy by the employee with the conditions without which a transaction of the principal could not legally be completed, will make the employer liable under a penal law, e.g., the illegal sale of wood alcohol without a proper label under the Inland Revenue Act, R.S.C. 1906, ch. 51, and 7-8 Edw. VII, ch. 34, sec. 27; R. v. Russill, 29 O.L.R. 367, 22 Can. Cr. Cas. 131.

And the employer may be liable to conviction under liquor laws for illegal sales made by his employee without his knowledge or connivance,

if the sales were made in the course of the employment. R. v. Conrod, 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 414. Compare Caldwell v. Bethell [1913], 1 K.B. 110; Strutt v. Cliff [1911], 1 K.B. 1; R. v. Williams 42 U.C.Q.B. 464.

Aiding under compulsion]-See. secs. 20, 21.

Place of trial for aiding and abetting a crime punishable on summary conviction]-See sec. 707.

Extra-territorial offence]--Counselling a woman in Canada to submit in a foreign jurisdiction to an operation which, if performed in Canada, would be a crime, is not an offence against the criminal law of Canada. R. v. Walkem 14 Can. Cr. Cas. 122, 14 B.C.R. 1.

Attempt to solicit another to attempt a crimel-See sec. 72 as to attempts generally. It is an offence to attempt to solicit a person to attempt or conspire to commit an offence. R. v. Brousseau, 28 Can. Cr. Cas. 435, 26 Que. K.B. 164; R. v. Ransford, 13 Cox C.C. 9; R. v. De Kromme, 17 Cox C.C. 492. So there may be a conviction for the attempt to incite to an attempted crime by sending a letter which might not amount to a solicitation because of the receiver not reading the letter but handing it over to others without being made aware of its contents. R. v. Ransford, 13 Cox C.C. 9.

And see Brousseau v. The King (1917), 56 S.C.R. 22, affirming in the result, 26 Que. K.B. 164.

Special provision as to servant's liability for trade mark offences]-See sec. 495.

Variance from the offence which was counselled]-See sec. 70.
Accessories after the fact]-See sec. 71.

Person counselling theft and afterwards receiving the goods]-One who is a principal to a theft cannot be convicted of receiving the goods knowing them to have been stolen, upon evidence merely showing that he stole the goods. The offence of theft must have been completed before the separate offence of receiving can be committed. R. v. Hodge 12 Man. R. 319, 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 350. The same doctrine has been held to apply to a principal in the second degree; i.e., to an aider and abettor, but not to the case of one who counsels or procures the theft without becoming a principal in the second degree. Such an accessory before the fact is liable under sec. 69 as a party to and guilty of"

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the theft and if he afterwards becomes a receiver of the goods he may be convicted also of that offence under Code sec. 399. R. v. Hodge, 12 Man. R. 319, 2 Can. Cr. Cas. 350.

Offence committed in furtherance of common intention of conspirators] See sees. 444, 573.

Persons counselling offence.

70. Every one who counsels or procures another person to be a party to an offence of which that person is afterwards

guilty, is a party to that offence, although it may be committed in a way different from that which was counselled or suggested.

2. Every one who counsels or procures another to be a party to an offence is a party to every offence which that other commits in consequence of such counselling or procuring, and which the person counselling or procuring knew, or ought to have known, to be likely to be committed in consequence of such counselling or procuring.

Origin]-Sec. 62, Code of 1892.

Principals and accessories to criminal offence]-See sec. 69.

Accessory after the fact.-Husband or wife.

71. An accessory after the fact to an offence is one who receives, comforts or assists any one who has been a party to such offence in order to enable him to escape, knowing him to have been a party thereto.

2. No married person whose husband or wife has been a party to an offence shall become an accessory after the fact thereto by receiving, comforting or assisting the other of them, and no married woman whose husband has been a party to an offence shall become an accessory after the fact thereto, by receiving, comforting or assisting in his presence and by his authority any other person who has been a party to such offence in order to enable her husband or such other person to escape.

Origin]-Sec. 63, Code of 1892.

"Receives, comforts or assists"]—There must be an act to assist the criminal personally in order to constitute an accessory after the fact; mere failing to notify the authorities of the crime is not usually enough, except as to treason. R. v. Chapple, 9 C. & P. 35; see sec. 76 as to accessories after the fact to treason. But to "conceal" or procure the concealment of a felony was a common law misdemeanor known as misprision of felony. Burbidge Cr. Law (Can.) 508.

Acts intended to destroy or conceal things which may be produced in evidence against a prisoner on his trial, make the doer an accessory after the fact. R. v. Levy, 7 Cr. App. R. 61; R. v. Butterfield, 1 Cox C.C. 39; 2, Hawkins Pl. Cr., ch. 29, sec. 26,

t

Punishment of accessory after the fact-See secs. 574 and 575, and as to treason, sec. 76; and murder, sec. 267; concealment of deserter, sec. 82.

Accessory both before and after the fact]-A defendant may be charged as an accessory before the fact in one count, and as accessory after the fact in another count, and may be convicted on both counts R. v. Blackson, 8 C. & P. 43; R. v. Mitchel, 6 St. Tr., N.S. 599, 620, 621. Joint or separate trial of accessory]-See sec. 849.

Wife's crime committed in husband's presence]-See sec. 21.
Receiving stolen goods]-See secs. 399-403.

Attempts. Question of law.

72. Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits an act for the purpose of accomplishing his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offence intended whether under the circumstances it was possible to commit such offence or not.

2. The question whether an act done or omitted with intent to commit an offence is or is not only preparation for the commission of that offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit it, is a question of law.

Origin]-Sec. 64, Code of 1892; English Draft Code, 1879, article 74 (part).

Act done with intent to commit crime]—An attempt implies an intent; but intending to commit a crime is not the same as attempting to commit it. R. v. McCarthy, 41 O.L.R. 153; R. v. Snyder (1915), 34 O.L.R. 318, 24 Can. Cr. Cas. 101; and see sec. 949, as to convicting for an attempt on a charge of the completed offence, "if the evidence establishes an attempt." R. v. Weiss and Williams (No. 1), 4 W.W.R. 1358, 21 Can. Cr. Cas. 438 (No. 2), 5 W.W.R. 48 and 400, 22 Can. Cr. Cas. 42.

Mental intentions may be changed at any time before being carried out. When not accompanied by overt acts in the direction of a crime they do not constitute even an attempt at crime. Pockett v. Pool (1896), 11 Man. R. 275, at 286.

An assault with intent to commit an offence involving violence will ordinarily be held to be an attempt to commit that offence. R. v. Johns, 15 S.C.R. 384.

In some instances, some preliminary act as to which it might be doubtful whether or not it was too remote to constitute an attempt " may, by statute, be created into a substantive offence. So under Code sec. 397, a trader concealing his own goods for a fraudulent purpose, er. gr. to defraud insurance companies, commits an offence although the fraud was not carried out and no claim was ever made by him against the companies. R. v. Goldstaub (1895) 10 Man. R. 497, 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 357.

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There must be a connection between the act done for the purpose of an intended crime and the crime itself. Sub-sec. (2) indicates that an act done with intent may be too remote to constitute an attempt." The question of remoteness is declared to be a question of law, but the doctrine of law governing this is left undefined by the Code and is left in an unsettled state by the many cases in which it has been discussed. It is said, however, that it is material to consider whether there is any further act "on the defendant's part" remaining to be done before the completion of the crime. R. v. Eagleton, Dears, 515, 538; Dugdale v. The Queen, Dears, 64, 22 L.J.M.C. 50; R. v. Hensler, 11 Cox C.C. 570, R. v. Roebuck, Dears, & B. 24, 23 L.J.M.C. 101; R. v. Cheeseman, L. & C. 140, 31 L.J.M.C. 89; R. v. Ring, 61 L.J.M.C. 116, 17 Cox C.C. 491; R. v. Linneker [1906], 2 K.B. 99, applied in R. v. Snyder (1915), 34 O.L.R. 318, 24 Can. Cr. Cas. 101; R. v. Robinson [1915], 2 K.B. 342, 84 L.J.K.B. 1149.

There is an obvious distinction between doing a thing with intent to commit an offence and attempting to commit the offence. For instance, A. may load his gun with the declared intention of shooting B. whenever he may meet him, but if he does not take his gun with him, it would be vain to pretend that he had attempted to shoot B., or if he bought poison with the intention of killing B, but did nothing more, it would be impossible to say that he attempted to poison B. So, if a prisoner conceals himself with the intention of escaping, that may, or may not, be sufficient evidence of an attempt according to the circumstances, but it is not the offence in itself. For instance, if the prisoner (while locked up in his cell) hid himself under his bed with the intention of escaping, it would be an extraordinary, thing to say that he had attempted to escape; while, on the other hand, if he were found concealed near an open gate awaiting a chance to slip past the guard. that would be enough to warrant a conviction for an attempt. R. v. Labourdette (1908), 13 B.C.R. 443, 8 W.L.R. 402 (B.C.), per Hunter, C.J.; R. v. Button [1900], 2 Q.B. 597, 69 L.J.Q.B. 901; R. v. Robinson [1915], 2 K.B. 342, 11 Cr. App. R. 124.

Although an attempt implies the intent, an intent does not necessarily imply an attempt. There may be cases very near the line as regards the attempt although there is no doubt as to the intent. It is always necessary that the attempt should be evidenced by some overt act forming part of a series of acts which, if not interrupted, would end in the commission of the actual offence. R. v. Mooney, 15 Que. K.B. 57, 11 Can. Cr. Cas. 333; R. v. Linneker [1906], 2 K.B. 99, 103; R. v. Robinson [1915], 2 K.B. 342. The interruption is not necessarily that of an outside cause or of a third party; it may be due to a change of mind on the part of the accused. R. v. Goodman, 22 U.C.C.P. 338 (arson); R. v. Esmonde, 26 U.C.Q.B. 152 (theft).

The physical impossibility of completing the crime is no defence to a charge of attempting to commit it. Code sec. 72; R. v. Williams