JAN. 6, 1837.] Building for United States Courts at Philadelphia-Treasury Circular, &c. Mr. K. then briefly noticed some remarks of the Senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. DAVIS,] who had stated that Michigan could not be a State, as, when she formed her constitution, she had no fixed boundaries. The Sen. ator from Massachusetts, Mr. K. said, had insisted that a fixed boundary was inseparable with the idea of a State; and as the United States had claim at least to a part of the territory over which Michigan claimed jurisdiction when she framed her constitution, she could not be considered as a separate State. Mr. K. said it was perfectly true that a nation must have a territory over which it exercised jurisdiction; but an undisputed boundary was not essential to an independent State. A community might be independent, and very powerful too, whose boundaries were not well defined. Our own boundary was disputed in the Northeast; and who could state the precise boundaries of Russia? Yet Russia and the United States were none the less independent communities of people because their boundaries were not well settled. [SENATE. to me that there is not a more suitable place where to commence than Philadelphia. Mr. CALHOUN called for the reading of the memorial; and it having been read, Mr. C. said he had no objection to its being referred to the Committee on the Judiciary; but he hoped they would pause and weigh the question a long time before they would give their assent to our commencing a penitentiary system of the United States. There was patronage enough exercised by the General Government already-its powers were great and extensive, without their being introduced into a State. He objected to a State and General Government acting together. He merely threw out these sugges tions to the committee, in the hope that they would pause a long time before they would give their sanction to the commencement of the proposed system. Mr. GRUNDY said he did not object to the reference of the memorial to the committee of which he was a member. But as to pausing a long time on the subject, he had made up his mind, and he would say that, so far as he could judge of the disposition of his colleagues, they would not pause for any length of time; for the committee would report in a few days, not only on the subject of penitentiaries, but on court-houses also. Mr. BUCHANAN remarked that he was sorry to hear that the chairman of the Judiciary committee had made up his mind on the subject. It appeared to him (Mr. B.) that at some period, not very remote, it would be necessary for the Government of the United States to erect penitentiaries. How could it be avoided? As long as the Government of the United States are a Government executing their own laws, and punishing offenders against them, they must make some provisions for their punishment. The States, without entertaining any hos Mr. K. then adverted to the preamble to the bill, which had been so strongly objected to that some gentlemen were willing to vote for the bill if the preamble were stricken out. He said, as both Michigan and Ohio now wanted the restriction removed, and Michigan admitted without restriction, he would certainly have no objection, if no body else were concerned but Michigan and Ohio. If these States had any disinterested love of fighting, if he were to consult his own feelings, he would say, let them go at it and fight it out. But a community of States, he thought, should act on the same principle as a community of individuals. They should keep the peace among disorderly members. It would frequently gratify two bullies to settle a quarrel in the public streets, surrounded by a mob, but no well-organized community would permit such disorder. This squab.tility to the Government of this Union, might find it very ble between Michigan and Ohio, about a few acres of ground, might set the whole Union into a blaze, and possibly cost the Government millions of dollars to put it down. If the restriction were retained, he had no doubt Michigan would continue to observe it in good faith, and we should hear no more about it. We should, most likely, avoid the horrors of another Toledo campaign. He had, therefore, thought it best to retain the preamble, and not repeal the condition; and he hoped the bill would pass, and pass just as it was. The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and it was passed, by yeas and nays, as follows: YEAS-Messrs. Benton, Brown, Buchanan, Dana, Fulton, Grundy, Hendricks, Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Linn, Nicholas, Niles, Page, Parker, Rives, Robinson, Sevier, Strange, Tallmadge, Tipton, Walker, Wall, White, Wright-25. NAYS--Messrs. Bayard, Calhoun, Clay, Crittenden, Davis, Kent, Moore, Prentiss, Southard, Swift-10. The Senate then adjourned. FRIDAY, JANUARY 6. BUILDING FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AT Mr. BUCHANAN presented the memorial of sundry citizens of Philadelphia, praying that an appropriation may be made for the erection of a suitable building for the accommodation of the courts of the United States, and also for the erection of a penitentiary at that city. Mr. B. said, in presenting the petition, I recommend it to the consideration of the Judiciary Committee. I can say we have brought the penitentiary system in Pennsylvania to perfection. Our plan has become a model, not only in many parts of this country, but in Europe. And as it will be necessary, at no remote time, for the United States to erect penitentiaries, it appears inconvenient to accommodate the prisoners sentenced by virtue of the laws of the United States. What was to be done? Were they to be set at liberty? Were they not to receive the punishment inflicted by the laws? He could not suppose that any State would not show a proper comity to the United States courts. But suppose it should happen that they were unable or unwilling to do this, in what a situation would the Government be placed? He could not, he confessed, see in this thing any interference with the rights or the liberties of the States. He had no idea that his calling the attention of the Judiciary Committee to the subject would have caused the least debate, or he would not have done it. The petition was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. TREASURY CIRCULAR. On motion of Mr. CLAY, (Mr. EWING, of Ohio, having been called home by sickness in his family,) the Senate proceeded to the further consideration of the joint resolution repealing the Treasury order of July last, &c. The question being on the substitute offered by Mr. RIVES, for refusing, by the United States, the paper of such banks as should issue bills under certain specified denominations Mr. SOUTHARD addressed the Senate on the subject at large, in continuation and conclusion of his former reremarks on the subject, as given entire in preceding pages. THE MINT BILL. On motion of Mr. WRIGHT, when Mr. SOUTHARD had concluded his remarks, this subject and all the other previous orders were postponed, and the Senate preceeded to consider, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill from the House of Representatives supplementary to the act for establishing a mint and regulating the coins of the United States. The amendment proposed by the Committee on Fi SENATE.] Treasury Circular. nance, extending the limit of wastage allowed to the chief coiner, from one one-thousandth part to one and a half one-thousandth part, was adopted, and the bill, so amended, was reported to the Senate. Mr. WRIGHT entered into various explanatory details, showing some small changes contemplated by the bill. After which, the bill was ordered to lie upon the table, but subsequently was taken up, and ordered to a third reading. After transacting some other business, the Senate spent a short time in executive business. The Senate then adjourned. MONDAY, JANUARY 9. The CHAIR presented the credentials of the Hon. SAMUEL PRENTISS, re-elected Senator for six additional years, from the State of Vermont. Also, the credentials of Hon. WILLIAM C. PRESTON, re-elected Senator from the State of South Carolina. TREASURY CIRCULAR. On motion of Mr. CLAY, the previous orders were postponed, and the Senate proceeded to the further consideration of the joint resolution rescinding the Treasury order of July, 1836. The question being on Mr. RIVES's substitute, Mr. STRANGE rose and addressed the Chair as follows: Mr. President: It was not my purpose to have addres sed the Senate to-day, but as some gentlemen, who desire to be heard on this question, have deferred their preparation from an expectation that I would occupy the floor, I am unwilling that inconvenience should result to a member of this body from any misconception arising from intimations I may have given. Therefore, although not prepared to my own satisfaction, I will ask the indulgence of the Senate for a few moments. I could have voted upon the original resolutions of the Senator from Ohio sub silentio, because, in so doing, my vote would have explained itself; but in adopting the substitute of the Senator from Virginia, I shall be placed in an equivocal position before my constituents, and therefore think it necessary that certain explanatory comments should accompany my vote. I will not deny, that as thoughts flowed in upon my mind during the discussion of the original question, I occasionally felt disposed to give them utterance; but prudence, that cowardly and sometimes assassin virtue, destroyed each embryo purpose as soon as it was formed. But now she changes sides, and whispers me that it is due to myself, and those whom I have the honor in part to represent, to crave the indulgence of the Senate for a few moments. I am opposed to the original resolutions, because they proposed to rescind an executive order. I do not mean by this a mere verbal criticism, for 1 suppose the honorable Senator really meant what his resolution contained, and proposes to rescind or repeal an executive order by a vote of the National Legislature; and this, with due def. erence, I conceived to be a manifest solecism. The legislative, executive, and judicial departments of this Government are wisely separated by the constitution, and one cannot interfere with the province of another. The legislative prescribes rules for the executive and judiciary, but cannot itself perform any legislative or judicial function, except in the special cases set forth in the constitution. Congress may, if it be necessary and proper, command the Executive to repeal the Treasury order, but cannot itself repeal it. Congress passes laws for the government of every citizen, from the highest to the lowest, and at his own peril he yields or withholds obedience. As well, and even with more propriety, might the Supreme Court say it repeals an act of Con [JAN. 9, 1837. gress, when it pronounces it unconstitutional, and refuses to enforce it. And as well might Congress say it repeals a decision of the Supreme Court, when that decision, having opened its eyes to some defect in the existing law, induces it to prescribe a new rule for future action. Even when the decisions of the court are palpably repugnant to the existing law, Congress cannot repeal them. Congress may direct what decisions shall be made in future, but cannot repeal those already published. Neither can it repeal the decisions of the Executive. The Legislature prescribes rules for the government of both these departments, and to each of them it must be left to apply them; and each must, in the first instance, judge how far its own actions square with the rules prescribed, upon its own official responsibility. A direct declaration of repeal, therefore, must be altogether inoperative, and of course an absurdity. The truth is, this Treasury order is altogether an execut ve Congress may command its repeal, and doubtless the Exact, and can only be undone by executive authority. ecutive would yield such command respectful obedience. But it strikes me there is something in the mode of this undertaking to effect the repeal of the Treasury order, not consistent with strict parliamentary propriety; at least, not altogether consistent with the professed purpose of those who desire its repeal. It is laid down in Jefferson's Manual, the highest authority acknowledged by us in such matters, that "When the House com. mands any thing, it is by order. But facts, principles, their own opinions and purposes, are expressed in the form of resolutions." Now, the resolutions before us, while they assume the name of resolutions, effect the office of orders, and to perform more, as I think I have before shown, than even an order would be competent to accomplish. But, again, I am opposed to the resolutions, because they propose to prescribe a rule, unnecessarily, as I conceive, in a matter where, from its nature, a large discretion is desirable, being highly convenient, and in no degree liable to dangerous use. I know it is the fashion of the day to suppose that the executive authority is the only one liable to abuse, or in any way likely to threaten the liberties of the country. Among the blessings, Mr. President, for which we of the present day are debtors to Heaven, there are none, politically speaking, for which we have more just reason to be grateful, than that the formation of our constitution has not been left to our own bands; that we have received it ready formed, in all its beautiful proportions, by men who seem to have been commissioned by Heaven for this very thing. Surrounded by an atmosphere just purified by the storms and convulsions of the Revolution, every one feeling more strongly than any other want that of an equal, wise, and impartial Government, they addressed themselves to the task with no faculty biased by local or personal passions. They sought for truth with their visual organs purged from the mists of prejudice, and they found her. They listened to her inspired instructions, and penned the happy constitution under which we now live, the envy of other nations, and the pride of our own. They divided Government into three departments, and prescribed the sphere in which each should move. Harmony and safety will ever attend its action, while each strictly observes the law of its creation. But it is difficult to say from which the most direful results are to be apprehended, should it with eccentric movement forsake its natural orbit, and invade those of its sister planets. Viewing this matter in the light of experience, we should be led to suppose that from the legislative department there was the greatest reason for jealousy of usurpation, or invasion of the province of others. The most remarkable and desolating revolutions of which modern history furnishes an account are those of England and France, and the complete prostration of the executive and judicial authorities beneath the feet of the legislative marked those sanguinary events. But to press this portion of the subject no farther, suffice it to say, that true wisdom dictates to each department great forbearance towards the others, and a no less scrupulous abstinence from infringing upon their rights, than a jealous care of its own. The collection of the revenue is strictly an executive act. The Legislature, to be sure, can alone prescribe the subjects of revenue, and the mode of its collection; but the funds, to use the language of the resolution, in which receivable, is, in the general, a fair subject to be left to the Executive, under the constitution, and the broad range of circumstances which may from time to time arise. The general principle, certainly, (from which neither common reason nor convenience will allow of any wide departure,) is, that the public revenue should be collected in what is obviously equivalent to so much gold and silver, the acknowledged standards of value both by the constitution and the usage of trade. What is so equivalent must depend greatly upon circumstances continually fluctuating-the currents of trade, and the peculiar application for which any given portion of the revenue is designed. Sometimes the ease of the citizen may be consulted to a great extent, in perfect consistency with the security of the Treasury; and at others, nothing short of the precious metals themselves will serve the purposes of the public demands. I do not mean to say that Congress has not the power of dictating even the funds in which the revenue may be paid, or that there is any thing improper in her doing so; but that, in general, the officer whose business it is to supervise the Treasury, in his turn under the supervision of the Executive, will be well capable of judging, and much more competent to act to the advantage of the public, under sudden emergencies, (which no human sagacity is sufficient to foresee,) when untrammelled by rigid, inflexible rules; and, therefore, unless strong considerations call for the enactment of such rules, it is far better to leave him with the responsibility upon his own shoulders, which, with out such enactments, would rest there. Thus the executive class of public officers would be stimulated to more activity; feeling, in addition to their responsibility to us, the representatives of the people, a direct responsibility to them, our common masters, for the wisdom and fidelity of their action. I am further opposed to the resolutions, because they proceed upon a principle altogether unknown to custom, and directly at war with sound policy. In general, either a public or private agent is bound to collect the debts of his principal in specie, or something clearly its equivalent; his undivided attention should be directed to the interest of him whom he represents. Truly, that disposition to oblige, which, with rare exceptions, characterizes all intelligent men, and still more, in public matters, that love of popularity by which alone, in our country, men are either elevated to office or suffered long to retain it, are ample guarantees that the debtor will not be subjected to inconveniences not demanded by the agent's own responsibility to his principal; and these are all that have been heretofore thought safe to allow the debtor, or at all reasonable for him to ask. In fact, it generally happens that consultation of his own ease in making his collections with the least labor and trouble, the law of kindness, and the love of popularity, induce the agent to relax from an observance sufficiently rigid of the interests of his principal, and to receive payment in funds not the most valuable, if not, in many cases, somewhat doubtful. Such seems to have been at one time, to a very alarming extent, the fiscal experience of this Government. But these resolutions propose to spur the flying steed, to impose that as an obligation towards [SENATE. which there is already a natural and dangerous proclivity. They propose essentially to change the office of the head of the Treasury Department, and, requiring him to overlook the security of the national property, compel him to receive the national dues in a class of funds from which the debtor, having the right of selection, will of course choose what will be most easily obtained, and consequently, in all probability, the least safe and valuable. I am again opposed to the resolutions, because, as I conceive, they are intended to censure the President of the United States. If any doubt rested upon the mind, upon the mere perusal of the resolutions themselves, that doubt must cease as soon as we listen to the comments of their advocates, and the reasons which urge them to their support. Some of the reasons upon which they are avowedly supported are the evil motives ascribed to the President, in causing the issue of the Treasury order they are designed to repeal. He is, in effect, charged with falsehood; for the Treasury order bears upon its face, doubtlessly under his own authority and direction, the motives which induced him to give it existence; and we are here publicly told that his true motives were of an altogether different kind; thus directly charging him with an attempt to deceive the public, in placing before it false motives for his official action. But this is not all. He is not only charged with falsehood, but at least one of the motives imputed to him is in itself altogether base and dishonorable. We are told that some of the land speculators alluded to in the order were his own particular friends, whose interest he was solicitous to promote; that they have already made large investments in the public lands, and are threatened with loss, or at least a necessity of holding for an inconvenient length of time, should the United States continue to be a competitor with them in unrestricted sales; and that, while the United States is demanding specie, they, by selling for paper, would acquire a preference in the market, and be enabled to command better prices; thus making the President of the United States, in forgetfulness of his high station and his well-earned honors, to sell the latter for trash to enrich his friends, and prostitute the former to gratify their avarice. Another motive assigned is, that being in heart opposed to the deposite law of the last session, he was desirous of throwing every difficulty in the way of its execution, to verify the evil omens uttered by himself and friends in relation to it, and to render it odious in the eyes of the people. To accomplish all this, the Treasury order was framed, in the hope that the pressure and embarrassments it should produce might be imputed to the deposite act. It may be that the Presi dent of the United States was not well inclined to the deposite act, and that in truth it is a mischievous measure, some of the evils of which are now demonstrating themselves; that those are now feeling them who could not in any other way be brought to dream of their existence; that in fact the connexion between present difficulties and the deposite act is so intimate as to make it appear that one was got up by previous design to accompany the other. But however all this may be, it is well known the present Chief Magistrate is not a man to accomplish his views by any indirection; that a bold and manly, and, as his enemies think, a rash and reckless policy, is one of his characteristics. Yet gentlemen who advocate these resolutions ascribe to him conduct highly disingenuous, and motives exceedingly dishonorable. It is not my wish, in malice, to impugn the motives of any one; and if I should refer unfavorably to the motives of a party, I hope no gentleman within or without these walls will consider it personal to himself, or springing, in the slightest degree, from individual feeling. We are all men, and are all liable to have our judgment warped, however clear and intuitive originally, by the allurements of persuasion, the fascination of affection, the delusions of prejudice, or the madness of passion; and when I find myself differing with another, I am always willing to suppose, and have it supposed, that either he or myself have fallen under subjection to one of these malign influences. There are gentlemen still living, and on the theatre of public action, whose fame once fired my infant soul with admiration, and whose fame I still cherish as the boast of my country. But God has given to every ra tional and responsible being faculties by which he is bound to try the actions and opinions of others as well as his own; he must be obedient to their decisions, and not suffer himself to be led captive at the chariot wheels of authority. Tried by this standard, I have found those whom I once viewed as little less than demigods, men of like passions with myself, and in like manner subject to idols, as the learned Lord Bacon has been pleased to term the various delusions to which the human mind is exposed. While, therefore, I am still disposed to accord to them the fame they so justly merit, and allow to them at the same time patriotism equal to that of Curtius, who sealed his with his life, I yet see in them motives to assail the present administration well calculated to mislead them, and find in them a practice of indiscriminate condemnation of all its measures. Like the Jews of old, their cry continually is, "can any good come out of Nazareth?" They must be indulged in the cry, but it is the du ty of every one who loves his country to answer that cry, in all its various modifications, whenever he shall believe it groundless, with instant denunciation, lest the people become deluded by it, and stimulated, as of old, to the sacrifice of their best friend, their truest benefactor. Let me not be misunderstood. Much as I esteem and admire General Jackson as a patriot and wise statesman, let it not be said I have ever uttered the blasphemous thought that he bears the most remote comparison with the sacred personage who fell a victim to Jewish persecution. But I do insist that to these original resolutions it is a just cause of resistance that they are designed to swell the cry of disapprobation against an administration pronounced, as I understand, by Nathaniel Macon, the political patriarch of North Carolina, the best this country has ever witnessed. But this objection is intimately connected with another; and that is the tendency of the adoption of these res olutions to the re-establishment of the United States Bank. The whole of the party with whom I have the honor to act concur in the opinion that this institution cannot exist consistently with the constitution; and many who differ from us in other matters unite with us in believing it one highly dangerous to the public weal. But these are questions not now for discussion; they may be considered as settled by the verdict of the people. But, sir, a new trial is moved for, and all sorts of devices are set on foot to prepare the mind of the only tribunal which can decide whether or not it shall be granted to lend a favorable ear to the application. None is more likely to be successful than the conviction that the fiscal concerns of the country are prone to gross mismanage ment without it. If, therefore, Congress shall, by the adoption of these resolutions, give color to such a belief, gentlemen have already warned us in their speeches of the bearing it is likely to have upon the question of the recharter of the United States Bank. This recharter is, in my humble opinion, the main object for the accomplishment whereof the present administration is abused and vilified, and all the other party machinery set to work. Among other things, with the cunning characteristic of a certain little animal common in our country, the bank pretends to be dead. But it is a delusion: the monster is not dead; it does not even sleep. I owe it to the respectable gentlemen connected with that institution, some (JAN. 9, 1837. of them my highly esteemed personal friends, to say that my hostility to the bank is entirely political. To more able, and, for aught I know, more honest hands, hearts, and heads, than some who have heretofore held some control of its affairs, they could not have been committed. But, even with them, flagrant abuses have attended its administration, and the freedom of elections, that life-spring of our political system, been seriously threatened. If these things happen in the green tree, what will be done in the dry? If honest men are borne away upon the tide of human passion, what may we expect when, as in the common course of things may well happen, mere stock. jobbers and knaves shall rule over its destinies? Every tendency, then, to its recharter ought to be resisted, even if the problem were demonstrated that we could not manage our fiscal concerns so well without it. These, sir, are some of the reasons that would have indisposed me a priori to support the original resolutions. But gentlemen say they ought to be adopted, and the order rescinded, because it was issued in contemptuous disregard of the opinion of the Senate, expressed at its last session. If this be so, it is a grievous fault; and that the alleg d perpetrator hath not been called upon more grievously to answer it, is, to my mind, proof positive that the accusation is groundless. The circumstance which, as I suppose, gives color to this charge is, that at the last session of Congress it was proposed in the Senate to adopt a resolution substantially conformable to the present Treasury order, which a majority of the Senate refused to do. To test this matter, let us suppose the administration the private agent of a private individual, whom we will imagine to be Congress. In some of those moments when the mouth unconsciously pours forth the fulness of the heart, the agent overhears his principal, while casting over in his mind the large es tates of which he is the proprietor, and the vast sums of money which, by way of rent, are pouring into his cof fers, "I believe," says he, "I will instruct my agent to receive nothing but gold and silver from my tenants." He debates the matter over with himself, and finally concludes to give his agent no instructions upon the subject. But gold and silver are the legal currency of the country, and the agent, of his own head and imagination, compels the tenants to pay in gold and silver. They complain that it would have been far easier for them to have paid in the notes of specie-paying banks. With what justice could the principal complain that he had been contemptuously treated by his agent, because he had not construed his not commanding him to demand gold and silver, as an instruction not to demand gold and silver? I confess, had I the honor to have been at the head of the Treasury Department, I should have reasoned in this way. Notwithstanding a proposal to give me special instructions upon this matter, Congress has thought it expedient to leave me to my own discretion, upon my official responsibility, and expects me to adopt such measures as this novel crisis of affairs may, from time to time, require. My situation is difficult and delicate, and it behooves me, with statesmanlike eye, to survey the scene; and, with manly and judicious firmness, to adopt such measures as are demanded by the exigency. Puerile fears, or irresolution, on my part, may endanger the whole national treasure. But we are told that the Executive has no right to consider the state of affairs; no right to take any measures with reference to the currency of the country, or the disposal of the public lands. That these are matters exclusively with Congress. Indeed, sir! and, pray, why have we any Executive at all? Why does not Congress just pass laws, and place their execution in the hands of agents of their own selection and appointment? Simply because our forefathers were too wise to adopt any such form of government. They knew that a perpetual legislative body was the most tyrannical of all institutions, and that intervals in its sessions, as well as its existence, were essential to liberty. But they did not intend that, during those intervals, the vessel of state should float down the stream of events without a pilot. No, sir, they constituted a responsible Executive; responsible to the great sovereign power from whom, and by whom, he is called to the exercise of high, useful, and honorable functions. Where the Legislature prescribes for him particular rules, provided they be such as the constitution allows them to prescribe, he is bound to follow them with implicit obedience; but, where they have omitted to do so, the broad chart of the constitution is the only limit to a discretion which he is not only at liberty but is bound to exercise. He is criminally negligent if, within those limits, be fails to adopt such measures as the public exigencies may demand. He has not only a right, but is bound, to judge when such exigencies exist, and so to frame his measures as to pass them in safety. Whether he acts, or forbears to act, he has not only to encounter the strict ordeal of public opinion, but may be called up on to answer, on impeachment, for excess on the one hand, or laggard indifference on the other. And is the right of judging to be denied him, when such responsibility for events rests upon his shoulders? When not only the fame which has been his passport to high distinction is to be snatched from him by the decision of his cotemporaries, and himself tried and degraded upon a formal proceeding, but the page which hands his name down to posterity marked with the opprobrious words of tyrant, usurper, knave, fool, or coward? Try him as a private agent to whom you have committed your affairs. A wide space intervenes-seas roll between you, or for some other reason he is not within reach of instruction. An important crisis takes place, and by a single step he may make your fortune. The crisis passes, and the step is not taken. You hear of this crisis, and, believing that you have trusted your affairs to a wise man, you do not doubt that all that was proper to have been done has been done. When next you meet your agent, you say to him, "Where are the golden ingots you have amassed for me? where the treasures of Ethiopia and the Indies?" "I have them not," replies your agent. "Why," you inquire, "did you not perform such and such an act?" "I did not," the agent doggedly replies; "you did not tell me to do it." Would you not seize him by the throat, and indignantly exclaim, "Stupid dolt! did I tell you not to do it?" Tell me not, then, that the most important public agent may doze in the palace provided for his accommodation, and move only when quickened into action by legislative impulse. But this brings us to another point. Senators say that Congress has already prescribed the rule in this case, and declare that this order is in violation of it, and therefore illegal; and upon this point, methought, the other day, the highly distinguished Senator from Massachusetts "bit his thumb at us." I do not mean to say that that gentleman knew any thing of the character, or even the name, of the humble Senator from North Carolina, but he alluded to a class to which I have the honor to be long. I know that the Senator from Massachusetts wields a ponderous lance, and with the arm of a giant, and I should be loth to encounter its deadly thrust. But be has, as I think, assumed to himself ground on which a stripling might venture to assail him. As an eagle, "towering in his pride of place," may drop a feather from his plumage, destined at some future day to give force and direction to the arrow which wounds him, so did the Senator from Massachusetts, in one of those able effusions which contributed to place him on that enviable elevation he now occupies, furnish arguments, strong and irresistible, against the position he has now | [SENATE. thought proper to assume. If the Treasury order is illegal, I would ask, in the first place, what need of further legislation? Does a law derive more efficacy from repetition? Or does its obligation depend upon the number of ponderous tomes it may fill? If gentlemen really believe there is a law now existing which overreaches the Treasury order, are they not sporting with us when they ask us to pass another? If the Executive is in fact regardless of a law passed in 1816, will he be more mindful of a law passed in 1837? But let us hear what law is violated, or, rather, alleged to be violated. The Senator from Massachusetts, in a speech delivered in 1816, informs us that by the statute all duties and taxes were required to be paid in the legal money of the United States or in Treasury notes. What was the legal money of the United States? At that time Congress had legalized no money except gold and silver, and United States Bank notes; and, of course, if only legal money was receivable, nothing but gold and silver, and Treasury notes, and United States Bank notes, were receivable; but the following joint resolution was then adopted: The joint resolution of 1816. "That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he hereby is, required and directed to adopt such measures as he may deem necessary to cause, as soon as may be, all duties, taxes, debts, or sums of money, accruing or becoming payable to the United States, to be collected and paid in the legal currency of the United States, or Treasury notes, or notes of the Bank of the United States, as by law provided and declared, or in notes of banks which are payable and paid on demand, in the said legal currency of the United States; and that, from and after the 20th day of February next, no such duties, taxes, debts, or sums of money, accruing or becoming payable to the United States as aforesaid, ought to be collected or received otherwise than in the legal currency of the United States, or Treasury notes, or notes of the Bank of the United States, or in notes of banks which are payable and paid on demand, in the said legal currency of the United States." And this, it is said, compels the Secretary of the Treas. ury to receive in payment of public dues, at the option of the debtor, either gold or silver, or Treasury notes, or United States Bank notes, or notes of banks which are paid or payable on demand in legal money. Language, I suppose, Mr. President, is subject to various interpretations, according to the relationship which the speaker bears to the subject-matter. As, for instance, if a creditor, addressing his agent, should say to him, "You must collect for me either gold and silver, or Treasury notes, or United States Bank notes, or notes of specie-paying banks," could he understand him in any other sense than that he would be satisfied with either, leaving to his agent to collect in either fund, according to the dictate of convenience? If the creditor should intend to assume the singular attitude of speaking mainly in behalf of his debtor, ought not the agent to be distinctly apprized, in some way, that such was the fact, before he could be justly charged with disobedience of orders in not allowing the debtor to choose the fund in which he should pay? And would not every one be filled with astonishinent, should a debtor be found unreasonable enough to insist to the agent, that, upon any instructions he might have received from his principal, he, the debtor, acquired a right of action against him for declining to obey those instructions? But the Senator from Massachusetts will not, I am persuaded, differ with me upon this principle of law: that in construing statutes, reference may be had to the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. What does the history of the times inform us was the old law, and the mischief, at the adoption of |