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cess of said sum shall be null and void; and all bonds issued under the provisions of this act shall be registered in the office of the state auditor, to whom a fee of ten cents shall be paid for recording each bond."

Nothing is better settled than this rule-that the purchaser of bonds, such as these, is held to know the constitutional provisions and the statutory restrictions bearing on the question of the authority to issue them; also the recitals of the bonds he buys; while, on the other hand, if he act in good faith and pay value, he is entitled to the protection of such recitals of facts as the bonds may contain.

In this case the constitution charges each purchaser with knowledge of the fact that, as to all counties whose assessed valuation equals one million of dollars, there is a maximum limit, beyond which those counties can incur no further indebtedness under any possible conditions, provided, that in calculating that limit, debts contracted before the adoption of the constitution are not to be counted. The statute, on the other hand, charges the purchaser with knowledge of the fact that the county commissioners were to issue bonds, at par, in exchange for such warrants of the county as were themselves issued prior to the date of the first publication of the notice provided for; that the only limitation on the issue of bonds in the statute was, that the bonds should not exceed in amount the sum of the county indebtedness on the day of notice aforesaid; that while the commissioners were empowered to determine the amount of such indebtedness, yet the statute does not refer that board, for the elements of its computation to the constitution or to the standards prescribed by the constitution, but leaves it open to them, without departing from any direction of the statute, to adopt solely the basis of the county warrants. The recitals of the bonds were merely to the effect that the issue was "under, and by virtue of, and in full compliance with," the statute; "that all the provisions and requirements of said act have been fully complied with by the proper officers in the issuing of this bond;" and that the issuing was "authorized by a vote of a majority of the duly qualified electors," etc.; no express reference being made

Opinion of the Court.

to the constitution, nor any statement made that the constitutional requirements had been observed.

There is, therefore, no estoppel as to the constitutional question, because there is no recital in regard to it. Carroll County v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556. It is true, it might be said, that inasmuch as the bonds recite that all the requirements of the statute had been fully complied with by the proper officers, and inasmuch as one of those requirements was that the officers should determine the amount of the county debt, the inference is fair and reasonable that the statute meant only that they should count what was a just and actual debt, not claims that were void, and therefore no debt; and that the recital made was in effect a statement that the whole matter had been examined by the board, and that they had issued bonds for only such warrants as were found to be issued in conformity to the law, the whole law-fundamental as well as statute. Waiving the question as to whether such a conclusion, persuasive as it might be in other aspects of a cause, is not too remote and indirect for the basis of an estoppel, the avowed object of which is to exclude from consideration the truth, still how could the case be any better for the defendant in error? Had the bond expressly stated that the board canvassed the debt, and found the same to be binding and valid under the law and the constitution, and that the same was $500,000, the recital would not be an estoppel. It must be remembered that these bonds show on their face an issue of $500,000. In the case of Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83, 92, this court said:

"Recurring, then, to a consideration of the recitals in the bonds, we assume, for the purposes of this argument, that they are in legal effect equivalent to a representation, or warranty, or certificate on the part of the county officers, that everything necessary by law to be done has been done, and every fact necessary by law to have existed did exist, to make the bonds lawful and binding. Of course, this does not extend to or cover matters of law. All parties are equally bound to know the law; and a certificate reciting the actual facts, and that thereby the bonds were conformable to the law, when,

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judicially speaking, they are not, will not make them so, nor can it work an estoppel upon the county to claim the protection of the law. Otherwise it would always be in the power of a municipal body, to which power was denied, to usurp the forbidden authority, by declaring that its assumption was within the law. This would be the clear exercise of legislative power, and would suppose such corporate bodies to be superior to the law itself."

Now, while it is true that the bonds show on their face an issue of $500,000, yet it is also true that neither the constitution nor the statute nor the bond shows the amount of the valuation of the county; and it therefore might be said that, for this reason, and notwithstanding the purchaser's knowledge of the limit, and his knowledge that $500,000 of debt was incurred, yet he might not have known that the limit had been exceeded, being ignorant of the other term in the calculation, that of the amount of the assessed values, and that the recital of conformity, misleading him, would operate as an estoppel. This question is settled in the case of Dixon County v. Field, supra. The court there say, p. 93:

"If the fact necessary to the existence of the authority was by law to be ascertained, not officially by the officers charged with the execution of the power, but by reference to some express and definite record of a public character, then the true meaning of the law would be, that the authority to act at all depended upon the actual objective existence of the requisite fact, as shown by the record, and not upon its ascertainment and determination by any one; and the consequence would necessarily follow, that all persons claiming under the exercise of such a power might be put to proof of the fact made a condition of its lawfulness, notwithstanding any recitals in the instrument."

"The amount of the bonds issued was known. It is stated in the recital itself. It was $87,000. The holder of each bond was apprised of that fact. The amount of the assessed value of the taxable property in the county is not stated; but, ex vi termini, it was ascertainable in one way only, and that was by reference to the assessment itself, a public record equally ac

Opinion of the Court.

cessible to all intending purchasers of bonds, as well as to the county officers. This being known, the ratio between the two amounts was fixed by an arithmetical calculation. No recital involving the amount of the assessed taxable valuation of the property to be taxed for the payment of the bonds can take the place of the assessment itself, for it is the amount as fixed by reference to that record that is made by the constitution the standard for measuring the limit of the municipal power. Nothing in the way of inquiry, ascertainment, or determination as to that fact is submitted to the county officers. They are bound, it is true, to learn from the assessment what the limit upon their authority is, as a necessary preliminary in the exercise of their functions and the performance of their duty; but the information is for themselves alone. All the world besides must have it from the same source, and for themselves. The fact, as it is recorded in the assessment itself, is extrinsic, and proves itself by inspection, and concludes all determinations that contradict it."

To the suggestion that the purchaser was not chargeable with knowledge of the fact that the maximum of 12 mills on the dollar had been exceeded for the $500,000 of debt ascertained to be due on the day of notice, and for which bonds were issued, might have been partly or wholly created before the constitution was adopted, and therefore be excluded from the rule by the very terms of the constitution itself - there are two decisive answers. First, the bill of exceptions shows that the debt was not so created either in whole or in part. Second, the defendant in error is not entitled to an estoppel even if such an inference might have been drawn from the recital of conformity. The cases just cited show that the records are the only source of information.

The question here is distinguishable from that in the cases relied on by counsel for defendant in error. In this case the standard of validity is created by the constitution. In that standard two factors are to be considered; one the amount of assessed value, and the other the ratio between that assessed value and the debt proposed. These being

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exactions of the constitution itself, it is not within the power of a legislature to dispense with them, either directly or indirectly, by the creation of a ministerial commission whose finding shall be taken in lieu of the facts.

In the case of Sherman County v. Simons, 109 U. S. 735, and others like it, the question was one of estoppel as against an exaction imposed by the legislature; and the holding was, that the legislature, being the source of exaction, had created a board authorized to determine whether its exaction had been complied with, and that its finding was conclusive to a bona fide purchaser. So also in Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. 74, the condition violated was not one imposed by the constitution, but one fixed by the subscription contract of the people.

For these reasons, and under the stipulation above recited, The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court, with a direction to enter judgment for the defendant.

JONES v. VAN DOREN.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA.

A bill in equity by a widow to obtain her right of dower, alleging that she conveyed it to one of the defendants upon an express trust for her, and he conveyed to the other defendants with notice of the trust, may be allowed to be amended by alleging that she was induced to make her conveyance by his fraudulent misrepresentations as to the nature of the instrument.

Upon a bill in equity by a widow against one who has obtained from her by fraud a conveyance of her right of dower, and another who, with notice of the fraud, has taken a mortgage from him, and has foreclosed the mortgage by sale of all the land, part to the mortgagee and part to a purchaser in good faith, and praying for an account, a redemption of the mortgage and a reconveyance of the land still held by the mortgagee,