I feel a deep regret, and especially for one of them, who appears to have been animated rather by a zeal for the cause which he has unhappily espoused than by the more unworthy motive of enriching himself by the plunder of his fellow-citizens. It is deeply to be regretted that the courage and willingness to sacrifice himself for the benefit of his associates, slight glimpses of which have been revealed by the evidence, have been wasted on an enterprise which is as indefensible in morals, or even under any political theory ever proclaimed by the advocates of secession, as it is criminal in law. The jury found the defendants guilty. Sentence imposing both fine and imprisonment was pronounced upon them. Rubery was subsequently pardoned by President Lincoln, at the request of "our good friend," John Bright, of England. The other defendants were subsequently, during the attendance of Mr. Justice Field upon the Supreme Court, at Washington, brought before District Judge Hoffman, sitting in the Circuit Court, on habeas corpus, and released from imprisonment upon taking the oath prescribed in the proclamation of President Lincoln, issued after their sentence, and upon giving bond for their future good behavior. The opinions deliveredin that case, and on the application of the officers and crew of the U. S. Ship Cyane, for a share of the proceeds of the Schooner Chapman, are appended. IN RE RIDGELEY GREATHOUSE ON HABEAS CORPUS: CIRCUIT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. 1. JURISDICTION.--The court has jurisdiction to inquire into the legality of the imprisonment of a person held under its own sentence. 2. Amnesty PROCLAMATION.-The proclamation of the President of December 8, 1863, extends to persons who at its date had been convicted and sentenced for the offenses described in it. The proclamation embraces not only rebels in arms or in a situation to injure the government, but also such as are already arrested and incarcerated. It is the duty of the court to construe the proclamation like any other public act or law, and to apply to it the well settled rules of interpretation, irrespective of any opinion, or even knowledge, of the private but unexpressed intentions of its author. A prisoner confined under a legal sentence can voluntarily accept a conditional pardon. Before HOFFMAN, District Judge. Opinion of the Court-Hoffman, J. [February, Alexander Campbell and Delos Lake, for petitioner. W. H. Sharp, United States Attorney for U. S. HOFFMAN, J. A writ of habeas corpus is applied for on the part of Ridgeley Greathouse, a prisoner now in execution under the judgment and sentence of this court for the crime of engaging in and giving aid and comfort to the existing rebellion. The legality of the conviction and sentence is not denied; but it is claimed that the prisoner is entitled to his discharge under the proclamation of the President, of December 8, 1863. The application is resisted by the district attorney on two grounds: First. That the court has no jurisdiction to award the writ or discharge the prisoner, even though it be clear that he is within the terms of the proclamation, and, Second. That the proclamation does not apply to his and similar cases. 1. As to the jurisdiction of the court. The authority of the courts of the United States and of the judges thereof to issue writs of habeas corpus, is derived from the fourteenth section of the act of September 24, 1789. That section provides that "either of the justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. Provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in jail, unless where they are in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or committed for trial before some court of the same, or necessary to be brought into court to testify." It is contended by the district attorney that the authority here given does not embrace cases where a prisoner is in custody under conviction and sentence. That the court, when sentence is pronounced, is functus officio, and has no further power over the case; that the marshal's return that he holds the prisoner by virtue of such conviction and 1864.] Opinion of the Court-Hoffman, J. sentence is conclusive; and that even a special pardon issued to the prisoner cannot be set up in answer to it. For this position no authority is cited. It will be seen that, if correct, it would be the duty of the court to remand a prisoner to undergo execution of a capital sentence, even though he should produce a full and free pardon by the President, under the great seal of State. Even this result the district attorney did not hesitate to admit to be the necessary consequence of the principle contended for. The terms of the statute embrace, it will be observed, all cases of commitment-and the proviso by implication includes not only cases of commitment for trial before some court of the United States, but also all cases where persons are in jail under or by color of the authority of the United States. It is evident that this language extends to all persons imprisoned under the authority of the United States, whether under the judgment of a court or the warrant of a committing magistrate. The duty of the court, on the return of the writ, is plain. If it appear that the prisoner is held by virtue of a warrant issued by a competent officer, or by the judgment and sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction, he will be remanded. But if it appear that though the original commitment was lawful, yet, that in consequence of some subsequent event, his further detention is no longer lawful, he will be discharged. Thus, if he be committed until he pay a fine, which he has paid accordingly, and the return states the commitment only, the court will inquire into the fact and release the prisoner. "So, after a conviction, he may allege a pardon, or that the judgment under which he was imprisoned has been reversed." (1 Hill, 404.) In The People v. Cassel (5 Hill, 167), Judge Bronson says: "The officers may also inquire whether any cause has arisen since the commitment for putting an end to the imprisonment, as a pardon, reversal of the judgment, payment of the fine, and the like." That the court does not become, by passing sentence, functus officio, to all intents and purposes, is evident from the consideration that it is by virtue of the authority of the Opinion of the Court-Hoffman, J. [February, court and by force of its sentence that the prisoner is detained; and even when he has obtained a conditional pardon and been discharged, yet, if he violate the condition, he may be re-arrested and remanded by the court in execution of the original sentence. But the point is authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Ex parte Wells, a motion was made in the Circuit Court for a habeas corpus on behalf of Wells, a prisoner convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but who had been pardoned by the President, upon condition that he be imprisoned during his natural life. Under this pardon, the prisoner claimed to be entitled to his discharge. The application was refused by the Circuit Court, and came before the Supreme Court by way of appeal. The questions debated were, whether the Supreme Court was not, in entertaining the application, exercising an original, instead of the appellate jurisdiction to which, in such cases, the Constitution restricts it; and, secondly, as to the force and effect of the pardon and the legality of an imprisonment by virtue of the condition contained in it, and the prisoner's acceptance of it. It was held that the jurisdiction invoked was an appellate jurisdiction; and that the imprisonment pursuant to the condition of the pardon was legal. But no doubt seems to have been suggested-either by the court or at the bar-of the authority of the Circuit Court to award the writ; nor of that of the Supreme Court, provided the jurisdiction exercised was appellate and not original. In Ex parte Watkins (7 Peters, 568), the court awarded the writ in the case of a person convicted of offenses against the United States, and sentenced to imprisonment and the payment of fines. It is nowhere suggested, in the case, that the authority of the Circuit Court, or that of the Supreme Court (if the jurisdiction was to be deemed appellate) to inquire into the force. and effect of the sentence, and the legality of a further imprisonment under it, was open to controversy. It is plain, from the foregoing, that it is the right and duty of the court in this case to inquire into the cause of commitment of the prisoner, and that if he is held by virtue of the 1864.] Opinion of the Court-Hoffman, J. sentence of this court, to ascertain and decide whether, by reason of any matter subsequent thereto, such as the payment of his fine, the expiration of his term of imprisonment, a pardon, or the like, he is now entitled to be discharged. 2. The pardon whereby it is claimed that the sentence of the prisoner is avoided is contained in the proclamation of the President of December 8, 1863. The part requisite to consider is as follows: "Therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare and make known to all persons. who have directly or by implication participated in the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted, that a full pardon is granted to them, and each of them, with restoration of all rights, if third parties shall have intervened, and upon the condition that every such person shall take and subscribe an oath, and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath, and which oath shall be registered for permanent preservation, and shall be of the tenor and effect following, to wit," etc. The authority of the President to grant an effectual pardon to all persons embraced within the terms of this proclamation is not disputed. It is derived from the power confided to him by the Constitution, and in this case is exercised in pursuance, as the preamble recites, of an express authority given by Congress to the President, "to extend by proclamation to all persons who may have participated in the existing rebellion in any State, or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions, and at such terms, and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare." The pardon and amnesty thus proclaimed is, therefore, a public and official act, of which the court will take judicial notice, and it corresponds to a class of pardons well known in England, pardons by act of parliament. Nor is it disputed that the crime described in the proclamation is the same crime as that whereof the prisoner has been convicted. The language of the proclamation is: "All persons who have directly, or by implication, participated in the existing rebellion." 1281 |