was before the House of Commons, there was a motion at committee stage for the taking of a religious census. It was proposed by Lord Hugh Cecil, a persistent advocate of Church of England interests in the House. It was opposed by non-conformist members, and in particular by the members from Wales, on the ground that such a census, unless it were based on communicant members of the different religious bodies, would be misleading, and that it was not worth while to create bitterness and acrimony for the sake of a return based on any less reliable test. The motion to add this to the list of questions embodied in the census form, which received no support from the Government, was rejected without a division. The cost of the war in South Africa is being defrayed partly by increased taxation and partly by loans. According to a statement laid before the House of Commons by Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 5th of August, the war was then estimated to cost £69,323,000. Of this sum, £25,460,000 is to come out of current revenue, and £43,863,000 had been or was at that time about to be raised by loans. New or increased taxation to meet the increased expenditure was authorized by Parliament in March, in the Finance Act for 1900-01. The only new tax was a stamp duty of one shilling on contract notes covering transactions on the produce exchanges. An addition of one shilling a barrel was made to the duty on beer, an addition of sixpence per gallon to the duty on spirits; an addition of fourpence per pound to the duty on tobacco; an addition of sixpence per pound to the duty on foreign cigars; and an addition of twopence per pound to the duty on tea. The income tax, which since Sir William Harcourt's budget of 1894, has been payable on incomes over £160, and has stood at eightpence in the pound, was advanced to one shilling. As a means of reducing expenditure for the current year, Parliament also authorized the suspension of the payment of the national debt, a suspension which will reduce the expenditure by £4,640,000. Farmington, Conn. EDWARD PORRITT. The Classification of Monopolies and Combinations. Professor Richard T. Ely, in his recent work on "Monopolies and Trusts," devotes one chapter to "the classification and causes of monopolies." He finds that "what we need here, as elsewhere in the scientific and popular discussions of economic problems, is analysis, for the tendency in discussion of both kinds is to gen eralize too hastily." He further observes that the "classification of monopolies is not only based upon their causes, but reveals their causes." Of the seven classifications which the author offers for consideration, the second in order, based upon the source of monopoly power, is the most significant: A. SOCIAL MONOPOLIES. I. GENERAL WELFARE MONOPOLIES. I. Patents. 2. Copy-rights. 3. Public Consumption Monopolies. 5. Fiscal Monopolies. II. SPECIAL PRIVILEGE MONOPOLIES. I. Those based on public favoritism. 2. Those based on private favoritism. B.-NATURAL MONOPOLIES. I. THOSE ARISING FROM A LIMITED SUPPLY OF RAW MATERIAL. BUSINESS. III. THOSE ARISING FROM SECRECY. Ely makes the following clear distinction between the social and the natural monopolies: "A social monopoly is a monopoly which arises out of social arrangements, and is an expression of the will of society as a whole, through government, or of a section of society strong enough to impose its will on society. A natural monopoly, on the other hand, is a monopoly which rests back on natural arrangements as distinguished from social arrangements." Ely then compares his own important contribution to the work of classification with that of Senior, Lexis, Patten and Johnson, Jenks and Bullock. It may prove of value to continue the comparison still further and include the original and striking classification of combinations as given by Robert Liefmann in his work entitled "Die Unternehmerverbände.1 It should be remarked at this point that Ely has, to use his own words, "expressed the conviction that combination itself cannot produce monopoly." Whether one agrees with the above conviction or not, there can hardly be doubt that a comparison of these two classifications, each the most searching 'Die Unternehmerverbände: Freiburg i. B.; J. C. B. Mohr, 1897. from its own especial standpoint yet contributed by economic analysis, will prove both helpful and interesting. Liefmann writes with German industrial conditions primarily in view, and consequently he sharply distinguishes the combination (Verbände), from the association (Verein) on the one hand, and from the company (Gesellschaft) on the other. In his analysis of the combination, he first calls attention to the fact that with the introduction of a medium of exchange, all tradesmen naturally fall into two classes, viz., (1) sellers, and (2) buyers. Buyers as well as sellers form combinations and indeed the same group is at one moment in the one class and at the next in the other. Each individual and each economic group is constantly aiming to obtain the maximum profits. Under these cir- . cumstances Liefmann inquires, how does this constant effort to win the maximum profits operate when considered in relation to the three forms of exchange which Menger has enumerated in his "Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre." These forms are: (1) the sale of an indivisible quantity of a monopolized commodity; (2) the sale of a divisible quantity of a monopolized commodity; and (3) the sale of a divisible quantity of a commodity under competitive conditions. In the first case, the seller goes alone to the market and disposes of his goods to the highest bidder. Here the maximum price and the maximum profits are identical. As a term to designate this form of economic effort Liefmann suggests "price regulation" (Preispolitik). In the second case, the possessor not of an indivisible, but of divisible quantities of monopolized commodities, will naturally seek for the highest possible profits. He would fail in his purpose were he to put the whole amount of his supply on the market at once. Hence he places on the market at first only a small portion of the whole, then another small part, and so continues to adjust his offer to the demand as to obtain in the end the maximum profits. That is, he must adopt a rational policy of supplying the market. This policy Liefmann names a "regulation of the supply" (Angebotspolitik). Where one's goods are in the form of money, this would be termed a "regulation of the demand" (Nachfragepolitik). The third case is the more usual one. The competitors in the market prevent the seller of marketable goods from obtaining the highest possible profits. Hence arises the attempt to suppress competition and secure a monopoly. According to Liefmann's analysis there are two and only two methods of obtaining a monopoly: (1) state help, such as the protective tariff, patents, etc. But, since a monopoly granted by the state is limited or may be limited either in extent of territory or duration of time, naturally sooner or later the competitors turn to (2) mutual help, or combinations (Verbände). Instead of destroying their competitors, the members of a combination associate with them. To secure a monopoly without removing the competitors from the field, is the essential characteristic of a combination. The combination may serve any of the objects which the individual in a state of free competition is constantly striving for, viz., (1) the attainment of the highest possible price; (2) the possibility of a rational supply policy; (3) the creation of a monopoly for each contracting member, or it may be for each group of such. The work which a combination seeks to accomplish determines its form, therefore to correspond with the three lines of effort into which the work of economic groups has been classified above, there are three fundamental forms of the combination, viz: I. The combination for the purpose of a common price policy; 2. The combination for the purpose of a common supply policy (considered from the standpoint of the buyer, a demand policy); 3. The combination for the purpose of a common monopoly policy. Since each of these three forms can be established by buyers as well as sellers, we have two classes for each form:— A. BUYERS' COMBINATIONS. The combination of buyers serves only for the purpose of a common price and common demand policy. Combinations for the purpose of a common monopoly policy are rarely formed, since buyers seldom realize the existence. of competition among themselves and therefore do not attempt to remove it. As buyers they are opposed to two classes, (1) the producer of the raw and partially worked material, and (2) the laborer. Against these they form combinations for both price and demand regulation. B. SELLERS' COMBINATIONS. The combinations of the undertakers as sellers, Liefmann designates as "Die Kartelle." Combinations of this sort are formed to correspond with all three of the ground forms. But this purpose can be accomplished in either of two ways: (1) There may be a combination of individual members whose economic freedom is limited by the agreement in respect to a single point only, naturally for all in the same way, as for example, in the establishment of a price; (2) there may be a combination of the contracting parties in their collective capacity, through which the agreement is effected and which then fixes the relation of the individual to the combination, as, for example, to establish the total output and then apportion to the individual his share. Liefmann calls a combination of the first sort a limiting combination (beschränkende Kartelle) because it limits the individual in his economic activity in a determinate point; the combinations of the second sort, sharing combinations (verteilende Kartelle), because they are formed by the whole body and the total production, the total demand or the total profits are shared by the members. The first is called a combination of the lower order, the last of the higher order, because the last requires the stronger organization. Both groups have three sub-classes according as they are formed for the purpose of controlling prices, regulating the supply or the creation of a monopoly. Hence the classification:: I.-Combinations of the Undertakers as buyers: (1) against the laborer for the purpose of controlling the demand for labor and the rate of wages; (2) against the producers of raw material for the purpose of controlling the demand and prices. II. Combinations of the Undertakers as sellers: A [lower order] Limiting syndicates (1) for the purpose of controlling the supply; B. [higher order] Sharing syndicates (1) for the purpose of pro-rating the production; A comparison of these two classifications makes it evident that Professor Ely has been largely influenced by American conditions, Liefmann by German. In Germany, agreements for fixing prices, controlling the market, or dividing the profits have been held to be legitimate contracts enforceable at law. In the United States, on the contrary, such contracts have not only been declared illegal at the common law but, in addition, have been the subject of stringent anti-trusts legislation in nearly one-half of the states of the Union. Consequently, while our anti-trust legislation has proved no bar to monopoly, it has changed the form of the monopoly. Our monop |