siderably beyond the actual increase of the currency. It is to this cause alone, and under every circums'ance which, as a nation, we can be placed, that I attribute the whole of the speculations, now and heretofore, that have appeared to begin in prosperity, and to end in the distress and ruin of thousands. "The speculative rise probably exceeds the addition to the squares added. If 2 per cent. is added, prices will rise 8; if 8, 32 per cent. If, on the other hand, there is a contraction of 8 per cent. it will be attended with a fail of publ c credit and confidence in buying and selling. These are the evils, and they are evils of great magnitude, that attend the use of the paper currency. There is a range of contraction and expansion in the use of paper, that does not belong to a metallic currency, and which, perhaps, does more than counterbalance all the advantages to a nation from the use of paper." [DEC. 22, 1836. In confirmation of these facts and views, he would beg leave to read a letter which has been published; it is from no visionary theorist, or anti-bank man, but from a responsible officer, the cashier of the Branch of the United States Bank in Baltimore, in 1830, and was addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury. It bears date February 15, 1830. "Looking back to the peace, a short period, fresh in the memory of every man, the wretched state of the currency for the two succeeding years cannot be overlook. ed. The disasters of 1819, which seriously affected the circumstances, property, and industry, of every district in the United States, will long be recollected. A sudden and pressing scarcity of money prevailed in 1822; numerous and very extensive failures took place in New York, Savannah, Charleston, and New Orleans, in 1825. There was a great convulsion among banks and other moneyed institutions, in 1826. The scarcity of money among traders in that State and eastward, in the winter of 1827-'8, was distressing and alarming. Failures of banks in North Carolina and Rhode Island, and amongst the manufacturers of New England and this State, (Maryland,) characterized the last year, (1829;) and intelli gence is just received of the refusal of some of the prin cipal banks of Georgia to redeem their notes with specie-a lamentable and rapid succession of evil and untoward events, prejudicial to the progress of productive inIndustry, and causing a baleful extension of embarrassment, insolvency, litigation, and dishonesty, alike subver. sive of social happiness and morals. Every intelligent mind must express regret and astonishment at the recurrence of these disasters in tranquil times and bounti ful seasons, amongst an enlightened, industrious, and enterprising people, comparatively free from taxation, unrestrained in their pursuits, possessing abundance of fertile lands and valuable minerals, with capital and ca pacity to improve, and an ardent disposition to avail ourselves of these great bounties. Extract from the Edinburgh Review, vol. 4, No. 2. "In a country so opulent as this, and so rapidly increasing in wealth and population, the too great ardor of speculation, and the miscalculation of producers, must necessarily sometimes occasion over-trading, and consequently gluts and depresses of the market. But were the currency in a perfectly sound state, the excitement arising from such causes would almost necessarily be confined to one or a very few businesses, and would be very far indeed from being either general or universal. point of fact, all periods of general excitement, or periods marked by a general tendency to speculation, and by a general rise of prices, have, both in this and other countries, been uniformly distinguished by some extraordinary facilities in obtaining supplies of money or of credit, or of both. We are bold to say, that no single instance to the contrary can be pointed out in the history of industry in modern times." Mr. N. said that the opinions of these two enlightened writers, in pointing out the evils of a paper currency, contained a satisfactory explanation of the true origin of the pecuniary difficulties which now exist in this country. There was no Treasury order in England, no tam pering with the currency, so far as the Government was concerned, yet the same evils had been experienced there. A paper currency was, from the very nature of it, unstable, and subject to constant fluctuations. Such had been its character in England, and in this country particularly. Since the establishment of the late Bank of the United States, it had been more unstable. Those who suppose that reactions and periods of distress were only occasional, and the result of extraordinary causes, were entirely mistaken. They are evils inherent in the system, and inseparable from it. Whoever will look back to the period of the establishment of the Bank of the United States, will find that such has been the case in this country. The severe and universal distress which prevailed throughout the Union in 1819 and '20, will long be remembered. In 1822, money again became scarce, and in 1825 there was great distress in the United States, as well as in England, where the pressure was universal and desolating in its consequences. So great was the calamity, that it was found necessary to take away, in part, the monopoly of the Bank of England, and authorize the establishment of joint stock banks, as a means of relief. In 1826, money was scarce in New York; and in the winter of 1827-'8, in the Middle and Eastern States. In 1829, many banks failed, and there was great distress among the manufacturers in the Eastern States. In the latter part of 1832, money again became scarce; and nearly the entire year of 1834 was distinguished, not only for a pressure, but for a panic, unexampled in this country. The evils of this period are too fresh in the memory of every one, to render it necessary to enlarge upon them. "Calamities of an injurious and demoralizing nature, occurring with singular frequency amidst a profusion of the elements of wealth, are well calculated to inspire and enforce the conviction, that there is something radi cally erroneous in our monetary system, were it not that the judgment hesitates to yield assent, when grave, enlightened and patriotic Senators have deliberately an nounced to the public, in a recent report, that our sys tem of money is in the main excellent, and that, in most of its great principles, no innovation can be made to arlvantage." Mr. N. said that the letter which he had just read con tained more truth and honesty than all the communications which had ever appeared from the head of that banking institution, of which the writer of this letter was an officer. It presented a faithful but melancholy picture of the operations of our banking and credit system. With such facts as these, and the experience of the last twenty years before us, he thought it was trifling with common sense to talk about the Treasury order being the cause of the existing difficulties. Sir, (said Mr. N.,) the cause of these evils lies deeper and broader; it exists in your paper currency and banking system. The order has, no doubt, in some small degree, contributed to increase the pressure; and this is also true of the deposite act. They have served to bring on the crisis a little sooner than it might otherwise have come, but the disease was upon us, and must have its course. If we were to look to any secondary causes, that of a wild spirit of speculation stands pre-eminent, and particularly speculation in public lands. But speculation is stimulated by our system of currency and credit. The immense purchases of the public lands during the last two years have filled your Treasury to overflowing; more than forty millions had been received from the sales of the public domain. This immense capital had been withdrawn from its accustomed employment. This, of itself, was sufficient to derange the whole business of the country. The period of distress to which he had particularly referred, was also distinguished by speculations in the public lands. They commenced in 1818; the sales that year exceeded seven millions of dollars; in 1819, they were more than seventeen millions, and the first two quarters of 1820 amounted to the enormous sum of twenty-seven millions. In July the law went into operation, requiring cash payments; and so entirely did the sales depend on credit, that they were almost entirely suspended, and the last half of that year amounted to only about four hundred thousand dollars; and, for the four succeeding, did not average one million a year. Speculations in the public lands again commenced in 1834, when the sales amounted to about eight millions; in 1835, to fifteen millions, and the present year to more than twenty-four millions, including the sales of the Chickasaw lands, which do not go into the Treasury. That a reaction should follow this reckless spirit of speculation was inevitable. Mr. N. said he thought that the attempt to charge the embarrassments and pressure for money upon the Treasury order had entirely failed. He believed the order to be legal, and was satisfied that it had had but little agency in causing the existing crisis. Still it was, in his mind, a question whether the principle of that order ought to be maintained. He considered it as a temporary measure, well calculated to remedy existing evils of the most alarming magnitude. But he was not prepared to say that it would do as a permanent regulation. The strongest reason for its adoption was to guard against the flood of paper money which was flowing with a swelling tide into the deposite banks from the sales of the public lands. This evil he hoped would be corrected by legislation before Congress adjourned, which, so far as that object was concerned, would supersede the Treasury order. But still the question is be fore us, and may have to be decided, in what currency shall the public revenue be collected' This was a question of great delicacy and magnitude. Great as he considered the evils of our paper system of money and credit, he did not see how this Government could provide a remedy. It certainly could not do it by any direct legislation; it had no power over the State banks, or their issues. The only power it could exercise upon the paper currency of the State banks was indirectly in the collection and disbursement of the revenue; and this was no small power, especially at a time like the present, when the revenues amounted to more than forty millions. A large portion of the whole currency of the country passes through your Treasury annually. Mr. N. said he was not prepared to say to what extent this power could safely be exercised. He was satisfied, however, that it would not do at this time to collect the revenue in specie, exclusively. Congress had, no doubt, a right to do this; but, in the collection of so large an amount of revenue, we must have some regard to the business of the country, and to the ordinary currency used in commercial and other transactions. It is evident that we might adopt a rule which would occa. sion great inconvenience, and perhaps injustice, because the large sums of money received into the Treasury cannot well be collected in a currency not in general use. Whatever principle is adopted as a permanent regulation, ought to be uniform, and applicable to the customs as well as the lands. That, in the collection and disbursement of the public revenue, it will be proper to attempt to remedy some of the evils of the paper system, he had no doubt. We may, by our regulations, do [SENATE. something to increase the use and circulation of specie, and discountenance bills of small denominations. With regard to this important object, Congress had, perhaps, done all that it could by direct legislation. It has su perseded the act of 1819, and legalized foreign coin; it has raised the standard of gold coin; it has established additional mints and greatly increased the annual coinage, and particularly that of gold, which has already become a new and important part of our metallic currency. The amount of specie in the country is greatly increased the last three years, for which this administration is entitled to great credit. Mr. N. said that he could not assent to the proposition of the Senator from Massachusetts, who, if he understood him, contended that it was the right and the duty of Congress to regulate the whole currency of the country. By this, he understood the Senator to mean, that Congress had the power to regulate the paper issues of the State banks. If he did not refer to this description of currency, it was difficult for him to conceive to what his remarks were intended to apply. But whilst we were so emphatically informed that this was the duty of Congress, we were not told how it was to be done. In what way can Congress regulate the paper currency supplied by the State banks? The gentleman did not inform us: he seemed to have a studied caution and reserve on this point, and thereby hangs a tale. Mr. N. thought, however, there was no secret in the case. The views of the Senator have been heretofore disclosed. Sir, said Mr. N., the Senator would regulate the paper currency of the States by a paper currency of the Federal Government; he would regulate the banking institu tions of the States by the agency of a Bank of the United States. This was the secret. A national bank is to be the regulating power. But the country thought the remedy worse than the disease; they had twice tried it, and knew what sort of a regulation it was. He was speaking of a national bank in a mere financial point of view, without any reference to constitutional or political objections; and, in this aspect of the question, he did not hesitate to say that the proposition of establishing a national bank, as a means of restraining and regulating the State banks, was the most preposterous one ever sub. mitted to a deliberative body, and the boldest attempt ever yet made to practise on the gullibility of the people. That such an institution possessed, and would ne cessarily exercise, great power over the State banks, he was not disposed to deny; but the question was, whether that power would be exercised for good or for evil. The question is not whether it is a regulator, but whether it is a safe regulator; whether it tends to keep the paper currency of the country more stable, or to render it more fluctuating. He appealed to the experience of the country in the last twenty years to settle that question. When the great national bank throws out its money plentifully, the State banks do the same; they are invited to this course, and it is their interest to pursue it. When it curtails its discounts and its issues, the State banks are compelled to do the same; so that the result of this mode of regulating the paper currency of the country, through the agency of a national bank, is, to place in the hands of a few individuals the power to make money plenty or scarce at their pleasure. The currency of the country is made to depend on the interest, the caprice, or the passions, of one or more individuals. This is a power greater than that possessed by your Executive; and its terrible effects were experienced during the memorable year of the panic. Mr. N. said that the present high prices of provisions and the necessaries of life were supposed to be inconsistent with the existing scarcity of money. There was nothing, however, extraordinary in this state of things; it was the case in 1819. The reaction was felt first upon SENATE.] Treasury Circular. [DEC. 22, 1836. the principle of distribution unpopular. Sir, said Mr. N., the opponents of that principle do not desire the aid of any stratagem or artifice; they will not even take advantage of embarrassments and difficulties which the execution of that law has occasioned. These were temporary evils; they were foreseen at the time. He was one, and perhaps the last, who had come into the sup stocks, and those kinds of property which had a more intimate connexion with the money market; whilst the products of labor were less easily or immediately affected. When the prices of the necessaries of life are once raised, by an undue expansion of currency and credit, and consequent speculation, it takes a long time, often years, to bring them down. Labor is the last thing that is raised in price; but when it is, all the products of la-port of that measure; but he did it with the full belief bor will of course be advanced, and may remain high for years; but the reaction which is going on must bring them down to their proper value. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. EWING] has given a very novel explanation of the present high prices of breadstuffs. He says that this country will no longer export wheat or flour; that there is but a small belt of three or four degrees of latitude suitable for grain; and that, from the establishment of manufactures, the demand at home is greatly increased; so that hereafter we can do no more than supply the domestic demand. We are told, also, that Europe is a great grain country. But the Senator seems to overlook the great and im portant fact of the difference in the population of the two continents. The whole population of the United States is less than that of the British isles, which for several years have supplied the entire breadstuff for their whole population. At the time of the union, in 1750, England and Scotland had a population of seven millions and a half, and the agriculture of the country produced barely a supply of grain equal to the consumption; and since that time the population had more than doubled, yet the last two or three years no wheat had been imported. The production, by the improvement of agriculture, had increased considerably above one hundred per cent. and to what extent it might be increased remained to be known. Comparing this country to England, he did not doubt that its resourc s for grain, when properly developed, would be found sufficient to sustain a population of two hundred millions. The Senator's own State, and one adjoining, could preduce grain sufficient for the present population of the whole Union. Mr. N. said he would conclude what he had to say, by noticing one observation of the Senator from Ohio, [Mr. EWING.] That Senator did not seem to be satisfied with condemning the Treasury order as unconstitutional and illegal, and as the cause of the distress which has prevailed, but he seemed to think it necessary to assail the motives of its authors. He more than insinuated that the measure did not originate with the President or the Secretary of the Treasury. He seemed to allude to a power behind the throne, greater than the throne itself; but with whom that power existed, we were not informed. He expect. ed every moment to hear that it was the "Kitchen Cabinet;" but the Senator had not expressly alluded to that famous council, which once exercised such potent influence over public affairs. that its immediate effect would be to increase the existing difficulties. In supporting the act, he did not consider that he sanctioned the principle of distribution. Had the Senate then been told, as it had now, by the Senator from South Carolina, [Mr. CALHOUN,] that in passing that act they would establish the principle of distributing surpluses from year to year, the bill could not have passed the Senate. Deeply and forcibly as many of us felt the condition of your Treasury; unwling as we were that forty millions of the public money should remain, for several years at least, in the deposite banks, to be used as a capital, multiplying all the evils of our inflated paper system; anxiously and deeply as we were impressed with these evils, we should not entertain even a thought of relieving the country from them by sanctioning the principle of distribution. No, (said Mr. N.,) that principle has not yet received the sanction of this body; but, it seems, it is to be pressed upon us the present session; and he trusted the opponents of the measure would be prepared to meet it, here and elsewhere, before the tribunal of public sentiment, where all questions affecting the great interests of the country and the safety of our institutions must ultimately come, and where the decision is not only final, but always safe, and usually correct. The opponents of this scheme want no extrinsic circumstances, or even temporary considerations, to bear on the question; all they ask is, to meet the principle in free, open, and fair discussion, upon its own intrinsic merits. If it is a sound and safe principle, in accordance with the constitution, consistent with the rights of the States, and conducive to the general prosperity, it will doubtless be sustained; but if it shall appear to be in conflict with the spirit of the constitution, fraught with mischief, tending to corruption, and dangerous to the rights and independence of the States, it could not stand, either here or before the popular tribunal of the country. Mr. N. said he had concluded what he had to say, and had detained the Senate much longer than be intended. Mr. RIVES said he thought the observations just made by his friend from Connecticut [Mr. NILES] showed conclusively that there were insuperable objections to the adoption of the resolution proposed by the honorable Senator from Ohio, [Mr. EwING,] for rescinding the Treasury order of 11th July last. In the first place, the form of the proceeding was altogether unusual and inappropriate. It proposed to rescind an executive act. But the business of Congress was not to invalidate or to confirm executive acts, but to pass laws; or in other words, establish rules operating in futuro, to which executive action would thereafter conform. The action of the legislative authority ought to be original, independent, and prospective, and to bear on its face no reference to the acts of any other department. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive what reason there can be for giving the particular form proposed to the action of Congress in this case, unless it be to imply a censure on the act to be rescinded. But however unpre He thought that common justice required that the motives of the President should have been spared. This, however, had not been done. The Senator appeared to think that there was some wicked motive in the Treasury order; that the object of its authors was not what it imported, or what had been assigned. He says, the real object was to create embarrassment and distress throughout the country, and to charge the same to the operation of the deposite act of last session, and thereby render that measure unpopular with the people. This was the deep-laid plot which the Senator has discover-pared I may be at present, said Mr. R., to make the proed. Mr. N. said he would only say, in reply, that if any such purpose had any influence on the issuing of the Treasury order, it was the silliest scheme that ever originated from the fatuity of man. It could not be supposed that the act of last session was to be repealed, and, of course, there could be no other object but to render visions of the Treasury circular the permanent policy of the Government, I will not concur in any proceeding which shall cast a censure on the Executive for issuing it. Whatever may have been, or may still be, its actual operation, (and on this point the diversity of testimony and opinion among those far better informed than I have any means of being, is so great as to render any judg ment I might be able to form of but little weight,) of one thing I am well persuaded, that the motives which induced the Chief Magistrate to direct it to be issued were of the most honorable and patriotic character. I must say, also, that notwithstanding the ability and talent displayed on this, as on all other occasions, by the learned gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. WEBSTER,] he has not, in my humble judgment, succeeded in establishing any want of legality in the measure adopted by the Executive. Whatever rule, therefore, Congress may deem it necessary and expedient to establish for the future collection of the public revenue, I shall, for one, be opposed to any mode of action on the subject, which shall imply a censure for the past. [SENATE. the under-valuation of the gold coins; in the largely increased coinage and importation of both gold and silver; in the salutary influence exerted by the Treasury, through the collection and disbursement of the public revenue, over the leading State banks, and in the enlightened policy adopted by a majority of the States, in beginning a suppression of the smaller notes. It can be carried fully into execution only by a continued co-operation of the General and State Governments, on the same sound and practical views. Like every other great reform, it must be gradual and progressive. In unduly precipitating the process, there will be danger of inauspicious reactions; and in the view of the great body of the community, whose material interests are always liable to be bruised and shocked by sudden and violent changes, the remedy might unfortunately come to be looked upon as worse than the disease. While, therefore, I would steadily persevere in the wise policy of enlarging the specie circulation of the country, (the first efficient commencement of which has been made under the present administration,) I would carefully abstain from compromising the success of so important a reform by any premature or precipitate ex The honorable Senator from Connecticut [Mr. NILES] has, in my judgment, presented the executive order of July last in its true light, as a temporary and occasional act, growing out of an extraordinary state of things then existing. It was designed to meet that state of things, and may have been wise and salutary as a temporary act, to operate until the meeting of Congress, while its continuance as a permanent legislative rule would be inexpedient. The President himself evidently regards it inperiment, which might endanger reaction. The present this light. In his message, at the commencement of the session, he submits the whole subject for the consideration of Congress; and while he recommends to them earnestly the adoption of some measure for limiting the sales of the public lands, he attaches but little importance to the future requisition of specie in payment for them. Now, sir, I beg leave to say, in advance, that any practicable and equal measure, which shall be digested by the gentlemen of the West, to prevent the great evil of a monopoly of the public domain in the hands of speculators, shall meet with my hearty concurrence. A bill for that purpose is already before us, and, without having examined, or being prepared to express an opinion of its details, I hope it will receive the prompt consideration and action of Congress. But to return to the Treasury order. The President has done what he deemed his duty, under the pecul ar and extraordinary circumstances of the emergency. We are now called upon to do ours, in establishing some definite and permanent rule for the future collection of the revenue. An indispensable characteristic of any permanent system must be its uniformity. The genius of our constitution demands equality in the laws, and especially in the fiscal operations of the Government. does not allow, as a permanent regulation, that specie shall be required in payment of one branch of the reve nue, while bank notes are received for another-that one rule of collection shall prevail in the West, and another in the East. Whatever medium of payment, therefore, Congress shall prescribe for one portion of the public dues, ought to be extended to every other. It Shall that medium, in public receipts and disbursement, be specie exclusively? Even if this should be the ultimate policy of the Government, the country is, in my opinion, not yet ripe for its adoption Specie must first diffuse itself more generally through the ordinary business of society, the common channels of circulation must be better filled with the metallic currency, before the Government can, with justice to the public debtor, sternly demand payment of its dues in gold and silver exclusively. The only effectual means by which a larger circulation of gold and silver in the general trade and business of the community can be obtained, is the suppression of bank notes of the smaller denominations. This is that practical reform of the carrency which has been held steadily in view by the present administration and its friends; and in preparing for which, much has already been accomplished in the important steps of putting down the Bank of the United States; correcting by law occasion may, with great propriety, be embraced, to make another safe advance in the prosecution of that reform, by laying a restriction on the receipt, in public collections, of the notes of all banks issuing bills under certain denominations. The joint resolution of 1816 ought to be remodelled, and adapted to the present condition of things. Some of its provisions have become obsolete. Of the four media of payment, in the collection of the public dues, recognised by it, two no longer exist, to wit: Treasury n tes, and notes of the Bank of the United States, as a national currency. Of the remaining two, specie and the notes of specie-paying banks, the latter ought in my opinion to be subjected to additional restrictions, especially such as may have a tendency to promote the great practical reform of a suppression of the small notes. But, while the notes of specie-paying banks are treated by all the world, in private transactions, as equivalent to specie, I do not think the Government would be justified in refusing them in public collections altogether, until gold and silver shall, by the previous suppression of small notes, have taken the place more generally of a paper currency. What has appeared to me best to be done, under existing circumstances, is a revision and modification of the joint resolution of 1816, adapting it to the present condition of things, and providing that all sums of money accruing to the United States, whether from customs, public lands, or otherwise, shall be received only in gold and silver, or in notes of banks paid on demand in gold and silver, but with the following restriction as to such notes, with a view to encourage the disuse and suppression of the smaller bank issues, and thereby enlarge the specie circulation; that is, from the passage of the law, no notes to be received in public collections of any bank, though a specie-paying bank, which shall issue bills or notes of a less denomination than five dollars, and the like prohi bition to be gradually extended, (allowing due time for the change,) first to the paper of banks issuing bills of a less denomination than ten dollars; and, finally, to that of banks issuing bills or notes of a less denomination than twenty dollars. I would add also this farther limitation: that not even the notes of specie-paying banks of the above descriptions sbould be received, unless they were such as the banks in which they were to be deposited, should agree to pass to the credit of the United States as cash; obtaining thus a double guarantee for the soundness and safety of the public collections, and making the whole transaction, to every practical purpose, equiva lent to a payment in specie. SENATE.] Heirs of Colonel Philip Johnston. [DEC. 26, 1836. A measure of this kind would, in my opinion, best On the 1st of August following he was promoted to the satisfy the exigencies of all the public interests involv-colonelcy of his regiment in the brigade under General ed, whether of the revenue, the currency, or the gene- Heard, destined to form part of the flying camp, then ral business of the community, and would conform to assembling, for the defence of New York. It was then the sense of the country at large. I have drawn up, well known that the enemy, with a powerful fleet, and a Mr. President, a resolution, founded upon and imbody-well-disciplined and appointed army, was menacing New ing these views; but I am embarrassed by a question of order, in placing it regularly before the Senate at the present moment. I will, however, take the liberty of reading it to the Senate, and will cheerfully conform to any suggestions which may be made as to the best manner of disposing it. The call of the ayes and noes on the second reading of Mr. EwING's resolution was then withdrawn, and it was passed to a third reading by general consent, in order to admit a motion to amend: and it being then allowable to offer an amendment, Mr. RIVES moved to amend it by striking out all after the word "Resolved," and inserting in lieu of it his own resolution, as follows: Resolved, That hereafter all sums of money accruing or becoming payable to the United States, whether for customs, public lands, taxes, debts, or otherwise, shall be collected and paid only in the legal currency of the United States, or in the notes of banks which are payable and paid on demand in the said legal currency, under the following restrictions and conditions in regard to such notes: that is, from and after the passage of this resolution, the notes of no bank which shall issue bills or notes of a less denomination than five dollars shall be received in payment of the public dues; from and after the first day of July, 1839, the notes of no bank which shall issue bills or notes of a less denomination than ten dollars shall be receivable; and, from and after the 1st of July, 1841, the like prohibition shall be extended to the notes of all banks issuing bills or notes of a less denomination than twenty dollars; but the public debtors shall have the option of paying either in the said legal currency, or in the notes of banks of the description above mentioned, in good credit: provided, however, that no notes shall be taken in payment by the collect ors or receivers, which the banks in which they are to be deposited shall not be willing to pass to the credit of the United States as cash. The amendment was ordered to be printed; and then, On motion of Mr. HUBBARD, The Senate adjourned till Monday. MONDAY, DECEMBER 26. HEIRS OF COLONEL PHILIP JOHNSTON. Mr. WALL presented the petition of Maria Scudder, Martha A. Lloyd, and Elizabeth Johnston, the children and heirs of Colonel Philip Johnston, for compensation for his revolutionary services. Mr. W. remarked: On presenting this petition, I feel that I should not discharge the duty which I have undertaken for the respectable petitioners, nor do justice to the State which I have the honor in part to represent, if I did not avail myself of the occasion to make known to you the merits and services of one of her most gallant and patriotic sons. Colonel Philip Johnston, the father of the petitioners, was among the first of her sons which the devoted patriotism of New Jersey offered on the altar of American independence. Never, sir, was there a more pure and noble sacrifice made on that altar. At the declaration of independence, Philip Johnston was a lieutenant colonel in the New Jersey militia; he had been appointed to that rank by an ordinance of the Provincial Congress of New Jersey, passed on the 14th of June, 1776, providing to raise, by voluntary enlist ment, 3,300 militia, to reinforce the army at New York. This ordinance was passed in pursuance of the resolution of the Continental Congress of the 3d of the same month. York. This was, indeed, "the time that tried men's souls." The timid sought safety in retirement, and the wavering were dismayed. At this moment the earnest and soul-stirring appeals of the Father of his Country to the patriotism and bravery of Americans, roused the patriotic spirit of the sons of New Jersey: "And from the sods of grove and glen, Rose ranks of iron-hearted men, To battle to the death." The reputation of Colonel Johnston for patriotism, bravery, and talents, enabled him speedily to enlist his regiment, and at its head he marched to defend bis "bleeding and enfeebled country." He was then in the vigor of manhood, in the possession of a moderate competency, and the prospects of the future bright be fore him. These, and all the endearments of the domestic circle, a young and beloved wife, and three daughters of tender years, he left at the call of his coun. try. The morning of the 27th of August, 1776, found Col· onel Johnston at the head of his gallant regiment, on the battle-ground of Long Island, resolved, in the language of his illustrious commander-in-chief, "to conquer or to die." He fought near the side, and under the eye of his immediate commander, General Sullivan. It was a post of danger as well as of honor, and demanded both courage and conduct. Never did any officer more gal. lantly fulfil the expectations of his country, or more glo riously earn a title to the blessings and praises of his countrymen. He fell at the head of his regiment by a wound in his breast, and bravely struggling to turn the fortunes of that disastrous day. He died for his country, and under its banner, fighting for the general defence, and to secure the blessings of freedom for his whole country. Yes, sir, he died in the cause and service of America, for the liberty and rights of all, and left to his country. men an inestimable legacy, the example of his pure på. triotism, his devoted courage, his chivalrous gallantry, and his glorious death. Who can calculate the extent, the influence, and the value, of that example upon the fortunes of our country at that gloomy and trying period, when even "hope was sinking in dismay?" Well, sir, may New Jersey glory in the example of such a son. It marshalled the way to those "heroic deeds" which have immortalized our revolutionary sires. "'Tis to the virtues of such men man owes Feats of renown, though wrought in ancient days, Sir, no monument has been erected, by the gratitude of his country, to the memory of Colonel Johnston; no recorded honors thicken around his tomb; no history displays his "feats of renown;" for, unfortunately for his memory, the revolutionary history of New Jersey is yet to be written. His fame rests in the memory of his few surviving gallant companions in arms, or happily may be faintly recorded among the memorials of frail and decaying memory in the Pension Office. One memorial of the "heroic deeds” of Colonel Johnston, gathered from the |