THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (PART 2) PARTIES TO CONTRACTS 1. It is a first principle that in whatever different capacities a person may act, he never can contract with himself nor maintain an action against himself. In a common-law court one cannot be both plaintiff and defendant in the same case,' even though on the one side he appear in a representative capacity;' and, as a contract is an obligation enforceable at law, it follows that there must be at least two parties to a contract. There may be any number of persons to a contract, so long as there are more than one and the number of parties, and who they are, is ascertained or ascertainable at the completion of the contract. A promise made to everybody is not a promise to any person; and a promise by a multitude, or an indefinite and unidentified number of individuals, to jointly do a particular thing, cannot be enforced.* An offer may be made generally, as in the case of a general offer of a reward, but to complete the contract it must be accepted by a definite party or parties. 2. The parties to a contract must exist; that is to say, if the party purport to be a natural person, he must be living. A contract with a fictitious person is void." In the case of an artificial person, such as a corporation, it must have a legal existence to entitle it to contract. It is also requisite to the validity of all contracts that the parties. thereto are legally capable of contracting. 16 Pick. (Mass.) 316 (1828). 2 76 Ill. 355 (1875). 358 N. Y. 425 (1874). 481 Fed. Rep. 282, 283 (1897). For notice of copyright, see page immediately following the title page Incapacity may result either from a physical or mental condition which excludes real consent, or it may result from a rule of the common law or a statute which prevents certain classes of individuals from entering into a binding agreement, or restricts or limits their powers in this respect. COMPETENCY INFANTS 3. An infant is a person under the age of twenty-one years.' This is the age at which, at common law, a minor, whether male or female, attained his or her majority; but the age selected is purely arbitrary, and, in a number of states, females reach their majority at eighteen. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the common-law rule prevails. 4. It is difficult to state a rule as to what contracts of an infant are void. The dicta in the early English decisions indicate that the criterion in each case was whether or not the transaction were beneficial to the infant, such transactions as were prejudicial to his interest being held null and void. In the practical application of this principle, however, so many contradictions are to be found that modern writers are inclined to abandon this test altogether. Most of the acts of infants are voidable only and not absolutely void; and it is deemed sufficient if the infant be allowed, when he attains maturity, the privilege to affirm or avoid in his discretion his acts done and contracts made in infancy. The distinction between an act that is voidable and one that is void is determined by arbitrary rules of law. A void act cannot be ratified by the infant on attaining majority." 5. The contracts of infants are, therefore, divided into three classes: (1) Those that are valid and bind the infant 7 Rapalje & Lawrence, Law Dict., Vol. 1, p. 650. 813 Mass. 237 (1816); 26 Am. Law Rev. 502 (1892). 92 Kent's Comm. 234. 103 Cr. C. C. (U. S.) 276 (1827) with or without his affirmance on attaining majority; (2) those that are void absolutely; and (3) those that are voidable and may be ratified by the infant on attaining majority. In this last class are included most of the ordinary cases of contract, the first two classes constituting, in a sense, exceptions to the more general rule. VALID CONTRACTS OF INFANTS 6. Legal Obligations. - Whatever an infant is bound to do by law, the same will bind him although he does it without suit at law." The authorities, says Lord Mansfield, are so express upon this point that it is unnecessary to cite instances. Thus he may join with his cotenants in making partition; he may pay rent; or if his acts take effect from an authority with which he is entrusted, as where he acts as an executor or trustee, he cannot disaffirm his acts which the law would compel him to perform." 7. Marriage. - Executed contracts of marriage by the common law, both in England and the United States, are as binding as if made by adults; at common law, the age of consent is fixed at twelve in females and fourteen in males." The statute laws of many of the states prohibit the issuing of a marriage license or wedding certificates to minors without the consent of their parents or guardians, under severe penalties. But the effect of these statutes is directory only, to prevent as far as possible the solemnization of such marriages, and their effect is not to render such marriages void, when duly solemnized." 8. Apprenticeship. - Binding himself as an apprentice for instruction in a useful art or trade has been considered an act beneficial to the infant, and, therefore, valid, if the wages be a fair compensation for his services and the contract contain no inequitable advantage to the master." Under the English decisions, the question whether the 11 Co. Litt. 172 a. 123 Bur. (Eng.) 1794, at p. 1,801 (1765). 131 Gray (Mass.) 119 (1854). 14 See The Law of Husband and Wife: Solemnization. 15 20 R. I. 147 (1897). provisions in a contract of apprenticeship be or be not equitable as regards the infant, depend largely upon whether they were at the time of the agreement common to labor contracts, or were, in the condition of trade then prevailing, such as the master might reasonably be justified in imposing as a protection to himself, and also upon whether the wages were a fair compensation.16 As stated in an English case, "it is plain that the contract by which an infant binds himself to learn an art or trade to his own future profit is prima facie valid and binding. But no doubt the law has engrafted on that general principle certain well-known and defined exceptions. It has been held from the time of Lord Coke that an infant cannot bind himself to be liable to a penalty; and the contract to impose a penalty on an infant is void. Again, it has been held, that a contract by which an infant renders his vested interest subject to forfeiture is void against the infant; and again, wherever you find extraordinary or unusual stipulations contained in a contract, either of apprenticeship or services, there the court at least must be on the watch lest the infant should be held to be bound by a contract which is not reasonable and which is not good in law."" Thus, an apprenticeship contract, which bound the infant apprentice to enter into no engagements without the master's permission, but did not in any corresponding way bind the master to provide engagements or employment for the apprentice, was held unreasonable and not binding. In England and most of the United States, there are statutes regulating the mode of binding apprentices which must be consulted for the details of the subject. An apprentice can be bound only by indenture; if the indenture be defective in not strictly complying with the statute, in some states, it is held voidable by the infant, and, in other states, absolutely void.18 163 Q. B. Div. (Eng.) 229 (1877); 12 Q. B. Div. (Eng.) 352 (1884); 45 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 430 (1890). 1745 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 430 (1890), by Lord Justice Fry. 18 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2d Ed.), Vol. 2, p. 489, Apprentices, citing 3 Esp. (Eng.) 188 (1800); 18 Conn. 337 (1847). 9. Enlistment. - Every citizen, whether of age to make contracts generally or not, if of sufficient capacity, is under obligation to render military service to the country when required, and is subject to draft for such service." What a minor can be compelled to do, he may contract to do voluntarily under the terms of a statute granting authority to enlist minors, and if he be lawfully subject to military duty and be lawfully called on to enlist, his contract of enlistment is as valid and binding as that of an adult."1 20 10. Necessaries. An infant is liable for the actual value of necessaries furnished to him. The word necessaries is not confined in its strict sense to such articles as are necessary to support life but extend to articles fit to maintain the particular person in the state, degree, and station of life in which he is.' 22 Lord Coke considered the necessaries of an infant to include victuals, clothing, medical attendance, and "good teaching or instruction whereby he may profit himself afterward." " 11. There is some dispute as to whether the infant is liable on his express contract for necessaries, or whether the vendor must sue on an implied assumpsit, but in either case the real consideration is open to inquiry; the infant is not bound to pay for the articles furnished more than they are really worth to him as articles of necessity, and, consequently, he is not precluded by the form of the contract from inquiring into the real value of the necessaries furnished." The burden of proving the existence of an actual necessity lies on the vendor of the articles in question; he contracts with an infant at his peril. It is the vendor's duty to acquaint himself with the infant's circumstances and necessities. Where the supply of an article otherwise necessary has been grossly excessive, the court may declare it, as a matter of law, inordinate." So, too, if the infant reside = 19:30 Conn. 438 (1862). 201 Mas. (U. S.) 71 (1816). 21 24 Pick. (Mass.) 227 (1836). 23 Co. Litt. 172 a. 242 Kent's Comm. 240. 256 W. & S. (Pa.) 80 (1843). 226 M. & W. (Eng.) 46 (1840); L. R. 4 Ex. (Eng.) 32 (1868). |