dispute, between employers and workmen, shall not be indictable as a conspiracy, if such act committed by one person would not be indictable as a crime.““ ARBITRATION 150 66. In some of the United States, statutes provide for boards of arbitration for the adjustment of trade disputes between employers and their workmen." A federal statute, passed in 1888, makes similar provisions for disputes between railroad companies and their employes. It was by virtue of this statute that the president, in 1894, appointed a commission to investigate the Chicago riots. In England, in 1867, an act was passed establishing "equitable councils of conciliation," for the settlement of wage disputes and the adjustment of kindred labor controversies. In 1872, further and more extensive provision was made for the introduction of the principle of arbitration."1 COLLECTION OF DEBTS BY CRIMINAL PROCESS 67. No man can lawfully invoke the aid of the criminal process of the law to have decided a question of property, or the question affecting the indebtedness due from one individual to another, or other civil rights.' 152 Debts are contracts, rights existing between individuals which do not pertain to, or affect, the community generally. Legal actions for contracts, and for all rights between individuals, are exercised and enforced in the civil courts only; a criminal court, which is a tribunal for the trial of criminal cases-offenses against the community, affecting all the people in the community-is not the proper jurisdiction in which to bring an action affecting only the parties in interest. 149 Conspiracy and Protection of Prop erty Act (1875) (38 and 39 Vict.. c. 86) (1891); 2 Q. B. 549, note 557. 150 Stats. of Mass. (1890), Ohio (1893), N. J. (1892). 151 Schouler, Dom. Rel., Sec. 456, citing 30 and 31 Vict., c. 105 (1867); 35 and 36 Vict. (1872). 152 49 Tex. 131 (1878); 86 Tex. 497 (1894). Where a person endeavors or attempts by a criminal process to collect a debt, he is liable to the person he has had arrested in an action for malicious prosecution;" for any motive, other than that of simply instituting a prosecution for the purpose of bringing a person to justice, is a malicious motive on the part of the person who acts in that way." MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 68. A wanton prosecution made by a prosecutor in a criminal proceeding, or by a plaintiff in a civil suit, without. probable cause, by a regular process and proceeding, which the facts did not warrant, as appears by the result, is a malicious prosecution. 155 An arrest by a legal warrant on a criminal charge to compel the satisfaction of a mere private civil demand is a misuse of process, a fraud upon the law, and an illegal arrest as respects the party who knowingly and purposely perverts the machinery of the law in that way.' 156 If, as a matter of fact, a criminal prosecution be instituted for some collateral purpose, and, as a means of coercing another to surrender some right or claim which he makes regardless of the vindication of the law, whether or not the person against whom it is commenced has committed a criminal offense, the prosecution so begun is without probable cause and is a malicious prosecution." 69. If a criminal prosecution be instituted against a person for the mere purpose of coercing him into payment of a debt, or the surrender of some right claimed, and not in the interest of public justice, or to vindicate the law and punish crime, the charge is falsely made. The fact that he procured the advice of counsel will not shield the party making the charge from the consequences of his wrongful act, done, not in good faith upon such advice, but with the sinister motive 153 10 Ex. (Eng.) 352 (1854). 154 13 Neb. 492 (1882). 155 Bouv. Law Dict. 156 26 Mich. 518 (1873). 15777 Ill. 603 (1875); 116 Ind. 146 (1888). of personal gain. But, where competent counsel is consulted, to whom the facts are fully explained by the party, who then acts in good faith and in honest belief that the party charged is, probably, guilty of the criminal offense, this advice of counsel will constitute a defense in an action for malicious prosecution, for the reason that it is assumed that the advice of counsel creates that probable cause without which the institution of a criminal prosecution against another cannot be tolerated. If counsel be sought simply for protection against indulging one's malice, or to enable him to use the criminal laws for unjust and oppressive uses for his private gain and advantage, it will afford no defense to the party causing the arrest, but will be rather an element of increased damages. 158 158 144 Ill. 83, 88 (1893), quoting from 69 Ill. 376 (1873) and 26 Ill. 259 (1861). THE LAW OF PROPERTY (PART 1) PROPERTY IN GENERAL-REAL AND PERSONAL 1. "There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.' So great is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it, not even for the general good of the community. The property of a person may be taken for public use, but not without just recompense; and no man or set of men may lawfully make use of, or interfere with, the property of another without his permission.' 2. The right of private property-the third of the absolute rights inherent in every person, the other two having been herein before treated-consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all one's acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.' 3. Property, in its strict sense, is the right which a person has to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of anything that can be the subject of ownership to the exclusion of all other persons. In the sense that it includes everything in 12 Black. Comm. 2. 2 3 Vr. (32 N. J.) 554 (1867). 31 Black. Comm. 138. For notice of copyright, see page immediately following the title page |