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CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION

Terms defined or explained.....

9

The Nature, Design, and Utility of the present work

22

CHAP. I. Perceptions and Ideas in a train....

29

" II. Emotions and Passions ....

87

Part I. Causes unfolded of the Emotions and Passions :

Sect. 1. Difference between Emotion and Passion.-Causes

that are the most common and the most general.-

Passion considered as productive of Action...... 88

2. Power of Sounds to raise Emotions and Passions.... 45

3. Causes of the Emotions of Joy and Sorrow...... 47

! 4. Sympathetic Emotion of Virtue, and its cause

49

5. In many instances one Emotion is productive of an-

other.-The same of Passions ..

52

6. Causes of the Passions of Fear and Anger..

59

« 7. Emotions caused by Fiction .....

62

PART II. Emotions and Passions as pleasant and painful, agree-

able and disagreeable.—Modification of these quali-

ties

71

“ III. Interrupted Existence of Emotions and Passions.---

Their Growth and Decay

76

" IV. Coexistent Emotions and Passions

81

V. Influence of Passion with respect to our Perceptions,

Opinions, and Belief

90

Appendix. Methods that Nature hath afforded for computing

Time......

96

Part VI. Resemblance of Emotions to their Causes

100

VII. Final Causes of the more frequent Emotions and

Passions....

102

CHAP. III. Beauty ....

108

Part II. Theory of the Beautiful

118

IV. Grandeur and Sublimity.....

129

V. Motion and Force......

148

VI. Novelty, and the unexpected appearance of Objects.

152

VII. Risible Objects

158

" VIII. Resemblance and Dissimilitude

160

IX. Uniformity and Variety .....

171

Appendix. Concerning the works of Nature, chiefly with re-

spect to Uniformity and Variety

180

X. Congruity and Propriety....

184

XI. Dignity and Grace

192

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PAGZ CHAP. XII. Ridicule....

199 XIII. Wit......

207 XIV. Custom and Habit

219 XV. External Signs of Emotions and Passions

229 XVI. Sentiments....

240 XVII. Language of Passion

256 " XVIII. Beauty of Language

267
Sect. 1. Beauty of Language with respect to Sound...... 269

2. Beauty of Language with respect to Signification. 273
3. Beauty of Language from a resemblance between
Sound and Signification

800
4. Versification....

807 XIX. Comparisons

842 XX. Figures

361 Sect. 1. Personification

861 2. Apostrophe

373 3. Hyperbole

874
4. The Means or Instrument conceived to be the
agent....

878
" 5. A figure which, among related Objects, extends
the Properties of one to another.

878
6. Metaphor and Allegory

881 " 7. Figure of Speech.

392 TABLE 1. Subjects expressed figuratively...... 395

2. Attributes expressed figuratively. 898 XXI. Narration and Description..

404 XXII. The Philosophy of Style....

421 " XXIII. Epic and Dramatic Compositions..

444 " XXIV. The Three Unities

457 XXV. Gardening and Architecture.

463 " XXVI. Standard of Taste...

480

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INTRODUCTION

TERMS DEFINED OR EXPLAINED.

1. EVERY thing we perceive or are conscious of, whether a being or a quality, a passion or an action, is with respect to the percipient termed an object. Some objects appear to be internal, or within the mind; passion, for example, thinking, volition : some external ; such as every object of sight, of hearing, of smell, of touch, of taste.

2. That act of the mind which makes known to me an external object, is termed perception. That act of the mind which makes known to me an internal object, is termed consciousness. The power or faculty from which consciousness proceeds, is termed an internal sense. The power or faculty from which perception proceeds, is termed an external sense. This distinction refers to the objects of our knowledge ; for the senses, whether external or internal, are all of them powers or faculties of the mind.

3. But as self is an object that cannot be termed either external or internal, the faculty by which I have knowledge of myself, is a sense that cannot properly be termed either internal or external

. 4. By the eye we perceive figure, color, motion, &c. : by the ear we perceive the different qualities of sound, high, low, loud, soft : by touch we perceive rough, smooth, hot, cold, &c.: by taste we perceive sweet, sour, bitter, &c.: by smell we perceive fragrant, fetid, &c. These qualities partake the common nature of all qualities, that they are not capable of an independent existence, but must belong to some being of which they are properties or attributes. A being with respect to its properties or attributes is termed a subject or substratum. Every substratum of visible qualities, is termed substance; and of tangible qualities, body.

5. Substance and sound are perceived as existing at a distance from the organ; often at a considerable distance. But smell, touch, and taste are perceived as existing at the organ of sense.

6. The objects of external sense are various. Substances are perceived by the eye; bodies by the touch. Sounds, tastes, and smells, passing commonly under the name of secondary qualities, require more explanation than there is room for here. All the objects of internal sense are attributes : witness deliberation, reason

ing, resolution, willing, consenting, which are internal actions. Passions and emotions, which are internal agitations, are also attributes. With regard to the former, I am conscious of being active; with regard to the latter, I am conscious of being passive.

7. Again, we are conscious of internal action as in the head : of passions and emotions as in the heart.

8. Many actions may be exerted internally, and many effects produced of which we are unconscious : when we investigate the ultimate cause of the motion of the blood, and of other internal motions upon which life depends, it is the most probable opinion that some internal power is the cause : and if so, we are unconscious of the operations of that power. But consciousness being implied in the very meaning of deliberating, reasoning, resolving, willing, consenting, such operations cannot escape our knowledge. The same is the case of passions and emotions; for no internal agitation is denominated a passion or emotion, but what we are conscious of.

9. The mind is not always the same ; by turns it is cheerful, melancholy, calm, peevish, &c. These differences may not impro-, perly be denominated tones.

10. Perception and sensation are commonly reckoned synonymous terms, signifying that internal act by which external objects are made known to us. But they ought to be distinguished. Perceiving is a general term for hearing, seeing, tasting, touching, smelling; and therefore perception signifies every internal act by which we are made acquainted with external objects; thus we are said to perceive a certain animal, a certain color, sound, taste, smell, &c.

Sensation properly signifies that internal act by which we are made conscious of pleasure or pain felt at the organ of sense: thus we have a sensation of the pleasure arising from warmth, from a fragrant smell, from a sweet taste : and of the pain arising from a wound, from a fetid smell, from a disagreeable taste. In perception, my attention is directed to the external object : in sensation, it is directed to the pleasure or pain. I feel.

The terms perception and sensation are sometimes employed to signify the objects of perception and sensation. Perception in that sense is a general term for every external thing we perceive; and sensation a general term for every pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense.

11. Conception is different from perception. The latter includes a conviction of the reality of its object; the former does not; for I can conceive the most extravagant stories told in a romance, without having any conviction of their reality. Conception differs also from imagination. By the power of fancy I can imagine a golden mountain, or an ebony ship with sails and ropes of silk. When I describe a picture of that kind to another, the idea he forins of it is termed a conception. Imagination is active, conception is passive.

12. Feeling, besides denoting one of the external senses, is a general term, signifying that internal act by which we are made conscious of our pleasures and our pains; for it is not limited, as sensation is, to any one sort. Thus feeling being the genus of which sensation is a species, their meaning is the same when applied to pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense : and accordingly we say

indifferently, “I feel pleasure from heat, and pain from cold,” or, “ I have a sensation of pleasure from heat, and of pain from cold." But the meaning of feeling, as is said, is much more extensive. It is proper to say, I feel pleasure in a sumptuous building, in love, in friendship; and pain in losing a child, in revenge, in envy: sensation is not properly applied to any of these.

The term feeling is frequently used in a less proper sense, to signify what we feel or are conscious of: and in that sense it is a general term for all our passions and emotions, and for all our other pleasures and pains.

· 13. That we cannot perceive an external object till an impression is made upon our body, is probable from reason, and is ascertained by experience. But it is not necessary that we be made sensible of the impression : in touching, in tasting, and in smelling, we are sensible of the impression ; but not in seeing and hearing. We know indeed from experiments, that before we perceive a visible object, its image is spread upon the retina tunica ; and that before we perceive a sound, an impression is made upon the drum of the ear: but we are not conscious either of the organic image or of the organic impression ; nor are we conscious of any other operation preparatory to the act of perception; all we can say is, that we see that river, or hear that trumpet.

14. Objects once perceived may be recalled to the mind by the power of memory. When I recall an object of sight in that manner,

it

appears to me precisely the same as in the original survey, only less distinct. For example, having seen yesterday a spreading oak growing on the brink of a river, I endeavor to recall these objects to my mind. How is this operation performed! Do I endeavor to form in my mind a picture of them, or a representative amage ? Not so. I transport myself ideally to the place where I saw the tree and river yesterday: upou which I have a perception of these objects similar in all respects to the perception I had when i viewed them with my eyes, only less distinct. “And in this recollection, I am not conscious of a picture or representative image, more than in the original survey; the perception is of the tree and

Yet a singular opinion that impressions are the only objects of perception, has been espoused by some philosophers of no mean rank; not attending to the foregoing peculiarity in the senses of seeing and hearing, that we perceive objects without being conscious of an organic impression, or of any im. pression (except in cases where the object of sight is very brilliant, or the sound excessively loud and grating).

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