citizen in a presidential election is practically limited to a choice between two persons previously selected by party conventions. Theoretically, he may vote for any electors whose names he chooses to inscribe on his ballot. But any ballot, except for one of the two party nominations, is only an elaborate and inconvenient contrivance for throwing his vote away. The President is really appointed, in the alternative, by the party conventions; all the voter has to do with the matter is to vote for one or the other of these nominees, or to abstain from voting at all. It is true that, if the dissatisfaction with party nominations should be so extensive as to lead to a third, which should have strength enough to command the electoral vote of some State or States, the election might be thrown into the House of Representatives. But as that body is now constituted, the choice of the House, restricted by the Constitution to the three candidates who had received the highest electoral vote, would almost certainly devolve upon the regular nomination on the side to which the majority of the House belonged. It is too late to consider, and useless to discuss the wisdom, policy, or consistency with the true theory of republican government, of the departure from the constitutional method which has thus become established in practice; for it is not easy to see how it is now to be avoided. Nothing short of an amendment of the Constitution would be effectual, and no such amendment has yet been proposed, or, as far as can be discerned, is like to be.

But it still remains to be considered how the sense of the people can be most fairly ascertained, in the exercise of the very limited right of choice that is left

to them. For the last half century, and until Michigan introduced a change by recent legislative enactment, the electors, not only at large but for the Congressional districts, were chosen by general ticket in all the States. Consequently, though some or many such districts may give large majorities one way, if the aggregate majority in the State, however small, is the other way, that determines the choice of all its electors. And not only may the election be thus decided, but the large States, and often a single large State, obtain an almost absolute right of dictation in the nominating conventions of the respective parties. It not only decides which of the two nominees shall be elected, but determines beforehand who they shall be. It is regarded in practical politics, which constitutes nowadays the science of government, as fatal to the nomination of the most desirable and widely desired candidate, if it can be shown that the opposition, for whatever reason, of some relatively small faction in one of the large States, makes it doubtful whether he will obtain an aggregate majority there. The people of the other States, and indeed the majority of the people of that State, are therefore not only restricted in the election to the choice between the two party candidates, but they must submit to the dictation of perhaps a small minority in the selection of the candidates themselves. And it is considered as a grave objection to the nomination of any man that he lives in a small State. It is this condition of politics which has gradually drawn attention to the inquiry whether a change of the prevailing method of elections by general ticket, so far as the district electors are concerned, is not desirable.

In the consideration of this subject, it will be admitted to be of the first and last consequence that it should not be regarded from a party standpoint. The question presented is not strictly a constitutional one, since either method is consistent with the letter of that instrument. It is nevertheless a question of that nature, because it involves the expediency of an important and probably permanent change in the manner of the exercise by the people of a great constitutional function and right. Such topics are not within the proper domain of party politics. The Constitution, its methods, and its machinery form the common basis upon which all political action should rest. They cannot be wisely or safely dealt with upon partisan motives, nor for partisan purposes. A change that should be brought about by one party for its own benefit would be likely to be abrogated by the other, when in its turn, which is certain to come, it succeeds to power. Higher and more statesmanlike views-something of the patriotic spirit that inspired the authors of our Constitution, and brought all parties into harmony in its adoption—a fair and thoughtful consideration, looking not to personal or party advantage, but solely to the requirements of the general welfare, will be necessary to the just determination of questions of this character. Nor, indeed, if it were attempted to deal with this subject aside from its merits, and only in aid of the necessities of one or the other of the political parties, would it be possible to foresee which would be the ultimate or even the immediate gainer by the proposed change. Each would be likely to gain in some quarters, and to lose in others; to succeed in some elections, and to

fail in others. How the ultimate balance of profit and loss would adjust itself is beyond the reach of prophecy, and quite unworthy of consideration. It is from the point of view of neither party that the suggestions of this article are offered.

If, as seems probable, the election of President is to continue to be made through previously instructed electors, and thus substantially by a direct popular vote, the true question to be considered, as between the two methods of choice under discussion, is which of them most fairly gives expression to the will of the people. That under a republican form of government the majority must control, is universally conceded. But what does the term majority really mean? Is it the aggregate majority of the entire people of the United States, or is it the majority in such political sub-divisions of the country as it is found expedient to create? And if the latter, what shall those subdivisions be? The most strenuous advocate of the majority rule would not agree to an amendment of the Constitution which should provide that the election of President should be determined by the aggregate vote in all the States of the Union, so that the candidate should be elected who upon a count of the whole received the greatest number of votes. Many Presidents have been elected who upon such a computation would have been defeated. They have been chosen by a minority of the vote cast, over competitors who have received a majority. A dozen votes in the right place may thus overrule many thousands in other places; and a President may be elected against the expressed will of the larger proportion of the people over whom he is called to preside. Such a result

is entirely in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The same thing constantly takes place in the election of the State legislatures; the vote being by districts, a political majority of one or both houses is frequently chosen, when the aggregate vote of the State is stronger the other way; while if the legislative body had been elected upon general ticket, it would have been unanimously the opposite, politically, to what it is. By legislatures thus chosen, Senators of the United States are often elected from a party which in the whole State is in a minority. Yet both legislatures and Senators act for the entire State, whose majority is thus overruled. So in the election of members of Congress; in most of the States large enough to have more than one district, the members are divided between the political organizations, though if elected by general ticket they would all belong to the same. It has never been claimed that in any of these cases the will of the majority is in any proper sense defeated, or that a minority has been permitted to determine the elections. These illustrations show that under our Constitution, as in all systems of free government, the term majority has a relative or qualified meaning, and refers, not to an absolute preponderance of the entire popular vote, but to a majority in the municipal sub-divisions, great or small, within and for which the election takes place. That is to say, that the people govern by representation, and not in mass; indirectly, not directly.

It is not true, under the spirit or by the letter of the American Constitution, that minorities have no rights which majorities are bound to respect. If that were so, one section of the country might speedily take