on the national government as against the citizens generally, since I have already dealt with the limitations on its powers as against the States. Here a remarkable divergence from the American Constitution is disclosed. When that instrument was enacted, the keenest suspicion and jealousy was felt of the action of the government to be established under it. It was feared that Congress might become an illiberal oligarchy and the President a new George III. Accordingly great pains were taken to debar Congress from doing anything which could infringe the primordial human rights of the citizen. Some restrictions are contained in the original Constitution; others fill the first nine amendments which were passed two or three years later, as a part of the arrangements by which the acceptance of the Constitution was secured. And down till our own time every state constitution in America has continued to contain a similar "Bill of Rights" for the protection of the citizens against abuse of legislative power. The English, however, have completely forgotten these old suspicions which, when they did exist, attached to the crown and not to the legislature. So when Englishmen in Canada or Australia enact new constitutions, they take no heed of such matters, and make their legislature as like the omnipotent Parliament of Britain as they can. The Canadian Constitution leaves the dominion Parliament unfettered save by the direction (sect. 54) that money shall not be appropriated to any purpose that has not been recommended to the House of Commons by the executive, a direction embodying English practice, and now adopted by Australia also. And the Australian Constitution contains but one provision which recalls the old-fashioned Bill of Rights, viz., that which forbids the Commonwealth to "make any law for establishing any religion or for imposing any religious observance or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion." The Swiss Constitution, influenced by French and American models, is in this respect more archaic, for it imposes a series of disabilities on its legislature in the interest of individual freedom (sectt. 39, 49, 54-59). This diversity of attitude between the English on the one hand and both the Americans and the Swiss on the other is a curious instance of the way in which usage and tradition mould a nation's mind. Parliament was for so long a time the protector of Englishmen against an arbitrary executive that they did not form the habit of taking precautions against the abuse of the powers of the legislature; and their struggles for a fuller freedom took the form of making Parliament a more truly popular and representative body, not that of restricting its authority.

The point just examined is one which arises in all rigid constitutions, whether federal or unitary. But the next point is one with which only federations are concerned; and it is one in which all the great federations agree. All have adopted the same method of providing both for the predominance of the majority of the people considered as one nation, and for the maintenance of the rights of the States considered as distinct communities. The Americans invented this method; the Swiss, the Canadians, the Germans, and now the Australians have imitated them. This method is to divide the legislature into two houses, using one to represent the whole people on the basis of numbers, and using the other to represent the several States on the basis (except in Germany) of their equality as autonomous communities. It was this device that made federation possible in the United States, for the smaller States would not have foregone their independence in reliance upon any weaker guarantee.

The Australian scheme provides (sectt. 7-23) for an Upper House or Senate of thirty-six members, six from each State, and a House of Representatives (sectt. 24-40) of seventy-five members, elected on a basis of population, so that forty-nine members will come from the two large States, New South Wales and Victoria,— and twenty-six from the four small States. No original State is ever to have less than five.

. The equal representation of the six original States is always to be maintained, but the number of senators may be increased, and when new States come to be formed, the Parliament may allot to them such number of senators as it thinks fit. Senators sit for six years, and do not all retire at the same time. These features are taken from the Constitution of the United States, which, as already observed, has been a model for subsequent federal upper houses. But there are remarkable variations in the Australian scheme.

1. In the United States each newly created State receives as a matter of right its two senators. In Australia the Commonwealth may allot such number as it thinks fit.

2. In the United States one-third of the Senate retires every two years. In Australia one-half retires every three years.

3. In the United States the president of the Senate is the VicePresident of the United States, chosen by the people. In Australia, the Senate is to choose its own President.

4. In the United States the quorum is one more than a half of the total number; in Australia one-third of the total number.

5. In the United States the legislatures of the several States elect the senators. In Australia the senators are elected by the people of the State.

This last point is one of great interest. Tocqueville, writing in 1832, attributed (erroneously, as the sequel has shown) the excellence of the American Senate to the method of election by the state legislatures. Since his days the American Senate has declined, and so far from this mode of election having tended to sustain its character, the general, though not unanimous, opinion of the wise in America deems the Senate to be injured by it, and desires a change to the method of election by direct popular vote. It was partly because the Australian convention had become aware of this tendency of American opinion that they rejected the existing American plan; nor is it impossible that the Americans themselves may alter their system, which gives greater opportunities for intrigue and the use of money than popular election would be likely to afford. In Australia, the senators are in the first instance to be elected by the people, each State voting as one electorate, but this may be altered (e.g. to a system of district elections) by the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or failing its action, by the Parliament of a State. It will be interesting to see what experiments are tried and how they work. District voting may give different results from a general state vote, and a party for the moment dominant may choose the plan that best suits it.

6. In the United States the Senate is an undying body, perpetually renewed by fresh elections, never losing more than one-third of its members at any one time. In Australia the Senate may be dissolved in case a deadlock should arise between it and the House of Representatives.

The Senate is the sheet-anchor of the four small States. Commanding a majority in it, they have consented to acquiesce in the great preponderance which their two larger neighbors possess in the House of Representatives. The numbers of the latter House are to be always as nearly as practicable double those of the Senate, a point whose importance will presently appear.

The House is to continue for three years (subject, of course, to dissolution), a term intermediate, though inclining in the democratic direction, between the two years of the American Congress and the seven (practically six) years of the British House of Commons. The Canadian term is five years. Until the commonwealth Parliament otherwise provides, the electoral suffrage is to be (as in the United States) the suffrage prescribed by state law

for the election of members of the more numerous state house, and it is expressly provided, doubtless with a view to the fact that women's suffrage already exists in two colonies, that no law shall prevent a state voter from voting at commonwealth elections. So far from securing, as does the United States Constitution, that no person shall be excluded on the ground of race from the suffrage, Australia has expressly provided that persons belonging to a particular race may be excluded, for she declares (sect. 25) that in such cases the excluded race is not to be reckoned among the population of the State for the purposes of an allotment of representatives. Plural voting is forbidden. The quorum of members is a mean between the inconveniently large quorum (one-half) of the American, and the very small one (forty) of the British House. The seat of any senator or member of the House becomes ipso facto vacant if he fails (without permission) to attend any session for two continuous months. No person having any pecuniary interest in any agreement with the public service (except as member of an incorporated company of at least twenty-five persons), or holding any office of profit under the crown, can sit in either house, unless he be a minister either of the Commonwealth or of a State. The exception is noteworthy, not only because it is framed with a view to the establishment of Cabinet government, but also because it implies that a man may, contrary to American and Canadian usage, be at the same time both an executive official of a State and also a member of the federal legislature. It would appear that women are eligible to membership of either house. Every senator and representative is to receive a salary, fixed for the present at £400 ($2000) a year.

84. The Federal Executive

The executive is to consist of the governor-general and the ministers. To the great convenience of the Australian people, the head of the executive does not need to be elected either by popular vote (as in the United States) or by the Chambers, as in France and Switzerland. He is nominated by the British crown, and holds office so long as the crown pleases, receiving a salary fixed, for the present at £10,000 ($50,000) a year (exactly the salary of the American President). He has an executive council, modelled on the British Privy Council (though the name Privy Council is not used as it is in the Canadian Constitution), and from it he chooses a number of ministers (fixed for the present at seven), who are to

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administer the several departments of the public service. They must be members of one or other House of Parliament remarkable provision, for though this is a British practice, that practice has never been embodied in any positive rule. As the governor-general is only a constitutional figurehead, these ministers will in fact constitute the ruling executive of the Commonwealth.

$5. The Federal High Court

The judiciary is to consist in the first instance of a federal high court (containing a chief justice and at least two other judges) capable of exercising both original jurisdiction in certain sets of cases, and also appellate jurisdiction not only from single federal judges and inferior federal courts, but also from the supreme courts of the States. Power is taken both to establish lower federal courts and to invest state courts with federal jurisdiction. But besides this judiciary proper, there is created a second court for dealing with cases relating to trade and commerce, under the name of the Inter-State Commission (sect. 101). This remarkable and very important institution has doubtless been suggested by the United States Inter-State Commerce Commission created by Congress some eighteen years ago in order to deal with railway and water traffic between the States. Its functions will be half-administrative, halfjudicial, and in questions of pure law an appeal will lie from it to the high court, while a guarantee for its independence is found in the clause which declares that its members shall not be removed during their seven years' term of office. All federal judges are to be appointed by the governor-general, that is to say, by the executive ministry. All trials (on indictment) for any offence against the laws of the Commonwealth shall be by jury, and held in the State where the alleged offence was committed. The judicial establishments of the States remain unaffected, and the judges thereof will continue to be appointed by the state executives.

In determining the functions of the high court there arose an important question which seemed for a moment to threaten the whole scheme of federation. The draft constitution, which the convention had prepared and which the people had approved by their vote, provided that questions arising on the interpretation of the Constitution as to the respective limits of the powers of the Commonwealth and of the States, or as to the respective limits of the constitutional powers of any two or more States, should be adjudicated upon by the high court of the Commonwealth, and