settlor or testator."

I am unable, therefore, to follow the reasoning of the Court below. It seems to me that that reasoning has been to some extent induced by their view of the form of the conveyance. Whatever the reason for it is, I am unable to agree with the judgment, and I move your Lordships that this interlocutor be reversed.

LORD MACNACHTEN.-I entirely agree. I think the Lord Advocate was justified in saying that the learned Judges in Scotland were misled by the form of this conveyance. The conveyance is really in common form. I will just refer to a note by Mr. Davidson in his book on Settlements (3rd ed.), vol. iii. pt. ii. p. 857n. (a). He says: "Whenever land is intended for division among the children of a marriage, by far the most eligible mode of settlement is the creation of a trust for sale and declaration of trusts of the proceeds." Here the land was intended ultimately to be divided-at any rate, it was contemplated that it might be dividedbetween the children of the marriage, and accordingly the settlement is in that form.

When once that difficulty is removed, the case seems to me to be of the plainest possible kind. Here was a lady who was absolutely entitled to property which contained opened quarries. She settled it, reserving for herself for life the income of the property. Surely that included the income to be derived from these opened

quarries. Apparently they were worked up to the year 1878. There was only a short interval between that time and the time of the lady attaining the age of twenty-one. Six months after she attained the age of twenty-one she married and made this settlement. It seems to me that she is clearly entitled to the income of these quarries.

LORD MORRIS.-I am of the same opinion.

LORD SHAND.-I also concur. The distinction apparently sought to be drawn by the respondents' counsel is that the provision of the deed of agreement or settlement shall not apply so as to give to a liferenter the full benefit of the profits or income of her own property, unless the mines were opened or worked by herself. I think there is no authority that can go that length. The case we have before us is apparently this: that mines which have been worked for a very considerable timein the hands of different people-worked, as the Lord Advocate put it, "off and on during a century "-were for a period of four years only unworked. To hold as the result of this that, because these mines for some special reason were what Mr. Guthrie described as "dormant for a temporary period, however short a period-not abandoned mines or mines which had not been worked for a very long period of time, and which therefore might be taken as abandoned-if the settlement was made during that period the proceeds of those mines are to go in a different way from what they would if the mines were then working, is, I think, unreasonable.

short

I am of opinion with your Lordships that these mines, although in a sense dormant mines-by which I mean mines the working of which had been for a time suspended, it may be because of a diminished price to be got for the mineral, or some other temporary cause-must be regarded as opened mines in the sense which the law has always attached to those words in questions like the present.

LORD BRAMPTON.-I am of the same opinion.

An appeal lies to her Majesty from a decision of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada upon a petition of right.

A contract to do work for the Crown not containing a stipulation that the Crown shall give all or any of such work to the contractor, is not enforceable against the Crown, and no such stipulation can be implied.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada, dated June 25, 1898, varying a decree of the Superior Court for the Province of Quebec of February 21, 1898.

The respondent sued by petition of right for damages against the Crown for alleged breach of contract. The facts are stated in the judgment.

The claim was resisted on the groundsfirst, that the contract was irregular and void; secondly, that it had never been approved by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council under an Order in Council of January 27, 1897; thirdly, that it was not authorised by law or resolution of the Legislative Assembly, and no money had been voted in respect of it; fourthly, that

no Government could contract liability beyond the fiscal year; and fifthly, that the contract imposed no obligation to pay for work not given to the respondent.

The Superior Court ratified the contract for the fiscal year 1897, but held that it could not bind the Crown for future years. The majority, however, of the Court of Queen's Bench held that as the printing of official documents was a permanent service, the making of a contract for a term of years was matter of administration, and such a contract was valid until rescinded by the Legislature. If the Crown repudiated or broke the contract, damages would be payable to the respondent. The Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court in respect of the current financial year, but left the respondent to make further application for future years.

Blake, Q.C., Archambeault, Q.C. (Attorney-General for Quebec), and Robidoux

(all of the Colonial Bar), for the appellant.

Th. Casgrain, Q.C. (of the Colonial Bar), and Hume-Williams, Q.C., for the respon

dent.

LORD MACNAGHTEN delivered the

judgment of their Lordships:

In August, 1897, the respondent Demers, carrying on business in the city of Quebec as a printer, under the firm of J. L. Demers et Frère, sued her Majesty the Queen by a petition of right claiming $85,000 as damages for breach of a contract in respect of the printing and binding of certain public documents.

It seems that on January 27, 1897, the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec had approved a report of the Committee of Council stating that the Provincial Secretary recommended that the work in question should be entrusted to the respondent's firm for a term of eight years to run from January 1, 1897, at the prices which that firm had received for the samework since 1892, and that he should be authorised to sign a contract to that end, subject as to its details to the approval of

the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.

On March 18, 1897, a contract was signed purporting to be made between her Majesty represented by the Provincial

REG. v. DEMERS. Secretary, authorised in that behalf by the Order in Council of January 27, 1897, of the first part, and the respondent Demers of the second part. The contract declared that the respondent covenanted to execute for her Majesty the Queen during the term of eight years beginning from January 1, 1897, the printing and binding of the public documents specified in the body of the instrument, and that the contract was made for the prices and considerations expressed in the schedules and table annexed thereto.

No Order in Council was passed approving this contract or its details as contemplated by the Order of January 27. The Legislature of Quebec had been dissolved on February 27, 1897, before the contract was signed. The elections took place shortly afterwards. The Government was defeated and resigned, and on May 28, 1897, their successors came into office.

The fiscal year of the province ends on June 30. On June 30, 1897, a report of the Committee of Council was approved by the Lieutenant-Governor, stating that the Provincial Secretary had reported to the effect that the contract was not binding on the Government, and that he proposed that it should be cancelled.

The respondent was advised of the cancellation of the contract. No work was given to him after June 30, 1897. All the work executed by him up to that day was paid for according to its value as measured by the contract prices.

After protesting against the action of the Government, the respondent presented his petition of right, which was duly fiated and filed on August 31, 1897.

In the Superior Court judgment was delivered by Mr. Justice Larue on February 21, 1898. Holding that there had been a breach of contract on the part of the Government, his Honour awarded damages against the Crown for the fiscal year 1897-98, for which year the vote of supplies for printing had been passed in January, 1897. But he dismissed the claim for damages in respect of the subsequent years, on the ground that a contract made by the Crown for the payment of money extending over future years cannot bind the Crown in default of legislative ratification.

On appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench the learned Judges delivered judgment on June 25, 1898. They confirmed so much of the judgment of the Superior Court as dealt with the damages for the year 18971898, but varied the judgment by reserving to the respondent all his remedies as to the damages which might accrue to him for the later years of the contract.

The judgment of Mr. Justice Larue and the judgments of the learned Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench deal at some length with several questions of constitutional interest which were raised in the pleadings. Their Lordships do not propose to deal with these questions or with the question whether the alleged contract was of any validity without the confirmatory Order in Council contemplated by the order of January 27, 1897. It appears to their Lordships that, assuming the contract to be a good and valid contract, the respondent has not shewn that there was any breach on the part of the Government.

The contract purports to be made between her Majesty the Queen, represented by the Provincial Secretary, and the respondent Demers. It does not purport to contain any covenant or obligation of any sort on the part of the Crown. The respondent undertakes to print certain public documents at certain specified rates. For all work given to him on the footing of the contract the Government was undoubtedly bound to pay according to the agreed tariff. But the contract imposes no obligation on the Crown to pay the respondent for work not given to him for execution. There is nothing in the contract binding the Government to give to the respondent all or any of the printing work referred to in the contract; nor is there anything in it to prevent the Government from giving the whole of the work, or such part as they think fit, to any other printer.

This point, which in their Lordships' judgment is fatal to the respondent's claim, was raised in the pleadings and apparently presented to both the Courts below. But it seems to have been lost sight of in the discussion of the more interesting questions which were debated in the course of the litigation.

A preliminary objection was raised by

CRUMPE v. CRUMPE, H.L.

of Crumpe, no other surname following or preceding the name of Crumpe, such name to be adopted by him and his heirs. And I further declare no taker shall possess the rents of my estates who does not conform to and comply with this mandate and desire; and I further declare the said Silverius shall receive said rents conditionally that he the said Silverius shall have no power of encumbering these lands or rents by anticipation, or by debts, mortgages, mortgage bonds, bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, rent charges or any other legal security or device, and if the said Silverius does so at any time although obeying the injunction given as to change of name, I then revoke the gift of the rents of these my fee-simple estates from the said Silverius my nephew and from his heirs male, or should the said Silverius not forfeit the same and die without male issue him surviving, I then will and bequeath these rents and estates (but conditionally) to his brother Commander William Moriarty, R.N., and his issue male in tail male his first and every other son lawfully begotten, and the conditions and restrictions under which he is to enjoy the same, he must relinquish all claim to the dividends of my investments in banks railway companies or any securities and that he the said Commander William Moriarty, R.N., and his heirs male shall in six months after he began to receive these rents assume bear and take by Royal license the surname and arms of Crumpe, no other surname preceding or following the name of Crumpe, and that the said Commander William Moriarty, R.N., shall have no power of encumbering these lands or rents by anticipation or by bonds mortgages or any other legal security, and if he does so at any time I then revoke the gift of those rents and lands from him and his heirs male or should he die without heirs male arriving to age or marriage, I under any of the above circumstances occurring, will and desire my executors and trustees to sell out each separate estate in the Landed Estates Court Dublin and the produce thereof to divide into equal shares or portions."

And the testator then declared certain trusts of the said shares or portions.

On June 30, 1882, Silverius Crumpe

(otherwise Moriarty) executed a disentailing assurance of the estates devised by Francis Crumpe.

Silverius Crumpe died on April 4, 1897, without leaving lawful issue him surviving, having previously made his will dated March 2, 1892, whereby he devised the lands and hereditaments in the county of Limerick so devised to him as aforesaid to his wife, the respondent Mary Crumpe, for her life, and from and after her death to the respondent Richard Walter Tweedie and Charles Curling, upon trust to pay thereout certain annuities, and subject thereto to the respondent Theodore William Carte Moriarty and his issue male, as and for an entailed estate conditionally upon his assuming the name. and arms of Crumpe, as therein mentioned, and in case the respondent Theodore William Carte Moriarty should fail to comply with the said condition, or should die without issue male him surviving, then he devised the said lands and hereditaments to John Langford Sealy Crumpe, his heirs and assigns, conditional upon his assuming the name and arms of Moriarty in addition to the name and arms of Crumpe, with remainder, in the event of the said John Langford Sealy Crumpe failing to comply with such conditions, to the appellant Redmond George Silverius Crumpe, eldest son and heir of Commander William Moriarty, mentioned in the will of Francis Crumpe, and his issue male. Silverius Crumpe by his will further devised the said lands and hereditaments in the county Kerry (being the residue of the real estate of the testator Francis Crumpe) to the respondent Richard Walter Tweedie and the said Charles Curling, upon trust to pay certain annuities, and subject thereto he devised the same unto and to the use of the appellant and his heirs male, with divers remainders over.

Commander William Moriarty, in the will of Francis Crumpe named, died on July 9, 1886, without having executed any disentailing deed in respect of the said lands, leaving the appellant, his eldest son and heir-at-law, him surviving.

The appellant, on March 2, 1898, commenced an action in the High Court of Justice in Ireland against the respon