est recommendation urged by the applicants, their strongest argument, is this: "We are cordial friends to the distinguished chief who has so ably filled the chair of the Chief Magistrate," &c. Let me now make an appeal to the majority in this House, and I am glad that what I say will be heard by the Senator from Virginia, [Mr. RIVES.] This body has been pronounced by him to be the aristocratic branch of the Federal Government. If not positively and avowedly aristocratic, it has at least a squinting toward aristocracy. Well, and who are the majority of the aristocracy here? Are they not the friends of the administration? Now, the democratic branch in Congress have determined that it is unwise and improper to leave a large surplus revenue in the deposite banks, to pay the country an interest of two per cent.; and whence does the opposition to this salutary democratic measure proceed? From the aristocratic majority in the Senate. Are you, then, going to confirm your own charges against this body? I take your own words, and I ask, will you oppose the democracy of the country? Will you withstand the people's will? Will you, by a silent report, give your lordly dissent to what they have approved and resolved upon? I call on that majority of this Senate who, at the last session, thought it unwise to leave the public money in the deposite banks, to rally around their own principles, to stand by their democratic friends in the other House, and to take the money of the nation out of the hands of these deposite banks, and distribute it among the people of the States, on the principles advocated by themselves last year. I fear, howev er, the Senator from New York cannot be brought to consent to this arrangement. Well, then, I will propose to him, by way of a compromise, that he consent to the land bill. This is a middle measure; it disposes of two great interests at once. Is it possible to conceive of a better disposition both of the question of the surplus and the question of the tariff? If the honorable gentleman will consent to that, I will agree with him; but I entreat the majority of this body not to lend themselves to the plan of retaining this surplus revenue in a few banks, to be selected by the administration. I hope we shall not agree to the recommendation of the Committee on Finance, and I trust that its honorable chairman will, when the yeas and nays shall be called, be found now, as he was found at the last session, standing in a small minority. I ask that the question may be decided by yeas and nays. Mr. RIVES said he did not rise from any wish to lengthen this debate, but merely with a view to submit a few remarks in reply to the appeal which had been addressed to himself and others by the honorable Senator from Kentucky. I do not see why he was so particularly anxious that I should hear what he had to say on this subject. I have often listened to that honorable Senator, always with pleasure, and often with profit; but what was it he was so anxious I should hear? In some observations which I had the honor to submit upon another occasion, I took occasion to say that, in a philosophic view of the structure of this Government, the Senate was to be considered as the aristocratic branch of it; not that every individual member of that body was an aristocrat, in the odious sense of that term, but that the body, from the manner of its constitution, was less immediately subject than the other House to the popular will. On that point, I shall enter into no controversy, but I would apply the honorable Senator's argument to his own case. He says that we are bound now to show that we of the Senate are not aristocratic in our feelings and course of action, and we are to do this by obeying the impulses which proceed from the democratic branch in the other House; and he contends that, if we shall refuse to do so, it will be a verification of what I said. There is no propriety in his making an issue with me; VOL. XIII.-65 [SENATE. but let it be admitted that the argument is properly addressed to a democratic majority, and it amounts to this: that, in order to vindicate their democratic character, they must, in all things and on all occasions, submit to an expression of the will of the democratic branch of the Government. If this be so, let me remind the Senator of his own course in relation to that very important measure, the fortification bill of the last session. He cannot but recollect the appropriation by the House of Representatives of three millions of dollars, in anticipa tion of the contingency of a war with one of the European Powers. The amendment came here, and was sternly rejected. Notwithstanding the gentleman's doctrine of submission to the democratic branch, the rejection was persisted in until, by means of it, the bill was lost. The Senator himself, on that occasion, set an example directly the reverse of what he is now contending for. I do not call up this subject from any desire to revive the heats which then prevailed, but I mention it as an occasion of reminding him that, if he means to urge a principle of action upon us, he must at least observe it himself. Now, what ought to be the course of the Senate? Will the Senator from Kentucky, or any other gentleman, who does not speak merely ad captandum, say, that when the Senate stands committed before the world to a great system of policy, and an amendment comes from the other House, proceeding on wholly different grounds, this body is bound to surrender the policy it approves, and adopt that which comes from the House of Representatives? Does not the whole system of this Senate proceed upon the ground that there should not be any surplus revenue? Have we not altered the land system and reduced the tariff for the express purpose of preventing a surplus? And now, when we are openly pledged to the country, and to the world, not to distribution, but to reduction, must we at once turn about and say that there shall be a surplus, and that it shall be distributed among the States? Is there any fairness in requiring us to surrender all our fixed opinions at the mere bidding of a majority of the other House? There are other channels, beside the acts of that body, through which we may learn the will of the people. Member as I am of that which, according to its essential genius, is the aristocratic branch of this Government, I do hold myself under the control of public opinion, as it comes to me in authentic forms. The House of Representatives is not the only oracular source whence I am to learn it. There are the acts of my own State Legislature; there is the public press; there are a thousand other legitimate exponents of public opinion. Looking at these indicia, what do we see? We see that, even by the temporary distribution of the surplus which had accumulated last year, we have thrown an apple of discord among the States. Such is the language of my own State. While, owing to the pressure of circumstances, she has felt herself constrained to accept the deposite of her quota of the surplus, she warns this Government against the repetition of the measure. And what did we hear from the gentleman from Connecticut? [Mr. NILES.] He tells us that he has received letters from many members of his own State Legislature, describing the conflicts in that body, and all terminating with this objurgation: "For God's sake, send us no more surplus." Such has been the effect in all the New England States; and I do say that the public sentiment of this nation, as expressed by its legitimate organs, echoes the same sentiment. Let us have no more surplus, but bring down the revenue. In yielding to the public sentiment, thus fully expressed, there is no in consistency with democratic principles, but the con. trary. We are reminded, however, that many of us voted SENATE.] Distribution Question. for the distribution bill of the last session. But what were the circumstances? Then we had a large amount of surplus actually in hand. We could not get rid of it. Ought we to have expended it in reckless and anti-republican extravagance, or should it be left in the deposite banks? I then said that it was infinitely better to distribute it among the States. I chose this as the lesser evil; I always regarded it as an evil, never as a good; and I resorted to it only as a means of preventing greater evil. Now there is no actual surplus, although I see that, if there is not some change in the revenue laws, there is every probability that there will be one. We have adopted two important measures, which, according to the gentleman from Kentucky himself, are well calculated to prevent a surplus. In saying this, I refer to a part of his speech which I was so unfortunate as to lose; I was not in my seat when, I am told, the honorable Senator referred to myself. His remarks I shall be happy to notice at another time, though I cannot attend to them at present. I understand that he distinctly took the ground, when objecting to the reduction of the tariff, that that reduction was not necessary in order to bring down the revenue, because that had already been done by the land bill. [Mr. CLAY here explained. What he had said was this: that, if all the measures passed by the Senate should be concurred in by the House, there would probably be no surplus; in which remark he had alluded to the varicus extravagant measures which had been voted.] [ MARCH 3, 1837. but a perfect identity. The bill of the last session and the amendment now proposed by the House of Representatives were in the very same terms. The subject-matter of both was the same, and they differed only as to the amount-a difference which involved no principle, but was a mere incidental fact, in no way touching the essence of the amendment or affecting its character. So far as the question of constitutional law was concerned, the two were perfectly identical; and all that prevented their identity in all respects was the difference in the amount of money which might be in the Treasury on the 1st of January next from that which had been there on the 1st of January of last year. Could gentlemen find in this difference sufficient ground to change their votes? If it was right to distribute $38,000,000, why was it not right to distribute $10,000,000? The policy which dictated the one equally sanctioned the other. The policy of collecting revenue for the purpose of distributing it was advocated by none; but if a surplus of revenue legitimately collected did occur, how ought it to be disposed of? Ought it to be thrown into the deposite banks, to excite the cupidity of these corporations and encourage reckless speculations? Or should it be thrown back into the hands of the people? This was the question which had been decided at the last session. Congress determined in favor of the latter alternative. But because they had restored to the people $38,000,000 of their own money, was it time for Government to indemnify itself by retaining $10,000,000 to meet the fan We viewed these measures, which the honorable Sen-cies or the lusts of those in power? ator characterizes as extravagant, as connected with each other, and constituting a whole. I shall not enter upon a consideration of them now. The most important, and those which the Senate chiefly relied on to reduce or to prevent a surplus, were the land bill and the bill to reduce the tariff, (and which, if passed, will reduce it by two and a half millions.) After a long and painful deliberation and debate, we brought those bills into a shape acceptable to the Senate, and they were adopted and passed. They indicated the course of policy approved and sanctioned by this body. But here comes an amendment which is based upon directly opposite principles; an amendment which proceeds upon the assumption that there is to be a surplus, and that it must be distributed among the States. If this is to prevail, both the tariff bill and the land bill are at once superseded. It is in vain for gentlemen to blink the question. That must be the inevitable consequence. But after we are solemnly pledged to the reduction policy, must we at once surrender it, out of our profound respect for the other branch of the Legislature? And we must do this lest we incur the odium of aristocracy! The Senator from Kentucky must surely have apprehended the spirit of my remark as to the aristocratic character of this body. He cannot but have understood me as not referring to the character of individuals, but to the genius of this branch of the Government, to the character purposely given to it by the provisions of the constitution; and I insist that, from its structure, it does possess this character. I avow that as my sentiment; I repeat it openly; and, formidable as the Senator from Kentucky always is, I am ready to discuss it with him. But this is not the time for such a discussion. I should not have said a word but for the pointed reference of the honorable gentleman to myself. I did hear his remarks, and listened to them with profound attention; but, weighty as they were, they would have been far more so had they been supported by his own example. But the honorable Senator from Virginia was reluctant to throw an apple of discord into the State Legislatures. The return of their own money might be converted into an apple of discord by State politicians, but to the country at large it was the bond of peace and union. How were the States to be agitated by a measure which gave peace to the Union? Ought the Government, in the excess of its patriotism, magnanimity, and tender mercy, to take the people's money out of their hands to relieve them from discord? Should the Government render itself unhappy and distracted, in its disinterested desire to save the people from corruption? The people, it seemed, were to be fatally corrupted by handling this money; but the Government might be steeped to the lips in the corrupting stream, and still remain purer than snow. To manage the money would occasion the Government no embarrassment whatever; but the poor silly people were unable to bear so weighty a trust, and to them it would prove but an apple of discord. Mr. CRITTENDEN followed. He expressed strong surprise that gentlemen who had voted for the distribution bill of the last session should declare that they could see no analogy between that law and the present amendment. Not only was there the most perfect analogy between the two, Another reason urged in opposition to the measure was, that it would inspire the members of the National Legislature with narrow and selfish feelings: each man would be endeavoring to withhold the appropriations necessary to the general good, from a hope of securing a larger share of surplus for his own State. Nothing could be more idle than such an objection. Did not gentlemen perceive that the same argument might be applied to the ordinary duty of appropriation? Was there not the same temptation to withhold the taxes; and might not gentlemen as well argue that the General Government could never go on, because it would be the interest of the representatives to prevent the taxation of their constituents? The argument was precisely the same; and if it was a valid argument, it went to show that the American people were incapable of conducting a free republican Government. His friend who had last addressed the Senate appeared to have serious apprehensions lest his colleague had repeated what were unpopular opinions, and seemed resolved for himself to eschew such a course, as the greatest of misfortunes. Mr. C. hoped he would never fall under so heavy a calamity; but unless the people of that gentleman's State had a distaste for money, which did not belong to Mr. C's constituents, it was possible he might find that he had himself incurred the same disaster which he bad so earnestly deprecated in the case of Mr. C's colleague. For his own part, he had not seen a single man in his own quarter of the country who at all disapproved of Kentucky's taking her share in the distribution of the surplus. Yet he had never understood that the people of that part of the Union were distinguished by an inordinate regard for money. He did not think that in that respect they went very far beyond the people of the North and of the East. He feared, lest some great change had passed upon the character of the gentleman's constituents, that he would find on his return home that they had again relapsed into at least a due estimate of the value of money. He could not but apprehend that the honorable Senator would find it somewhat hard to persuade them that it was better that millions of the public revenue should remain in the Treasury than in their pockets. The honorable Senator, however, did not, he presumed, need any of his admonition; he doubted not that he would be sufficiently careful of his own popularity. Some of the States, to be sure, had shown themselves very coy in taking their share; but whatever might have been their scruples, and the throes of their conscience, he believed that as yet not one had refused; and, what was more, they would take the same again and again, whenever it might be deemed necessary to disencumber the Treasury. The Senator from New York [Mr. WRIGHT] had said that it was the policy of the coming administration to have no surplus. A very proper policy, indeed; and the present amendment would give to the nation ample security that such a policy should be observed. Give them this security, and then the majority would never be found creating a surplus with a view to retain and manage it. There were several ways to prevent a surplus: one was, not to raise more money than was wanted; another method, equally certain, was to make the expenditure come up to the amount of the receipts. Now, the amendment proposed would tend to preserve the economy of this Government. If virtue, as has a thousand times been observed, was the foundation of republican Government, then a lavish expenditure of public money, by corrupting the virtue of the nation, must have a direct tendency to undermine public virtue; and the amendment, by preventing the accumulation of an extravagant surplus at the disposal of the Government, would contribute so far to the preservation of virtue, and thereby to the safety of our liberties. In every point of view, Mr. C. consid ered the distribution policy as good. Gentlemen had expressed an apprehension that if the experiment of distribution should again be made, the thing would, in a short time, become habitual, and that all previous measures would be calculated with a reference to that end. He had no such apprehensions. It was proposed to distribute only the superfluous and unnecessary revenue; and what better could be done with this, than to give it back to the people? He trusted that none of those who had supported this policy at the last session would oppose it now. The action of the House of Representatives went clearly to show that the people approved of the measure. So forcible had been the pressure of public opinion, that it had broken down all party trammels. Men had revolted from under party discipline, from a wholesome fear of their constituents. As far as his knowledge extended, the public sentiment of the country was all in favor of distribution. There could be no good reason for leaving the surplus in the banks. The Executive had told the Senate that it furnished great means for speculation; and so strong had been his conviction of the evil to be apprehended, that, with a view to prevent it, he had assumed the responsibility of issuing [SENATE. the Treasury order; and yet the Senate was to be deterred from a measure which was legal and legitimate, and which would remedy the evil. This went to show that, after all, the majority of the Senate were in favor of banks and banking. He remembered well when the President, in commencing his attack on the United States Bank, held out to the nation the golden prospect of a specie circulation. It was the cheap purchase of anticipated glory. It rang from Maine to Georgia, and the bank was destroyed. The nation had all been in the most triumphant anticipation of those halcyon days which were to follow; but when the time was actually come, and the friends of the administration were asked for what they had promised, behold, what a multitude of objections were at once interposed. One was afraid that the money would corrupt the people; another that its possession would create interminable discord; another dreaded the danger of the example, and predicted that it would weaken the Government, and make it a mere collector for the States. Thus, after all the promises, and after the first great step had been taken, gentlemen were likely to fall back into the old position, to keep fast hold of the money bags; and when the people remonstrated, to reply by assuring them that they were incapable of managing their money; that it would only corrupt them; and that their wisest course would be to leave it in the pure and incorruptible hands of those who now had the management of it. He Mr. EWING, of Ohio, was desirous of submitting a few remarks, which he considered due to the occasion. He was not one who was in favor of collecting revenue for the sake of again distributing it, and the gentlemen who placed the matter on that footing lost their argument on him. He had no such disposition now, nor had he been so disposed when the deposite bill of last session was passed. It was not the proposition of this amendment. The proposition went on the supposition that there would be a surplus. If no surplus should arise, the clause would have no effect; it would be altogether nugatory; but if there was a surplus, it would place the money in safe keeping, and at the same time avoid all the mischief of retaining it in the deposite banks. While Mr. E. was unwilling, on the one hand, to create a surplus with the view to distribution, he would not, on the other, consent to unsettle the business or disturb the tranquillity of the country for the sake of avoiding one. was opposed to interfering with the compromise, and he still hoped it would not be interfered with. He would not upset an arrangement of that importance to prevent a surplus of two millions, at the expense of more than fifty millions of injury to the country. It would be better to throw the money into the Potomac.. Nor was be disposed to give away the public lands, to prevent the price of them from coming into the Treasury; nor was he willing to give the public domain at less than its value to a certain exclusive set, rather than let all our citizens share equally in its advantages, as heretofore. If a surplus arose, he would rather distribute it than avoid its accumulation by measures like these, or by extravagant appropriations beyond what had ever been known before. If the laws of the country brought a surplus into the Treasury, he would not wrest the laws for the sake of preventing it; nor would he absorb the reve nue in lavish and wasteful expenditures, rather than distribute a surplus. If it came into the Treasury in a fair and legitimate manner, he would dispose of it as it had been disposed of last year. He could not see the least distinction between the two cases. Some gentlemen had said that they could see no resemblance between the case of last session and the case of this; to him they appeared not only like each other, but the same. This amendment was in the very words of the distribution bill of last year; it was a perfect fac simile of that bill. SENATE.] Distribution Question. Here was certainly some slight resemblance. It was, indeed, very true that, while the form of the bill was the same, there might exist a state of things which would make the bill very different in principle. Now, let us see what are these alleged points of distinction. Gentlemen had said that last year it had been admitted that there would be a surplus. It was very true that he had admitted it, and those who acted with him; but there had been gentlemen on the other side who protested strongly that there would be no surplus. All the difference, then, in that respect, consisted in this: that more had been admitted at the last session than now. Mr. E. heard none now say that there would be no surplus.. His own estimate at the last session had been that there would be one of ten, fifteen, or eighteen millions, if the appropriations were marked with any thing like moderation. But both appropriations and revenue had far exceeded his calculations. But be this as it might, the same argument which had been urged last year applied equally well now; if there was no surplus, this law would divide nothing. It was a hypothetical law. He would not, indeed, agree to pass a law which would probably be nugatory, but that did not apply to the present amendment, because there was every probability that there would be something, and not a little, to divide. They knew that there was to come in a large incidental sum from the Bank of the United States; then there were the receipts from the customs, and the receipts from the public lands; so that when gentlemen came to see the actual figures next winter, he rather believed that they would find not less than twelve millions of dollars, which must either remain in the deposite banks or be distributed among the States. As to the proper time for passing the bill, gentlemen knew that various deposite banks complained even last year. The Secretary told Congress that the sudden withdrawal of the money from those institutions would cause a great shock. Why not, then, give him time? If they waited until the next ses sion, much time would necessarily be consumed in legislation; and after the bill passed, the banks would need time to conform themselves to the new arrangement, so that it would be past midsummer before a cent could actually be distributed. There was another reason for legislating at this time. It would give the deposite banks timely warning that the public moneys in their hands were not to be loaned out permanently, for the purpose of investments. Such a notice would be very important.. But it was said that this practice of distribution, if repeated, would become habitual, and that the General Government would starve for want of the requisite appropriations. Gentlemen who urged this objection must have greatly changed their ground within a few years. The friends of the honorable Senator on his left [Mr. | BUCHANAN] had advocated the doctrine that too much was expended for the General Government. He held in his hand a report of a speech made by the honorable Senator from Missouri, [Mr. BENTON,] which seemed to have been carefully considered, in which that gentleman had endeavored to show that it required not less than eight millions to put the machinery of Government in motion. Allowing for extraordinaries, it might require twelve millions. The gentleman would remember that they had expended thirty-seven millions last year, and that he had recommended and strongly advocated the expenditure of not less than sixty millions, which was five times the amount of his own estimate of the neces sary expenses of the Government. Did not this go to show that the danger was not that of starving the General Government, but quite on the other side? That the real danger was of making the appropriations so extrav agant as to absorb the revenue, let it amount to what it might? The expense was not felt, because the money [MARCH 3,-1837. flowed into the Treasury without direct taxation; but the danger was only the greater on that account. Who had ever heard of a Government going backwards in its expenditure? What Government had ever been able to retreat? England, it was true, had freed herself from one million and a half, out of about forty millions-an enormous load of taxation-but it had not been without a mighty effort, a struggle which shook the kingdom. How could we ever accomplish a reduction of our national expenses, unless we fell on some disposition of the public revenue which should induce gentlemen to think what could be saved to their constituents? Mr. DAVIS rose and said he could not permit a measure of so much consequence to be lost without expressing his dissent from so ill-advised and injurious a policy. The measure proposed was precisely the same which went through both Houses at the last session, with an almost unexampled unanimity. It proposed simply to trust the several States with the custody of all the surplus revenue, if any should exist, beyond five millions. If this fails, the money will go to the deposite banks. It is singular, if such distrust is entertained of the States, that their credit is not as good as that of the deposite banks! The amendment has been deprecated as introducing a new and dangerous policy; but let it be distinctly understood that it proposes that whatever surplus there may be beyond five millions shall be placed with the States, instead of being left in the deposite banks--that it shall be held by the officers of the States, instead of being under the control of the office-holders of the United States. This is the measure, and the whole measure, which has excited the extraordinary alarm and apprehension which we hear from gentlemen in this chamber. Some Senators seem indignant because it is connected with the fortification bill. This is pronounced unnatural and highly objectionable, because the matters have no affinity. If the two measures could be conveniently separated, and presented each in a bill by itself, I should prefer that course; but every one who witnesses the daily proceedings in the other end of the Capitol knows that the order of business and the rules of action there aře such that matters incongruous in themselves are every session brought together in the same bill, from necessity. The stutute books contain the most plenary proof that such a course has it in nothing unusual. Admitting, therefore, that the connexion is unnatural, there is nothing in it unprecedented or uncommon. here can be ignorant of the fact that this important measure could not be acted upon at all by the House, unless as an amendment to some bill; and it must thus come up, or be left without consideration. No one But is there any thing so unnatural as is represented between the bill and the amendment? The bill is an appropriation act, purely so; taking money from the Treasury to strengthen the defences of the country. The amendment provides for taking what remains, after these and other appropriations are satisfied, and placing it with the States. The great object of each is to dispose of the public money--the one in a useful, the other in a safe way; and all they differ in is, that the bill gives to what it takes one direction, and the amendment to what it takes another direction. Can it be said that they do not relate to the same subject? Does not the fortification bill relate to the public money? And does not the amendment relate to that, and nothing else? I confess I am not able to see much force in the objection, and am not surprised that the House disregarded it. It is, after all that has been made of it, but an unsatisfactory apology for giving a preference to the deposite banks over the treasuries of the States. But it is a new act of distribution; and we are warned of the injustice and unconstitutionality of collecting revenue to distribute among the States. Let me say, at once, to all who thus speak of the amendment, that they misrepresent it. It makes no provision for the collection or the distribution of revenue. You will not collect a cent more or less of revenue, whether we adopt or reject it. It involves no question of policy, nor has it any connexion with the tariff; and the Senator from Mississippi is quite mistaken, when he attempts to prove that it has. It neither proposes to alter, modify, enlarge, diminish, or continue the revenue laws. Turn it which way you will, give to it whatever reading ingenuity is capable of, scrutinize it as closely as you please, and it provides for the safe keeping of the public money, if any sum over five millions shall be on hand; nothing more. And the only question here is, shall the States have the use of it till it is needed, or shall the stockholders of the deposite banks be enriched by loaning it out for their own benefit? This is all the matter we have to deal with; and let us meet it fairly; let us call it by the right name; and, if it is to be so, let the people understand that the interest of these banks is more powerful than their own in this place.. Whose money is this? It belongs to the people; it is their property; and whom do you talk of corrupting and seducing from their duty by the fascinating influences of money? The people. The people are to be bribed and corrupted by possessing their own property. How wonderfully pure and patriotic the officers of this Government! They can trust themselves with the money; but the people will be corrupted and seduced, if their own property is permitted to approach so near to them as the State treasuries! It is said, sir, that a spirit of avarice and cupidity will seize the people, and that members of Congress will become so infected with the mania that they will refuse to make the necessary appropriations; and what most astonishes me is, that our experience under the act of 1836 is urged to justify this reasoning. In my judgment, never was any thing more unfounded. Look at the appropriations of the last year, amounting to about $50,000,000. When and where has this extravagance any parallel? Look at the appropriations of this year, the amount of which I have no means of ascertaining, but scarcely less profuse, as we all know, than those of the last year. Nay, more: I appeal to every gentleman here to consult his own conscience, and then to declare whether he has felt any such sordid influence on his mind, in the votes which he has recorded. And if he has not, I leave him to settle the question whether he is more pure than his fellow-citizens, and more capable of resisting temptation. Sir, I have seen a great and commanding influence exerting itself, ever since the bill of 1836 was proposed, to defeat it. It worked in vain last year, but its power has increased in this body. It has grown determined to set the States down as narrow-minded, avaricious, and un-worthy of confidence; ay, not fit to be trusted with their own. And there seems to be such a conviction of this unfitness, that the deposite banks are to be placed over them as guardians. Now, sir, there is but one of these arguments entitled to the slightest consideration; all suggestion as to the avarice and corruption of the people is a calumnya slander; it is an attempt to teach them to disgrace themselves. But when we are told that the powers of this Government may be diminished by this process, I will not say it does not deserve consideration. I have hither. to seen no proofs of it, and yet I confess I should not regret to see the patronage of the Executive diminishedcut down to a tithe of its present ample dimensions. It is plethoric, and I am willing to see it depleted. If, therefore, it should produce this effect only to a reasonable extent, (and I should let blood freely,) I should be [SENATE. far from objecting to it; indeed, the medicine is needed, for this branch of the Government wants purifying. Here lies, whatever else may be urged, the great objection to this measure, which is felt by those in, and who hope to be in, power. It is they who feel all this anxious solicitude about the avarice of the people, and their danger of corruption. But I cannot resist the belief that they feel much more solicitude about retaining power and patronage. No power works with more effect, or insinuates itself more certainly into the feelings, and winds itself about the hearts of men, than that of money. You have a host of deposite banks scattered throughout the country, one and all bowed down to the executive will. Connected with them is an army of stockholders, borrowers, and persons seeking special favors. The Executive is the magnet, the centre of attraction, which holds all these in their places, and in obedience. Those who have dwelt with horror upon the influence of the Bank of the United States, and its successor, will be able, by turning their eyes from that monster to this, with its multiplied heads, to understand the power and patronage which money bestows. It is the fear of losing this influence that creates this holy horror, and excites this distrust of the States. You are willing to pile up the public money in these banks till it overtops their capital, and run the risk of all danger, rather than part with the controlling influuence it gives you; and this is the reason why the people cannot be trusted with their own property; why the deposite banks are better entitled to use and enjoy the earnings of the public money than the people themselves. But they well understand this reasoning; they well comprehend that you have a very studious care of their morals, but a sharper eye upon your own power and inter ests. It is said there will be no surplus. Be it so; what harm will come of this law in that case? It only proposes to divide and deposite what may exist; and if none exist, there will be nothing for the law to act upon, and nothing to corrupt the people. It will be a harmless dead letter merely, for it is not permanent, as has been suggested, but provides for the deposite of such as shall be on hand the 1st day of January next. Nothing more. If the Senate resist this measure because the office-holders are in danger of losing some of their power and patronage, the responsibility must rest on those who do it. All I ask is, that the issue be fairly made up for the public decision. Let the people understand that they are considered less worthy of confidence than the officeholders and the pet banks. After some further debate, the question was taken, and the Senate determined to adhere to its disagreement, by the following vote: YEAS--Messrs. Benton, Brown, Buchanan, Cuthbert, Ewing of Illinois, Fulton, Grundy, Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Linn, Lyon, Mouton, Nicholas, Niles, Norvell, Page, Parker, Rives, Robinson, Ruggles, Sevier, Strange, Tallmadge, Walker, Wall, Wright-27. NAYS-Messrs. Bayard, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Crittenden, Davis, Ewing of Ohio, Hendricks, Kent, Knight, McKean, Moore, Morris, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Southard, Spence, Swift, Tiptor, Tomlinson, Webster, White-23. The Senate, on motion of Mr. BENTON, spent some time in cxecutive business. When the doors were reopened, the Senate took up and acted upon some other minor business; when Mr. HUBBARD submitted a joint resolution, providing for the appointment of a committee, to join such committee as may be appointed on the part of the House of Representatives, to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him that the two Houses, having |