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canal under the control of the leading maritime powers of the world and providing for its permanent neutralization through international agreement. He contended that such artificial channels should be free like straits and other natural bodies of water and ought to be held in trust for mankind. Furthermore, the spirit of concession and regard for the public opinion of the world were strong enough to secure the accomplishment of this worthy purpose through the joint action of the great commercial powers. Indeed, it was the true policy of the United States to unite with other powers in promoting the establishment of means for free and unrestricted communication among the nations of the world. For her to refuse such coöperation and seek an isolated and unsocial policy would prevent the attainment of her true destiny.1

Although denied the unqualified endorsement of the government, these views and the generous offer of New Grenada were the most influential factors in facilitating the conclusion of the treaty of 1846. By its terms the United States undertook to guarantee efficaciously the neutrality of the isthmus and also New Grenada's rights of property and sovereignty in the same.2 This was a wide departure from the early practice of the United States respecting foreign alliances. Yet much of the old opposition to such arrangements still remained. Proof of this is found in the effort which the government made to show that the treaty in question did not, in fact, constitute an alliance. In communicating the treaty to the Senate the President stated that the guarantee only extended to a single province and was not made for political but for commercial reasons. The United States also had a greater interest in the isthmus than any other power. Besides, the parties to the treaty were not actuated by any desire for exclusive privileges, but wished to secure the right of free and equal passage over the isthmus to all nations. Moreover, it was confidently expected that England, France, and other leading maritime powers would enter into similar agreements with New Grenada. Finally, should the United States neglect this opportunity, it was probable that other nations would obtain 1 Sen. Rept. 339, 1st sess. 29th Cong., pp. 2-28. Haswell's Treaties of the United States, p. 205.

exclusive privileges in the transit and thus deprive her of its advantages. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the United States to ratify the treaty. Yet if the peculiar features of the case did not greatly impair or wholly destroy the objections to such alliances, then the stipulations should not be entered into no matter what their advantages might be.1

Although the treaty of 1846 was ratified by the Senate, many, including the next administration, looked upon it as establishing a dangerous precedent. Nor was this view repudiated for many years thereafter, notwithstanding the added interest in the subject of interoceanic communication resulting from the Mexican War. That struggle, which came to a close almost simultaneously with the ratification of this treaty, gave to the United States a vast region bordering on the Pacific Ocean. It was at once recognized by the people of the United States that an isthmian transit was essential to the development of that region. In fact, there were many who regarded such a communication as absolutely necessary for the maintenance of American dominion on the Pacific coast. Accordingly, steps were at once taken to secure suitable concessions for the opening of a canal or railroad between the two seas. Mexico was offered a large sum for the privilege of opening a sea to sea railroad by way of the Isthmus of Tehauntepec. The offer being refused, attention was directed to the route by the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua. Government agents and private companies vied with each other in their efforts to secure a concession for a transit by that route. But no sooner had a suitable grant been obtained from Nicaragua than an unexpected obstacle to the enterprise appeared. Part of the route for the proposed transit lay within the territory claimed by Great Britain for the Mosquito Indians and that power at once gave notice that no infringement of the Mosquito rights would be permitted. Obviously Great Britain was determined that the United States should not acquire a monopoly of the

1 Cong. Globe App. 27, p. 252,

Sen. Ex. Doc. 97, 1st sess. 32d Cong., p. 12.

Sen. Ex. Doc. 27, 2d sess. 32d Cong., p. 32.

Dem. Rev., vol. 23, p. 412; vol. 27, p. 537. Whig Rev., vol. 9, p. 332. Sen. Ex. Doc. 97, 1st sess. 32d Cong., pp. 60 and 61.

Sen. Ex. Doc. 27, 2d sess. 32d Cong., p. 20.

Nicaragua route. To the popular mind, then intensely jealous of England's motives, it appeared that she was intent upon checking the development of the country if not upon destroying the integrity of the Union. Under those circumstances the government of the United States felt constrained to adopt a definite policy respecting the status and control of any isthmian transit that might be opened. Moreover, public sentiment demanded that whatever else might be true of it, the new policy must facilitate the early construction of a transit between the two seas. But that necessitated the removing of the obstruction to the enterprise which the British protectorate of the Mosquito interposed. It was equally imperative that the work should be placed upon a basis satisfactory to the leading powers of the world; otherwise it would be impossible to secure the necessary capital for the undertaking. Finally, whatever else was done, American interests, present and prospective, must be conserved.

In the light of these facts and with a view to meeting the requirements of the case, the American policy respecting the status and control of isthmian transits was adopted. A cardinal principle of that policy was that no American monopoly of the transits should be sought or maintained. In short, the government reaffirmed its adherence to the principles to which the United States had been more or less definitely committed since the issuance of Clay's instructions in 1826. Although liberally inclined toward other nations, that government was determined to secure for the United States equal rights with them in the use and control of the proposed transits. Moreover, it was a fundamental maxim of the American policy that no guarantee of sovereignty to any state should be made as the price of a right-ofway for a transit. Neither would governmental countenance be given to any project for such a work based upon an assignable concession.1

Such was the attitude of the United States respecting the isthmian transits when, in 1849, circumstances for the first time constrained the government to take an active part in promoting the construction of a means of communication between the two ' House Ex. Doc. 75, 1st sess. 31st Cong., p. 121. Sen. Ex. Doc., 1st sess. 32d Cong., vol. 10, p. II.

oceans. Negotiations were at once opened with some of the Central American States and Great Britain. From the former concessions were readily obtained,' but they were of little value so long as the British pretensions regarding Mosquito rights were maintained. That such would be the case was early perceived by the government and it was for the removal of that obstacle that negotiations were opened with the British government. The result was the conclusion of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in 1850. By the terms of that instrument, which professed to set forth and fix the views of the two governments respecting a shipcanal by the Nicaragua route, both Great Britain and the United States were forever bound to abstain from seeking or maintaining any exclusive control over the proposed channel, or exercising dominion in its vicinity or any part of Central America. They also agreed to use their influence in promoting the construction of the proposed channel and to protect the same when completed from unjust seizure or confiscation. The contracting parties also guaranteed the neutrality of the passage and undertook to invite all other powers with which they were on friendly terms to join in the stipulations for the protection and neutrality of the transit. It is also significant that the two countries were bound to extend their protection by treaty stipulations to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railroad, across the isthmus which connects North and South America.2 Very soon after the conclusion of this instrument the two governments became involved in a bitter controversy regarding the true import of some of its provisions. Although this dispute continued almost without interruption for a decade and frequently threatened the peace of the two countries, the government showed no disposition to repudiate the principles upon which the treaty was based so far as they related to the control of the canal. On the contrary, unqualified adherence to them was frequently reaffirmed. Said General Cass, "The United States do not seek either the control or exclusive use of these

'House Ex. Doc. 75, 1st sess. 31st Cong., pp. 173-180.

Whig Rev., vol. 12, p. 443. British Blue Book on Cent. Am. Affairs for 1856, pp. 18 and 19.

Sen. Ex. Doc. 47, 2d sess. 48th Cong., pp. 440-444.

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routes. They desire that the advantages should be common to all nations. What the United States want in Central America is the security and neutrality of the interoceanic routes which lead through it. This is the desire of the whole commercial world. If the principles and policy of the ClaytonBulwer Treaty are carried into effect this object is accomplished." But the unshaken faith of the United States in the soundness of its policy is even more conclusively proven by the treaties relating to interoceanic communication which the government negotiated during this period. These instruments not only did not conflict with the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, but embodied substantially the same principles.

Yet it is not to be inferred from this that the bitter controversy with Great Britain was wholly devoid of influence upon the United States. All hope of an early opening of the canal being destroyed, interest in a railroad communication naturally revived. Owing to its proximity a road by the Tehauntepec route had long been desired. As already indicated an unsuccessful attempt to secure a right-of-way for such a work was made in 1848. For a number of years thereafter the government persisted in its efforts to obtain a suitable concession for a transit through that region. Negotiations looking to that end were in progress when the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was concluded in 1850.2 Substantially the same principles obtained in the proposals which the United States made to Mexico as were embodied in the treaty with Great Britain. This attitude was maintained by the United States until sometime after the dispute arose with Great Britain respecting the treaty of 1850. But the action of that power intensified American suspicions of European motives and induced the government to take a more radical stand in opposition to foreign control of isthmian transits. Mexico was explicitly informed that the United States would never consent that a transit by the Tehauntepec route should be placed under foreign supervision or control.3

Thus matters stood till in 1853, when the conclusion of the Gadsden Treaty placed citizens of the United States upon an 1 Sen. Ex. Doc. 112, 2d sess. 46th Cong., pp. 116 and 117. Sen. Ex. Doc. 97, 1st sess. 32d Cong., p. 16.

3 Ibid., p. 151.

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