Why Government Succeeds and Why It Fails

Sprednja platnica
Harvard University Press, 1. jul. 2009 - 224 strani
This book looks beyond politics to show how the ability of the U.S. government to implement policies is strongly affected by various economic constraints. These include the credibility of the policies, the ability of government to commit to them, the extent to which firms and consumers rationally anticipate their effects, whether the success of a policy further encourages firms and individuals to behave in intended ways, and whether the behavior of such actors can be sustained without continued government intervention. The authors apply these concepts to four areas of policy: macroeconomic policies to promote employment and economic growth, redistributive policies to benefit the poor and the elderly, production policies to provide goods and services, and regulatory policies to guide the behavior of firms and individuals. In doing so they provide plausible explanations of many puzzling phenomena--for example, why government has been successful in reducing cigarette smoking, but has failed to get people to install and maintain emission-control devices in their cars. This book recasts debates about public policy, avoiding conventional pro-government or anti-government positions; rather, it helps to predict when public policy will succeed.
 

Vsebina

Macroeconomics Can Government Control the Economy?
16
Partisan Incentives and Political Cycles
17
Monetary Policy and Rational Expectations
21
Fiscal PolicyIs It Just Crowding Out?
29
Persuasion and the Art of Equilibrium Selection
31
Budget Deficits as Policy Instruments
38
Can Government Control the Economy?
43
Redistribution A Success Story?
44
Producing Goods and Services Getting the Right Mix
92
What Is Production?
94
Crowding Out Private Provision
96
Credibility as an Obstacle to Inducing Production
102
Credibility as an Obstacle to Restricting Production
105
Production Is Difficult
112
Economic Constraints and Political Institutions
114
Divided Government and the Politics of Gridlock
115

Economic Constraints and Redistribution
46
Data
48
Government Commitment to Future Redistribution
53
Implications for Redistribution
54
Effectiveness of Redistributive Policy
55
Why Not Taxes?
64
Redistributive Possibilities
67
When Can Government Regulate?
68
The Scope of Regulation
69
Possibilities and Pitfalls
71
Regulating Consumer Behavior
85
Conditions for Regulatory Success
90
Federalism and the Devolution of Authority
121
Political and Policy Reform
127
What Do Politicians Know?
132
Institutional Design and Policy Effectiveness
133
Final Thoughts
135
Five Lessons
137
The Burden of Government
141
Notes
145
References
171
Index
193
Avtorske pravice

Druge izdaje - Prikaži vse

Pogosti izrazi in povedi

Priljubljeni odlomki

Stran 21 - You mean to tell me that the success of the program and my reelection hinges on the Federal Reserve and a bunch of fucking bond traders?

O avtorju (2009)

Amihai Glazer is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Irvine.

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