clause one hundred and fifteen, which says: "The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion or for imposing any religious observance or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth."

It has already been mentioned that after the enactment of the Commonwealth Bill by the Imperial Parliament the Queen's proclamation is necessary to formally establish the Union. This must issue within twelve months. It will take the form of declaring "that the people of"-the colonies which have adopted the constitution-"shall be united in a Federal Commonwealth under the name of 'The Commonwealth of Australia.'" And the colonies which may adopt the constitution and enter the federation as original states are the seven pure British colonies of New South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, West Australia and South Australia, all of which, although differing widely in population, wealth and resources, stand abreast in political development and the enjoyment of responsible parliamentary government. Fiji, for example, a tropical crown colony, with a predominating colored population, although usually treated as within the Australian group, is excluded. New Zealand and West Australia are willing, but hesitate to come in, and at the moment of writing exhibit considerable apprehension at the prospect of being left out. New Zealand is separated from Australia by 1,200 miles of sea-put by Sir George Grey as 1,200 reasons against its entering the Union.

The United States Constitution, to which Lord Rosebery not long since applied the epithlet "matchless," was, speaking generally, the model upon which the framers of the Commonwealth Bill proceeded. Indeed they have been recently accused by a Canadian constitutional writer of being enslaved, not only by the form, but by the very nomenclature of America. He reproached them for having preferred "Commonwealth" with, as was said, "its decidedly American flavour" as the designation of the federated state, to "Dominion" the Canadian appellation, and the term "States" as descriptive of the constituent parts of the Union to

the old name "Colonies," and the same writer professed to regard as most deplorable of all, the use of "House of Representatives" as the name of the popular or more numerous branch of the legislature instead of House of Commons. It is difficult to appreciate the restricted view which consoles itself with narrow hypercriticism of this kind. "Commonwealth" has a Cromwellian and typically English rather than American, flavor, but although many would be satisfied with a word associated with in many respects as glorious a period as any known to the history of England, yet its choice was due rather to the fact that it was a good wholesome Anglo-Saxon word, expressive of the political union best calculated to promote the commonwealth. "House of Commons" is an absurdity used of any representative assembly out of England, whether in Canada or elsewhere. Its appropriateness is indigenous to the country whose history gave it its origin and peculiar significance. It cannot be transplanted. There is and can be only one House of Commons. And if the House of Representatives is prescriptively American, it is equally applicable here, and we appropriate it with due and grateful acknowledgment.

A prevailing dominance of the central power is the characteristic mark of the Canadian Union. The centralization idea, and the subordination of the constituent provinces, is conspicuous throughout the Canadian system. It was very early seen that this would not be tolerated in Australia. The autonomy and dignity of the individual colonies, it was insisted, must be preserved to the fullest extent compatible with the establishment of the Union. No diminution in their powers was to be permitted except so far as was indispensable to the efficiency of the federation, and in respect of those large matters of common national concern, which could only be effectually dealt with by the central authority. The colonies wanted absorption as little as a precarious alliance under the name of federation. For this the United States gave us warrant and precedent. In Canada it is the powers of the provinces that are specified and limited, whilst all other powers-everything that is not confided to the provinces -is entrusted to the Dominion. The opposite method was pursued in America. The States retain all powers not expressly

given up, while the federal authority is entrusted only with certain selected and definite powers necessarily large, numerous, and far-reaching because they are national, but leaving what may be termed the undefined residue with the States. Australia follows the United States, and holds firmly by the principle of dual citizenship. Not only are the powers devolved upon the central authority specifically set out, but it is explicitly declared that "the powers, privileges and territories of the existing Colonies shall remain intact except in respect of such Surrenders as may be agreed upon to secure uniformity of law and administration of matters of common concern." It is obvious and generally admitted that far fewer questions are likely to arise for legal determination as between the federal and State legislatures in relation to their respective powers under the United States and Australian method than in Canada. The temptation to the central power in Canada to bring everything into its net is naturally great, and the power of the provinces to resist is necessarily lessened by the embarrassment of a specific enumeration of their own powers which, subject only to Imperial control, had previously been, as regarded their own concerns, unlimited. Unlike the British North American Act the Australian Commonwealth Bill in no way interferes or permits interference with the constitutions of the respective states. The governors also of the respective colonies will continue to be appointed by the Crown as heretofore, unless the colonies themselves, with the approval of the Imperial authority, should hereafter legislate for some different method of appointment-election, for example, by the vote of the people. Elective governors are as yet unknown to British dominions. In Canada, on the other hand, the lieutenant-governors of the provinces are appointed by the Governor-General upon the advice of his ministers. Difficulty, therefore, has arisen there as to whether lieutenant-governors are the representatives of Her Majesty or merely officers of the federal authority. A problem of this kind can never arise in Australia. Then again in Canada the Governor-General possesses the power of vetoing provincial legislation. The existence of such a power renders a federal judiciary on the model of that of the United States less essential in Canada, where in point of fact a true federal

judiciary does not properly exist. In Australia there is no such veto, and therefore, where provincial legislation may be thought to conflict with federal legislation, policy or interest, the Federal High Court alone can solve or adjust the dispute. The omission of this power of veto from the Australian measure was not due to any jealousy of the federal power, or because the omission would leave greater freedom of action to the state, but simply because the colonies would never consent to give this power of veto to the Governor-General and his ministers. It remains so far as regards state legislation, equally with federal legislation, as it always has done, with the Queen and subject thereto with the Federal High Court, which, like the Supreme Court of the United States, is the constitutional tribunal to decide upon any conflict of legislative jurisdiction between the federal and state parliaments. Moreover, the governors of the states may communicate directly with the Crown as hitherto, whereas in Canada the Governor-General alone is the channel of official correspondence. It is no doubt probable that as time goes on the state legislatures may undergo changes and limitations not only in their powers, but in the number of chambers and the number of members of which they consist. This may arise both from economical considerations and the natural accretion of power to the more powerful central government, but the point to be observed at present is that the Commonwealth Bill leaves all this to the growth of time, and constitutional development, recognizing that, subject thereto, the status of the separate colonies should be undisturbed as far as possible. A further point of difference lies in the fact that the members of the Canadian Senate are nominated by the Governor-General for life—practically a ministerial nomination. The effect is to render the Canadian Senate an anomaly and an absurdity, and to reduce it to a position of weakness, if not impotence, in the legislative organism of the Dominion. It is notorious that the Canadian Senate has become for all governing purposes a valueless institution. In Australia the Senate, resting upon the same franchise as the House of Representatives, is strong with the strength derived from the direct vote of a free people, and can never cease to exercise a potent influence in the state unless through folly, abuse of its

functions, or a betrayal of the interests confided to it by its constituents. According to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Bank of Toronto vs. Lambe, the Canadian is "a carefully balanced constitution under which no one of the parts can pass laws for itself except under the control of the whole acting through the Governor-General." This expresses a constitutional position the very reverse of that under which the people of Australia have consented to live.

The substance of the Australian Commonwealth Bill divides itself generally into two main parts-one embodying the constitution strictly so called, and the other the bargain or business arrangement between the separate states upon the basis of which they agree to unite. The constitution may be further divided into the various provisions dealing with the legislative, the executive, and the judicial powers. The Queen, the Senate, and the House of Representatives constitute the Parliament, and must concur in legislation. As in the United States, the Senate represents or expresses the federal principle, namely the equality of the individual states, and, therefore, like the American, is founded on the principle of equal representation for each state. This was not yielded by the more populous colonies, any more than by the larger States in 1787, without a prolonged and severe struggle. Without it there would have been no federation. There are, however, broad and vital distinctions between the American and the Australian Senate. In the first place, the conspicuous feature in the Australian Constitution-affecting not the Senate alone, but every other part of it—is the direct influence and power exerted by the people upon their representative men and governing bodies. No conventions or other political buffermachines have any place in the Australian system, nor can any such contrivances interpose between electors and elected. The Australian Constitution, it may be convenient to say here, is essentially more democratic than the American. It is a people's constitution if ever there was one. All power in the ultimate resort rests not theoretically but actually with the people. They elect the Senate, equally with the House of Representatives, by direct vote upon the same suffrage-in South Australia by adult suffrage-women having the franchise as well as men; in the