the partnership. With respect to the question of fact, viz., whether the verdict is against the evidence, I am of opinion that there ought to be a new trial.

MARTIN, B.-I am of the same opinion. There is no doubt about the law in cases of this kind. If three partners agree that each shall bring into the concern £500, that becomes a part of the partnership property; and no action can be maintained in respect of the money brought in by each, for it would be useless for one partner to recover, when, upon taking a general account amongst all the partners, he might be liable to refund. But in this case the transaction is altogether separate from the partnership. Three shareholders agree to become security for money advanced to the company, and which ultimately they are liable to pay. Then they ought to be in the same condition as if each had himself advanced to the company an aliquot portion of the money. If each had done so, he might have recovered against the company the money so advanced. Then the three being liable to pay, the plaintiff, who has paid more than his share, may maintain an action against the defendant for contribution. As to the other point, I agree that there ought to be a new trial.

BRAMWELL, B.-Upon the matter of law I subscribe to Mr. Creasy's argument. If a partner advances money on account of the partnership, he can not recover it in an action against his copartners, for the law will not imply a promise to pay it; and why? because, at the time he made the advance he impliedly undertook that it should remain until an account was taken. But if two or three members of a partnership, not being the whole, think fit to enter into a separate obligation to a third party, upon the security of which he advances money to the partnership, each being liable to pay the whole, and bound to indemnify the others against the payment of more than his share, that can not be considered as a partner. ship transaction. Here, so soon as the bank advanced the £500 to the company, each of the three parties was entitled to take credit, as against his co-surety, to the extent of one third of £500. Then one of them, having been compelled to pay more than his share, has a right to call upon the others to contribute.

WATSON, B.-I am of the same opinion.

Rule absolute.

BURTON V. WOOKEY.

(6 Maddock, 367. Court of the Vice Chancellor, 1822.)

Bias, against interest. No partner who owes a duty toward another can place himself in a situation which gives him a bias against the discharge of that duty.

'Charging intermediate profit against associate. A partner may not buy by barter for, and charge cash against, his firm.

The plaintiff and defendant entered into partnership together to deal in lapis calaminaris. The defendant, who was a shopkeeper, was to take the active part in the concern, and to purchase the lapis calaminaris from the miners in whose neighborhood he lived. Many of the miners were, before the partnership, in the habit of dealing at his shop, and continued so for some years after the partnership, receiving from the defendant ready money for the lapis calaminaris and paying for their shop goods afterward as they would have done to any other shopkeeper; but in the year 1817 or 1818, owing, as the defendant alleged, to the distress of the times, a new course of dealing took place between the defendant and the miners; in the place of paying them for the lapis calaminaris with money, he paid them with shop goods, and in his account with the plaintiff he charged him as for cash paid to the amount of the price of the goods.

The question was whether he could justify this charge, or whether he must not divide the profit made by him on the sale of the goods with the plaintiff.

THE VICE CHANCELLOR (SIR JOHN LEACH).

It is a maxim of courts of equity that a person who stands in a relation of trust or confidence to another shall not be permitted, in pursuit of his private advantage, to place himself in a situation which gives him a bias against the due discharge of that trust or confidence. The defendant here stood in a relation of trust or confidence toward the plaintiff, which made it his duty to purchase the lapis calaminaris at the low

1 Jones v. Dexter, 130 Mas. 380; 39 A. R 459 and note citing ca e, 461.

est possible price. When in the place of purchasing the lapis calaminaris he obtained it by barter for his own shop goods, he had a bias against a fair discharge of his duty to the plaintiff. The more goods he gave in barter for the article purchased, the greater was the profit which he derived from the dealing in store goods, and as this profit belonged to him individually, and as the savings by a low price of the article purchased was to be equally divided between him and the plaintiff, he had plainly a bias against the due discharge of his trust or confidence toward the plaintiff. I must therefore decree an account of the profit made by the defendant in his barter of goods, and must declare that the plaintiff is entitled to an equal division of that profit with the plaintiff.

BROWN V. KIDGER ET AL.

(3 Hurlstone & N. 853. Court of Exchequer, 1858.)

'Power of managing partners to borrow and to accept bills. The four defendants were partners in coal mining. Two of them conducted the business of the colliery. These managing partners borrowed money and accepted a bill of exchange in the name of the firm in settlement of firm debts on which actions had been brought. The partnership deed contained a clause that if any partner should, for his own use, accept any bill of exchange, the others might determine his interest in the partnership. Held, that the managing partners had power to borrow the money and to bind the firm to the payment of the accepted bill.

The first count of the declaration stated that the plaintiff, by his bill of exchange, now overdue, directed to the defendants under the name and style of the "Peggs Green Colliery Company," required the defendants under such name and style to pay to the plaintiff's order, £260 148., one month after date; and the defendants then accepted the said bill but did not pay the same, and thereupon the same was returned to the plaintiff, who had previously negotiated the same, dishonored, with the expenses thereof, which the plaintiff was compelled to pay. There were also counts for money lent and money paid.

1 Ricketts v. Bennett, 11 M. R. 278; Hawtayne v. Bourne, 1 M. R. 285; Burmester v. Norris, 3 M. R. 449; McConnell v. Denver, 11 M. R. 432; Jones v. Clark, 11 M. R. 473.

The defendants Bostock and Knight, pleaded to the first count, that they did not accept the bill; to the residue of the declaration, never indebted.

An abstract of another plea was delivered, and on application for leave to plead several matters, the learned judge or dered that the defendants be at liberty to plead the above pleas, the plaintiff undertaking that the subject-matter of the other plea, of which an abstract was delivered, might (if nec essary) be given in evidence under the first plea. The abstract was as follows: That the bill was accepted by Kidger and Price as agents to the Peggs Green Colliery Company, in which the defendants Bostock and Knight were alleged to be partners, without the knowledge or consent of the defendants Bostock and Knight, for their own private purposes, and not for partnership purposes, and that the partnership never received any value for the same; that the plaintiff is suing as trustee for Kidger and Price, with full notice of the premises.

At the trial before the Lord Chief Baron, at the London sittings after last Trinity term, it appeared that by articles under seal, dated the first of September, 1853, the four defendants. Kidger, Price, Knight and Bostock, agreed to carry on together, as copartners, the business of coal masters, for the purpose of working a coal mine which had been demised to them, situate at Peggs Green, in the county of Leicester. The partnership was to continue for twenty years from the 25th of March, 1853. At a meeting of the partners in October, 1856, it was resolved that Kidger and Price should conduct the business of the colliery, which they accordingly did. In 1857, two actions were brought against the partnership, one by the Midland Railway Company to recover £154 15s. 2d. for tonnage of coal carried from the colliery to Leices ter, and the other by one Worswick, to recover £91 19s. 1d. for the hire of trucks. Kidger and Price were unable to satisfy these claims, and Knight refused to contribute. Kidger and Price applied to the plaintiff, who was the attorney employed by them to defend these actions, to advance the money, and they engaged that he should be repaid out of the first assets of the partnership which could be collected, and should have a bill of exchange accepted by them on behalf of the

partnership. The plaintiff paid the debt and costs in both actions and drew a bill of exchange, dated the 6th February, 1858, for payment of £264 14s. one month after date, which was accepted by Kidger and Price, "pro Peggs Green Colliery Company." On the 25th January, Kidger and Price gave notice of a half-yearly meeting on the 2d February, to provide funds to reimburse the advances they had made in carrying on the works of the company. The meeting was held on that day, when Kidger and Price reported "that since the last half yearly meeting, the Midland Railway Company had commenced an action at law to recover £154 15s. 2d. for tonnages due from the colliery, and that Mr. W. Worswick had also commenced an action at law to recover the sum of £91 198. for rent or hire of trucks due from the colliery; and that notwithstanding the resources of the colliery did not enable them to meet these demands, Messrs. Kidger and Price, to avoid costs and expenses, raised and paid these debts and the costs of the actions, to which Mr. T. Bostock contributed £37 11s. 10d. That by the accounts is shown to be due to Messrs. Kidger and Price the sum of £410 12s. 10d., in addition to which the sum of £261 19s. was due for rent at Michaelmas last, for which provision must be now made, either by an immediate contribution by the partners or by raising money by other means." The following resolution was entered in the minute book: "Resolved, that a contribution by the parties in Peggs Green Colliery, in accordance with their respective shares therein, should be made within three months from this meeting, of £900, and that Messrs. Kidger and Price in the meantime raise, by temporary means, money to meet the necessities of the company in carrying on the partnership undertaking." The partnership deed contained the following clause: "That if any or either of the said partners shall, for his own use, or any other purpose than the immediate use of the said partnership concern, draw, accept, or indorse any bill or bills of exchange or promissory note or notes in the name of the firm, it shall be lawful for all or any of the others of them, at any time within fourteen days after the same shall come to their, his or her knowledge, to give to the party so acting, notice in writing, by leaving the same at his or her last known place of abode, announcing a dissolution of the said copartnership so far as regards the interest of the said party for