Opinion of the Court. tween citizens of the States and aliens, and between citizens of different States. In Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 61, 87, the question arose whether a corporation composed of citizens of one State could sue in the Circuit Court of the United States a citizen of another State, and it was answered in the affirmative. In deciding the question, the court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, said: "However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the States will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that the Constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different States. Aliens, or citizens of different States, are not less susceptible of these apprehensions, nor can they be supposed to be less the objects of constitutional provision, because they are allowed to sue by a corporate name. That name, indeed, cannot be an alien or a citizen; but the persons whom it represents may be the one or the other; and the controversy is, in fact and in law, between those persons suing in their corporate character, by their corporate name, for a corporate right, and the individual against whom the suit may be instituted. Substantially and essentially the parties in such a case, where the members of the corporation are aliens, or citizens of a different State from the opposite party, come within the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution on the national tribunals. Such has been the universal understanding on the subject. Repeatedly has this court decided causes between a corporation and an individual without feeling a doubt respecting its jurisdiction." The doctrine of this case has been followed and is now the settled law in the courts of the United States. On the same principle, provisions of law, in terms applicable to persons, securing to them the enjoyment of their property, or affording means for its protection, are held to embrace private corporations. The construction given to the 6th article of the defini Opinion of the Court. tive treaty of peace of 1783 between Great Britain and the United States illustrates this. 8 Stat. 83. That article provided that there should be "no future confiscations made, nor any prosecutions commenced against any person or persons for, or by reason of, the part which he or they may have taken in the present war; and that no person shall, on that account, suffer any future loss or damage either in his person, liberty, or property." An English corporation held in Vermont certain lands granted to it before the Revolution, and the legislature of that State undertook to confiscate them and give them to the town where they were situated. The English corporation claimed the benefit of this article, and recovered the property against the contention that the treaty applied only to natural persons, and could not embrace corporations because they were not persons who could take part in the war, or could be considered British subjects, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Washington, observing that the argument proceeded upon an incorrect view of the subject, and referring to the case of the Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, to show that the court, when necessary, will look beyond the name of a corporation to the individuals whom it represents. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 491. Many other illustrations of the doctrine might be cited. We are of opinion that the same rule of construction should control in this case, and that, in accordance with it, 2319 of the Revised Statutes must be held not to preclude a private corporation formed under the laws of a State, whose members are citizens of the United States, from locating a mining claim on the public lands of the United States. There may be some question raised as to the extent of a claim which a corporation may be permitted to locate as an original discoverer. It may perhaps be treated as one person and entitled to locate only to the extent permitted to a single individual. That question, however, is not before us and does not call for an expression of opinion. The objection to this construction arising from the fact that the section gives force, in the location of claims, to the rules and customs of miners, so far as applicable, when not in con Statement of the Case. flict with the laws of the United States, does not strike us as of great weight. A corporation interested in mining may be represented by an officer or agent, at any meeting of miners called together to frame such rules and regulations in their mining district. Corporations engaged in other business are constantly represented in this way at meetings called in relation to matters in which they are interested. There is nothing in the nature of mining to prevent such a representation of a corporation when rules to control the acquisition and development of mines are to be considered and settled. It follows that the judgment of the court below must be Reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to overrule the demurrer of the defendants, and to take further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. PICARD v. EAST TENNESSEE, VIRGINIA AND GEORGIA RAILROAD COMPANY. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE. No. 246. Argued April 12, 1889.- Decided May 13, 1889. Legislative immunity from taxation is a personal privilege, not transferable, and not to be extended beyond the immediate grantee, unless otherwise so declared in express terms. Immunity from taxation does not pass to the purchaser at a sale of "the property and franchises of a railroad corporation " to enforce a statutory lien. Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217, on this point affirmed. Although a grant of immunity from taxation by a legislature to a corporation has sometimes been held to be a privilege which may be transferred, the later and better opinion is that, unless other provisions remove all doubt of the intention of the legislature to include the immunity in the term "privileges," it will not be so construed. The property of the East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Railroad Company, situated in the State of Tennessee, is not exempt from taxation under the laws of that State. THE case is stated in the opinion of the court. Opinion of the Court. Mr. George W. Pickle, Attorney General of the State of Tennessee (with whom were Mr. Albert S. Marks, Mr. John J. Vertrees and Mr. William O. Vertrees on the brief) for appellant. Mr. William M. Baxter for appellee. MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. This is a suit to enjoin the collection of certain taxes for the years 1883 and 1884, assessed by the Board of Railroad Tax Assessors of Tennessee against the property of the complainant, the East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Railroad Company. The property formerly belonged to the Cincinnati, Cumberland Gap and Charleston Railroad Company; and the claim asserted by the bill is, that the property, whilst held by that company, was exempt from taxation, and that such exemption has accompanied it in its transfer to the complainant. That company was incorporated by an act of the legislature of Tennessee, passed November 18, 1853. Among other things the act provided that whenever the company should have completed its road from Cumberland Gap to the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, or to the southern boundary line of the State, it should "have all the rights and privileges" conferred by its charter for a period of ninety-nine years. Statutes of Tenn. 1853-4, c. 301, § 6. It also declared that the company should be vested, except as otherwise provided by its charter, with "all the rights, powers and privileges, and subject to all the restrictions and liabilities, of the Nashville and Louisville Railroad Company." An act was passed by the legislature of Tennessee on the 9th of February, 1850, to incorporate a company under this last name, which, among other things, declared "that the capital stock in the said company, the dividends thereon, and the roads and fixtures, depots, workshops, warehouses, and vehicles of transportation belonging to the said company shall be forever exempt from taxation in each and every of the said States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and it shall not be lawful for either of the said States, or any corpor Opinion of the Court. ate or municipal police or other authority thereof, or of any town, city, county, or district thereof, to impose any tax on such stock or dividends, property or estate." Statutes of Tenn. 1849-50, c. 76, § 40. It does not appear that any organization of this company was ever perfected. It is stated by counsel that none ever took place; and it would seem that such was the conclusion of this court in Goodlett v. Louisville Railroad, 122 U. S. 391, 406. Assuming, however, that its organization was perfected, its rights, powers and privileges were subject to the restrictions specified in the act, and one of these was that the act should "become a law whenever the State of Kentucky may enact the same for the same purpose, with such modifications and amendments" as she may deem right, not inconsistent with its provisions. By this restriction we understand that the act was not to take effect until re-enacted by Kentucky, with such modifications as she might suggest, not inconsistent with it. It is conceded that Kentucky never passed any such act as here mentioned. We are of opinion therefore, that we may properly omit from consideration the act of February 9, 1850, to incorporate the Nashville and Louisville Railroad Company, and the attempt to invest the Cincinnati, Cumberland Gap and Charleston Railroad Company with its "rights, powers, and privileges." If this construction be correct, the Nashville and Louisville Railroad Company never acquired under that act any rights, powers, or privileges, those designated in its charter being subject to restrictions, which were not complied with; and, therefore, whatever right the Cincinnati, Cumberland Gap and Charleston Company possessed, to have its property exempted from taxation, must be found independently of the provision referring to and granting the exemption contained in the charter of the Nashville and Louisville Railroad Company. There is no such exemption from taxation in its own charter. It is, however, contended that provisions in an act of the legislature of the State, chartering the Lexington and Knoxville Railroad Company, passed on the 22d of December, 1853, had the effect of extending such exemption to |